Introduction
The Political History: From the Protestant Missions to the Cold War
From Cold War to Arab-Israeli War: 1958-1975
The Lebanese War Disengagement: April 1975 - March 1976
The Syrian Option: 1976 - 1981
The Israeli Option: 1981 - 1982
The American Option: 1982 - 1984
Disengagement: 1984 -1989
The Syrian Option II: 1990-
A Review of the Dynamics of the Relationship: The US - Soviet Dynamic
The Regional Dynamic
The Bilateral Dynamic
Lebanese Perceptions and Misperceptions
Conclusion
Endnotes
Additional References

The determining factors of U.S. policy toward Lebanon are deeply intertwined with U.S. Policy considerations at the global, regional, and bilateral levels. The thread of American-Lebanese relations must be traced amidst the thick web of interconnecting policies and relations of which Lebanon is a part. For example, U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon in 1958 as part of the U.S.-Soviet tug-of-war; Lebanon became a center for American diplomatic, intelligence, and commercial activity in the late 1960s and early 1970s because of the collapse of U.S.-Arab relations in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; general U.S. support for Lebanon stemmed from American empathy toward Lebanon's democratic institutions, its liberal economic system, and its cultural pluralism. U.S. policy has always reflected such a mix of global, regional, and bilateral concerns.

The perceptual problem for most Lebanese, however, which we will look into in more detail later, is that U.S. policy toward Lebanon is always seen as bilateral. The landing of U.S. Marines in 1958 and again in 1982 was deemed as proof of America's concern for Lebanon as was its heavy presence prior to the 1975 war. Even its inaction in preventing the collapse of the state in 1975 was part of a "Kissinger master plan" and evidence of America's complicity in destroying Lebanon, hence proof of Lebanon's importance - even if negative - to the U.S. All strings seemed to lead to Washington. In reality, for the U.S. Lebanon occupied and occupies very little prominence; indeed, it often barely appears on the foreign policy agenda at all.

Lebanon's inflated sense of self-importance is, perhaps, an instinct natural among small nations that must exaggerate their apparent value to outside players in order to survive; or perhaps it is the residue of the attention lavished on the country earlier in the century by France. In any case, this self-importance distorts Lebanese perceptions of U.S. policy and perceives the U.S. as always engaged either in championing or battling the Lebanese cause; whereas, most of the time, the U.S. is simply disengaged. In this article, I will trace the course of U.S. policy toward Lebanon; review the global, regional, and bilateral elements in the relationship; and finally examine the perceptions and misperceptions of each party toward the other. Only by looking at this larger and multi-faceted complex of relations and perceptions can one begin to recognize the course and color of the light thread of U.S.-Lebanese relations woven into the wider fabric.

The Political History:
>From the Protestant Missions to the Cold War

Before World War II, the U.S. had not moved fully onto the world stage, aside from a short foray into Europe in World War I. The Middle East, especially, was the special reserve of the colonial powers, Britain and France. American companies began to appreciate the importance of the Arab Gulf area as a source of oil early in the twentieth century, but U.S. policymakers were still far from contemplating any active policy in the Middle East. With regard to Lebanon, American interest was limited to the activity of American Protestant missionaries who had come to Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century and built several educational institutions, most notably the American University of Beirut (established originally as the Syrian Protestant College). But this interest was of an unofficial cultural nature and was channeled through private church and missionary organizations. Contact had also been established in the reverse direction by the thousands of Lebanese emigrants who settled in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This cultural interest was overtaken by commercial interests only in the 1940s and 1950s when Lebanon became integrated into the world oil market. The British Iraqi Petroleum Company built an oil pipeline through Syria to the Lebanese port town of Tripoli, while ARAMCO built its Trans Arabian Pipline (TAPLINE) with a terminus in Sidon. American firms and businessmen began to set up shop in the country, and Beirut gained increasing importance as a business, banking, communications, and tourist center.

America's definitive entry into world politics in World War II, accompanied by the collapse of British and French power, the establishment of Israel, and the emergence of the Cold War, propelled the U.S. into the arena of Middle Eastern politics. The U.S.'s first objective in this phase was to consolidate the still generally pro-Western regimes of the Middle East into a regional alliance system aligned with the West and designed as a bulwark against Soviet expansion south into the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. This objective crystallized into attempts to establish a Middle East Command in 1951,and then the Baghdad Pact in 1955,which was centered around a southern tier alliance with Turkey, Iraq ,and Iran. Throughout this period, the Lebanese government went along with general American policy in the region and came to be regarded as an ally -albeit a minor one. Opposition to the U.S. policy in the region, however developed under the leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Between 1954 and 1958 Nasser led a wave of opposition to the United States which saw the downfall of pro-Western regimes in Syria and Iraq and the destabilization of other pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Soviets acquired new clients in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The Cold War had come to the Middle East.

In Lebanon, this was reflected in increased polarization. President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) chose close alignment with the U.S and was the only Arab head of state to come out in open support of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. His administration was rewarded with American financial and other support, often channeled through the CIA, which was especially effective in helping Chamoun's supporters sweep the 1957 parliamentary elections. In this early phase, however, Lebanon was regarded simply as one of America's friends in the frenetic and high stakes game of the Cold War. No elaborate or involved policy had been developed for Lebanon nor was there any deep understanding among American policy makers about Lebanon's domestic politics and its regional situation. The rude awakening came in 1958 when domestic political tensions surrounding Chamoun's attempt to renew his term of office, exacerbated by ideological tensions over Nasserism and the rising tide of Arab nationalism, plunged the political system into paralysis. This was followed by civil strife which claimed some 2,000 lives.

The Eisenhower administration expressed "concern" about developments in the country, but took little action. Only when the crisis took on regional, and indeed, global significance - namely after the overthrow of the pro-Western monarchy in Iraq by Communist and Nasserist forces in July 1958 - did the U.S. administration accord importance to the Lebanese situation and dispatch Marines to the beaches of Beirut. For Washington, the Marine deployment was a warning to Moscow and Cairo, and an act of reassurance for America's remaining allies in the region. The move was part of America's maneuvering on the regional and global stages; that U.S. diplomats could take advantage of their country's temporary engagement in Lebanon to work out a denouement to the local political crisis was of marginal importance.

However, U.S. involvement in Lebanon opened the eyes of U.S. diplomats and policy-makers to the complexities and contradictions of Lebanese politics of which they had known only vaguely before. The Lebanon they now perceived was one of bewildering confessional diversity and shifting alliances - a 'Precarious Republic', as the American political scientist Michael Hudson would label it in his influential study of 1968. In practical terms, the 1958 experience resulted in the shaking of U.S. faith in the ability of Lebanon to be a useful ally in regional or global politics. As Henry Kissinger would reflect several years later, Lebanon appeared too involved in caring "for its own fragile cohesion to play an active role in Mideast diplomacy."[1] When the Marines left Lebanon, U.S. policy-makers' tentative commitment to Lebanon as an ally in the Cold War against Moscow and Cairo left with them.

Lebanon came to be regarded as a fragile state of subtle alliances and delicate balances, unfit for the rigors of the Cold War. The U.S. continued to welcome warm Lebanese-American relations and to appreciate the Lebanese government's generally pro-Western orientation in cultural and economic matters, but Lebanon was dropped from the chessboard of Cold War politics to be set adrift in that coldest of regions in the Cold War: the 'neutral' zone.

In Lebanon, of course, American moves were explained in bilateral terms as proof of the U.S.'s staunch commitment to the Lebanese state and its willingness to commit troops in its defense. In narrower confessional terms, it was taken as proof of American commitment to a strong Maronite presidency and opposition to a larger share of power by the Sunni or wider Muslim community. The shadow of the 1958 intervention would color Lebanese perceptions and calculations for years to come.

From Cold War to Arab-Israeli War: 1958-1975

After a brief honeymoon period of stability and prosperity between 1958 and 1966, Lebanon was dragged back into the international political arena, this time through the door of regional politics. While in 1956 the U.S. had avoided classification as a full-fledged enemy of the Arabs because of its opposition to the Israeli-French-British invasion of Egypt during the Suez crisis, America's open support for Israel in the much more devastating 1967 War confirmed its status among Arab nationalists as an enemy of the Arabs. While in 1958, alliance with the U.S. was problematic, in the late 1960s even normal diplomatic relations with the U.S. became dangerous. Anti-American feeling spread in the region and contributed in Lebanon to renewed internal polarization. The situation was exacerbated by the breaking of diplomatic relations between Egypt, Syria, Iraq and other Arab states, and the U.S., and the relocation of a number of U.S. diplomatic, business, and intelligence operations to Beirut under a government still friendly to Washington. Beirut quickly gained a reputation as an outpost of "American imperialism", and "progressive forces" led by emergent Palestinian guerrilla movements and leftist Lebanese parties, with support from like-minded governments in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, set out to do battle with the imperial hegemon on Lebanese soil.

Lebanon quickly lost its political integrity as a nation-state. South Lebanon became a battleground in the War of Attrition that developed in 1968-69, and the growth of Palestinian armed power in Lebanon, with Arab backing, led to a gradual collapse of state sovereignty. This situation was recognized quasi-formally in the Cairo Agreement of 1969 in which the Palestinians were allowed special military and political privileges. The U.S. was alarmed at the rapid advances made by the Palestinians and the radicals and soon lent its political support to a tougher Lebanese stance in which the Lebanese would deal with the Palestinians as King Husayn had dealt with them in Jordan. This was referred to as the 'Ammanization' option. President Franjiyyeh, elected in 1970, seemed to have the required tough-man characteristics to do the job, but aside from an abortive May 1973 army attack on the Sabra refugee camp, the state proved unable to act decisively. Muslim, leftist, and Syrian opposition to the clampdown tied the state's hands. Once again, political and communal tensions were leading toward paralysis and civil strife.

The U.S. gave up hope for the 'Ammanization' of the emerging Lebanese crisis and fished around for a new policy for Lebanon's domestic problems based on political reform and accommodation with the Palestinians. U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley courted Rashid Karami and the reformist Maronite leader, Raymond Eddé, and urged all parties to reach a new political consensus through reform. Indeed, Godley's efforts represent the first signs of American understanding of, and concern for, the Lebanese political crisis on its own terms, separate from regional or global concerns. In 1973, however, the U.S. administration was soon overtaken by the momentous events of the October War and its aftermath of spiralling oil prices.

The war changed U.S. Middle East policy in several ways. First, it disproved the principle laid down by President Johnson in 1967, and reaffirmed by Kissinger, that the U.S. could prevent war in the Middle East and ensure the free flow of oil by maintaining the clear military superiority of its principal ally in the region, Israel.[2] Arab frustration had led to a war that not only threatened to overwhelm Israel but also to drag the U.S. into direct confrontation with the Soviet Union; furthermore, it led to the consolidation by the Arabs of the use of oil as a powerful political weapon against the West. Kissinger reacted to these realizations by embarking on a vigorous diplomatic initiative to forge peace between the Arabs and Israel, based on step-by-step diplomacy and bilateral negotiations between individual Arab states and Israel.

Second, the war shifted the focus of U.S. attention from the Levant - the scene of Cold War confrontations and Arab-Israeli wars - to the Gulf, where the U.S.'s massive oil interests - which had been threatened by the oil embargo - lay [3] The Levant became a marginal arena whose importance increased or decreased depending on how the situation there affected the flow of oil from the Gulf. U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran developed into large-scale military and economic alliances overshadowing U.S. relations with all other Middle Eastern countries except Israel.