The Conflicting Histories of Lebanon
The Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance
The Genesis of the Lebanese Crisis, Internal Causes
Regional Causes
International Causes
The Showdown
The Initial Response
The Iraqi Revolution
The Western Response: Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan
Egyptian and Soviet Responses
Conclusion

Endnotes

Myths and legends often form a community's view of its own history. Historical truth is the first casualty not only of war but also of nation-building. Only cohesive and united societies can afford the luxury of historical self-deception. Fragmented societies indulge in such fanciful invention at the their own peril, for, to survive, they need to know and comprehend the real and full truth of their past and accommodate themselves to political realities. The Lebanese, in particular, have resisted coming to terms with their own history. They have failed to learn from their tragic past and have continued to entertain illusions about their national identity and their importance in the world.

The Conflicting Histories of Lebanon

It was from this perspective that Kamal Salibi diagnosed the genesis of the bloody and prolonged war that erupted in 1975 and that almost destroyed the political and socio-economic fabric of Lebanon. He argued that the upheaval was basically a civil war fought between Lebanese factions flying different historical banners: the Christian Lebanese particularist banner on one side, and the Arab nationalist/Islamist banner on the other. To him, both sides were misguided; contrary to the claims of the particularists, the concept of a historical Lebanese nationality is not well founded. As a country, asserted Salibi, Lebanon is a modern creation; it was established and organized by the colonial powers. Although Lebanon's history is somewhat different from that of its Arab neighbors, Salibi rejected the idea of Lebanon as an entity separate and distinct from Arabism: the Lebanese case fits comfortably into the general pattern of Arab history.[1]

This does not mean that Salibi subscribes to the Arab nationalist Islamist interpretation of Lebanon's history. While he emphasized the basic Arabism of Lebanon, he warned against blindly adhering to the tenets of Arab nationalist doctrine. This highly idealized vision, contended Salibi, is problematic since it distorts the evolution of Arab history by confusing Islam and Arabism. By refuting the different theories of Lebanon's history and setting the record straight, he hoped to inject the Lebanese with a dose of realism and remind them of their humble origins. [2] If they failed to come to terms with their historical origins and the differences among them, Salibi feared, the Lebanese would continue to act as tribes:

Each tribe forever suspicious and distrustful of the others; each tribe always alert, extending feelers to the outside world in different directions, probing for possible sources of external support in preparation for yet another round of open conflict.[3]

Still, Salibi did not deal directly or explicitly with the foreign policy prescriptions and implications of these two main poles of thought. This omission needs to be rectified, given the close linkage between domestic and foreign politics in Lebanon. Nassif Hitti has argued that, since independence, the controversial issues that plunged the country into the abyss of instability and violence belong to the realm of external rather than internal politics. For example, the crisis of 1958, the protracted conflict with Palestinian guerrillas after 1969, and the all-out war that erupted in 1975 can all be seen as products of irreconcilable differences over Lebanon's relationship with its environment, differences arising from contradictory perceptions of Lebanon's place in the region and beyond.[4]

What are some of the perceptions that have had such considerable impact on Lebanon's relations with the outside world? The Asile du Liban constituency, with its emphasis on the Phoenician origin and special historical character of the Lebanese, perceived of Lebanon as a "shinning example of liberal democracy and general social advancement in the Arab world.[5] The Arab world was seen as a tribal domain, inferior to that of the civilized, European-like, and materially successful Lebanon. Small wonder that this particularist, Lebanonist school identified itself culturally and politically with the West rather than with the Islamic world. It called for a reorientation of Lebanon's foreign policy and for a strategic alliance with the Western powers. An idealized view of the West fostered exaggerated expectations: it was assumed that the latter would fight to protect the "only Western model" in the Arab region.[6]

The Lebanonist adherents thus came to overvalue Lebanon's place on the Western strategic chessboard and set goals beyond their capabilities. The result was the adoption of confrontational policies that alienated and clashed with the objectives of the Arab nationalist and Islamist segment of Lebanese society. The latter saw the political destiny and future of Lebanon in a different light. Their point of reference was the Arab/Islamic world rather than the West. The interests of Lebanon were subordinated to those of its immediate environment. In a sense,. this constituency served, consciously or unconsciously, as a conduit for and mirror to other ideologies, whether Nasserism, the Palestinian nationalism of the PLO, or the militant Islamism of the Islamic Republic of Iran.[7] Not surprisingly, Lebanon became a theater for inter-Arab rivalries and regional conflicts.

The Crisis of 1958:
The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the perceptions of the particularist and Arab nationalist/Islamist schools affected Lebanon's external relations, and how they adversely influenced the formation of its foreign policy. It will be argued that the inflated images held by the two constituencies distorted their world views and led to an over-estimation of their own and Lebanon's importance in the international system. The failure to maintain a balance between goals and means produced reckless policies based on miscalculation and improvisation. At no time was this truer than in the conflict of 1958, when the clash between the differing views of the two groups culminated in a bloody confrontation and outside intervention.

As a case study, the crisis of 1958 sheds much light on the foreign policy misperceptions of both constituencies. Contrary to popular perceptions, American military intervention in Lebanon did not reflect any strategic commitment by Washington to the Lebanonist agenda or to Lebanon's future. In addition, Beirut was not the main target of U.S. action; rather, Cairo and Moscow were. Shocked by the success of the July 1958 Iraqi evolution, although accepting it as a fait accompli, American officials used Lebanon as a theater to project their military power and demonstrate their will to protect their vital regional interests, mainly the supply of oil. They wanted to signal to their adversaries their readiness to use force, if necessary, to arrest the further crumbling of the Arab conservative order. As one U.S. policymaker put it, "Lebanon was a test case in the eyes of the others."[8]

The Eisenhower administration probably would not have sent troops to Lebanon if the Iraqi revolution had not occurred. Prior to the July revolution, and notwithstanding the repeated requests for U.S. intervention by president Camille Chamoun and his foreign minister, Charles Malik, president Eisenhower was reluctant to become entangled militarily in the quagmire of Lebanese politics. But in U.S. eyes, the dramatic events in Iraq introduced a dangerous new element in that it threatened to destroy the whole Western security structure in the Middle East. Eisenhower felt that the time had come to intervene in the region to "stop the trend toward chaos."[9]

In this sense, the U.S. action should be viewed within a broader context than merely that of the situation in Lebanon. Lebanon served as a convenient place for the United States to send signals to its adversaries. Far from being seen as a proof of Western commitment to the security of Lebanon, American intervention was part of the struggle between the West and revolutionary Arab nationalism. the Lebanonist constituency failed to realize that Lebanon was not high on Washington's global priority list. They duped themselves into believing that their alliance with the Western powers was mutual and strategic. How else can one explain Chamoun's anger and bitterness toward the U.S. government when it ultimately abandoned him in favor of his nemesis, Gamal Abd al-Nasser?[10]

Likewise, the Arab nationalist/Islamist adherents fell victim to the same misconceptions, and they suffered, like their Lebanonist compatriots, from a similar geostrategic myopia. The problem was that they digested uncritically the slogans of radical Arab nationalism emanating from Cairo and Damascus. To them, Lebanon had to march with the Arab caravan whatever the consequences and costs. They were obsessed with Nasser who became (in the words of Shaykh Nadim al-Jisr, a leading opponent of President Chamoun), "to all Arabs and Moslems, and object of worship next to God."[11]

As a result, the lines between national and regional politics blurred. Not only did the Arab Cold War play itself out in Lebanon, but so too did the rivalry between the Arab Nationalist Movement and the West. The crisis of 1958 was a case in point, Nasser's Egypt was asserting its leadership in the Arab arena by attempting to punish and subdue regional enemies. It was also battling the Western powers to force them to recognize Egyptian hegemony in the area. In a sense, Arab nationalists were pawns sin the Egyptian game of regional and international politics. They had a blind faith in the authenticity and historical inevitability of Nasser's brand of Arabism and in their own important role in achieving it .They never questioned the real motives behind Egypt's drive for Arab unity or realized that they were being used as tools to achieve Nasser's objectives.

The irony was that at the height of the 1958 war Nasser was secretly negotiating with the Americans to strike a deal. One wonders whether the Egyptian leader took the time to consult with his junior allies in Beirut to get their approval for such a course of action. According to the existing evidence, the answer is no. In local conflicts where the interests of small actors tend to be sacrificed to those of bigger powers, it was no surprise to see that in Lebanon both the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies endured the same treatment by their more powerful patrons.

The Genesis of the Lebanese Crisis
Internal Causes

The Lebanese conflict, which broke out in the spring of 1958, had internal, regional, and international dimensions, all closely related to one another.[12] It is only by surveying events in Lebanon up to the 1958 crisis and examining these three dimensions that the Lebanese war can be understood.

On the domestic front, a struggle for power between the opposition and President Camille Chamoun was polarizing Lebanese politics and society. Chamoun, a staunchly pro-Western Maronite politician, was determined to assert his political will at all costs. As early as May 1957, the Commander of the Lebanese army, General Fouad Chehab, privately told U,S. representatives that Chamoun's "dictatorial" style was driving the opposition into a corner and splitting the political elite across sectarian and religious lines. Chehab contended that he had often warned Chamoun against tampering with the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 1957. According to the General, the balance of the system was such that it would not be possible to eliminate opposition.[13] This balance between Christians and Muslims, maintained Chehab, would not allow Chamoun to become a "dictator". Hence, in the General's eyes, the solution lay in a compromise which would save face for the government and "give the opposition a slice of the cheese." He implored his American interlocutors not to view the internal power struggle in Lebanon in terms of East-West rivalry. Most of the men opposed to Chamoun, concluded Chehab, were patriotic Lebanese: "If [Suleiman] Franjieh or [Kamal] Joumblat are Communists then I am afraid you must consider me one also," he is reported to have said.[14]

In a similar vein, the secretary general of the Moslem National Organization, Abd al-Wahab Rifa`i, informed a U.S. official that Chamoun's handling of local political issues and personalities was at the heart of the problem. He accused Chamoun and Malik of being egocentric, adding that they "sought to impose their personal convictions upon the people without sufficient spadework."[15]

This showed clearly that opposition to Chamoun was broadly based, and included some of the important members of the ruling establishment. They blamed the president personally, and argued that his authoritarian approach was responsible for alienating a large segment of the political elite. In Chehab's words, Chamoun was the problem.[16] Given the level of opposition to his administration, one would have expected Chamoun to try to placate his opponents and come to terms with them. But the tenacious president and his combative foreign minister were not prepared to tolerate dissent. They were determined to win the battle of wills against the opposition by counting on the physical and political support of the Western powers. Their overestimation of Lebanon's strategic importance to the West and their overconfidence would prove their undoing.

This strategy was translated initially into a resounding victory of the pro-Chamoun forces in the 1957 parliamentary elections, which further polarized Lebanese political life. The opposition bitterly contested the magnitude and legality of the government 's triumph, and alleged that Chamoun wanted to amend the constitution so that he could be re-elected. The president's refusal to publicly deny these allegations convinced his opponents and supporters alike of his intention to seek a second term, and both the CIA and the U.S. embassy in Beirut concluded that Chamoun had fixed the elections in such a way as to ensure his re-election.[17]

The opposition also accused Washington of financing the pro-Chamoun candidates. There was some truth in this charge. The main CIA contact with Chamoun, Wilbur Eveland, claimed that the CIA provided 'massive' funding to the pro-government deputies, and he portrayed the elections as a CIA-run operation.[18] According to Eveland, the United States did so in the knowledge that the new parliament would elect a new president in 1958. Although no specific U.S. documents relating to Washington's influence on the elections have been released yet, recently declassified sources hinted that the United States "played an active role." They also showed that Foreign Minister Malik sought American assistance to influence the results of the elections.[19]

Regional Causes

It would be misleading, however, to think of the Lebanese crisis as simply an internal struggle for power, or as a clash of temperaments and personalities. Internal dissatisfaction with Chamoun was fueled mainly by the government's pursuit of regional and international policies which were seen to be provocative and divisive. In the second half of the 1950s the polarization of the Arab world exacerbated internal divisions within Lebanon.

Two currents were competing for influence and dominance on the Middle East scene: while Nasser's Egypt led the revolutionary pan-Arab nationalist movement, Iraq, representing the pro-Western Arab states, spearheaded the conservative opposition to Egypt's quest for regional dominance. The Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry poisoned inter-Arab relations, and the flames of the Arab Cold War engulfed the regional order. Lebanon was no exception. Chamoun's pro-Iraqi policy manifested itself in his flirting with the idea of joining the Baghdad pact, which antagonized Egypt and later Syria. Not only did Nasser and Chamoun hold conflicting views on the major issues that divided the Arab world, but they also had a serious clash of personalities.[20]

Chamoun's stand on other regional issues added further to the straining of relations between Egypt-Syria and Lebanon, and the deepening of Lebanese internal divisions. When Britain and France invaded Egypt in 1956, Chamoun refused to sever diplomatic relations with the two European powers. 'The rulers of Lebanon," Nasser declared later, 'stabbed us in the back during our time of stress."[21] During the Syrian crisis of 1957, Chamoun and Malik received the U.S. envoy, Loy Henderson, without consulting Syria. Malik exhorted the Eisenhower administration to topple the Syrian regime. He told Henderson that -pro-Western Lebanon could not coexist with a neutralist or communist-oriented Syria: "Sooner or later one or the other must disappear."[22] In return, the Syrian foreign ministry denounced Chamoun for serving 'imperialistic and Zionist designs."[23]

The Lebanese president was not deterred, however. He perceived radical Arab nationalism as a threat to the regional conservative order of which Lebanon was an integral part. Chamoun and Malik were prepared to take risky decisions to combat the rise of Nasser's pan-Arabism. For example, when in February 1958 Egypt and Syria united to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), Chamoun initially refused to recognize the new entity.[24] Neither the president nor his foreign minister seemed to take much account of the domestic implications of pursuing an anti-Egyptian policy. Instead, they swam against the current of public opinion, thus undermining the bases of their political legitimacy.[25]

The opposition resented Chamoun's lukewarm attitude toward the UAR. After the conclusion of the union, Damascus became a virtual pilgrimage site for many Lebanese politicians and citizens wishing to pay homage to Nasser. The speaker of the Lebanese parliament, Adil Usayran, declared that "Lebanon will march with the Arab caravan, and anyone who thinks of working for interests other than those of the Arabs will have no room in Lebanon."[26] In their zeal for Arab unity under Nasser, Muslim demonstrators trampled the Lebanese flag in the streets of Tyre.[27]

Given the diametrically opposed views of the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist/Islamist constituencies, the stage was set for a confrontation in which each side sought external support to consolidate its position. While Chamoun and Malik courted Washington, the opposition welcomed with open arms Egyptian and Syrian political and material assistance. Both sides played a dangerous game: they mortgaged the future of their country to foreign creditors.

International Causes

Chamoun's pursuit of a pronounced pro-Western policy only compounded his difficulties internally and regionally. He, Malik, and Prime Minister Sami Solh tied Lebanon's fortunes to American policy in the Middle East. Their strategy could have been beneficial but for the steady deterioration of relations between the West and the forces of revolutionary Arab nationalism since the mid-1950s. This development confronted the Chamoun government with a problematic choice.[28] Beirut had to choose between a close association with Washington, thus risking domestic instability and regional isolation, and a low-key and neutral approach in order to appease pan-Arab nationalist forces. Chamoun hoped to preempt the opposition by aligning Lebanese foreign policy with that of the United States.

Chamoun and Malik quickly seized on the Eisenhower Doctrine to request U.S. military assistance. It was Malik, rather than Chamoun, who was the driving force behind Lebanon's active alignment of its foreign policy with Washington.[29] Even before Congress approved the doctrine in March 1957, Malik informed Eisenhower that Lebanon welcomed his initiative and was ready to combat communist subversion in the region. He also asserted that Egypt and Syria were gradually falling under Soviet domination. "It [is] essential," added Malik, "that political change take place in Syria and Egypt."[30]

With the exception of Libya, Lebanon was the only Arab country officially to endorse the doctrine. The other pro-Western Arab governments recognized the inherent danger in such a move. Chamoun's opponents believed that, by aligning Lebanon with the West against Egypt and Syria, the president had violated not only Beirut's traditional neutrality but also the delicate balance among the various Lebanese factions. As two of the opposition leaders, Kamal Junblat and Shaykh Jisr, put it, the 1958, intifada was a direct response to foreign influence and to Lebanon's dependence on the West.[31] More than any other issue, Lebanon's international alignment and its estrangement from the Arab fold brought the crisis to a head. This reflected the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies' contradictory perceptions and irreconcilable differences over Lebanon's relationship with its environment.

The Showdown

The scene was thus set for a confrontation between the regime and the opposition. The balance of power was clearly not in Chamoun's favor since General Chehab refused to commit the army on the president's side. The General was opposed to involving the army in an internal struggle lest it be torn apart by the contradictions of Lebanese politics. In discussions with U.S. representatives. Chehab ,could not hide his "sincere disgust" with Chamoun and his collaborators.[32]

The neutralization of the army was important in two respects. First, it exposed basic divisions within the Lebanese government and the precarious position of Chamoun himself. Second, it enabled the opposition, with material and political assistance from the UAR, to expand and consolidate its presence in large areas of the country. Chamoun was forced to rely on local militias and on the police for resistance. To him, this was not a viable option since he was not interested in a stalemate. Chamoun needed to defeat his opponents and their regional sponsors, and for this he required the intervention of a superior Western force.

As tensions increased in the early months of 1958, Chamoun and his government tried to emphasize the external nature of the crisis and to impress on Washington the need for decisive action. They portrayed the conflict as a struggle between pro-Western Lebanon and radical Arab nationalism, which was allied with communism.[33] In three separate statements in May, Chamoun, Solh, and Malik accused the UAR of interfering in Lebanon's internal affairs with the intention of overthrowing its democratically-elected government. Beleaguered at home, Chamoun and Malik began looking for outside support.

In his meetings with U.S. officials, Malik lamented the incapacity of the West to deal with the communist threat. By emphasizing the external menace and by playing the Cold War card, Chamoun and Malik wanted to internationalize the dispute and involve the Americans on their side. In contrast, the opposition was adamantly against the internationalization of the crisis since the configuration of forces was in their favor. In contrast to Chamoun, they asserted that the roots of the conflict were internal and had nothing to do with the ambitions of the UAR. Nevertheless, they relied heavily on the moral and physical support of the UAR.[34]

At the end of may 1958 the Lebanese government lodged two complaints against the UAR before the Arab League and the UN Security Council. To Chamoun and Malik, however, the League was not equipped to resolve the crisis. Instead, they focused their efforts on the Security Council, which voted to send an observer team to Lebanon.[35] By mid-May, Nasser broke his silence and denied any responsibility for events in Lebanon. He accused Chamoun of trying to convert a purely internal affair into an external problem in order to "deceive the Big Powers and induce them to intervene." In the meantime, the Voice of the Arabs radio station, a mouthpiece of the Egyptian government, was attacking Chamoun and calling on the Lebanese people to topple him.[36]