Two Years of Living Dangerously:
General Awn and Precarious Rise of Lebanon's Second Republic,

Paul E. Salem



Table of Contents

Abstract
Michel Awn: From the Military into Politics
The Challenge to the Status Quo
The Road to Isolation and Defeat
Assessing the 'Awn Phenomenon'
The 'Errors' of the Awn Administration
The Demise of the 'First Republic'
The Taif Agreement and the Precarious Birth of the 'Second Republic'
The Obstacles Facing the 'Second Republic'

  1. Immobility
  2. The Militias
  3. The Israeli Veto
  4. Lebanese-Syrian Relations
  5. Scant Coercive Power
  6. Scant Financial Power
  7. Developing a New Style of Politics
  8. Non-Representativeness
Conclusion

Abstract

The two years between 1988 and 1990 were among the most dramatic and dangerous in the history of Lebanon's 16-year old war. They saw three consecutive wars, the temporary division of the state, the further partition and polarization of the Christian community, the establishment of a new national accord, and an expansion of Syrian power in the country. Although it is hard to encompass all these developments within one analytical framework, much can be understood by focusing on the two poles of Michel Awn and his policies, on the one hand, and the Taif Agreement and its supporters on the other. The interaction between these two camps or tendencies is at the heart of the explosive and revolutionary changes that took place during this period.

The relationship between the two poles can be characterized as dialectical. In brief, Michel Awn posed such a violent challenge to the status quo in Lebanon -- to the traditional ruling groups, to the militias, to the occupying powers, and to the policies of other international actors -- that he generated momentum for concerted action among most of those disparate groups, if only to rid themselves of him and the crisis he had created. In the process, the Taif Agreement, which represents a new National Pact for Lebanon, one that could lay the foundations for an end to the interconfessional tension and fighting that have been a central part of the war in Lebanon since 1975, was born. To be sure, Michel Awn did not realize his own professed goals of freeing the country from foreign occupation and disbanding the militias, but his actions did have the inadvertent effect of forcing his many Lebanese opponents to come to an agreement among themselves. In that sense, his explosive style and his aggressive rejection of the status quo seem to have been catalysts for reconciliation among the many factions in Lebanon -- a reconciliation long overdue. It remains to be seen, however, whether this spirit of cooperation, employed to overcome Awn and embodied in the Taif Agreement, will survive his demise, or whether, now that Awn has been subdued, the various factions and forces operating in Lebanon will return to their accustomed pattern of division and conflict in which they have thrived since the collapse of the Lebanese state in 1975.

In the following pages, I will review Michel Awn's tenure in Ba`abda and then examine the political ramifications of the Taif Agreement and the fortunes of the Hrawi government entrusted with the task of beginning to implement that Agreement.


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