The Initial U.S. Response

Recently declassified American documents show clearly that, initially, U.S. officials disagreed in their assessment of the Lebanese crisis. Three points of view can be discerned: the first, shared by Eisenhower and Dulles, argued that the problem in Lebanon was "Communistic in origin." To them, America's influence and presence inn the Middle East were at a critical point since the USSR was instigating instability throughout the region. Eisenhower wrote later: "Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the communists were principally responsible for the trouble."[37]

A second view established a connection between radical Arab nationalism and communism, thus emphasizing the destabilizing role of the UAR. The "Communist incitement to revolt" was linked closely with Nasser's efforts to destabilize the pro-Western regimes in the Middle East including Lebanon. Egyptian and Syrian aid to the Lebanese opposition reported U.S. representatives in Beirut, was prolonging and aggravating the situation. According to this view, Nasser's latest offensive was designed to inflict maximum damage on Western prestige in the area.[38]

In contrast, a third view held by American officials argued that the crisis was political; in nature. In their eyes Lebanon was not threatened by external aggression, since the UAR, which had confined its activities to propaganda, was not a member of the Socialist bloc. For example, the U.S ambassador to Beirut, Robert McClintock ,saw largely domestic political causes at the heart of the conflict. To him, questions of foreign policy were less important than questions of personality.[39] However, this was a minority opinion within the U.S. administration.

Before the escalation of the crisis in early May, the U.S. government was forthcoming in its commitment to Chamoun's policies and even with regard to his quest for reelection.[40] This represented a low-risk strategy for Washington since political discontent had not erupted yet into an allout rebellion against the Chamoun regime. As the situation further deteriorated following the assassination of a leading opposition journalist, Nassib al-Matni, the Eisenhower administration reconsidered its previous undertaking to Lebanon. The intensity of the riots which broke out in the country sobered U.S. officials. The latter recognized the inherent danger getting entangled in internal Lebanese politics, which would have pitted them against the forces of radical Arab nationalism.

It was within this context that McClintock advocated the adoption of a cautious U.S. approach to the Lebanese crisis, unless "we desire to use the Lebanon issue as a means for carrying out a conscious policy of enmity toward Nasser and the UAR with a view to splitting off Syria and trying a 'neo-Suez' against Nasser."[41] But Eisenhower and Dulles were not prepared to risk a confrontation with the UAR over Lebanon. American officials did not see Lebanon as intrinsically important in itself. Chamoun and Malik, to their dismay, later discovered this truth, and it shattered their somewhat idealistic view of the West.

Accordingly, on May 13, in response to a tentative request by Beirut for possible U.S. intervention, McClintock was instructed to inform Chamoun that Washington considered the introduction of American forces into Lebanon as a 'grave" step which could have the most serious and far-reaching consequences. At this stage, the Americans were uneasy about military intervention. The stakes were low and the potential political costs very high. The U.S. administration impressed on Chamoun the need to rely on his own resources to resolve the conflict. American officials hoped that Chamoun could still deal with the evolving crisis by putting his house in order.[42] The consensus in Washington was that armed intervention could have regional repercussions which would be inimical to Western interests.

For example, during a National Security meeting, the director of the U.S. Information Agency, George Allen, warned against the sending of American troops because this would be regarded as an intervention on behalf of the Christian community. As he put it: "The Lebanese had for so many years tended too much to place reliance on the protection of outside powers - the Turks, the French, the British, and, lately, ourselves." Instead, Allen concluded, the Lebanese should depend on themselves for protection.[43] In response to a lowering of tension towards the end of may, Dulles stated publicly that the administration did not consider Lebanon to be threatened by international communism under present conditions.[44] Although the U.S. airlifted police arms to Beirut and moved elements of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, American officials were reluctant to commit themselves to any decisive action.

Meanwhile, Moscow's initial response to the Lebanon crisis was limited and confined to rhetoric. An official Soviet statement protested the dangerous attempts by foreign powers to interfere in Lebanon's internal affairs. Western intervention, warned the statement, could result in "serious consequences" for the future of peace in the Middle East.[45] Moscow did not, however, undertake an active diplomatic 9offensive in Lebanon as it had done during the Syrian crisis the previous year.[46] This reflected the marginal position which Lebanon occupied in Soviet policy, and indicated that Soviet officials did not see their vital interests to be involved there.

By mid-June the security situation in Lebanon took a turn for the worse. Chamoun instructed Malik to re-inquire whether the U.S. would be willing, if requested, to send troops to Beirut. Malik impressed on American officials the urgency of the situation and put them on notice that a request for intervention might be imminent. He emphasized the external dimension of the crisis by accusing Nasserism and communism of unleashing their fury upon Lebanon. Malik told Dulles that the conflict transcended the boundaries of Lebanon to encompass the Middle East as a whole. It was a contest, he asserted, between Chamoun and the West on the one side, and Nasser and the Eastern bloc on the other; hence the real fight was between capitalism and communism. Western efforts to tackle the crisis, concluded Malik, should not be restricted to Lebanon; they should be broad enough to resolve the underlying problems in the region.[47]

The Eisenhower administration held a serious of meetings at the highest levels to discuss Chamoun latest overtures and define a course of action toward Lebanon. The consensus in Washington was still against intervention. Eisenhower doubted that intervention could be justified under the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was directed only against external aggression - an admission that the causes of the crisis were internal.. he felt that the United States should be subjected to the same criticism that its European allies had faced during their invasion of Suez. Eisenhower lamented the lack of strong leadership and the deep divisions within the Lebanese ruling elite: thus he "had little, if any, enthusiasm for our intervening at this time."[48]

Dulles echoed Eisenhower's opinion by noting that to intervene at this point would be catastrophic to U.S. allies and interests in the Middle East. Such an action, he added, should take into account the divisiveness of Lebanese politics and the general weakness of the pro-Western governments in the region. He was particularly worried about the unstable Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad. Dulles suggested that Washington must pressure the Lebanese into solving their problems themselves and induce Chamoun to make concessions. He was blunt with Malik: Chamoun should be under no illusion that by inviting the U.S. to intervene he could win the battle against Nasser; " on the contrary, he would lose it." In other words, the United States was not prepared to fight Nasser and the forces of Arabism to please Beirut.[49]

In fact, U.S. officials were secretly negotiating with Nasser to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis. This amounted to an implicit recognition by Washington of the Egyptian leader's transnational status and power in the Arab world. At the end of may, Nasser approached the Eisenhower administration and offered to use his influence to help end the conflict. A series of meetings took place in Cairo between Nasser and the U.S. ambassador. But when the State Department communicated to Chamoun the outline of the Egyptian leader's proposal, Chamoun rejected it out of hand. He refused to accept any compromise that would signal the end of his political career. What was puzzling was that American officials did not even attempt to convince Chamoun of the merits of Nasser's plan as a starting point for negotiations. They dismissed the proposal as a ploy to impose a solution "not desired by Lebanon." The irony was that two months later the Eisenhower administration would use the terms of the Egyptian plan as the basis for a settlement of the Lebanese crisis.[50]

On June 19, Dulles requested McClintock to urge Chamoun to do everything in his power to avoid a situation in which a request for intervention might be required. The ambassador told Chamoun that sending Western troops to Beirut would not solve the present crisis. Instead, it would have the opposite effect and arouse popular feelings which could destabilize and possibly overthrow the moderate Arab regimes; it could even lead to "Lebanon's ultimate territorial partition or truncation." This would result in the weakening of the Western position and an increase in the prestige and influence of Nasser.[51]

Chamoun was not convinced by these arguments. To him, a political solution was unattainable because, he believed, the initiative was no longer in the hands of local leaders; Nasser now was the driving force behind the rebellion. He left it to his foreign minister, however, to articulate the regime's position. Meeting with Dulles on June 30, Malik reiterated the view that the main cause of the conflict was not internal; it had a larger dimension. If Lebanese independence were undermined, he noted, other pro-Western governments would collapse: "Lebanon is holding the dike and this is a battle not for Lebanon alone but [for] the West. If Lebanon goes, the West will go down too."[52] Malik argued that neither Nasser nor his pro-Lebanese sympathizers were interested in a political compromise. At any rate, he added, Chamoun was not prepared to make any concessions because he believed that Nasser should not be permitted to have a say in Lebanon's domestic and foreign affairs: "Chamoun will fight this battle until he wins or collapses because this is a battle for freedom and for stability and peace in the Middle East. It transcends Lebanese interests."[53]

The apocalyptic language and the absolute terms in which Malik portrayed the conflict reflected a desire on his part to entice the West to intervene militarily in the crisis. But on a higher level, it also expressed an inflated conviction of the significance of Lebanon on the Western strategic chessboard. Yet how realistic were Malik's claims? And to what extent was the survival of the West really and inextricably linked to the survival of Lebanon?

Dulles, for one, was not impressed by Malik's presentation. Military intervention would be "disastrous," he told his Lebanese counterpart. By now, American officials were beginning to see Chamoun as the major obstacle to a peaceful settlement since he was "stubbornly unwilling to take those last measures of personal sacrifice which might assure a political compromise averting his own defeat. "It was in this context that Dulles proposed to Malik the need to think seriously about a successor to Chamoun.[54] Soon, however, bloody developments in Iraq would prompt American policy-makers to question their initial doubts about intervening in the Middle East, and cause them to pursue a contrary course of action.

The Iraqi Revolution

Conservative Arab rulers were worried about the escalation of the Lebanese crisis and the increased strength of the pro-Nasser forces there. No one was more anxious than the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Said, who was aware of the precarious position of the Iraqi monarchy. The struggle over the Baghdad Pact had convinced him that everything in the Arab order was interlinked. Political survival in Arab politics required a constant balancing and counterbalancing act.

Hence, in Iraqi eyes, an Egyptian victory in Lebanon would further contribute to the isolation of Baghdad in Arab circles. Such a shift in the regional balance of power would threaten the survival of the conservative Arab regimes. Given the weak foundations on which their rule was built, the Hashemites in Iraq would be the first to collapse. Inevitably, therefore, Nuri al-Said took the lead in trying to devise ways to support Chamoun.

According to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Waldemar Gallman, Nuri expressed his dismay with Washington failure to adopt a positive approach toward Chamoun. He implored the West to take the initiative in actively supporting the beleaguered Lebanese president. Furthermore, Nuri informed Chamoun that Iraq and Jordan were willing to conclude a defensive military or political agreement with Lebanon. Britain also supported an Iraqi-Lebanese defense link.[55] Iraqi officials encouraged Chamoun to stand firm and refuse to make any concessions to the opposition. "They assured him that Lebanon could rely on Western intervention as a last resort, Iraq went further and publicly attacked Nasser, accusing him of using communist methods of subversion from within in order to control the Arab world. To demonstrate their determination to help Chamoun, members of the Baghdad pact scheduled a meeting in Istanbul on July 14 to discuss, primarily, the Lebanese crisis.[56] But in the early hours of that day, a group of army officers, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, moved on Baghdad and overthrew the Hashemite royal family. Two decades of unpopular policies had antagonized large segments in the army and society, and the old order was swiftly demolished.[57]

The Western Response:
Intervention in Lebanon and Jordan

The revolution in Baghdad shocked Western leaders and took them completely by surprise. It also delivered a devastating blow to the British position in the Middle East, since Iraq was the last major bastion of British influence in the region. In U.S. eyes, the defection of Baghdad from the pro-Western camp threatened to weaken the region's defenses and undermine the security of the conservative Arab regimes. By its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, Iraq was the only Arab state to align itself openly with the west against Soviet communism. As Eisenhower put it, Iraq "was the country that we were counting on heavily as a bulwark of stability and progress in the region."[58] In other words, the United States could not afford to be passive.

The coup in Iraq posed a direct threat to Washington's interests and to its allies in the region. Panicking leaders in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia urged the U.S. to act forcefully to contain the revolutionary currents sweeping their societies. To Chamoun, the Iraqi revolution signaled a broad offensive by Nasser, with Soviet backing, to unseat all pro-Western Arab governments. Accordingly, a few hours after the coup, he summoned McClintock and requested Washington's prompt military intervention. He said he would interpret the administration's intentions by its deeds rather than by its rhetoric.[59]

Likewise, King Hussein met the U.S. representative in Amman with a similar request. King Saud also contacted the Eisenhower administration and asked for Western intervention in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Unless the West acted decisively, Saud warned, the U.S. and Britain would be finished as major powers in the Middle East; Saudi Arabia also would be forced to acquiesce in Nasser's ambitions - a veiled threat that Saud would realign his regional and foreign policies.[60]

On July 14, Eisenhower held a series of meetings with his cabinet the NSC, and congressional leaders to formulate U.S. strategy. To Eisenhower, the Iraqi revolution changed U.S. objectives from stabilizing a precarious situation in Lebanon to preventing the possibility of "a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East." Dulles, echoing the sentiments of the pro-Western Arab leaders, stated that the real authority behind the new Iraqi regime was Nasser, and that behind Nasser was the Soviet Union. The fear of a domino effect was high in the minds of American officials, and CIA Director Allen Dulles warned that the coup would set up a chain reaction which would endanger the survival of the conservative Arab regimes.[61]

Eisenhower seemed to have made up his mind about the necessity of taking strong action to avoid the collapse of the whole Western security structure. He told the NSC that "we must act or get out of the Middle East entirely." Secretary of State Dulles concurred with the president. He said that U.S. prestige and credibility were at stake not only in the Middle East but throughout the world.[62] U.S. officials believed that the United States must provide a psychological boost to its friends in the area by asserting itself militarily. The consensus within the administration was that to do nothing would be disastrous to Washington's interests and to its local allies. In a key meeting attended by the heads of the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, the consequences of U.S. inaction were summarized as follows: (1) Nasser would dominate the whole Arab arena; (2) Washington would lose influence throughout the area, and its military bases there would be in jeopardy; and (3) the reliability of U.S. commitments would be brought into question around the world. [63]

To American leaders, the crisis and its implications were not confined to the Middle East. They saw the conflict in broader, global terms through the prism of their rivalry with the Soviet Union.[64] To them radical Arab nationalism was supported and had been penetrated by communism, and Nasser was no more than an instrument in the hands of the Soviet Union. Dulles went further, comparing Nasser and his pan-Arabism with Hitler and his pan-Germanism.[65] The connection was thus easily established between Cairo's involvement in the Lebanese and Iraqi crises and the Kremlin's indirect aggression. The hidden hand of Moscow was seen to be pulling the strings. Yet, there was no hard evidence to implicate Moscow.

During their deliberations over the question of whether Washington should intervene or not, however, American policy makers were not terribly concerned about Lebanon. As Dulles put it, Lebanon was "not very important in itself";[66] it was no more than a battleground where the United States could assert its leadership against radical Arab nationalism and communism. McClintock was not even sure about this, however. After his meeting with Chamoun on July 14, the ambassador advised his superiors against intervention; such a decision could only be taken in light of broader political and strategic concerns affecting the American position in the whole region. "So far as Lebanon alone is concerned," added the ambassador, "we cannot as of midday discern need for so portentous a step."[67]

Yet having concluded that intervention in Lebanon was necessary to project American military power and political will, Washington sent U.S. marines to Beirut on July 15; meanwhile, British troops were dispatched to Jordan. Moscow and Cairo were the two main targets of the U.S. action. By engaging militarily, the Eisenhower administration hoped to force the Soviets to put a brake on Nasser's drive. In a meeting of the NSC, Dulles said that the real problem in the Middle East was not Nasser but the Kremlin's unwillingness to limit his actions. To Dulles, if Soviet leaders could be persuaded that Nasser's policies could lead to war, they would surely act to restrain him.[68]

At the heart of U.S. thinking lay a misperception that Nasser was Moscow's man rather than his own. American officials erred both in accusing the Egyptian leader of engineering the coup in Baghdad and in exaggerating Soviet influence on him, and a few months later events would prove them wrong. Qasim's Iraq asserted its independence from Nasser and effected the first major split in the Arab revolutionary movement. Concurrently, a heated and bitter propaganda campaign erupted between Cairo and Moscow, thus shattering the myth of Nasser's subservience to the Soviet Union. The problem with U.S. policy was that it looked at the Middle East through the lenses of the Cold War rather than in terms of its own internal dynamics. This distorted American perceptions of regional politics and complicated Washington's relations with the Arabs. Ironically, the Soviet Union was the main beneficiary of this policy.

Although U.S. officials had discounted the possibility of Soviet counter-action, they refused to sanction a military operation in Iraq. While the British advocated a full-scale armed campaign to clean up the whole area, Eisenhower was unwilling to go along. He was aware of the political and military implications inherent in such a move. U.S. officials recognized the futility of promoting a counter-revolution in Baghdad, since "the situation in Iraq was hopeless."[69] Furthermore, in deliberating whether or not to intervene in Lebanon, U.S. officials could not neglect the possibility of a Soviet reaction. The balance of terror had served to influence the superpowers against precipitate acts. They would sooner neglect their local allies than endanger the international balance of power.

U.S. strategy was also designed to avoid a costly confrontation with radical Arab nationalism. Robert Murphy, who was sent to Lebanon as Eisenhower's personal representative, visited Egypt and Iraq and assured Nasser and Qasim that Washington had no intention of attacking their countries. He made it clear that the U.S. was keen on maintaining good relations with the Arab nationalist movement. Moreover, the administration reported its intervention in Lebanon to the UN Security Council and stated its willingness to cooperate with the UN to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces.[70]

By promptly dispatching a presidential envoy to the region, Washington signaled its interest in a political solution. Indeed, during their deliberations, American decisionmakers displayed a realistic appreciation of the limits of force. They believed that armed intervention was unlikely to provide a quick and easy answer to the problems of Lebanon or the Middle East. In their opinion, using Western troops to stem the tide of nationalism would simply not work. "We have no illusion," noted Dulles, "that this response will solve the problems of that area - in fact it may make them worse." This view served to limit U.S. objectives to the restoration of political stability in Lebanon.[71]

Accordingly, while in Lebanon Murphy opened a channel of communication with all the warring Lebanese factions. In his meeting with the opposition leaders, Murphy reassured them that U.S. intervention was not designed to prop up Chamoun or to impose a settlement.[72] This was a clear signal from Washington that Chamoun was dispensable. Murphy's discussions with Lebanese politicians led him to report to Eisenhower that "much of the conflict concerned personalities. Communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection. The outside influences came mostly from Syria and Egypt."[73]

The importance of recognizing this was that Washington could now deal directly with the internal sources of conflict in Lebanon. Its efforts would no longer be diverted by focusing on an imaginary communist threat. By placing the crisis in its own context, U.S. officials would find the contending parties amenable to a political compromise. Hence the main key to a solution of the Lebanese puzzle lay in addressing and smoothing over the clashing views and claims of the government and the opposition. By coming to terms with this reality. Washington was able to facilitate a settlement in Beirut.

Egyptian and Soviet Responses

Nasser heard about the Iraqi coup and the subsequent American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan while visiting Tito in Yugoslavia. He was concerned mainly that Washington would use the Turkish military machine to crush the new regime in Baghdad and threaten Damascus. In contrast, Lebanon did not figure very highly in Nasser's thinking.

In Nasser's view, the USSR was the only power capable of counter-balancing Washington. The Egyptian leader decided to leave Yugoslavia and go to Moscow to consult with Soviet leaders and ascertain whether he could rely on them in the event of confrontation with the West. Nasser urged Khrushchev to prevent any Western or Turkish move against Iraq or Syria by delivering an ultimatum to the West.[74] His request was refused. "Frankly," Khrushchev was reported to have told him, "we are not ready for a confrontation./ We are not ready for World War Three.". He emphasized that Egypt would have to move with the tide because Dulles was determined to get his way. However, the Soviets had to do something to mollify their Arab friends. As a gesture of solidarity, Moscow ordered general troop maneuvers on the Bulgarian-Turkish border.[75] Khrushchev also privately warned Eisenhower against attacking Iraq. Such an eventuality, he implied, would trigger a "world conflict."[76]

Although Nasser left Moscow empty handed, Khrushchev's symbolic act of ordering troop maneuvers enabled the Egyptian leader to use the Soviet card in his propaganda campaign. As soon as he arrived in Damascus, he announced to the crowds that the Soviet Union was "fully behind us." Rhetoric aside, however, Cairo's and Moscow's responses were very restrained and Nasser's options were limited. Nasser's meeting with Khrushchev came as a real awakening to him. He could barely defend his interests, and far less mount a credible resistance to the Western powers, without active Soviet participation. In the post-world War II era, one of the implicit rules governing U.S.-Soviet relations was the avoidance of a direct armed clash. It was one thing to threaten the British, the French, and the Israelis, as Moscow had done during the Suez crisis, but quite another to threaten a superpower. Soviet leaders would not force themselves into a corner lest Washington call their bluff; superpower miscalculation could lead to global war. Local actors, who deluded themselves into believing otherwise did so at their peril. Like Nuri and Chamoun, Nasser did not seem to have learned this important lesson. The ultimate manifestation of this misunderstanding was Nasser's behavior during the Egyptian-Israeli crisis of 1967, when his gamble on superpower support would prove disastrous.

Soviet strategy toward the Lebanese crisis was similar to that which was adopted during the Suez and Syrian conflicts, its purpose being to force the West to recognize the Soviet presence and role in the region. In other words, Moscow wanted to lift the Western veto on its participation in Middle Eastern diplomacy. To do so required an active approach which would, on the surface, champion the rights of Arab states while, in essence, seeking a compromise with Washington. In a letter to Eisenhower on July 19, Khrushchev called for a summit conference of the five major powers in the UN security Council, with the participation of the UN secretary general, to seek a comprehensive solution to Middle East problems.[77] A great power summit would allow Moscow to become an integral part of any regional settlement. Washington would not tolerate this, however. It was determined to exclude Moscow from Middle Eastern diplomacy and, inevitably, Eisenhower rejected Khrushchev's proposal. The two leaders then engaged in a bitter and hostile exchange of letters.[78] As a result of superpower bickering, the UN Security Council could not find a formula to end the crisis.

Khrushchev and Eisenhower finally reached a compromise to place the Lebanese dispute before the UN General Assembly.[79] Again, no agreement could be reached on any draft resolution introduced by other members, and the result was a stalemate. The stalemate was broken in August, however, when the Arab states sponsored their own resolution which was unanimously adopted by the UN. This showed that despite the intensity of the Arab Cold War, inter-Arab feuds could still be tackled successfully within a regional framework.

The Soviet Union emerged as a passive player throughout the Lebanese crisis. It had neither the military capabilities nor the will to confront the United States. The events in Lebanon proved beyond any doubt that Washington was the dominant actor in the Middle East. The main challenges to the Western powers emanated from the region itself rather than from any external sources. Moscow's role was secondary.

Meanwhile, Murphy's mediation efforts among the Lebanese factions bore fruit. With U.S. backing, General Chehab emerged as the consensus candidate for the presidency. From the outset Washington was keen on Chehab as the successor to Chamoun since he was "immune to the charge of being forced on Lebanon with American bayonets."[80] At the end of July he was elected president, and in October the State Department announced that American troops would be completely withdrawn from Beirut by the end of the month.[81] This withdrawal marked the end of the Lebanese crisis.