

**Beyond the Neoliberal-Monetarist Impasse: Toward  
a New Policy of Economic Recovery**

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## Introduction

Economic policy makers in Lebanon are finding themselves again in a seemingly intractable impasse. After seven years of “local voodoo economics” the picture is bleaker than ever. The economy is plagued with persistent and unyielding high budget deficits, rising debt-to-GDP ratio, and declining output growth rates that many argue has developed into a classical business cycle with absolute declines in GDP registered in the past two years. The present government is hence faced with the task of lifting an economy out of a recession while at the same time reducing the budget deficit over time, stopping the exponential growth in debt-to-GDP ratio and maintaining economic growth prospects in the future. The *Fiscal Reform Plan*, adopted by the cabinet, was a step forward in economic policy making in Lebanon. It addressed boldly the issues facing the Lebanese economy and proposed a comprehensive set of policy steps over five years to reduce the budget deficit/GDP, debt/GDP ratios and to increase economic growth to an average of 5% by 2003. My view is that the plan and current economic policies in many ways fall short of expectations. There is a need for a theoretical vision that breaks with the past practices of supply-side economics, monetarism and neo-liberal thought. At present nothing of the sort has happened. Except for a shy reform of income taxes towards a more progressive system, current policies remain within the parameters of conservative thought. That consists of a belief in balanced budgets, contractionary monetary policy, privatization, and increases in indirect taxes (gasoline, tobacco, import tariffs) albeit it carries more dangerous elements: commitment to fiscal austerity at a time of economic recession and an aggressive policy of substitution of foreign debt for domestic debt.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Even the envisioned VAT is said to have a one rate, which of course increases its regressive nature. The Hoss government was seen by many as the government of national salvation. A break with the past was expected. However, to their disappointment, the social and economic policies of the Hoss government were more conservative than its predecessors.

If the task at hand is to think of what can be done in terms of fiscal policy (and monetary policy) to finance development in this decade, a quick look at the effects of the above policies on the Lebanese economy will show the need for a new policy of economic recovery. This new policy has to do away with what we can call ‘depression economics’ (to borrow from Paul Krugman). The outcomes of ‘depression economics’ can be summarized as follows. Fiscal austerity will hamper economic growth and will constrain the state’s future outlays for public investments in physical and human capital which in turn will generate less national savings in the long run.<sup>2</sup> Contractionary monetary policy that aims solely at price stability, currency value, maintenance and expansion of existing foreign exchange reserves, and balance of payments equilibrium at the expense of employment and economic growth will form huge constraints on any growth-oriented strategy in this decade.<sup>3</sup> In its turn, privatization is a big gamble if the macroeconomic conditions, regulatory frameworks and hence private investors’ risk aversness are not right. My conjecture is that privatization will end up in a fiasco on many grounds: efficiency, distribution of wealth, monopolization, and consumer welfare. More importantly, for our purposes, the fiscal benefits will be doubtful. Last, the external debt issue continues to be considered an ‘accounting problem’. The rationale for the substitution of external debt for internal debt is the interest payments savings resulting from the differential interest rates between dollar bonds and LP bonds. This accountant mentality ignores the other aspects of external debt. The current trend if it continues will form a resource-constraint on development finance in the next decade.

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<sup>2</sup> Of course the theoretical basis for the relationship between budget deficits and economic growth goes all the way back to Keynes. For recent analysis that apply to the US case, see Eisner (1994) and Tobin (1993). For an anti-austerity anti-neoliberal argument at the European level, see Lipietz (1992). For a defense of Keynesian polices, see Tobin (1986).

## Public Debt Management

Post-war Lebanon embarked on an ambitious reconstruction project that aimed at putting the Lebanese economy well into the upper-middle income group of nations by the year 2007. This economic growth plan has been accompanied by other economic, fiscal, and financial measures aimed at monetary and fiscal stabilization. In order to fight inflation and achieve external balance, the Hariri government and the central bank used the nominal exchange rate as an anchor in the post-1992 stabilization program. This restrictive monetary policy depended on high reserve requirements and the abandonment of inflationary finance that characterized government financing in the 1980's. This policy was successful in bringing down inflation that averaged in 1986-1992 at around 110% annually (BdL, 1993) to its current single digit levels. In contrast, fiscal policy has been expansionary in that the fiscal adjustment was minimal if not non-existent.<sup>4</sup> This expansionary fiscal policy coupled with the supply-side tax reforms of 1993 that reduced taxes on profits, salaries, capital incomes and others led to the growth of public debt in Lebanon to unprecedented levels. Tables one and two summarize budget deficits and the debt evolution in the post war period.

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<sup>3</sup> For a discussion on the relationship between the objective function of central banks and economic growth and employment, see Epstein (1992).

<sup>4</sup>This policy was similar to the Reagan administration's disinflationary policy of the early 1980's. Restrictive monetary policy led to disinflation while expansionary fiscal policy led to the mitigating of the adverse effects of monetary policy on output at the expense of higher local and foreign debt. For details of fiscal adjustment during the Hariri period see my paper Dibeh (1997).

**Table 1 Budget Deficits 1993-1998 (in bn LP)**

Year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Revenues	1,855	2,241	3,033	3,536	3,753	4,441
Expenditures	3,017	5,204	5,856	7,244	9,161	7,906
Deficit	1,162	2,963	2,823	3,708	5,408	3,465
Deficit/GDP	9.0	19.3	15.6	18.2	23.6	14.1

Source: For 1996-1998, BdL Quarterly Reports 1999:1. and 1998:4. For 1993-1995, Ministry of Finance. GDP for 1993-1995 from BdL reports. GDP for 1996-1997, IMF Occasional Paper 176. For 1998, Fiscal Reform Plan.

**Table 2 Public Debt of Lebanon (1993-1998)**

Year	Net Public Debt (in billions of LP)	External Debt (\$million)	GDP	Debt/GDP (%)
1993	4,433.6	327	12,892	34.4
1994	6,681.9	772	15,347	43.5
1995	9,259.9	1,343	18,061	51.3
1996	16,318	1,898	20,417	79.9
1997	22,098	2,434	22,878	96.6
1998	25,826	4,199.80	24,509	105.4

Source: For external debt 1993-1998, BdL. For Net Public Debt 1993-1995, Ministry of Finance. For NPD 1996-1997, IMF Occasional Paper 176. For 1998 NPD, BdL Quarterly Report 1999Q1 and GDP, Fiscal Reform Plan.

Tables one and two show that government deficit growth was one of the main developments in public finances during this period. The persistent government deficits, led public debt both internal and external to grow tremendously. The stage was set for a fiscal crisis of the state represented by the exponential growth in debt to GDP ratio and growing deficit to GDP ratio that reached record levels in 1997 of 23.6%. This fiscal crisis was the result of the Hariri government ambitious plan of reconstruction, increase in public wages and social expenditures and the tax reforms of 1993 that reduced direct taxes on wages and profits to record levels. This combination of large expenditures and low taxes led to the continuous widening of the budget deficit and hence to the accumulation of debt.<sup>5</sup> These deficits were financed by the issuance of local T-bills denominated in Lebanese pounds. However, starting in 1998, as the fiscal crisis

<sup>5</sup> The Hariri government fatal error was not in its ambitious plan of government expenditures as many would argue but in its failure to create a modern revenue system through progressive taxation and taxation on interest bearing instruments. If such a system was implemented, Lebanon would have had acceptable levels of deficits and debt to GDP ratios. Lawrence Summers in evaluating the impact of Reagan's policies said with great relevance to the subject

intensified and local savings were deemed insufficient for the financing of the state, the government started looking for external markets for finance. This was reflected in the discrete jump in external debt figures for 1998. This policy is continued today at an accelerating speed. The pure accounting rationale given by the government for such a move is unconvincing to many. The political economy of such a shift to external debt reflects the unwillingness of local agents mainly commercial banks to continue to rollover debt in LP-denomination. Whatever the reason is for this substitution drive, the economic implications of borrowing in foreign markets and in foreign currencies have to be investigated.<sup>6</sup>

### The Risks of External Debt

The debate over the proper mix of internal and external debt has centered on the pure accounting idea of interest rate differential between debt instruments denominated in foreign currencies and debt instruments denominated in Lebanese pounds. The differential currently stands at around 5-6%. Although the reduction in debt servicing payments can be substantial if the debt mix included higher ratios of external debt, the picture is not complete without including in the analysis the economic implications of substituting external debt for local debt. Such analysis has been missing from the rationale of such policy advanced by both the previous and current governments. It seems that the expediency of solving or better said postponing the fiscal crisis of the state is overriding all other considerations. But what are these other considerations?

The major difference between external debt and internal debt is that the first entails a resource transfer from the country to the outside world while the second involves internal reallocation of

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at hand "The choice is not between tax increases and deficits, but between tax increases and deficits followed by tax increases" (Summers, 1984, p.190).

<sup>6</sup> A classic example of stop-go relationship between government debt roll-over and markets is the French Franc crisis in the 1920's (Krugman, 1991).

resources between holders of debt instruments and eventually taxpayers.<sup>7</sup> To understand this important difference which at times is ignored in public policy discourse, a look at a debt crisis situation in two extreme cases will help. Case A, in a country that holds only internal debt and case B, a country that holds only external debt. A debt crisis is generated when the country is no longer able to make debt repayments and hence additional debt sources dry up. In case A, the country can reduce the debt burden by inflationary finance through printing money or can resort to foreign debt on a one-time basis. All these measures do not involve any resource transfer to the outside world and hence consumption, investment and other components of aggregate demand are not affected. In case B, the adjustment process involves currency depreciation and production shift from non-tradables to tradables. This adjustment leads to reduction in consumption, imports, economic recession and a dramatic increase in debt-to-GDP ratio.<sup>8</sup>The Latin American countries that went through the world debt crisis in the 1980's faced this dynamic. The same happened in Mexico after its currency crisis in 1994 which was generated also by the presence of short-term debt denominated in foreign currencies.<sup>9</sup>Hence, a higher default probability and vulnerability to currency crisis are important factors in deciding to substitute foreign debt for internal debt as the consequences of a debt or currency crisis in the presence of external debt can be economically devastating. Many indicators are important in assessing both currency crisis vulnerability and the probability of default in indebted LDCs. <sup>10</sup>Following are the indicators and their time evolution in Lebanon in the past years.

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<sup>7</sup> The distributional implications of internal debt are enormous especially in Lebanon where the T-bill holdings are concentrated in the hands of commercial banks.

<sup>8</sup> For details on the adjustment process under external debt and the experience of Latin American countries, see Sachs and Larrain (1993).

<sup>9</sup> For a description of the Mexican currency crisis, see Edwards and Naim (1998).

<sup>10</sup> For details see Woller and Phillips (1996) and Charbaji, Ali and Mrrash (1993)

- 1) The debt service ratio (DSR). DSR is the ratio of external debt service to exports of goods and services. The debt service includes interest and principal payments. The higher the ratio is the more likely the country is going to face difficulties of debt repayment. The following figure shows the DSR for Lebanon.

{FIGURE 1}

- 2) Ratio of interest on the country's external debt to exports of goods and services. This indicator although closely related to the DSR it differs in its emphasis on the short-term of external debt.

{FIGURE 2}

- 3) Rate of International Reserves to Imports. This indicator measures the flexibility of the Foreign exchange reserves of the central bank in accommodating foreign debt.

{FIGURE 3}

- 4) The ratio of external debt to reserves. This indicator measures the degree of absorption of foreign exchange reserves by external debt. The higher is this ratio the more probability of rescheduling is increased.

{FIGURE 4}

- 5) The ratio of external debt to GDP.

{FIGURE 5}

- 5) The degree of openness of the economy. This is measured by the ratio of imports to GDP. This indicator measures two things. First, the extent of the adjustment of the economy in case of a debt crisis. Second, it measures the extent of foreign exchange available for debt servicing.

{FIGURE 6}

All the above indicators except for imports to GDP show an increasing trend over the past six years. With the current policy of external debt substitution for domestic debt, the forecast is for these trends to continue at even a faster rate. Threshold levels after which a debt rescheduling occurs are difficult to determine nor optimal levels are readily available. However, it is clear that in the case of Lebanon, there is an increase in the degree of vulnerability of the Lebanese economy to the ravages of a debt crisis. The resource transfer to the external world is increasing and given the public debt dynamics that the economy witnessed in the past six years and shows no signs of abating, the road of debt substitution taken by the government is a risky one and its negative effects may well go beyond the immediate and short term effects of interest differential savings.<sup>11</sup>

According to Krugman (1991), the debt crisis in Latin America was preceded by a conventional currency crisis and only then it developed into a debt crisis. The crisis started as a crisis of anticipated devaluation of the Latin American currencies. When creditors realized that the difficulties of the economies were going to affect not only the exchange rate but debt servicing, a cutoff of lending occurred. Sachs, Tronell and Velasco (1996) construct a theoretical model of currency crisis. According to their model, countries that are most vulnerable to a reversal of capital inflows are those with a weak banking system, an overvalued exchange rate and low reserves relative to their liquid liabilities. The indicators are then: real depreciation, bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP and M2/R. Following are the data for Lebanon, Mexico, Argentina and the Philippines which experienced currency crises in 1994 and 1995.

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<sup>11</sup> Although a significant amount of debt is held by local banks, a debt crisis will still induce an adjustment process described above even if the resource transfer problem is mitigated. The reason is that a debt default crisis will be accompanied by a currency and balance of payments crisis and the necessity of closing the external gap generated by the persistent current account deficits.

Table 3. Comparison between currency crisis indicators for Lebanon and three countries that experienced currency crisis

Country	Real Depreciation	Lending Boom	(M2/R)
Lebanon	-21.3	66.6	3.46
Mexico	-28.5	116.2	9.1
Argentina	-48.0	57.1	3.6
Philippines	-6.7	50.0	4.1

Source: For Mexico, Argentina and Philippines, Sachs et al (1996). For Lebanon, computations by author from several data sources. For real depreciation, it measures the average currency appreciation during 1995-1997 relative to the average of the years 1992-1994. Raw data from IMF Occasional Paper 176. Lending Boom is growth in Private credit-to-GDP ratio for the years 1993-1998. Source: For credit, BdL Database. For GDP, various sources. Reserve Adequacy Ratio is for November 1999, M2=currency in circulation +demand and savings deposits in LP + T-bills held by public in LP. R=net reserves. Source: Association of Banks of Lebanon database.

## Privatization

Although the question to privatize or not to privatize may be an ideological one, the issue at stake at the current juncture in Lebanon is whether privatization will be effective in reducing the budget deficits and the public debt. The goal of privatization as stated clearly in the *Fiscal Reform Plan* is to reduce both current budget deficit in the year of the sale and the use of part of the proceeds for the retirement of public debt. The plan stipulates the following temporal allocation of privatization proceeds

Table 4. Fiscal Revenues from Privatization

Year	Proceeds (in billions of LP)
2000	2054
2001	1900
2002	1000
2003	1000

Source: Fiscal Reform Plan.

Although empirical evidence shows that privatization is more effective in reducing the debt burden than in reducing the budget deficit in a current year (Pinheiro and Shneider, 1995), the fiscal benefits from privatization are not self evident. The primary objective of privatization according to many experts including the World Bank and the IMF is efficiency and productivity enhancement in the delivery of basic services such as utilities more than it is an instrument for budget deficit and debt reduction. According to Pinheiro and Schneider (1995) the proceeds

form privatization are usually “too little and too late to help in resolving a fiscal crisis.” Moreover, according to Mackenzie (1998), proceeds from privatization should not be used to finance recurrent expenditures nor privatization itself should be a substitute for willingness to increase taxes. A large emphasis on fiscal revenues, as the case is presented in Lebanon, may lead to adverse conditions such as highly leveraged purchases and increased monopolization which in the end lead to less than the desired efficiency and productivity increases. If such a situation develops privatization becomes the substitution of an asset for a future stream of cash flows whose net effect on the intertemporal government budget is zero. In general there are conditions under which privatization may reduce the present value of public sector borrowing requirements such as: the company has to be worth more to the private sector than for the state, the state enterprise has to become more profitable after sale and the state enterprise has to grow faster in private hands. Hence, the macroeconomic conditions under which the sale occurs are very important. Adverse macro conditions and the absence of regulatory framework can increase the risk aversness of investors leading them to reduce the value of the company and hence greatly reduce the fiscal impact. If the value differential is such the case that the government receives less for its assets than they are worth then the intertemporal effect is negative which has the opposite effect of fiscal tightening (Mackenzie, 1998). Moreover, if private investment in the privatized firms reduces investment elsewhere then the fiscal benefits are greatly reduced. Moreover, when the government’s purpose is financial gain, it will restrict competition (to guarantee profits for investors) and hence lead to the deterioration of allocative efficiency. This dynamic was evident in the Argentinean privatization (Gallani and Petrecolla, 1996). The regulatory environment was intentionally not established so as to allow quasi-rents to exist where financial losses did.

According to Mackenzie (1998), there are other macroeconomic effects of privatization. If the value of the firm for the private sector is larger than for the public sector, then its transfer may entail a reduction in investment equal to the value of the assets of the company. Moreover, even

if investment does not fall, the aggregate supply will increase as a result of increased productivity and that will widen the gap between AD and AS necessitating a more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Financial markets are also important in privatization. In underdeveloped markets, the privatization process may have a large effect on the money supply and that would lead for shares to be traded at lower prices than the privatizable enterprise net worth.

In Lebanon, the current privatization fever offering it to the public as a panacea for all the country's economic problems carries many dangers. First, macroeconomic conditions are not favorable for the valuation of the companies by private investors. Second, the regulatory framework is virtually non-existent. Third, it is not clear especially in the case of major utilities (telephone and electricity) that the efficiency gains will lead to future revenue stream for the government through taxation higher than the current revenues. Fourth, the signaling value of privatization has high risks in Lebanon since the government and other proponents has put it at the top of the agenda for fiscal balance. The positive signal can turn into a negative one very easily when projected proceeds start dropping and the projected fiscal deficit increases as result.

## Toward a New Economic Policy

At the start of 1999, the Governor of the Banque du Liban stated that one of the main macroeconomic policy targets of the Central Bank is to curb inflation. The ultimate objective is to lower interest rates on the Lebanese pound and foster economic growth while trying to preserve the purchasing power of the national currency.<sup>12</sup> This policy bias lies at the basis of economic policy in Lebanon in the post war period. This orthodox monetarism combined with supply side economics of the Hariri governments had generated the fiscal crisis of the state and subsequently the economic recession of today. The present government has substituted fiscal conservatism and neoliberal thought for supply side economics but kept orthodox monetarism. The results could be worse especially that the initial conditions are of fiscal crisis plus economic recession. The government's plan for fiscal reform is too austere. A quick look at the projected revenue, expenditures and debt evolution in the next five years tells to this fact.

Table 5. Government Plan for reduction of deficits and debt (1999-2003)

Year	Tax Rev.	Expenditures	Inflation	Debt/GDP	deficit	debt
1998	3,543	9992	4.50%	118.8	5562	29117
1999	4369	8958	4.00%	127.6	3453	33167
2000	4745	9416	3.50%	126.7	3437	35116
2001	5760	9733	5.00%	115	2524	34813
2002	6253	9633	3.50%	105.4	1824	34509
2003	6830	10081	3.00%	96.3	1583	34106

Source: Fiscal Reform Plan.

At first sight, the plan seems to achieve most of what most economists have been calling for since a long time. However, a proper measure of the future budget deficits by looking at real budget deficits to see their impact on aggregate demand gives a different picture.

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<sup>12</sup> The exact figure for inflation in 1999 has been the subject of controversy. However, some economists and policy makers are claiming that we have achieved a zero inflation level. The problem lies not in the figure but in the interpretation. This is hailed as a triumph for monetary policy. Of course, any able-minded economist knows that zero inflation means that a drastic disinflation has occurred with great costs in unemployment and lost output. If the figure is true, we need to congratulate the monetary authorities for presiding over one of the severest deflationary

Table 6. Real Deficits in the government plan

Year	Real Deficit <sup>a</sup>	Real Deficit <sup>b</sup>
1999	3320.192	2774.346
2000	3320.773	761.5024
2001	2403.81	-1960.76
2002	1762.319	-1470.97
2003	1536.893	-1396.38

<sup>a</sup>Real Deficits calculated from the nominal deficits projected in the Fiscal Reform Plan using inflation levels predicted by the plan itself.

<sup>b</sup>Real Deficits calculated from the projected debt evolution in the Fiscal Reform Plan.

The real deficits from table 6 can be seen to be drastically reduced during 1999-2003. This may seem necessary to reduce the burden of the public debt on the economy. However, once we account for inflation and debt retirement using privatization proceeds, nominal deficits starting in 2001 become real surpluses. This means that debt reduction can occur at a slower pace than envisioned in the plan and hence incurring a less contractionary impact on the Lebanese economy.<sup>13</sup> Given the current recession, the planned increase in taxes (see table 5), the planned privatization that may decrease aggregate demand, and the contractionary monetary policy of the BdL, the prognosis is that we will linger in economic recession all the way until the year 2003.

What is the alternative? The outline of a policy of recovery follows. It is based on four premises. First, Fiscal policy cannot turn contractionary at the time of economic recession and given the current economic structure has to lead the economy into an expansion. Second, monetary policy, although cannot lead the expansion because of the current fears of exchange rate stability, has to accommodate the fiscal expansion and abandon its anti-inflationary policy. Third, given market

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episodes in the capitalist world since the Great Depression in 1929. This is one of the reasons why monetary policy in Lebanon should not remain outside the realm of democratic accountability.

<sup>13</sup> It is important to note here that the reform plan, as austere as it is, does not bring Lebanon out of the levels of unsustainable debt. Using the rough formula of Olivier Blanchard for maximum sustainable debt ( $MSN = LFPS/r$ ) where MSN=Maximum Sustainable Debt, LFPS=Largest Feasible Primary Surplus and  $r$  = real interest rate on debt, we get MSN in 2003 equal to LP 25100 bn compared to actual projected debt of LP 34106 bn. Values for Lebanon used  $r=0.06$  which is the weighted average of real rates on foreign and local debt projected by the plan for 2003 and LFPS=1506 which the plan predicts to be the primary surplus in 2003. Given the current political opposition to the government plan and the 1999 and 2000 budgets, it is safe to assume that 1506bn is the maximum politically feasible primary surplus.

nervousness about the fiscal deficits and debt, a credible policy of deficit and debt reduction has to be enacted. The key for its success is a radical reform of the taxation system and the abandonment of quick fix solutions such as external debt issuance and fire sale privatization. Fourth, privatization, although may be beneficial in reducing the debt burden, it has to be postponed until economic recovery takes hold and macroeconomic and profitability conditions are better.

Detail of the plan are:

1. A plan to increase taxes starting in 2002. Once recovery takes hold, measures to reduce the budget deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio can start. The direct tax system should be reformed radically. The initial thrust of tax reforms has come to a grind. The issue at stake was, of course, not the minor changes in the income taxes that were enacted (which is a significant improvement over the tax law 282/93) but the need for a comprehensive tax reform that would bring the Lebanese revenue system in line, in terms of its modernity, with the current expenditures system of the post-war period. High marginal tax rates should increase for incomes above LP 120 million, which in the current system become essentially flat. There is plenty of room there for many brackets and higher tax rates. Taxes should be levied on incomes with low propensity to consume such as returns on T-bills and savings deposits above a certain threshold. The decision to reform the tax system should not be postponed indefinitely in preference to quick fix solutions with no long run viability such as borrowing or privatization.<sup>14</sup>
2. The second element in the recovery program is *fiscal expansion* for the next two years through public investment programs. Given the current level of real interest rates, investors' expectations, high indebtedness of consumers, the collapse of the real estate market, real appreciation of the Lebanese pound and export slowdown, the only engine of aggregate

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<sup>14</sup> For a tax reform plan along the above lines see Dah, Dibeh and Shahin (1999). The current "take from the poor and give the rich" fiscal system through regressive taxation and high interest rates on T-bills held by commercial banks and the rich class has to come to an end. The working and the middle classes who paid the highest price on the barricades of the civil war should not also pay the reconstruction cost.

demand is government expenditures. Supply-side policies such as incentives and tax breaks will not do it at this stage. Public investment will provide the fiscal stimulus needed for the economy to move out of the current recession. The by-product of increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of few percentage points should make no difference compared to the drastic rise in the past seven years.

3. For the fiscal stimulus to succeed, monetary policy should be coordinated with fiscal policy. The current obsession with inflation should be abandoned or the central bank will frustrate the fiscal policy through even a more severe contractionary measures. The role of the monetary policy has to be changed to monetary accommodation of the fiscal stimulus.
4. Reformulate the whole policy on privatization. The large scale fire sales currently planned will be detrimental to consumer welfare, regulatory functions, and above all to the fiscal benefits from privatization. Privatization should be put off until the economy is in full recovery and all alternatives for the public enterprises have been thoroughly investigated.

## **Conclusion**

The policies of the Hariri governments in the postwar period have pushed the economy towards its current state of fragile stability. The present government policies of monetary and fiscal contraction combined with exchange rate stability cannot be maintained indefinitely in the face of high debt growth and economic recession. The consequences can be tragic in terms of a sudden collapse of the currency engendering a generalized economic crisis. The policy reforms advanced in this paper, that unshackle the Lebanese economy out of its neo-liberal-monetarist straightjackets, should remove the specters of total collapse that currently haunt Lebanon.

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