Michael C. Hudson*
Continued
In his methodological analysis of counterfactuals, Fearon (1992) declares
that it is not appropriate to criticize them simply by insisting that they
could not have occurred; rather, the critic must show that “nothing else
would also have been different in a way that would have materially affected
the outcome” (195). Taken very strictly, this “co-tenability” requirement
might doom most counterfactual analyses. This would appear to be especially
true in the thicket of Middle East politics where Brown, quoting an Arab
diplomat, states that “everything is related to everything else” (16).
Does the counterfactual implantation of Arab democratic into the situations
discussed above “muddy the historical waters”: so much that no valid inferences
are possible? The inference that, in general, “Arab democracy” would not
have altered Arab foreign policy outcomes very much is open to challenge
on these grounds. But the challenge can be rebutted. Let me confine the
discussion to the Palestine/Israel conflict. The “democracies don't fight
democracies” hypothesis rests in part on mutual perceptions of what we
might call liberal-democratic legitimacy. If Arab governments were imagined
to have become democratic at time-1, it is possible to assume, all things
being held constant, that democratic Israel would be influenced by that
development and soften its aggressive policies at time-2, raising the possibility,
therefore, that the democratic Arab regimes would (contrary to our inference)
moderate their hostile policies at time-3, and so on. One might at this
point conclude that co-tenability is indeed impossible and that the whole
historical environment would become so completely -- and unpredictably
-- altered that the exercise is pointless.
Short of giving up entirely, however, one could ask the narrower question: how likely would it have been for Israeli decision-makers to alter their behavior if confronted with democratic Arab governments? It is not necessarily a convincing argument that key military and national security leaders in Israel would have “given the benefit of the doubt” to their Arab neighbors just because they were legitimately elected. The imperatives of Zionist ideology, the traumas of Jewish history, the givens have driven Israel toward the tough stance that it in fact adopted. Even if hypothetical Arab democracies had been less “threatening,” it is difficult to imagine a reciprocal softening caused by the democratic nature of Israel. Israel is a democracy in many respects, but in studying its foreign policy behavior, one must wonder whether the liberal-democratic norms and expectations which Doyle and others use to explain the “democracies” don’t fight each other” proposition, have been operative in the domain of Israel’s national security policy.
III. Prospects for Democratization and Foreign Policy
We can reach the following tentative conclusions from our historical
speculations: first, the Arab (and Arab/Israeli) cases do not clearly indicate
a clear relationship between regime structure (“democracy”) and foreign
policy behavior. This is mainly because there is so little democracy in
this region.
Second, to the extent that there might be such a relationship, these
cases suggest that “democratic” structures might be less “peace-prone”
than authoritarian structures. In those few instance of Arab democracy,
we do find examples of warfare and armed combat with “democratic” Israel.
This conclusion is also supported by our counterfactual analyses.
Third, the Middle East experience provides greater compelling support
for a corollary to the “democracies don’t fight democracies” proposition,
than for the proposition itself: the corollary is that democracies are
quite belligerent in dealing with non-democracies. “Democratic” Israel
fought wars with “undemocratic” Arab regimes in 1956, 1967, 1969-70, and
1973 (cf. Schweller, 1992, pp. 264-67). It should be noted, however, that
most writers on the Middle East do not identify regime type as a major
cause of these conflicts, focusing instead on “real” grievances, security
issues, and ideological factors.
Fourth, “regime type” is a clumsy variable -- static, hard to define,
and hard to apply. Perhaps it is more appropriate for long-term historical
and global comparisons than for the dynamics of conflict in the contemporary
Middle East. For the latter purpose, more promising political variables
might include regime stability and regime capabilities; and for investigations
of this level and scope, regime type may be less causally sensitive than
regime identity. Who governs? The form may be parliamentary, but it matters
whether the government is made up of conservative businessmen or radical
professionals. It matters whether it is one-party dominant or a fragile
coalition of disparate parties. And the degree of contestation and participation
is also important. In short, refinements will be necessary for further
fruitful investigation of the democratization and foreign policy problematic.
Finally, we can address the prospects for democratization in the Arab
world, and ponder how governments more representative of societies torn
by socio-economic dislocations and ideological ferment, yet increasingly
intruded upon by the “New World Order,” might behave in their external
security, diplomatic, and economic relations. There are two contradictory
trends at work in the Arab world following the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the 1991 Gulf war. One is the growing disjunction between states and
societies, and between regimes and oppositions, that is creating a crisis
of governance in which democratic “openings” are becoming possible. The
other is the growing imperative for Arab states to accommodate themselves
to the power and interests of the new world hegemony, the United States.
The deepening of economic and social tension exacerbated by the 1991
Gulf war has generated protest movements against incumbent regimes and
systems, and the worldwide perception of democracy in the ascendancy has
challenged regimes and civil society alike. The shift of economic development
doctrines in a neoclassical direction -- away from the state and toward
the market -- has strengthened the calls for a parallel devolution of political
power. Simultaneously, Islamic political movements have in many places
taken the lead in filling the participation vacuum. Although the sociological
conditions for democratic openings may be favorable, it is by no means
certain that democratization projects will succeed, as the Algerian example
reminds us. But if they were to succeed, with Islamic parties in positions
of influence, it is possible that foreign policy positions would take on
a more anti-American, anti-Israeli, and pro-unity character. yet they would
not be wholly doctrinaire or monolithic, because the democratic process
itself, and the accompanying process of economic liberalization, would
generate competing interests and policy alternatives.
Furthermore, the second trend we have mentioned -- the logic of the
“New World Order” -- is likely to generate “pragmatic,” “realistic” conceptions
of national interests which will further temper “extremist” impulses. The
evolution of Iranian foreign policy under Ayatollah Khomeini’s successors
illustrates this dynamic. Democratization in the Arab world or anywhere
else is not going to be “risk-free”. But it is not going to lead inexorably
to wars and regional crises either. Nor, on the other hand, is democratization
a panacea to eliminate regional conflict. In the long run, the dynamics
of the international system take precedence over the domestic environment.
Other things equal, one may argue that democratic decision processes are
marginally preferable to dictatorships because they reduce the chances
of leaders making egregiously irrational mistakes.
* Michael C. Hudson is a professor of international
relations and government and Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab Studies in
the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.