Both the Lebanese constitution of 1926 and the power-sharing "formula"(al-Sigha) devised in 1943 to complement the National Pact (al-Mithaq), considered the confessional system to be an interim political arrangement, limited in scope, which was nevertheless necessary. It is well known that the architects of this covenant warned against the inherent dangers of the confessional system and stressed its temporariness.

Despite their wisdom, however, from the time of independence to the eve of the war in 1975, confessionalism proliferated, succeeding in pervading all state institutions and all levels of the national bureaucracy. The principle of confessional balance was formally incorporated into the civil service law of 1959 and, since then, has been strictly observed by the Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court in Lebanon. In addition, new laws were promulgated granting the various religious communities extensive powers to govern their own internal affairs and institutions, and permitting them to regulate major aspects of the personal status and family relations of their members. Indeed, confessionalism did not die out with time as had been thought; rather, between 1943 and 1975 it was reinforced.

The sixteen years of war which ravaged Lebanon after 1975 sharpened confessional consciousness and allegiances and multiplied confessional practices and prejudices. It was a period characterized by intense communal polarization, the formulation of sectarian political demands and counter-demands, and, above all, the paramount role played by confessional armed groups - generally referred to as "militias." To stop the spiraling violence into which Lebanon had plunged, there was no realistic alternative except to reach a new power-sharing formula between the major Lebanese communities, and to gain its endorsement by their respective leaders, particularly the different militia chieftains. Here lies both the importance and the merit of the 1989 Taif agreement. As the instrument of a confessional "New Deal," it succeeded in silencing the guns and allowed for the gradual reinstatement of peaceful means and processes of political activity.

However, while it is essential to recognize that a new and more equitable formula for confessional power-sharing had become a politically necessary and pragmatically inevitable gateway to restoring civil peace, it would be a serious mistake to loose sight of the detrimental effects that the maintenance - if not the bolstering - of the confessional political system shall continue to produce, for the following reasons:

• It compels individuals to make known their sectarian identity as a sine qua non for eligibility to public office, and, most of the time, to depend on the "sponsorship" of leaders of their communities for appointment to most positions. Segmental allegiances are thus continuously reinforced while the concept of national loyalty is unremittingly debilitated.
• It permits the exploitation of genuine religious sentiments for parochial political ends, and favours hawkish confessional leaders who build their power base in the name of the defence of their communities' interests.
• It creates a hierarchy of different categories of citizens corresponding to the different political rights enjoyed by their respective communities, thereby weakening the sense of solidarity and unity among the Lebanese and perpetuating a main cause of social unrest and conflict.
• It institutionalizes barriers to equal opportunity by defining "who gets what" - and, more significantly, "who cannot get what" - through a rigid system of ceilings and by confining the right to equality within the limitations of fixed quotas. As a result, the confessional system will continue to represent a source of disenchantment and to breed frustration because of its basic discriminatory nature. One need only recall that only members of one out of Lebanon's seventeen religious sects may accede to the presidency of the Republic, and that only members of two other religious sects may accede to the offices of prime minister and speaker of parliament. At the other end of the spectrum, we can see members of the smallest religious sects simply denied access to any high ranking positions in the civil service.
• It consolidates clientelism and undermines the role merit and competence should play in the civil service. Instead, the "rational" requirement of the civil service are subordinated to the precepts of sectarian balance and, in effect, to the favouritism and nepotism of confessional leaders. This will always inhibit the promotion of accountability in the civil service, and will impair the efficiency of the state administration and weaken its credibility; this is not to mention how much it damages the motivation of civil servants.
• It cripples state authority by maintaining the fragmentation of the central government, which remains an arena of confessional competition for power. The most recent illustration of this phenomenon can be found in the constant and fierce wire-pulling taking place between Lebanon's post-Taif "Troika" - the president of the Republic, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament.
• Last but not least, it makes Lebanon extremely vulnerable to external powers. In fact, Lebanon's contending sects - who have a tradition of seeking outside support to enhance their capabilities in their domestic struggles for power - offer an attractive terrain for foreign protagonists also seeking to spread their influence.

In theory, the abrogation of the confessional political system should ensure justice and equal opportunity for all citizens, curb clientelism, increase the efficiency of the civil service, and promote the emergence of a sense of national - as opposed to parochial - loyalty, which would in turn help Lebanon better resist external pressures.

However, under the prevailing socio-political conditions - characterized particularly since 1975 by an unmistakable reinforcement of confessional allegiances and practices - the call for the abolition of the confessional political system, hic et nunc, is unrealistic. Instead, it is likely to provoke a self-defence mechanism in most sectarian groups and heighten confessional cohesion rather than lead to national integration. Instead of defusing communal tensions, it will more likely intensify them.

Deconfessionalization, which has sometimes been expressed as an appeal to the "rule of numbers," has been perceived by a majority of Maronites and members of other Christian sects as an attempt to drive them out from positions still guaranteed under the Taif agreement. Deconfessionalization, they fear, will turn them from a demographic minority into a permanent political minority. Moreover, the advent of the Iranian revolution, along with Muslim revivalism in Arab countries, has aggravated their perennial fear - whether justified or not remains besides the point here - of being reduced anew to the status of dhimmis, and of living once again on Muslim tolerance.

No matter how reasonable it is, the affirmation that deconfessionalization should only be "gradually" implemented is not enough to address the problem of how it is to be carried out - gradually or not - by confessional forces. As a matter of fact, mainstream Muslim political forces have often called - at one and the same time and with no regard to their inherent contradiction - for the deconfessionalizing of Lebanon's political system, and for a greater say for their communities in decisionmaking and fairer representation in state institutions. As to the fundamentalists, their motto speaks for itself: "No to confessionalism; yes to Islam."

Parallel to this, spokesmen for the Christian political forces managed to conciliate two equally contradictory arguments: while they pointed to the benefits of the confessional system and saw a rationale for its maintenance, they also advocated total "secularization." This was to be distinguished from political deconfessionalization in that it included matters of personal status and family relations, which, in the view of Muslims must remain governed by religious law. We should also note that the apparently radical Christian slogan of "eradicating confessionalism from the souls (nufus) so that it can be abolished in [Lebanon's official] texts (nussuss)" aims, in reality, at nothing less than postponing in fine any practical dealing with the issue of deconfessionalization.

This clearly shows the extent to which dominant political forces, Muslim and Christian alike, have double standards and use double talk when addressing the matter of deconfessionalization, thus reflecting their not so hidden, hidden agendas. The simple reality is that deconfessionalization cannot be introduced by confessional forces struggling over the size of their respective shares within the confessional system.

True deconfessionalization will therefore depend on the emergence and development of new and significant non-confessional social forces and pressure groups. Accordingly, the "gradual" process of deconfessionalization can only materialize as an expression of the stages of the growth of such forces and groups. Here, civil society with its trade unions, businessmen associations, professional organizations, and other similar groups with interests cutting across sectarian barriers, provides us with successful models of what non-sectarian institutions may look like and how they can be run.

It has been said that war is too serious a thing to be left to the generals. Similarly, deconfessionalization is too serious an issue in Lebanon to be left to traditional politicians. Instead, it is a challenge for civil society and new social forces.

Nawaf A. Salam is an Attorney at Law and a lecturer on International Affairs. He holds a Doctorat d'Etat in Political Science from the Institut d'études politiques (Paris) and an LL.M. from Harvard University. He is the author of Mythes et Politiques au Liban (Beirut, 1987), Prospects for Lebanon: An Essay on Political Opportunities and Constraints (Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1987); and Possible Reforms and Needed Reforms (In Arabic, Beirut 1989).