Maroun Kisirwani*
Table of Contents
Introduction
The Lebanese Bureaucracy
The Impact of the Civil War
Bureaucratic Survival
The Character of the Conflict
Citizen Attitudes and Behavior
Bureaucratic Sectarianism
Management of the Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic
Behavior
Summary
Endnotes
This paper examines in a general way some of the major patterns of interaction which developed between the Lebanese governmental bureaucracy and other institutions and groups in Lebanese society during the years of the Lebanese civil war. [1] On balance, this interaction allowed the bureaucracy to continue to function as a national institution, while other public organizations were divided along religious and sectarian lines. Hopefully, such a discussion can provide general insights into how bureaucratic organizations act and react in the face of extreme environmental pressures. The approach taken here is conceptual rather than historical. However, in order to place this discussion in its proper context, it is necessary to briefly consider the historical and cultural forces that have shaped Lebanon’s bureaucracy, as well as the more recent impact of the civil war on bureaucratic performance and behavior.
Lebanon’s bureaucracy has been shaped both by indigenous cultural and political traditions, and by the region’s long history of Ottoman and, later, French domination. [2] It must be noted here, first, that the Ottoman Empire itself adopted many of the features of the French administrative model following the reforms of the late nineteenth century. Thus, French influence on Lebanese administration actually predates the period of the French Mandate between 1922 and 1943.
French administration had been described as classical bureaucracy because of its close adherence to the Weberian “ideal type.” [3] In particular, French bureaucracy is notable for its extreme centralization of authority and for its elitism in the recruitment of bureaucrats. [4] A second factor to be noted is that the influence of the French administrative model is most strongly evident in the formal design of the Lebanese bureaucracy. A great deal of attention is paid, in both statutes and administrative regulations, to the promotion of the formal elements of the bureaucratic “ideal type.” Formal authority is highly centralized, both organizationally and geographically. Most civil servants live and work in the capital, Beirut, and it is here that all important policy and resource-allocation decisions are made.
Following the French model, Lebanon’s administrative and political system is unitary. The country is divided into six administrative districts known as Muhafazahs. These districts are further divided into smaller units called Qadas. The head officials of these divisions and subdivisions, called respectively the Muhafiz and the Qa`immaqam, are employees of the central government, as are all other district officials. As such, they have little autonomy. Legally, they must refer to the central administration in Beirut for decisions on most routine matters and for all exceptional cases.
There are some vestiges of local government in Lebanon. These include municipal councils in towns and villages, headed by a mayor (Ra`is al-Baladiyya); and Justices of the Peace, known as Mukhtars, in villages and in districts within cities and towns. However, these bodies or officials depend almost entirely on the central government for their resources, their legal and administrative authority being limited to a few functions of strictly local concern. For example, the selection of cemetery sites qualifies as a major municipal prerogative, while the Mukhtar’s chief function is to assist citizens in obtaining identification papers. In short, all major decision-making authority and control over financial resources rests with the representatives of the central government, who are themselves closely controlled from Beirut.
In addition to being highly centralized, Lebanon’s bureaucracy is also functionally specialized. Written rules governing work situations and employee conduct are spelled out in elaborate and exhaustive detail in the different ministries. Two watch-dog agencies, the Central Inspection Agency and the Civil Service Board, are charged with the respective missions of insuring proper adherence to operating procedure and guaranteeing the integrity of the merit system.
Also following the French pattern, the Lebanese bureaucracy is elitist in character. Historically, recruitment patterns appear to have favored members of the nation’s social, economic, and educated elites, who have tended also to be graduates of Lebanon’s exclusive and expensive private educational system, in particular, the French Maronite-oriented St. Joseph University. Professionally, officials at the higher levels of the civil service are predominantly holders of law degrees.
In the formal structure of its administrative system, Lebanon has been strongly influenced by the general form of bureaucracy found in modern Western nations. Despite strong French influence on formal structures, the Lebanese bureaucracy, in practice, is quite different from the French one. This is hardly surprising considering the great differences between French and Lebanese society: French society is modern, differentiated in its institutions, and possessed of a common cultural tradition elements. [5] It is relatively undifferentiated in its social institutions, encompasses a number of different and often conflicting cultural traditions, and possesses a much weaker sense of national identity. Given the diverse character of Lebanese society, the highly centralized French administrative model seems a singularly inappropriate choice. In fact, the French example has been greatly modified in its Lebanese application.
Informally, the Lebanese bureaucracy is built on the principle of sectarianism. This stems from the National Pact, the unwritten agreement negotiated at the time of independence in 1943, which allocated political and governmental positions between Lebanon’s different religious groups. [6] For example, the three top political positions in the government are distributed as follows: the President of the Republic is always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is always a Sunni Muslim. The principle of sectarian representation is also found in the composition of Parliament, the army, and the bureaucracy, and encompasses seventeen officially recognized sects. The number of positions allocated to each sect is, in theory, based on the 1932 census. Detailed figures on the numbers and types of positions allocated to each confessional group are not officially available, and due to political considerations, a national census has never been repeated. Considering the population trends, a new census would probably support a major redistribution of power and positions in favor of the Muslim community, in particular the Shi`a.
The Lebanese bureaucracy also differs from the “ideal type” in other ways: the practices of wasta and baksheesh are of great political importance. Wasta refers to the granting of favorable treatment by bureaucrats to individuals on the basis of political loyalty, family influence, class, or sect. Baksheesh is the charging of a cash gratuity by officials for government services. These forms of bureaucratic pathology are not surprising and reflect important traditional social values, in these cases the role of the family as the principal social institution in traditional Lebanese culture, and the common practice of exchanging gifts for services. [7].
In Lebanon’s traditional and conflict-prone society, however, these practices have helped to make the performance of the bureaucracy a continuing political issue. A great many Lebanese view wasta and baksheesh as corrupt and undesirable. Nevertheless, despite the pre-civil war reform efforts of four Lebanese governments, these practices have continued to persist. Corrupt practices and lack of sectarian representation have not been the only criticisms leveled at the bureaucracy. It hasalso been criticfor favoring the appointment of members and retainers of Lebanon ‘s traditional political families to high-level positions. Critics of this practice frequently argue that the traditional political elites, regardless of sect, have generally been insensitive to the plight and needs of Lebanon’s lower socio-economic groups.
In practice the Lebanese bureaucracy has been frequently criticized for the following reasons: (1) it is built on the principle of sectarianism which leads to discrimination; (2) it is unrepresentative of the demographic balance between the different confessional groups comprising Lebanese society; (3) it has a tradition of corruption and subservience to political influence; (4) it is elitist in character; and (5) it has been generally unresponsive to the needs of lower socio-economic groups and to pressures for social change emanating from these groups.
The civil war, between 1975 and 1990, severely impaired the ability of the Lebanese bureaucracy to function, but by no means destroyed it. Generally speaking, the major functions of a public bureaucracy are investment in infrastructure, the production and delivery of public services, and the maintenance of social order. The most visible impact of the Lebanese conflict was the inability of the bureaucracy to maintain order and provide security. The conflict rendered the army, the police, and the courts ineffective. A major reason for the inability of these institutions to function was their sectarian structure, which made them unusable in cases where their intervention might have been construed as taking sides. For example, attempts by the government to use the Lebanese Army, both at start of the conflict in 1975, and later in 1983, 1984, an 1990, led to massive desertions by individuals and units who disagreed with the government’s policies.
In areas where security was not an issue, however, the government and the bureaucracy were able to function. Some investment continued to be made in infrastructure, and the government continued to provide some basic, services, although intermittently and at reduced levels, depending on the security situation at any given time. These activities were less than adequate considering the level of need. The bureaucracy was often criticized for not doing its job, and for tolerating ever increasing levels of corruption on the part of public officials.
Such widespread perceptions of bureaucratic performance were shared by bureaucrats. A study by this author helped to document the impact of the civil war period on the performance of the bureaucracy. [8] Based on information provided by a sample of Lebanese public officials, the study provided a systematic look at the effect of the conflict on the bureaucracy as seen through the eyes of bureaucrats themselves. The study addressed several areas of bureaucratic performance and behavior, including the impact of the war on: (1) bureaucratic structure; (2) the availability of the work force; (3) employee professionalism and career attachment; (4) sectarian conflict in the bureaucracy; and (5) the prevalence of bribes and political influence. Information provided by the respondents pointed to the massive erosion of the formal elements of bureaucratic organization and the abandonment of formal bureaucratic values, as the major victims of the civil war period.
Among the specific effects reported by the respondents were:
This data was also analyzed to determine if sect played a role in the respondents’ perceptions of the impact of the war on the bureaucracy. While small perceptual differences were found between Muslim and Christian bureaucrats, there was strong agreement between the two groups on the overall impact of the conflict on bureaucratic performance. [9] Despite these difficulties, however, the bureaucracy continued to survive as a recognizable entity in Lebanese society.
Several interacting factors appear to have contributed to the survival of the Lebanese bureaucracy in the civil war period. These included:
The Lebanese conflict was characterized by intermittent and sporadic fighting among a fairly large number of groups, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese. There is a long historical tradition of Lebanese groups seeking outside assistance in internecine conflicts, and there has been no shortage of external allies willing to get involved on one side or the other. Alliances among the participants shifted frequently over the years as the various factions and their allies sought to define and redefine their strategies and objectives. While the conflict was often described in the West as Christian versus Muslim, this was an oversimplification. Sect was only one of the cleavages in Lebanese society. Of equal importance were the struggles between political elites, ideologies, and haves versus have nots. During the war years, Christians fought Christians and Muslims fought Muslims. The Syrians, at different times, fought or assisted Christian, Muslim, and Palestinian groups; and Palestinians fought Palestinians. The Israelis, during their 1982-83 occupation of the Shouf Mountains, aided both Christian and Druze forces against each other. In 1983-84, the Americans entered the conflict, briefly, in active support of the Christian-dominated central government. [10]
This list is by no means exhaustive, but these examples serve to illustrate that the conflict in Lebanon was very fluid and without stable alignments. [11] In addition, the actual fighting among the participants was intermittent rather than continuous. There were a number of periods of relative, if uneasy, calm during the war. When fighting occurred, it tended to be localized in scale. Periods of calm were important because they gave the government and the bureaucracy opportunities to reassert their authority.
In terms of strategy, fighting between the participants was largely aimed at achieving physical, para-military control over particular geographic areas, rather than dismantling or replacing governmental machinery. The damage to the bureaucracy appeared to have been largely incidental to the achievement of these other goals, and the destruction of the administration did not appear to have been a major goal of any of the contending factions. For the most part, the governmental bureaucracy was permitted to operate -- albeit in a limited way -- in areas under the armed control of the different incidents. For example, on several occasions in Beirut, temporary cease-fires were called during the fighting so that government workers could enter contested areas to repair damaged power and telephone lines, or to cash their wages at the end of each month.
This is not to imply that the combatants always acted neutrally with respect to the bureaucracy. The Lebanese factions did exert considerable influence on the activities of the bureaucracy in areas which they controlled, but they stopped short of dismantling it. The most serious challenge to the bureaucracy occurred in the predominantly Christian areas of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, and the Druze-dominated Shouf region. In these districts tfactional organizations col“taxes” and provided some types of services such as street cleaning, trash-collecting, and food distribution. But, these efforts seem to have been supplementary and temporary in nature, not permanent substitutes for governmental activity. In 1977 when a settlement of the Lebanese conflict seemed imminent, the militias in all districts indicated a willingness to restore to the central government certain collective functions they had assumed, and to dissolve some local government structures which they had established. In early 1983, and later in 1989, they also allowed the government to take over control of the ports which they had built or controlled. [12] By 1990, the Lebanese government re-established its administrative control over most of the country in accordance with the Taif Agreement. [13].
The reluctance of the major factions to replace the apparatus of the governmental bureaucracy with their own, lends support to the view that many Lebanese -- perhaps most -- did not see the partitioning of the country as a viable solution to the country’s problems. While systematic data on public opinion was lacking, this view did not seem to be an uncommon one among Lebanese citizens from all walks of life. Those who held this view often argued that Lebanon’s demographic heterogeneity and small size made partition an unacceptable alternative.