THE FORMATION OF

The Formation of Lebanese Civil Society

Fadia Kiwan*

"Power is a necessary evil..." When liberal thought reached this conclusion, it sought a form of power instituting a public authority which would fulfil its functions while, at the same time, preserving human liberty. Jean Jacques Rousseau argued that the best solution to this interplay was to insure that power emanated from the will of the people. He justified the individual's acceptance of authority as an acceptance of his or her own will, since the individual, in a certain way was a source of authority, in this way, individual liberty was not threatened. Rousseau called for an identification between the individual and the collective will, and thus for a fusion between the individual and the collectivity. This approach was controversial and Rousseau was accused of trying to justify Jacobin totalitarianism under the guise of liberalism.

In general, liberal thought has remained wary of power, considering that, in one way or another, it limits individual and collective liberty. Thus, liberalism sought to establish limits and impose restrictions on power in order to prevent its misuse. This is what led to the notion of the separation of powers and political pluralism, as well as to the establishment of competitive political systems recognizing the activities of an opposition, an environment for public liberties exercised by a national collectivity, and laws defining the prerogatives and relations between institutions as well as procedures to be followed in the exercise of power.

It is within this context that liberal thought distinguished between civil society and the State. This distinction was sought as a way of maintaining liberty vis-à-vis the State and placing it under the control of the popular will. Thus, the people could both maintain their control over political authority, and pursue their affairs in other fields of social activity in which the State did not intervene.

Marxist doctrine also distinguished between civil and political society. Within the framework of the theory of class struggle, Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci, Althusser, and others, argued that the manifestation of class exploitation was, first, political domination upheld by physical coercion in a political society built around the State; it then took the form of a cultural hegemony exercised by psychological means of persuasion within a civil society, through what can be called the ideological instruments of the State.

Gramsci specified, however, that the concept of civil society did not exist in all situations: in some societies the ideological instruments of persuasion of the State were well-developed and played a hegemonic role; while other societies, he noted, resembled gelatin in that civil society had yet to form, and institutions were, as yet, ineffective both in insuring the hegemony of a wealthy class, and consolidating and perpetuating the class structure of the society. In such cases, it was easy to take over power, and there was no need to use methods of persuasion and indoctrination. In cases in which civil society was well-structured and its ideological underpinnings well developed, however, the overthrow of the instruments of the State was not sufficient in changing the nature of political power, since the ideology imposed by the ousted class continued to influence the minds of citizens.

In Lebanon, one can easily affirm the existence of a civil society distinct from the State. Yet, this affirmation is superficial if one does not examine the signs attesting to a distinction between civil society and the State, and proving that the ways in which this distinction is manifested reflects the existence of a unified and solid civil society.

Classical liberalism and Marxism speak of a civil society based on the Western model; in other words as something emanating from a nation which formed prior to the establishment of the State, and which then united within the confines of a State as an expression of a national will. In Lebanon, however - as in other new states formed after the decline of colonialism - one cannot speak of a constituted nation, conscious of itself, existing prior to the establishment of the State. Indeed, these new states often suffered from significant social disintegration and the existence of 'particularistic' allegiances which were stronger than national ties and which prevented their formation. As a result, the State did not come into contact with a civil society, but with a multifaceted, pluralistic, and composite communal society. This is why the concept of communal society has been used to describe the range of what can be called 'civil' activities in the lives of citizens, in other words those activities not covered by state institutions.

It may be convenient to use the expressions 'public sector' and 'private sector' to distinguish between the domain of social activities in which the state intervenes, and the domain in which it does intervene. It should be asked, however, are the public and private sectors domains in which citizens come together at the national level? Or are they domains in which citizens are isolated from one another on traditional bases which preceded the formation of the State? Moreover, at a national level, does solidarity exist between citizens vis-à-vis the State? And in what situations? It should be specified that only national solidarity can immunize a society against abuse of power on the part of the State, which, in general, has a monopoly over the organized use of force, and which has the power to implement laws by punishing those who transgress them.

If we agree that the Lebanese State emerged prior to the formation of a civil society (in the Western sense of the term), it should be accepted without hesitation, however, that years of living in common within modern Lebanon, the activity of united and centralized state institutions, and the emergence of national organizations and institutions, created new ties between citizens which accompanied the more traditional ties characterizing their daily life. Thus, different ties coexisted side by side in Lebanon, whether traditional communal ties or civil ties at the level of national society.

In the developing modern Lebanese state, socio-economic institutions and infrastructures took root, as did public educational institutions, unions, professional associations, sport and youth organization, and political parties and organizations. These institutions progressively created new spheres of professional, social, and political activity paralleling the traditional activities which characterized communal society before the establishment of modern Lebanon. These modern institutions came to surpass traditional institutions by attracting citizens towards common interests, projects, and objectives which increasingly bound them together.

Before the war in 1975, organizations appeared that represented the first signs of the formation of a civil society stronger than traditional communal ties. A notable example of this was the nation-wide student movement whose national slogans reflected the aspirations of Lebanese youth within a framework of full socio-economic development. Similarly, a labour union movement grew which managed to establish, on various occasions, a new basis for relations between the different actors in Lebanon's economic life. Diverse political parties, acting at the national level, also came into being, giving birth to opposition movements which either opposed those in power, or which rejected the political system outright. Public opinion too became more influential, to the point where it affected the fate of those in positions of authority. At the same time, a dynamic press contributed to shaping this public opinion in an environment of relative liberty.

The most important indicator of the formation of civil society was the existence of a collectivity of political parties which called for a reform of Lebanon's political system and the modernization of the State. The parties acted at the national level and were critical of the State from which they maintained a distance.

During the war, the situation changed somewhat as the political-military conflict took on a confessional and, at some stages, a sectarian coloration. The war undermined the immunity of civil society, pushed it backwards, and caused it to begin to disintegrate as traditional ties were revived. Actions such as the forced displacement of populations, efforts by the different parties to insure confessional exclusivity in their areas, and the systematic bombardment of civilian and military targets tended to undermine the sense of belonging to a national collectivity, and forced people to fall back and seek refuge in confessional ghettos and even in sectarian islands within the same city. The establishment of demarcation lines between different regions - at times defined by confessional makeup - helped bring back particularistic communal ties at a time when the conditions necessary for developing civil society at a national level were not present.

This situation induced people to look to reinforce their sense of security and protect themselves from military threat. The result was a tendency by individuals to identify with one particular group against another group or groups, where little room was left for a concept of a national collectivity. The feeling of belonging to a national collectivity formed of diverse groups was thus thrust aside by a tendency to identify with smaller groups which, nevertheless, were perceived as representing the collectivity.

During the war, political programs circulated calling for the decentralization and cantonization of Lebanon. This further contributed to the confusion of the Lebanese, and allowed political organizations with particularistic or partitionist objectives to impose themselves in different regions. The younger generations were also influenced by particularistic visions and many young Lebanese enrolled in associations and political organizations which did not seek to accommodate the goal of a national civil society.

However, these events do not allow us to say that national solidarity disappeared altogether. On the contrary, the particularistic tendencies which the war revived were accompanied by various movements - composed of individuals from all parts of the country and with national programs - which attempted to mount a sort of civil resistance to the war. Among them were liberal-democratic political parties and the trades union movement which, despite pressures and constraints, maintained its unity and pursued activities favouring civil society and opposing the forces of war.

The trades union movement was made up of employees' and workers' unions from different parts of Lebanon, public school teachers, the union of Lebanese University professors, professional associations, women's organizations, student's associations, as well as some cultural organizations and clubs. The movement's crowning moment came in November 1987 when it organized a demonstration which brought together some 250,000 Lebanese who crossed demarcation lines and protested against the war and against the State's complacency towards those engaged in it. The movement also engaged in a wide range of other activities, including symbolic strikes, protest sit-ins, and blood-donation drives, and its activities culminated in two national congresses at which resolutions were adopted condemning the war and expressing the attachment of the active forces in Lebanese society to a national collectivity, despite, and with, all its differences.

In addition to the activities of the trades union movement, organizations within the civil society undertook actions having national objectives, organized conferences, round tables, demonstrations, and blood-donation and fund-raising drives, in protest against the abuse of public liberties and in favour of an independent civil society free of sectarian, confessional, regional, or other traditional attachments. Examples of such organizations were the Lebanese Association of Human Rights, the Committee for Women's Rights, the National Council of Women and affiliated organizations, organizations for the handicapped, the Non-Violence Movement, etc.

These actions clearly indicated the existence of a developing civil society because they took place at an equal distance from the complacent State and the dominant military forces which sought the disintegration of Lebanese society. These civil associations and organizations based their actions on the Declaration of Human Rights, international agreements, as well as international and national laws, all of which protect and safeguard the rights and dignity of individuals in times of war. The importance of these movements is that they simultaneously confronted both the State and the actors in the war.

The war years witnessed a tug-of-war between the forces calling for a return to particularistic communal ties, and those opposed to them who aspired to the consolidation of national civil society. For the latter, civil society had to become the source and regulator of public power, and it had to guarantee the rights of citizens and associations within the national collectivity.
The circumstances which brought Lebanon back to a state of peace did not, however, place civil society in a preponderant position. The political compromise which brought an end to the war benefited those who had waged the war by bringing them into positions of power, while it neglected or excluded representatives of civil society. Yet this did not lessen the determination of Lebanese citizens to consolidate civil society, which alone is capable of guarding against both public and private abuse of power.

In this postwar period, Lebanese society continues to be pulled between those who would like to see particularistic allegiances predominate, and those who want a national allegiance to prevail. Meanwhile, citizens find themselves at an equal distance between communal society and the emerging civil society. The only way to protect the rights of citizens is precisely through a strengthening of the institutions of civil society which can impose limits on the power of the State, and which can bring the State around to conform to the interests, objectives, and aspirations of its citizens. The alliance between the State and the former participants in the war, who, in reality, represent forces opposed to the State, has increased the conviction that it is necessary to develop and immunize national civil associations.

What may allow a national allegiance to prevail is a national civic education program directed at the younger generations. It is necessary to encourage contacts between people from different regions and social categories in professional, social, cultural, humanitarian, political, and sporting activities, in order that bonds, as well as common interests and aspirations, may develop between them which will transcend traditional particularisms.

It would be a mistake to place such a tasks exclusively in the hands of the State. In reality, the State will rally to it once the effort is undertaken and sustained by civil society. After all, it is civil society which is being formed, and which must evolve within itself the civil and democratic values which it can impose on the political authorities and which will act as the foundations of the State. It is only in this way that society will be sovereign and that the State will have no choice but to be democratic.

^* Fadia Kiwan teaches Political Science at the Lebanese University.