Continued

Conclusion

This paper has tried to show how the inflated self-images held by the Lebanonist and Arab/Islamist constituencies distorted their view of foreign affairs and led them to over-estimate their own and Lebanon's importance in the world. These images blinded them to the realities of power politics and to the inconsequential role played by Lebanon in the international system. Newly declassified U.S. documents show that during the crisis of 1958, far from being strategically indispensable to the West, Lebanon took a back seat in U.S. strategy. To American officials, the significance of Lebanon ebbed and flowed depending on their perception and calculation of broader U.S. regional and global interests. Before the Iraqi revolution, the Eisenhower administration was not inclined to send troops to Beirut. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the Hashemites in Iraq, however, U.S. policymakers changed their minds, and Lebanon acquired a temporary special status in the East-West struggle.[82]

While Chamoun and his adversaries enticed external actors to intervene on their behalf, they lost sight of the fact that the external actors were using them as proxies to fight their own wars. Instead, Lebanon was turned into a theater of the Cold War. For example, Chamoun and Malik requested Western intervention to counterbalance what they perceived to be an Egyptian-Syrian attempt to unseat them. They hoped to use the West to strengthen their own ranks and defeat their opponents. They had no appreciation, however, of the limits of Lebanon's power and influence in relation to Egypt's and Syria's. In U.S. eyes, Cairo, not Beirut, was the nerve center of the Arab world. Here lies the explanation behind Washington's unresponsiveness to Chamoun's repeated initial requests to intervene militarily on his behalf and put an end to the insurrection against his regime.

In the final analysis, American officials sacrificed Chamoun at the altar of their wider regional interests. After dispatching the marines to Beirut, Washington saw Chamoun as a liability, and so ignored him and dealt directly with Chehab and the opposition. Eveland drew an illuminating picture of Washington's contempt for the Lebanese president, and McClintock and Murphy were less than cordial to Chamoun. He was bluntly told not to count on U.S. support since Washington would not do his work for him. Small wonder that Chamoun felt bitter toward the administration for the way it had treated him. He believed that, in the end, Washington had deserted him to appease Nasser, when all the while he had seen himself as fighting on behalf of the West against the kind of radical Arab nationalism propounded by the Egyptian leader.[83]

Like the monarchists in Iraq, Chamoun had expected the West to sustain and maintain his regime in power. This miscalculation casts light on the nature of the relationship between small and large states. In their dealings with the United States, Lebanese and Iraqi leaders behaved as if they were strategically indispensable to Western security. They also had a blind faith in the capability and reach of their superpower ally. But they failed to remember a crucial principle in world politics: big powers have no permanent friends, only perpetual interests. The importance of local actors depends on how the major powers perceive the configuration of power on the regional and international scenes at a given historical moment.

Dulles' response to Chamoun's predicament was indicative of this thinking. Far from sympathizing with Chamoun's plight, Dulles pinned the blame for the debacle on the Lebanese president. He declared that Chamoun's difficulties could be explained by the fact that he went too far in embracing the Eisenhower Doctrine. The problem with Chamoun, he noted, was that he had adopted an extreme pro-Western policy"; so extreme that at one time Dulles had even suggested modifications in Chamoun's approach.[84]

Dulles was correct in one respect: encouraging client states to ally themselves too closely and openly with the West tended to undermine the legitimacy and security of these states. But the secretary of state was distorting the historical record by eschewing any responsibility for Chamoun's problems. Washington actively encouraged Lebanon to join the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the U.S. embassy in Beirut played a critical role in helping to unseat all the Lebanon deputies who had voted against accepting it.[85] In its crusade against Soviet communism and in its pursuit of vital economic interests, Washington had enlisted the support of whichever state was willing to sign up, regardless of the costs involved in such a transaction.

The Lebanese opposition, conversely, tied the future of Lebanon to that of Egypt. In this sense, knowingly or unknowingly, they reflected and carried out Nasser's policies. The fact remained that neither Washington nor Cairo was prepared to jeopardize its relationship with the other for the sake of their allies in Beirut. Despite the deterioration of U.S.-Egyptian relations since the mid-1950s, both sides recognized the importance of preserving mutual relations and avoiding a major confrontation. Before the Lebanese crisis was over, U.S. officials recognized the futility of trying to oppose radical Arab nationalism. Eisenhower proposed coming to terms with Nasser. As he argued, since "we are about to get thrown out of the area, we might as well believe in Arab nationalism."[86]

In the aftermath of the Iraqi revolution and U.S. intervention in Lebanon, the Eisenhower administration embarked on a major reappraisal of its strategy in the area. To the United States, the virtual collapse of conservative resistance to radical Arab nationalism made the latter appear to be the driving force in the region; it was the "wave of the future," U.S. officials believed that collaboration with Nasser's brand of pan-Arabism was an 'essential element in the prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area." They began to recognize Nasser as the undisputed leader of the Arab world and to deal with him as such. Egypt became the focus of Washington's relationship with the Arab states.[87]

In a similar vein, Nasser came to appreciate more deeply U.S. power and influence in the region. The rise of communist influence in the Arab East, coupled with the clash between communism and nationalism, and the subsequent Soviet-Egyptian quarrel, motivated Nasser to revive the American connection. In a gesture of goodwill, the UAR relaxed its criticisms of U.S. policy and actively sought U.S. cooperation in a number of fields. Relations between Washington and Cairo showed a marked improvement, and Nasser himself soon viewed the relationship as normal.[88]

The U.S.-UAR rapprochement came as a slap in the face for both the Lebanonist and Arab nationalist constituencies in Lebanon. The Lebanese crisis might not have escalated so dangerously had Chamoun's regime and its opponents not over-estimated their strategic importance. If both sides had kept a proper perspective of their place in the world, they would have been forced to come to terms with each other. Instead, they relied on foreign intervention to tilt the balance of power in their favor. The result was to exacerbate domestic problems and to turn Lebanon into a battle-ground for foreign rivalries. This proved to be another example of the linkage between internal wars and external interventions which have helped to shape the course of Lebanon's troubled history.[89]

It can be argued further that a similar inflated self-image was at work during the prolonged civil war which erupted in 1975. The inability of the Lebanese system made them vulnerable to outside influence and exploitation. Only by ceasing to entertain illusions about their national identity and their exaggerated importance in the world can the Lebanese rid themselves of the deadly ghosts of their tragic past. Lebanon's significance does not lie in its strategic or economic position, but in the solidarity and cohesiveness of its people and the willingness of the Lebanese to coexist in peace and harmony. The greatest challenge confronting the Lebanese is to construct one nation-state out of their myriad tribal, sectarian, and religious loyalties. Only then will the Lebanese assume their proper place within the community of nations.

*I wish to acknowledge the critical feedback of several scholars on an earlier version of this paper. In particular, I would like to thank the late Mr. Albert Hourani and Dr. Avi Shlaim of St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and Professors Philip Khouri of MIT and Zachary Lockman of Harvard University.

*Fawaz A. Gerges, who completed his doctorate in Politics and International Relations at Oxford University, is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. This year he is completing a book on the relationship between the great powers and the Arab world.

Endnotes

1. Kamel Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp.16, 31, 70-71, 139, 150-51,216-17, 226, 230.
2. Ibid., pp. 17-18, 219, 231.
3. Ibid., pp. 217-18.
4. Nassif Hitti, "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon: Lessons and Prospects for the Forgotten Dimensions," Papers on Lebanon, No. 9 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, April 1989), p.3.
5. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, p. 165.
6. Hitti, "The Foreign Policy of Lebanon," pp. 13-14.
7. Ibid., pp.14-15.
8. Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.4; and Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1956-1958, JCS History, Chapter IX, subject: "The Lebanon Crisis and After," p.469. This paper relies heavily on recently declassified U.S. documents obtained, by the Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford; from the Dwight Eisenhower library, Abilene, Kansas; Marine and Naval Corps Historical Centers; Central Intelligence Agency; and National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., and Suitland, MD
9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p.270.
10. Camille Chamoun, Crise au Moyen-Orient (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1963), pp. 424-31. An Interview with Raymond Hare, Oral History Transcripts, 28 August 1972, pp.68-9.
11. See the speech by the deputy from Tripoli Shaykh Jisr: the Roots of the Lebanese Revolution, Beirut to Department of State, No. 4006, 14 October 1958, p.10.
12. Fahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961), p.30.
13. Beirut to Washington, DA Intelligence Report, prepared by Robert C. Works, Subject: Opinions of Commanding General Chehab, No. R-189-57, 31 May 1957, pp.1-3.
14. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
15. McClintock to Department of State, Beirut, 27 March 1958, Foreign Service Dispatch, no. 547.
16. Beirut to Washington, DA Intelligence Report, p. 2. JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.421.
17. Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, 1, 15, 29 May 1957, p.10 of 20; Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, Historical Studies, Subject: The United States and Lebanon, 1958, No. 6, p.2; and U.S. Embassy, Beirut, 25 June 1958 [no identification]. (The Lebanese constitution limits the presidency to one six-year term).
18. Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East (London: W.W. Norton, 1980), pp. 248-58, 266.
19. The Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, 17 January 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960: Lebanon and Jordan. Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government printing Office, 1992), p.4. (henceforth, this series will be referred to as FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI.] The Lebanese Foreign Minister's call on the President, 6 February 1957, p.3.
20. Nadim Dimechkie, "The United States Intervened Militarily by Sending the Marines to Lebanon in 1958: Why did this Happen," paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s, 10-13 September 1992, pp.10-13, 19. Agnes G. Korbani, US intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1992: Presidential Decisionmaking (New York: Praeger, 1991), p.34. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, pp.36-7.
21. President Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (Cairo: Ministry of Information, 1958), p.197.
22. Beirut to Secretary of State, 28 August 1957. Quoted in David W. Lesch, "Prelude to American intervention in Lebanon: The 1957 American-Syrian Crisis," a paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950's, 10-13 September 1992,p.18.
23. Quoted in Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, 19 September 1957, p.1.
24. US Ambassador to Department of State, 14 February 1958, p.2 of 6. M. S. Agwani, the Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp.3-4.
25. Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation: A Study in political Development (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 104.
26. Quoted in the Egyptian Gazette, 5 March 1958.
27. Kamal Salibi, "Recollections of the 1940s and 1950s," a paper given at the University of Texas Conference on Lebanon in the 1950s, 10-13 September 1992, p.26.
28. Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.1; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420.
29. Dimechkie, "The United States Intervened Militarily," p.18 Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p.245.
30. The Lebanese Foreign Minister's call on the President, 6 February 1957, pp.2-3; JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420; and Richards to Secretary of State, Beirut, 16 March 1957.
31. Beirut to Department of State, "The Roots of the Lebanese Revolution," 14 October 1958, pp.2, 10; Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.2; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.420. Kamal Jumblat, Fi Majra al-Siyasa al-Lubnaniya [In the Course of Lebanese Politics] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali`a, n.d), p.57. B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict, a Modern Political History (London Zed Books, 1985), p.100.
32. Department of State, Office of Historian, 1958, p.2; and McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 3191, 25 March 1958, pp.1-2.
33. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, Nos. 4115, 4272, 5108, 22, 27 May and 25 June 1958; and Beirut to Department of State, the Roots of the Lebanese Revolution, 14 October 1958, p.4. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp.58, 85.
34. Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, p.11. Beirut to the Department of State, 9 January 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp. 1-2. Department of State, Office of Historian p.2. Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 24-25. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp. 256, 276. New York Times, 17 July 1958.
35. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 4438, 4 June 1958; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, pp. 435-39.
36. The New York Times, 11, 13, 23 May and 7 June 1958. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), pp. 196-98.
37. Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA, shared Eisenhower's and Dulles' views that the Soviets were in the Lebanese picture. Diary, 14 July 1958; Memorandum for Record, 15 May 1958, p.2; Memorandum of conversation with the President, Department of State, subject: Lebanon, 15 June 1958, p.4; and Eisenhower to Paul Hoffman, 23 June 1958, p.2. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.266. Stephen J. Genco, "The Eisenhower Doctrine: Deterrence in the Middle East, 1957-1958," in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 317, 339.
38. Beirut to Secretary of State, No. 3647, 4 may 1958; and JCS and National Policy, 1956-58, p.421. Alan Doty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp.25-27, 32-34.
39. Beirut to Department of State, 2 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p. 88. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, Chapter IV, Subject: Intervention in the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Country to Assure a Friendly Government, [n.d.], p.2.
40. Secretary of State to Beirut, No. 3629, 18 March 1958; and McClintock to Dulles, No. 3709, 7 May 1958.
41. Beirut to Department of State, 2 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI.p.88.
42. Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon, 13 May 1958, in ibid, p.49.
43. Editorial Note, 29 May 1958, in ibid., p.80.
44. Department of State to Beirut, 13 May 1958. Department of State Bulletin, 9 June 1958, p.945.
45. Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 25 June 1958, p.22.
46. Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, CIA, 19 June 1958, p.3 of 6.
47. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, 15 June 1958; Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 18 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.83, 131, 153.
48. Memorandum of a Conversation with the President, White House, Washington, 15 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p.136.
49. Ibid. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington 18 June 1958, in ibid., pp.153-54.
50. In his memoirs, Eisenhower blamed Chamoun's mistrust of Nasser for the failure to respond to the Egyptian proposal. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 268. The Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 20 May and 7 June 1958; the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt, 27 May, 5 and 9 June 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.68-70, 76-77, 91-93, 103-04. William Rountree to Embassy, Beirut, Washington, No. 4710, 10 June 1958. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), p.399.
51. Chamoun was also reassured that Washington had full confidence in him personally as the symbol of Lebanon's determination to defend its independence. Secretary of State to Ambassador McClintock, Beirut, No. 11077, 19 June 1958, pp.1-4.
52. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 20 June 1958; Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, 30 June 1958, in Ibid, p.186.
53. Memorandum of conversation, Washington,30 June 1958,in Ibid, p186.
54. Ibid., pp. 187-88. the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 19 June 1958, in ibid., p.158.
55. To Chamoun, the Iraqi proposal was no more than an empty offer since Iraq had traditionally avoided using its army against other Arabs. In his view, the conclusion of a treaty between Iraq and Lebanon at this time would have been more of a political liability than of any military value. McClintock to Secretary of State, Beirut, No. 4642, p.1-2. W.J. Gallman, Iraq under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), pp. 164-65. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 282. Lord Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London: Cassell, 1959), pp. 256-59.
56. Current Intelligence Weekly Review, CIA, Subject: Lebanese Situation (part I) 10 July 1958, p.1 of 4. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, pp.188-92.
57. Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 776, 805.
58. Eisenhower, Waging peace, p. 269. JCS, subject: Military Planning Talks with Middle Eastern Countries, Note by the Secretaries, No. 1887/347, March 1957, p.2650.
59. McClintock to Secretary of State, No. 358, 14 July 1958; Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles in a Meeting at the White House with Congressional Leaders, 14 July 1958, p.3.
60. The irony was that a few days later Saudi Arabia would refuse to permit Western overflights to transport fuel to Jordan. Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, 14 July 1958, pp.5-6; Synopsis of Reports Relating to the Mid-East Crisis, 14-9 July 1958, pp.1-2; and Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.5. Thayer, Diplomat, p.28.
61. Briefing Notes by Allen Dulles, 14 July 1958, p. 8; Telephone Call from Ambassador Lodge to Dulles, 14 July 1958; Dulles Remarks at Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.2; and 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p.3. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.269. Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy (New York: Praeger, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1963), pp. 164-65.
62. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.212-14. Timetable of Events of Week of July, 14-19, 14 July 1958. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p.270.
63. Conference with the President, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, pp.212-14. Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting Regarding Iraq, 14 July 1958.
64. Erika G. Alin, The 1958 United States intervention in Lebanon (The American University: Ph.D. thesis, 1990), p.393.
65. This Interpretation influenced America's perceptions of the Arab nationalist movement until 1959, when Cairo and Moscow had a falling out. Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, pp.212-14. Memorandum of Conversation, subject: Lebanon and the Middle East, 1 July 1958, p.3.
66. Memorandum of a Conversation between the Secretary of State and the British Embassy (Lord Hood), Washington, 14 July 1958; and conference with the President, 14 July, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, pp.212-13, 238.
67. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, 14 July 1958, in Frus, 1958-60, vol.XI,p.216.
68. 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p.11. William Quandt, "Lebanon 1958 and Jordan 1970," in B. Blechman and S. Kaplan (eds.), Force Without War: The US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), p.230.
69. The Chairman of the JCS, N. Twining, was one of the few voices within the administration to propose that the United States, in conjunction with Britain, Israel, Turkey, and Jordan, should attack Egypt and Syria and defeat the Iraqi free Officers. There was hardly any support for Twining's proposal, however, Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. XI, p.232. Memorandum for the Record, Dulles and Eisenhower, 14 July 1958; Conference with the President, 15 July 1958; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.5; Telephone call from Dulles to Eisenhower, 19 July 1958, p.469; and Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.4.
70. Moscow to Secretary of State, 15 July 1958; Oral History Transcripts, Interview with General Goodpaster, 2 August 1967, p.90; Dulles to all Diplomatic Posts, 15 July, p.2; and Conference with the President, 14 July 1958.
71. Conference with the President, 14 July 1958; Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, 18 July 1958, p.4; Dulles's Remark at Cabinet, 18 July 1958, p.3; and Department of State, Office of the Historian, p.5.
72. Beirut to Secretary of State, No. 835, 30 July 1958, pp.1-2.
73. Department of State, Office of Historian, p.5 Department of State Bulletin, 27 October 1958, pp.650-51.
74. Nasser's Speeches and Press Interviews (1958), p.212. Abdel-Latif al-Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat (Memoirs), Vol. II (Cairo: Al-Maktab al-Misri al-hadit, 1977), pp.52-3. Mohamed Heikal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972), pp.122-24.
75. News and Views from the Soviet Union, 19 July 1958, pp. 2-3. v. Micunovic, Moscow diary (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980), pp. 409-10. Mohamed Heikal, Madha hadatha fi Suriyya (What Happened in Syria) (Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyya, n.d.), pp.92-3.
76. Moscow to Secretary of State, 23 July 1958, No.216 (Section one of two), p.2.
77. Moscow to Secretary of State, No. 135, 16 July 1958 and No. 170 (two sections), 19 July 1958. Helen Denkos, Al-Siyasa al-Sufyatiyya fi al-sharq al-awsat, 1955-1975 [Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 1955-1975] (Beirut: Dar alkalima al-Arabiyya, 1983), pp.67-8.
78. Conference with the President, 20 July 1958, p.7; Eisenhower to Khrushchev, the White House, 22 July 1958, p.3; and Moscow to Secretary of State, No.216 (two sections), 23 July 1958; and No. 264 (three sections), 28 July 1958.
79. Department of State Bulletin, 1 September 1958, p.342.
80. CINCSPE COMME to CNO, NO.5854 (two parts), 25 July 1958, See Richard Murphy's informative account of his mission to Lebanon, Diplomat among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 398-418.
81. Department of State Bulletin, 22 October 1958, pp.650-51.
82. As Dulles put it: "Up to the time of the Iraq coup we had not felt that there would be a need for our action. It was the coup in Baghdad, with the disclosure of a similar plot in Jordan, which modified the situation and led us to believe that it was imperative to preserve the morale of the smaller nations around the perimeter of the Soviet-Chinese bloc into Africa, and we should without hesitation respond to Chamoun's request." Quoted in Korbani, US Intervention in Lebanon, p.40.
83. Chamoun, Crise au Moyen Orient, pp. 11, 424-31. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp.278, 296-99. The Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol.XI, p.260
84. 373rd Meeting of the NSC, 25 July 1958, p. 10; and 381 Meeting of the NSC, 2 October 1958, p.5.
85. Eveland, Ropes of Sand, pp.248-50.
86. Discussion at the Meeting of the NSCA, 25 July 1958, pp. 7, 10; and Conference with the president, 23 July 1958, p.2.
87. General Consideration Affecting U.S. Policy toward the Near East (Annex A), pp.40-43.
88. Malcolm kerr, The Arab World War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his Rivals, 1958-1970. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.19. Baghdadi, Mudhakkirat, Vol. II., p.100. Operation Coordinating Board, Report on the Near East, 3 February 1960 [period covered from 4 November 1958 through 3 February 1960], p.6.
89. Marwan R. Buheiry, "External Interventions and Internal Wars in Lebanon: 1770-1982." in Lawrence I. Conrad (ed), The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan Buheiry (Princeton, N.J.: The Darwin Press 1989), pp.129-38.