Continued

Citizen Attitudes and Behavior

Lebanese citizens of all backgrounds and political persuasions consistently express their low opinion of the performance of the bureaucracy. The two major complaints are the presence in the bureaucracy of extensive corruption and favoritism. In dealing with the government, the citizens often prefer to deal with a member of their own sect, on the theory that while the official may not be any more honest, he will at least not discriminate in his dishonesty on the basis of sect. Commonplace transactions, such as registering a vehicle or obtaining a driver’s license, routinely require the payment of a bribe. Some Lebanese, while continuing to complain, have come to regard small routine bribes with some equanimity as a kind of tax or tariff.

Bribes are nothing new in Lebanon, but in the wake of the civil war their payment seems to have reached epidemic proportions. They are widely required in transactions between citizens and the government, and the amounts involved can be substantial. For example, the registration of deeds establishing the ownership of property has become an expensive proposition for citizens: the fee is usually a percentage of the value of the transaction and can run into the thousands of dollars. Obtaining telephone service can also entail substantial bribes, or the use of wasta. In addition to this sort of street-level corruption, with which most citizens have first-hand experience, there is considerable belief that corruption exists at the higher levels of government. Stories circulate of major corruption including influence-peddling, diversion of funds, conflicts of interest, and racketeering. Such stories are widely discussed and circulated among the Lebanese. In many ways the country is like a small town in which every one sooner or later hears the details of everyone else’s secret, and some times sordid, business. [14]

Despite the low regard which most Lebanese have for the bureaucracy, they continue to deal with it; and by so doing help to maintain it. For the most part, citizens continue to stay within the letter of the law. They are willing to pay bills for government services such as electricity and phones, even when it is not easy to do so. These are, of course, essential services over which government has a monopoly. However, citizen also continue to engage in legitimizing transactions such as registering property and vehicles and obtaining many required government permits for various purposes. These are also time-consuming and expensive activities. During the war, the motives for this behavior were not altogether clear. When asked, most Lebanese indicated that fear and uncertainty were major factors in their respect for the law. Not having the proper documents made one vulnerable in a variety of situations. In addition, there did seem to be an anticipation of an eventual return of a viable Lebanese government. In any case, to this day, the willingness of citizens to deal with the bureaucracy in the prescribed manner has contributed greatly to its survival.

Bureaucratic Sectarianism

A related factor, which has had consequences for the survival of the bureaucracy during the war, is its sectarian structure. Sectarianism in Lebanese bureaucracy has been the subject of considerable debate. [15] As it is currently practiced, sectarianism has been criticized on political grounds by groups who feel that it has been used to limit their opportunities in Lebanese society. It has also been criticized by administrative reformers, perhaps simplistically, on the grounds that it often replaces competency and merit as the criteria for advancement in the bureaucracy, thus impairing administrative performance. Even so, the sectarian basis of the bureaucracy has been one of the more important reasons for its survival. It is only on the basis of sectarianism that the bureaucracy can exert its claim to legitimacy as a national institution representing the interests of all Lebanese. Given the importance of sectarianism to bureaucratic survival, it is not surprising that bureaucrats report a heightened awareness of, and a continuing concern with, sectarian issues in the bureaucracy.

Management of the Bureaucracy and Bureaucratic Behavior

Government management policies and bureaucratic behavior during the war period appeared to support incremental theories of organizational behavior. [16] These theories hold that bureaucratic organizations react slowly and uncreatively to environmental pressures. As the conflict developed in Lebanon, the government found that it could not exert its authority in those policy areas which had become the focus of political controversy. In such areas, the leadership found itself unable to enforce decisions made by the bureaucracy, and unable to guarantee the personal safety of officials who made unpopular but correct decisions. [17] The political leadership was even unable to enforce its own rules of conduct against officials with political connections. Consequently, in these areas of activity, the political leadership eventually gave up, perceiving that no action was possible. Bureaucratic forms were maintained, most employees continued to report for work, salaries continued to be paid, committees met, paperwork was generated, but confrontation with political groups and their armed wings was by and large avoided. In less controversial areas, the bureaucracy continued to function, but suffered difficulties arising from a lack of direction and coordination.

Generally, the government attempted to take advantage of periods of relative calm, seeing them as opportunities to reassert its authority. During these periods, high-level political and administrative leaders would make public statements announcing the restoration of normal activities, and administrative rulings or circulars would be issued to government employees. These directives would exhort employees to return to their jobs, and inform them that various rules of conduct which may have been overlooked as a result of the conflict, were now reinstated. Efforts would be made on these occasions to promote the notion of an impending return to normalcy. On the whole, however, these efforts met with only limited success for two major reasons: first, because they were largely rhetorical; the leadership had no ways of enforcing its decisions or its rules. And second, because the political situation continued to be characterized by outbreaks of violence, which tended to reverse any progress in the administration. This forced the bureaucracy into retreat, and underscored the fragility of the peace. There were literally hundreds of cease-fire agreements in Lebanon during the war. Often, on these occasions, the bureaucracy promised more than it was able to deliver, which only served to provoke more cynicism on the part of bureaucrats and citizens alike.

This phenomenon of advance and retreat embodies perhaps the major strategy which the bureaucracy fell back on in its efforts to cope with the political situation. The governmental and bureaucratic leaderships, largely through the use of rhetoric, strenuously attempted to preserve the concepts of a Lebanese identity, a Lebanese state, and a politically neutral administration, notions that many observers would regard as wild fictions given Lebanon’s recent history. However, these concepts were very important during the war since they were fundamental to the existence of a national administration. Without some level of acceptance of them on the part of citizens and administrators alike, the bureaucracy would have lost whatever remaining legitimacy it had, an thus its ability to function at all.

In addition, while trying to preserve the concept of a Lebanese entity, the bureaucracy also promoted its survival by tacitly abandoning many of its formal rules or the sake of expediency, political and otherwise. In most cases, this was not a conscious choice on the part of the leadership, but rather a consequence of the situational dynamics confronting individual bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, abandonment of formal bureaucratic values in the situation which existed had both positive andnegative implications for bureaucratic survival. For example, as a result of the fighting, employees were allowed to transfer to safer government offices nearer to their residences, often on their own initiative. Absenteeism, even when long-term, was also allowed. Government officials who accepted other jobs, sometimes outside the country, remained on the employment rolls and continued to receive salaries and raises; almost no one was fired or forced to resign from a government position. These accommodations, while not good administrative practices in the usual sense, were probably useful given the situation. Because the unemployed - particularly young to middle-aged men - tended to gravitate toward the militias, these practices helped keep employees committed to the bureaucracy, and by so doing, reduced the number of people available to join in the fighting.

Even the practice of condoning widespread economic and political corruption had a functional aspect. Although it badly tarnished the image of the bureaucracy, it no doubt helped to keep employees on the job. The small salaries paid to lower-level officials may not have provided the necessary economic incentive for many to remain in the civil service. At higher levels some officials were provided with the incentive of accumulating substantial wealth if they stayed in their jobs. [18]

Another area where the bureaucracy tended to ignore its formal rules during the war was in the way that it responded to the pressures brought to bear by political groups and organizations seeking special favors or treatment. Bureaucrats saw an increased tendency on the part of public officials to submit to these kinds of pressures. Requests for such special treatment were sometimes based on family, friendship, or political ties. But during the conflict, they were often accompanied by threats against individuals and their families. When such threats come from more than one group, the net result was frequently bureaucratic paralysis. When caught in a political crossfire, doing nothing was sometimes the most prudent course of action. The government could not enforce the laws, nor could it provide security for officials whose decisions made them unpopular with certain political groups. It was difficult to blame individual bureaucrats for giving in to this sort of pressure.

Another aspect of political influence was the co-optation of bureaucrats and bureaucratic agencies by the various political factions. There were, and continue to be, instances of public officials holding membership and even office in such groups. There have also been cases of bureaucrats using the resources of their positions to further the political and sometimes military aims of groups which they favor. Co-optation was a more subtle approach to dominating the bureaucracy than a direct take-over or replacement of governmental machinery by the parties. However, it held many of the same dangers. By further violating the neutrality of the bureaucracy in this fashion, the political factions could have easily destroyed what remained of its legitimacy and effectiveness.

As in the case of economic corruption, politicization of the bureaucracy had a functional dimension. By submitting to the political demands of various sorts, and by generally avoiding confrontation, officials were able to protect their careers, and sometimes their lives. Some civil servants, of course, managed to advance their careers on the basis of their political connections. Thus, much like the business community, the bureaucracy learned to live with and even profit from the conflict. However, there was a cost: while the bureaucrats survived, an effective bureaucracy did not.

In terms of bureaucratic behavior, one must remark on the choices and incentives which individual bureaucrats had to face as a result of the conflict. By and large, the dynamics of the situation served to promote traditional rather than formal bureaucratic values. The government’s inability to enforce regulations governing employee conduct was one aspect of the situation. The lack of security in the country was another. The general need to accumulate funds as a possible source of security for when the situation would deteriorate, enhanced the importance of economic incentives, and perhaps the tendency toward corruption. In addition, the need for political influence in order to maintain one’s position or to advance in the bureaucracy became increasingly important. Finally, in a country where political assassinations and kidnappings came to be regular occurrences, the need to avoid antagonizing any of the armed factions was very real in a personal sense. Given this reality, it is perhaps easy to understand today the non-professional behavior of many official. Yet there were also many officials who deplored what they regarded as the poor performance of the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy, but who felt helpless, frustrated and unable to act against it.

The pathologies described above, and the concessions that the bureaucracy had to make in order to survive, continue to be serious dangers for its survival, and ultimately for the survival of Lebanon as a national entity. So far, the bureaucracy has shown a considerable ability to persist. It learned how to adapt and survive in Lebanon’s conflict-torn society. But at the same time, these accommodations compromised the bureaucracy to the point that it lost its capacity to function independently and effectively as a positive force in Lebanese society.

Summary

In conclusion, the public bureaucracy survived in Lebanon despite being considerably weakened. It survived, in part, because the political factions allowed it to survive, and, in part, because it was able to maintain some level of credibility with citizens as a national institution. To promote its survival, it tried to present itself as a Lebanese institution, politically neutral, with the potential to resume its normal functions in better times. It was aided in this respect by its sectarian character. However, in the face of the pressures generated by the intensity of the conflict in Lebanon, the bureaucracy, for the sake of expediency, succumbed to economic corruption, favoritism, and political influence. While there was a functional aspect to this behavior in survival terms, it tarnished the image that the bureaucracy was attempting to project, and diminished its capacity to administer. Furthermore, the concessions that the bureaucracy had to make in order to survive may have made it, by default, a factor in perpetuating the conflict.

*Maroun Kisirwani is an associate professor in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut. He is author of Patron-Client Politics and Bureaucratic Corruption: The Case of Lebanon, Bloomington, Indiana, 1974.

Endnotes

• Lebanon’s war which began in 1975 between Christians and Palestinians settled in Lebanon, assumed different dimensions soon after its outbreak. As the tension between Lebanese Christians and Palestinians intensified, Lebanese Muslims joined in on the side of the Palestinians. The conflict thereupon took on a religious aspect, which, to some extent, was deceptive. As the war followed its course, Syrian and Israeli military involvement increased, as did the involvement of other regional and international forces.
• Binder, “Political Change in Lebanon,” in L. Binder (ed), Politics in Lebanon, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, p.292.
• The Weberian Model is fully examined in H. Hall, “Interorganizational Structural Variation: Applications of the Bureaucratic Model,” Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.7, no.3, 1962, pp. 295-308.
• The French administrative model is presented in detail in N. Suleiman, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1947.
• For a discussion of these concepts see D. Learner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1958.
• Rondot, “The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy,” in L. Binder (ed), op.cit, p. 136.
• Kisirwani, “Administrative Ethics in ,” al-Abhath, (American University of Beirut), vol. XXVII, 1978/79, p. 53.
• Kisirwani and W. Parle, “Assessing the Impact of the Post-Civil War Period on the Lebanese Bureaucracy : A View from Inside,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. XXII, no. 1-2, 1987, pp. 17-32.
• Ibid. p.26.
• Humphrey, “Lebanon to Be Or Not To Be,” Current affairs Bulletin, vol. 64, no.11, 1988; S. Hoss, Lebanon: Agony and Peace, Islamic Center for Information and Development, Beirut, 1984, p.39.
• The conflict in Lebanon was very fluid over the years and alignments were unstable. See B. Gregory, “U.S. Relations with Lebanon: A Troubled Course,” American-Arab Affairs, vol.35, 1990-91, pp. 62-93.
• East Beirut is inhabited mainly by Christians and was then controlled by the Christian Lebanese Forces militia. After the Christians were driven out in 1983, the Shouf Mountains became a largely Druze domain controlled by the militia of Walid Junblat.
• The Economist, 20 October, 1990.
• Kisirwani, Patron-Client Politics and Bureaucratic Corruption,: The Case of Lebanon, International Development Research Center, Bloomington, Indiana, 1974.
• For a discussion of this aspect of sectarianism see E.M. Cheery. The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism and Chaos, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1976.
• Cayer, Managing Human Resources: An Introduction to Public Personnel Administration, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1980.
• A number of top civil servants, including the Director General of the Ministry of Finance, were assassinated as a result of carrying out their duties.
• Civil servants accumulate wealth by imposing gratuity as a kind of personal tax or tariff on public transactions.