Superpowers
and Small States: an Overview of American-Lebanese Relations*
Paul E. Salem**
A Review of the Dynamics of the Relationship:
The U.S.-Soviet Dynamic
Before discussing this dynamic, one should note that it has suddenly
disappeared. With perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union
as a unified superpower, the Cold War is no more. However, for the four
decades that it lasted, the Cold War had a powerful disintegrative effect
on Lebanon. Cold War dynamics were closely linked to the polarization that
preceded the 1958 civil war as well as the heightening tension that preceded
the collapse of 1975, and it is no coincidence that the year that saw the
end of the Cold War, 1989, was the same year in which Lebanese deputies
were hustled to a resort town in Saudi Arabia to sign a document ending
their fourteen-year old war.
The Americans and Soviets were active in Lebanon both directly and by proxy. Before 1958, the Americans backed Chamoun against his opponents and the CIA channeled funds to the Kata`ib, the Tashnaq, and to Chamoun's parliamentary election war chest. In the early 1970s, they backed Franjiyyeh against the PLO then looked for a compromise while the CIA Athens station and Israel helped Christian militias equip themselves for the battle against the Palestinians. In the 1980s, the U.S. backed the Gemayel government politically and militarily as it moved into confrontation with Syria and other Soviet clients in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the U.S.'s regional client, Israel, helped train and equip the Christian militias on a large scale to confront the PLO, Syria, and other leftist parties.
Despite various overtures in the 1960s, the Soviet Union never developed
close relations with the Lebanese government. However, it backed a number
of groups in Lebanon including the PLO, the Communist party, and the predominantly
Druze Progressive Socialist Party, whose leader, Kamal Junblat, headed
the broad leftist coalition known as the National Movement. As war broke
out in 1975, political support was translated into military support in
terms of training and equipment. More than the U.S., the Soviet Union was
involved on the ground floor of the Lebanese war. Moscow's client, Syria,
was involved on all sides with an especially effective role in strengthening
the Palestinian presence in the early 1970s, arming the Druze PSP and the
Shi`ite Amal militia, and promoting the growth of the Pro-Iranian Hizballah.
In other words, the Cold War set the stage for general world confrontation;
in a country like Lebanon where the population was basically divided, where
the two superpowers and their clients enjoyed strong influence, and where
the state was weak, global tensions could only too easily lead to internal
war. There is little doubt that the end of the Cold War will gradually
ease internal political tensions in Lebanon.
An interesting point to note about the Cold War and its influence on
Lebanon is that the U.S. accorded more importance to Lebanon in times of
Cold War confrontation than in times of relaxed U.S.-Soviet relations.
While the U.S. intervened in Lebanon amidst the Cold War atmosphere of
1958, it failed to intervene in the Detente atmosphere of 1975 although
the disintegration of the state was following much the same pattern as
that of 1958. When the U.S. did intervene again, in 1982, it was amidst
renewed paranoia whipped up by Reagan about the Soviet threat and the designs
of the "evil empire". In sum, then, while the Cold War had a
disintegrating effect on the Lebanese polity it also accorded Lebanon at
least a minimum of strategic value for the U.S. on the international chessboard.
Regional polarization had an even more visibly disintegrative effect
on Lebanon than global polarization. The establishment of the state of
Israel and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees
to Lebanon provided the demographic foundation for the long-term involvement
of Lebanon in regional conflicts. In the 1950s, the Arab Cold disaster
as the Lebanese government lined up on the conservative side and the opposition
sided with Nasser. The 1967 War and the subsequent years of conflict between
Israel and Palestinian commandos in Lebanon devastated the south of the
country, depleted the resources of the state, and completely polarized
the Lebanese body politic. The 1973 War opened the doors for a separate
Egyptian-Israeli peace which only heightened tensions between Israel and
Syria. This led to a race for influence and strategic advantage along Israel's
eastern front of which Lebanon was a part, with both Syrian and Israeli
armies maneuvering freely in the country. Conflicts between Syrian and
Israel were played out in Lebanon, directly as well as through proxies,
as were conflicts between Syria and the PLO, Syria and Egypt, and Syria
and Iraq. More recently, even Iran joined the game of proxy wars through
Hizballah.
The basic tenet that small and internally divided countries risk internal
disintegration in polarized and militarized external environments is a
political lesson as old as history. Internal tensions are exacerbated by
external conflicts. As Thucydides noted in his history of the Peloponnesian
Wars, regarding the internal-external dynamics of the Civil War on the
island of Corcyra: "in peacetime there would have been no excuse and
no desire for calling [outside parties] in, but in time of [external] war,
when each party could always count upon an alliance which would do harm
to its opponents and at the same time strengthen its own position, it became
a natural thing for anyone who wanted a change of government to call in
help from outside."[17] Lebanon fits his description well.
As for U.S. policy at the regional level, it has been motivated by two
concerns: oil and Israel. U.S. concern for the free flow of oil through
the Gulf at relatively low prices dominates its Mideast agenda, especially
after the massive oil price rises of 1974. As long as Lebanon was integrated
into the world oil market through its two pipeline terminals and through
the value of the U.S. as part of the oil-commerce apparatus that the U.S.
sought to protect and preserve. But after the outbreak of war in 1975,
the destruction of Beirut, and the eventual closure of both pipelines,
Lebanon disappeared completely from America's oil-related calculations.
With pipelines running to Turkish, Syrian, and Saudi ports, Lebanon is
not likely to regain even the marginal importance it once enjoyed in the
oil-export structure. That Beirut could regain some of its role as a banking,
commercial, and touristic center for the oil economies of the gulf and
for international businesses is more likely. Until such time as Lebanon
forges an important role for itself in the web of U.S. interests revolving
around the Gulf, it is to remain of marginal importance.
The U.S.'s concern for Israel, which stems largely from domestic American
political concerns, has been responsible for keeping Lebanon from disappearing
completely off the American agenda. First because Lebanon is a state bordering
Israel and hence could pose a threat to Israel: second, because Lebanon
plays host to half a million Palestinians who are deeply hostile to Israel.
Much of America's concern about the war in Lebanon was related to its concern
that events in Lebanon could adversely affect Israel. Thus, the U.S. intervened
diplomatically in Lebanon in 1976 to avoid a Syrian-Israeli confrontation
and to encourage a Syrian blow to the PLO. Habib was sent to Lebanon in
1981 again to avoid a Syrian-Israeli confrontation as well as an Israeli-PLO
confrontation. When Israel ran out of plans in the 1982 invasion, the U.S.
rushed in to pick up the pieces and allow Israel an orderly retreat. Throughout
the war, the U.S. looked the other way while Israel fought a war with the
Palestinians on Lebanese soil, then cordoned off part of the South to set
up a mini-state blocked retribution against Israeli actions in Lebanon
at the UN. American concern for Israel will always be far greater than
its concern for Lebanon, and when the interests of Lebanon and Israel clash
directly, the U.S. will always pursue a policy closer to that of Israel.
Putting global and regional factors aside, U.S.-Lebanese bilateral relations
have good foundations but have suffered terribly over the past two decades.
These relations are founded on the twin pillars of the American University
of Beirut and the large Lebanese immigrant community in the U.S. The AUB
has consistently provided a positive image of the U.S. in Lebanon while
Lebanese immigrants made a comparably positive impression on many Americans.
This provided for the accumulation of much mutual good will. Favorable
American impressions of Lebanon were corroborated by the thousands of American
businessmen, bankers, educators, diplomats, and tourists who worked in
or visited Lebanon during the period of stability and prosperity before
1975. They admired its physical beauty as well as its political and economic
liberalism, its polyglot culture, and its religious pluralism. Lebanon
was not just another third world country, but one to which many Americans
in positions of influence grew particularly attached. On a more official
level, the U.S. government appreciated the democratic and liberal nature
of the Lebanese political system. This was expressed in modest amounts
of development aid and general political support for the Lebanese Republic
and the continued functioning of its democratic institutions.
The positive foundations of these bilateral relations is one of the
reasons why the U.S.'s declared policy throughout the Lebanese war remained
supportive, at least in principle, of "the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized
borders," and supportive also of the establishment of an able central
government and a strong army. Alongside these positions has been opposition
to partition and a recognition of the need for political reform. Unlike
its own behavior in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan,
etc., the U.S. has endeavored successfully not to acquire close clients
in the Lebanese war, preferring instead only to support the state. This
has allowed the U.S. to remain fairly neutral in the conflict and to play
a mediating role in bringing it to an end.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, anti-American terrorism emanating
from - although not controlled by - Lebanon, has drastically reduced Lebanon's
good will credit among the American population in general. Whereas the
name of Lebanon was previously associated with openness and tolerance,
the same name today evokes visions of masked kidnappers and anti-American
rioters. Television coverage of the war itself transformed the image of
Beirut from a bastion of pluralism, moderation, and democracy, to a hellish
portrait of fanaticism, violence, and collective suicide. The dominant
impression was transformed from one of admiration and attraction to one
of revulsion and repulsion, mixed in with humanitarian sympathy for the
victims of such a situation. In a media-dominated democracy like the U.S.,
such impressions are important and have a profound effect on policy in
the long run. As the dependent and much smaller partners of the bilateral
relationship, the Lebanese have an important task ahead of them of improving
this impression that fifteen years of war have left, lest the socio-psychological
foundation of the two countries' bilateral relations be damaged irreparably.
Lebanese Perceptions and Misperceptions
It is very difficult for most Lebanese to recognize Lebanon's modest
position within the U.S.'s complex global agenda; this would not be of
significance were it not for the fact that the Lebanese must understand
their place in the world in order to smoothly and successfully manage their
relations with that world's largest - and now, only - superpower. There
are several reasons for the exaggerated view that many Lebanese have of
their country's importance.
First, as mentioned earlier on in this article, it may reflect the instinctual
reaction of any small state which must exaggerate its importance in order
to convince larger powers to pay attention to it. Insofar as this strategy
does not cloud the vision and confuse the planning of the small state it
may be useful.
Second, the history of French solicitousness for Lebanon is expected
by many to be continued by the U.S. as the inheritor of the mantle of the
leader of the free world, or, to some, leader of the Christian world. But
the U.S. is not France. It does not have the same colonial or crusader
legacy. It did not establish Lebanon nor did it set up its institutions.
Furthermore, as a nation with a predominantly Protestant background, it
does not have automatic sympathy with the Catholic communities of Lebanon,
more specifically the Maronites, who dominated the state until recently.
This lack of sympathy was exacerbated by competition early on between Protestant
and Catholic missions in Lebanon.
Third, Lebanese misperceptions were reinforced by the undeniable fact
that the U.S. did intervene militarily in 1958 and again in 1982. Before
Operation Desert Storm, these were the only two cases of overt American
military commitment in an Arab country. To the average observer, they necessarily
demonstrated a particular American concern for Lebanon.
Fourth, many Lebanese believe that the U.S. has a strong commitment
to Lebanon because Lebanon is a liberal democracy and has a liberal economic
system. Any student of U.S. foreign policy, however, will quickly surmise
that crusading for democracy is not a high American policy priority. The
U.S. has no mission civilisatrice and American military and intelligence
agencies have the narrow task of simply defusing or countering security
or economic threats to the U.S. around the world. The U.S. has no program
for world democratization, and its interest in democratic systems after
World War II stemmed only from its fear that fascist or communist systems
would be naturally hostile to the U.S. when democratic systems around the
third world began to collapse in the fifties and sixties, the U.S. discovered
that it could establish strong and beneficial alliances with military dictatorships
throughout Asia, Africa, and South America. An American ally need not be
democratic; just strong and loyal. Thus, to the surprise of many Lebanese,
the U.S. established close alliances with authoritarian dictatorships in
Iran and the Arab world while its relations with democratic Lebanon remained
weak and marginal.
With regard to a laissez faire economy, the U.S. cares about
liberal economies if the economy in question is important as a source of
raw material or as a large-scale market. The commitment to free market
economies is material not ideological. The problem for Lebanon is that
the Lebanese economy is simply too small to register on the American world
trade balance sheet. Overshadowed by the vast resources of the Arab Gulf
actors, Lebanon has dwindled into economic insignificance. Whether internally
Lebanon runs its economic affairs on a free market or command economy basis
is of little concern to American businesses or American policymakers.
Lebanon's inflated conception of its economic importance for the U.S.
comes from the experience of the 1950s and 1960s when American oil and
construction firms were rapidly expanding their involvement in the Arabian
peninsula while American influence was declining in Egypt and the Levant
with the rise of Nasserism. The cosmopolitan cities of Egypt and the Levant
were the natural gateways for Americans to the insular Arabian peninsula.
These cities, however, became increasingly closed to Americans - all, that
is, except Beirut, which remained open until 1975. The reliance of American
business on Beirut became especially acute after the 1967 War when many
Arab countries severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. When the roof
fell on Beirut in 1975, American businesses did what they did when the
roof fell on other Arab cities: they left. In the meantime, Lebanon was
losing its comparative advantage for two reasons: first, the Gulf countries
were developing the human and technological resources to host large American
companies and communities themselves without the need for go-betweens;
second, the volume of business with the Gulf had grown so large, especially
after the oil price rises of 1973-74, that Beirut could no longer handle
the volume -with advances in travel and communication, banking and other
financial services began to be handled directly from London and New York,
thus cutting out the Lebanese middlemen.
To be sure, Lebanon can play an important and productive role in the
regional economic network, but there is no doubt that its role of the 1960s
and early 1970s has been overtaken. It will probably never again be the
capital of Arab business, but it could, one day, become again an important
town or suburb.
Despite the ups and downs of American-Lebanese relations, despite the
perceptions and misperceptions of both sides, and despite the mistrust
and hostility that have been fomented by fifteen years of war, there is
still ample opportunity for a reconstruction of that relationship on the
basis of realistic assessments and expectations in which each party is
aware of the other's priorities and policies. Most immediately, however,
if the U.S.-led that settlement, added to the peace dividends reaped from
the end of the Cold War, are likely to give a vigorous boost to Lebanon
and to its reintegration into the world community. Under such circumstances
the Lebanese state can repair and reinvigorate its relations with the U.S.,
the uncontested custodian of this new world community.
*This is a revised version of an article which originally appeared in the June 1992 issue of Cahiers de la Méditerranée, published by the University of Nice, Sophia, Antipolis.
**Paul E. Salem is the director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and the editor of the Beirut
Review. He is assistant professor of political studies at the American
University of Beirut and the author of Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics
in the Arab World (Syracuse University Press, 1994, forthcoming).