Chapter 1: Southern Mount Lebanon: False Democracy in an Unsovereign State
Chapter 2: Northern Mount Lebanon: Armia’s Prophecy
Chapter 3: The North: Socio-Political Structures and the Electoral Contest
Chapter 4: Beirut: The Lack of Equality
Chapter 5: South Lebanon: The Same Plot on an Old Stage
Chapter 6: The Biqa': The Failure of the Muhafaza Experiment
Chapter 7: Election Infractions and Fraud
Chapter 8: The Prolongation of Disorder Through the Electoral Process
Chapter 9: The 1992 - 1996 Legislature: The Story of Stalemate
Chapter 10: A Scene After the Election Battle: New Elites, and Alternative Elites
Chapter 11: Challenges to the Parliamentary Elections Within the Constitutional Council
Chapter 12: The Role of Political Parties: Marginalization and Disequillibrium
Chapter 13: Electoral Obligations and Behavior: Civic Dimensions and Political Participation
Chapter 14: Women and Politics in Lebanon in the 1996 Elections
Chapter 15: The Role of the Media
Chapter 16: Electoral Machines: Unequal Battles and Traditional Roles
Chapter 17: Democracy in Lebanon: Between Political Science and the Elections of 1996

Section I: The Election Process and its Results

Chapter 1: Southern Mount Lebanon: False Democracy in an Unsovereign State
Fares Abi Saab

This chapter, which takes a socio-political approach, attempts to shed light on the elements of disequilibrium to which the electoral process was subject, in several ways: through disturbances to the mechanisms of the modern state, to the legislature's ability to act as the representative of the people, and to the popular will, on the one hand, and, on the other, the external interference which determined the course of the campaign and the results.

The chapter also presents the most important socio-political developments in the country, in general, and in southern Mount Lebanon in particular in the decade preceding the election round (throughout the 1980s and 1990s). These developments resulted in changes to the balance of local and regional political forces which played a role in the elections. It also provides a sociological analysis of the role of traditional social relations in determining the party and political affiliation of voters and their electoral choices.

The chapter indicates the network of alliances and coalitions which were observed in the run-up to the elections, and treats the most important platforms and political stances taken by candidates, whether in written or spoken form. It takes up the course of the campaign and most important instances of electoral infractions and falsification which took place, as well as the final vote tallies and an analysis of the results.

Finally, a conclusion about the 1996 round attempts to shed light on the extent to which the elections expressed political transformations and changes in the sectarian balance of power in Lebanon in the post-Taif period, their regional and international context, and their indication of a new political and economic role for Lebanon in local and regional terms.

Chapter 2: Northern Mount Lebanon: Armia’s Prophecy
Nicholas Nassif

The chapter tells the story of the northern Mount Lebanon constituencies, where candidates underestimated governmental influence in the elections, and joined the election battle only to realize that the governmental lists were on the verge of achieving certain victory.

In the Metn constituency, Michel Murr’s list competed with an opposition list which joined joined together two allies, deputy Nassib Lahoud and former MP Albert Moukhaiber. The elections in this constituency were characterized by fierce competition due to strong opposition to the government list. However, this strong opposition did not pose a threat to Michel Murr’s list as he was strongly backed and supported by electoral means, powerful coalitions, and by electoral procedures and measures incorporated within the legislative electoral law. This led to the inevitable victory of all the candidate on Murr’s list except for August Bakhos, and the defeat of the candidates of the opposition list except for the outstanding success of deputy Nassib Lahoud. 

While the Metn elections were characterized by a government list and an opposition list, the Ftouh-Kisirwan elections were characterized by two pro-government lists, one of which contained opposition figure Camille Ziade. The competition between these two lists was based on local political interests and other considerations. This explains the rivalry between Fares Boueiz, the son-in-law of President Elias Hrawi, and Rucheid al-Khazen, who also has close ties with the President as well as with Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and with Mansour al-Bone, who is also close to the Prime Minister.

The elections in Kisirwan highlighted the intensity of local conflicts and revealed, on the one hand, the direct support of President Hrawi for both lists and, on the other, the remarkable Syrian support for Rucheid al-Khazen. As expected by the majority of citizens, the five deputies of 1992 were reelected to the 1996 parliament: Fares Boueiz, Rucheid al-Khazen, Elias al-Khazen, Mansour al-Bone (who obtained the highest vote total), and Camille Ziade.

Despite the fact that the opposition boycotted the elections and Bkirki did not endorse them, the constituency of Jbeil witnessed a large number of candidacies. The elections of Jbeil had a greater similarity to the elections in Metn than to the Kisirwan elections. The competition was as fierce as with the Metn election competition, but the government candidates won the election battle in the end.

Like Metn and Kisirwan, the government strongly intervened in the Jbeil elections, but the candidates( solidarity within the lists there was weaker than that of Murr(s list, Boueiz( list, or the Bone - Ziade - Rucheid al-Khazen coalition. In Jbeil, the support of the President was dispersed to the extent that three candidates from three competing lists were elected. These were Mahmoud Awad, Emile Nawfal, and Nouhad Soueid.

In a region which has been mainly influenced by the Maronite Christians for the past fifty years, the 1996 elections witnessed a decisive role by Shia voters. This phenomenon was due to the persistence of the Christian leaders’ refusal to run for elections, and the boycott by some Christian voters.

Chapter 3: The North: Socio-Political Structures and the Electoral Contest
Shawqi Douweihy

This chapter examines north Lebanon’s experience with the 1996 parliamentary electoral round. The chapter describes the important features of the muhafaza-wide electoral district - the predominantly Christian rural qadas of Batroun, Bsharri, Koura and Zghorta, the predominantly Sunni Muslim qada of Minyeh-Dinniyeh, the mixed composition of Akkar, and the special political make-up of Tripoli. It points out their salient features in terms of the importance of political families, political parties, and the dominance of certain towns in providing representatives to the legislature.

The chapter examines the northern phenomenon of many (five) competing electoral lists, which largely lacked cohesion as well as an “identity” that could distinguish them from one another. It deals with the last-minute arrangements to compose the lists, and the overnight surprises which saw some candidates going to bed believing themselves to be members of a given list, only to wake up to find themselves off the list for one reason or another. It describes the haphazard method of putting together a list which meant that figures with ties to a given top political leader could be found on competing lists, rather than being gathered together on a single ticket.

It analyzes the fragile unity of families in the electoral process, and the weakness of political parties. The fortunes of candidates from four groups - political families, non-political families, Islamist groups, and political parties - are analyzed in terms of their results, and are compared to the previous round. The special case of the Maronite seat for Tripoli is examined, where natives of the city are not in abundance - it appears to be a refuge for Maronite candidates unsure of their inability to win election in rural qadas. It also takes up the much-discussed phenomenon of non-Christians deciding the elections for Christian seats, and shows that at least in two important cases, those of Omar Karami and Saleh Kheir, the reverse was true. Most importantly, it examines the argument that the larger the electoral district, the greater the tendency for cohesive lists to form, as a first step toward the appearance of nation-wide and multisectarian political parties. In the case of the north, the lack of cohesion and identity were significant indications that this goal may not be as easy to achieve as some may believe.

Chapter 4: Beirut: The Lack of Equality
Issam Sleiman

This chapter describes the factors that marked the 1996 legislative elections in Beirut. These factors include the following:

The participation of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in the electoral competition

The division of Christians into two groups: those who participated in the

elections, and those who boycotted

The inequality of chancesfor success for the various candidate lists

The conumber of instances of fraud and violations

The poor participation, even in the Muslim areas of the capital, as compared to the

1972 elections

The decisive role of Sunni votes in the election results

The loss of parliamentary seats by Muslim fundamentalist parties

The victory of Mr. al-Hariri, even though he was incapable of monopolizing the

capital’s parliamentary representation

The chapter concludes with an account of how money played a considerable and decisive factor in the electoral campaign and results, and notes the necessity of creating a law which sets a limit on campaign budgets and expenses. 

Chapter 5: South Lebanon: The Same Plot on an Old Stage
Hassan Krayyem

This chapter treats the paradox of the 1996 parliamentary electoral round in South Lebanon: the district that saw the least important change in parliamentary representation also saw the most important electoral battle in terms of its implications for political polarization and its revealing a situation of genuine pluralism and fierce competition.

In addition to the imposed alliance of the Amal Movement and Hizbullah, which began in the 1992 round, there emerged clear third, fourth and even fifth options for voters. The most competitive of these other groups was the re-emerging coalition list of democratic and leftist parties and independents. The results of the elections, however, did not reflect such plurality because of the electoral system. The simple majority system as well as the orchestrated and imposed electoral coalition, to a large extent, predetermined the results.

In many ways, the 1996 elections reinforced the tendencies that emerged in 1992. The dominance of the new political parties and militias, the weak representation of the cities and large towns, and the hegemony of the Amal-Hizbullah coalition indicate the continued efforts to firmly establish the new Ta’if state.

In order to reveal the suppressed pluralism in South Lebanon, the chapter employs a projection exercise. If we assume a proportional system, and the reconstruction of the dominant coalition on this basis, many currents and forces that were not represented could have been represented according to their proportion of votes.

In addition, the results of the elections could have been drastically different if the electoral district of South Lebanon had been divided into two districts.

Chapter 6: The Biqa': The Failure of the Muhafaza Experiment
Antoine Atallah

This chapter examines the Biqa's first electoral experience since the 1950s as a unified electoral district. It makes a comparison to the qada'-based 1992 round, which was better in terms of the region(s enjoying near balance among sects. Meanwhile, creating an expanded district in the name of national cohesion highlighted basic political disparities among the sects, but these differences were in fact isolated from the will of the people.

In the past, sects were more at ease concerning balance and the soundness of their representation; today, the situation has changed. Fears have arisen among all groups, which have fanned sectarian tension instead of producing national unity and solidarity. The existing feelings of trust felt by sects can no longer be effective in influencing the course of electoral events. The chapter shows how the largest minorities controlled the fate of the rest, leading to disequilibrium in free choice and balance among sects, which should act as the foundations of the electoral process.

The 1996 elections were characterized by the lack of competitiveness that had been known in the past. In addition, an atmosphere of confusion and drift prevailed among the candidates throughout the electoral campaign period, and right up until election day. Everyone was waiting for (the unknown( to step in and influence events, even those candidates with support from the regime. None of the local politicians attempted to form an electoral list because local decision-makers were in a state of near paralysis. Regarding the region(s affairs, the decision was taken out of the hands of the local players.

The 1996 round did achieve some of its goals, such as reproducing the existing parliament, although its policy and program, which observers term (submissive,( were not altered. But these elections failed to achieve other goals, such as ideal representation or that most suitable to the situation on the ground, in terms of plurality of political tendencies. An important number of these were absent from parliament, while large segments of the Biqa (population were also unrepresented. Another failure was the breakdown of the process of political renewal by creating new elites and anchoring democratic norms in political life, due to the considerable number of electoral violations and infractions in the expanded district. This allowed a greater influence from above on the elections, as candidates were faced with a decline in party effectiveness against machines capable of covering the entire regions and preventing the existence of a single area where upstart candidates could poke through and achieve victory. Thus, the elections were used to reproduce the dominance of the ruling elite.

In terms of demography, both the Armenian community and naturalized blocs of voters influenced the results. This problem has become chronic, since with the coming of the Armenians in 1920, followed by several other minorities, as these groups now enjoy an electoral weight in Biqa( elections. Moreover, the distribution of naturalized citizens in the elections involved a process that was not innocent of ulterior motives, such as taking advantage of these groups( function to vote in large numbers in a cohesive fashion. Naturalized citizens were distributed deliberately in towns known to support both Muslim and Christian pro-regime candidates, functioning as a type of (reserve brigades( that could be added to the arsenal of a given candidate.

Chapter 7: Election Infractions and Fraud
Ziad Majed

This chapter describes the different types of fraud and legal violations which began long before the elections, and continued on different levels during the election period. In it, the author explains the reasons why the 1996 parliamentary elections were believed to be one of the worst elections in Lebanon’s history.

First, the chapter gives a description of how the electoral law itself was unconstitutional and violated the principle of uniformity of legislation. Second, it describes how the authorities used the state apparatus, including the public administrations, provision of services, and security forces to ensure an election victory for their candidates. Third, the chapter also shows how the audio-visual media law, which prohibited the coverage of electoral campaigns, was not respected and how the official TV station itself covered the campaigns of many government candidates.

In terms of the role of money, no controls were placed on campaign financing, thus allowing wealthy candidates to use money as a tool to obtain more votes, and many members of the local and international media witnessed bribery throughout the elections. The chapter goes on to describe how in several areas, the most rudimentary rules of election procedure were ignored and how the voters were intimidated into selecting specific candidates. Voter lists were inaccurate, and the curtains of the voting booths were removed. The paper also recapitulates how in several places, representatives of opposition and independent candidates were prevented from distributing candidate lists or observing either the voting or the vote-counting.

In short , the chapter shows how the elections came to be characterized by abnormal levels of fraud and violations, and the political pressuring of voters.

Chapter 8: The Prolongation of Disorder Through the Electoral Process
Farid al-Khazen

The chapter analyzes the 1996 elections from a macro perspective. It also compares the 1996 elections with previous elections: the first post-war election in 1992, and previous pre-war elections beginning from independence in 1943 tothe last election held before the outbreak of war, in 1972. In comparison with the 1992 elections,which were one of the worst in Lebanon’s electoral history, the 1996 elections improved in form but worsened in substance. The chapter addresses in detail the electoral law and its political functions, particularly in relation to the size of electoral districts, communal representation, the role of the state, the role of Syria, and electoral alliances and competition, as well as opposition politics.

The elections showed clearly that avenues for real political change were as blocked in 1996 as they were in 1992. The chapter concludes that elections in post-war Lebanon perform functions that are similar to elections held in non-democratic countries where elections are held, but with limited choice.