Can "Lebanonism", as a reasoned adherence to an independent and sovereign state, be the object of a meaningful history? That is the wager of this article. The paper will address the original affirmation of Lebanon, the negations which undermined it, and the situation at present. The value of this approach, which is both schematic and Hegelian[1], is useful: it seeks to extract the evolution of the national question in Lebanon from a sterile cycle where the affirmation of Lebanon, and its denial, confront each other without dialogue or progress. It attempts to place the 1975-1990 war in the context of a general debate, without, however, denying the war's specificity or its ramifications. And it strives to cast light on what we can call a Lebanese education - different than mere conditioning to a de facto situation - which looks towards the continuous enrichment of the initial Lebanese idea in the hope of revealing those factors to which it was blind and which blinded it.

When we re-examine Lebanese, Pan-Syrian, and pan-Arab nationalist ideologies - first formulated at the turn of the century in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire - we are struck by the simplicity of the Lebanese idea. Lebanese nationalism was not characterized by the same emotional and intellectual birth pains which accompanied these other nationalist claims. Rather, it emanated from a "fact" and a "reality": namely the organic status of Mount Lebanon in the 19th century as guaranteed by the European powers. The "fact" existed and had showed that it could work, despite the shadow cast by increasing emigration from Lebanon. It was left only to complete the fact, to give it juridical depth, and to extend its geographical scope; Lebanon had to be "re-given" its "natural", "historical," and "geographical" frontiers; it had to be granted an "indispensable agricultural base," maritime harbors, and complete independence, symbolized by the placing of a Lebanese governor - rather than an Ottoman Christian functionary - at the head of the state. These were the main demands of the "Lebanonists," and it is no surprise that those who headed the movement, such as Boulos Nujaym and Yusuf Sawda, were jurists.

What did the juridical status of the Mutasarrifiyya reveal? It was merely the latest embodiment, the plundered form of an ancient and continuous historical reality, itself the expression of a natural reality: the perennial Mountain. Thus, Lebanon was, and is, the fruit of three interlocking dimensions: Law, History, and Nature. The proclamation of Greater Lebanon on September 1, 1920 - due to, and tarnished by the mandatory power - completed the first of these interlocking dimensions by providing Lebanon with international status and an adequate geographical framework. Even Michel Chiha, as sensitive as he was to nuances, could only find these words to describe Riyad al-Solh's adherence to the new Lebanese entity: "At a solemn turning point, we were able to see Riyad al-Solh courageously renouncing vain ideology, and with extraordinary lucidity recognizing the facts."[2]

The philosophers of Lebanonism would come to focus on the ideological weight of the Lebanese entity. Charles Malik, for example, after having affirmed that what is real does not need to be justified since it is, while what only exists in the mind requires proof and arguments, wrote: Lebanon is "a real entity, established, defined, stable, independent, self-perpetuating and wanting to be so, and recognized by the world as having the right to exist and to persevere."[3] Kamal al-Hajj argued: "When we are in the presence of a political entity (kayan), we are in the presence of a nation," later adding, "our political entity, that of the Lebanese, is what we have that is most precious. It is our territory, our economy, our history, and our language. It is our past, our present, and our future..."[4]

The State, then, is the most convincing proof of the existence of a nation, its rootedness in the past, and its vision of the future. The establishment of Greater Lebanon effectively brought the State to its genealogical completion. It was the result of a history which was older than the imara of Fakhr al-Din and Bashir, older even than the resistance of the Mardaites and the first Maronite patriarch, stretching into a "grand" and "distant" past: "Forty centuries of Phoenicia attest to it, nineteen centuries since the coming of Christ confirm it, and some thirteen centuries since Islam... The character of Lebanon is such that all past history has recorded it. It has recorded it since the inception of writing and language..." [5] The uninterrupted history of Lebanon is that of a native population which absorbed peoples coming from east and west, resisted all conquerors, safeguarded its independence, maintained contacts with the West, and perpetuated its place in civilization.

As infused and nourished by human will as was this history, it remained, nonetheless, also rooted in nature; in other words in a solid, unchanging, "evident," and "indisputable" geography. Lebanon is a "geographical nation"[6] characterized by the unity and complementarity of its two elements, the mountain and the sea, whose characteristics are opposed to those of the sands of the desert. The mountain faces the sea along its longest slope, protects the coast and is unified through it; in return, it owes to the sea its vegetation and its fauna. The sea opens the country up to the far horizons, entrusts its inhabitants to commerce and travel, and thus to the great achievements of civilization, the arts, the sciences, and Democracy. It binds them to the other coasts of the Mediterranean, and establishes common traits between coastal inhabitants. The mountain - by virtue of its altitude - corrects the laziness brought about by latitude; its aridity forces the peasant to work, ties him to the cultivated soil, and instills in him a sense of property; it provides him with protection which, in turn, develops in him a taste for independence; it submerges him in a family life and in an atmosphere of rural virtues.

As a state born from a particular history - if not from History itself - and upheld by geography, Lebanon seems to be - in both the writings and words of its adherents - a reality so tight and sacred that its negation by its deniers represents, for one, "magical conduct" which seeks to dissolve itself into nothingness[7], and, for another, "unconsciousness or violence."[8] Although the course of Lebanon's modern history may have coincided with these prophecies, it did so because of the absence of a real dialogue, and without any of the parties being identified with Truth. The Lebanese "fact" was confronted with no less real facts of those Lebanese involuntarily incorporated into post-1920 Lebanon who did not subscribe to the myth of their new state, with neighbouring states, with refugees opposed to any system perpetuating their misfortune, and with the shifting interests of the superpowers.

On the level of ideas, Lebanonism was too dense to avoid shattering into pieces. Its adversaries sifted through its details and rejected its major options in the name of ideological blocs which were as sacred and as blindly self-satisfied, despite - or because - of the bitterness felt towards the colonial and post-colonial periods. A de-mystification of the Lebanese idea led to a different approach to the country's past. Lebanon appeared to have never been impregnable;[9] its topography opened it up from all sides, from its coast, its plains, and its passes. The mountain was much more an agreeable source of water than a fortress constantly on the lookout. The differences between the inhabitants of Lebanon and those of the region - which had only taken on importance in recent times - were seen to be far less significant than what they had in common. The present form of the Lebanese state was due to favourable historical junctures - whether in 1861 or 1920 - rather than to an unavoidable historical necessity. The hierarchy of cultures which supported the overall vision of Lebanonism (with the West being identified with civilization), was so schematic and poor that it rejected those who delighted in it outside of modernity.

In this wave of objections to the Lebanese idea was represented "the seriousness, the pain, the patience, and the labour of the negative."[10] Following the allied victory over the Axis powers and the ensuing British hegemony in the Levant, an agreement was reached representing the first synthesis of the different philosophies of Lebanon: the National pact, which sought to renew the foundations of the state. Lebanese independence was affirmed, as was Lebanon's membership in the Arab League. Ties were established between Lebanon and the two poles of the West and the Arab world, ties which were neither to be too close nor too distant; a fragile balance considering that both poles were in perpetual and often contradictory movement, that Zionism was present on Lebanon's borders, and that opportunities to consolidate Lebanon's unity and strength were missed.

This synthesis of views was important, even capital, and would become a condition for all similar future efforts. And yet, the National Pact would prove to be a solution which was too immediate. It was more the fruit of a new regional balance than of internal maturation; it was an agreement which, in the nationalist imagery of the period, was not sufficiently the product of a struggle and the shedding of blood;[11] and it was an instrument of a political class tainted by compromise and a surrender of principles. The Pact defined better what it rejected than what it accepted; it failed to unite the Lebanese over its interpretation; and it was ambiguous on the question of Lebanon's Arab identity (was it to be a cultural identity or merely a policy of good neighbourly relations?). Moreover, while it reinforced the communal system and a certain balance of power, the Pact seemed to privilege the Maronite and Sunni communities, "respectively situated at opposite forward outposts of the tension existing between Islam and Christianity."[12]

Amid the changes which were sweeping the Middle East, the Lebanese Republic - and the National Pact which served as its foundation - acted as a framework justifying the Lebanese "fact", which no longer appeared as a constraint, but rather as an amalgam of advantageous functions and interests. Lebanon came to play a variety of roles which made its permanence imperative: it was a country where an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims coexisted on a basis of equality and liberty. It was a meeting place for Christianity and Islam and for East and West. It was a land which welcomed all minorities and respected their identities. It was a haven for public and private liberties; an area of prosperity benefiting a large middle class which guaranteed stability, and which opened the way for social mobility. And it was a land of great culture. Lebanon was "in the heart of the Arab world... a source of equilibrium, a link."[13] It is worth honouring here the memory of Michel Chiha whose works - sustained by Lebanonist themes in their purest tradition - never lost sight of reality. This great thinker always sought, within a perspective of balance and moderation, institutional solutions - whether through parliament, laws, traditions, etc. - which would, in order to insure the specificity of Lebanon, at the same time guarantee its permanence.

Though it was a nation whose existence was justified by its performance, as well as by the poor performance of neighbouring countries, and though, through the National Pact it began a process of reconciliation with itself, Lebanon began to suffer from its success, as it would from the gaps in its system and from external realities. Its economic successes made it a place both attractive and coveted; its liberties, employed without restraint by all against all, became "pure negation"; its political pluralism exploded in all directions towards regional and international poles of influence. The cracks in the system became glaring. Efforts attempted under President Chehab and his followers aimed at implementing a social policy to reduce the differences between rich and poor, between regions, and between communities, did not go very far.

Politically, the regime both fed ambition and limited it. The result was the establishment of a class of self-satisfied notables - eager to maintain their positions before passing them on to their offspring - and a multitude of ambitious newcomers, willing to form all sorts of alliances - whether good or bad - to win places of their own in the political hierarchy. The communal makeup of Lebanese society allowed individuals to use the language of confessionalism to buttress and justify their positions or narrow interests, and to sustain, at little cost, a climate of tension and discord. This situation was accompanied by a number of significant developments, all within an environment affected by the impact of the vital importance of oil for the world economy. Among these can be mentioned the deepening of Palestinian national consciousness under the double impact of Zionism and the liberties provided by the Lebanese system; the qualitative and quantitative over-armament of Israel; the taking over of power in Syria by a vigorous regime. The unavoidable result of all these developments was the Lebanese war.

Have the Lebanese learned the lessons of their history? Or rather, will their political education confirm the Hegelian assertion that the first lesson of history is that peoples have never learned the lessons of their history? The holding of free and lawful elections in 1992, for example, would have been instructive on this point. Yet we all know the extent to which this did not occur, being replaced by an electoral process which strayed from its original intent. A number of alternatives exist, however, which allow us to examine Lebanon's political education; we can choose one of them: the feelings aroused by Aounism. Such feelings stretched far beyond the numerous demonstrations in Ba`abda, and found an echo among virtually all Lebanese, whatever their disagreements or suspicions. They had what Kant called "sympathy for an aspiration close to enthusiasm and which, in its manifestation, exposes one to peril," similar to that found among the "spectators" of the French revolution. The German philosopher affirmed that such a sympathy "could have no other cause but a moral disposition of humankind."[14]

Yet what can one make of the sentiments aroused between 1988 and 1990? The language of General Aoun was neither new, nor did it set new objectives for the Lebanese. It simply expressed, indeed trumpeted, a concept of independence whose principles are inscribed in all Lebanese institutions, especially the constitution. Yet, at the time, the Lebanese had lost both a sense of the impact of words and the feeling of joy involved in enunciating them freely. Thus, their "enthusiasm" reflected a general adherence to Lebanon, and rejected any form of absorption or belittlement; it proclaimed agreement with the spirit of institutions - "legitimacy" was a key word during this period - and the desire for complete independence.

As a sign of the triumph of Lebanonism through its spread to all the 'tribes' in the country, the enthusiasm provoked by Aounism could not avoid disillusionment since it lacked the means to convert itself into coherent policies. The General did not provide for the means to reach his ends. He, instead, was contented with predicting, and announcing, and attempting to decode a change in the international situation. Yet nothing came of this; rather, the opposite of what was expected took place. The General did not pronounce himself on the redistribution of power between the different communities, choosing rather to elude the question; this perpetuated a verbal consensus around his policies, but at the same time it did not address - indeed it may have aggravated - the dislocation in the country. Finally, having denounced, with good reason, the militias, notables, and other obstacles interposed between the people and the state, Aoun nevertheless failed to establish new institutions capable of linking the two.

In contrast with this Aounist enthusiasm for independence free of mediatory institutions, we can point to the Taif agreement, which established mediatory institutions without much enthusiasm for independence. In both cases, the Lebanese spirit was at work; but what appeared juvenile in Aounsim threatened to become increasingly senile in the case of Taif. It remains our hope, however, to combine the two and build an independence based on a desire to establish adequate mediatory structures, both internal and external. The first step in this direction is this "Lebanese education" which we have attempted to bring to light.

What is the Lebanese wager, a century and a quarter after the autonomy of Mount Lebanon, three quarters of a century after the establishment of Greater Lebanon, and half a century after independence? It is this: to renew the contract between those tenacious and obsolete units that are Lebanon's different communities, in order to transcend them within a structure which would allow room only for a State and its citizens; to do it despite the existence of a lightweight elite, and without renouncing liberty in a post-modern era where all affirmations and certainties have been undermined; to do it in an environment characterized by often merciless states and regimes; and finally to do it amid a rise in fundamentalism resulting from the bringing to heel of much of the world in order to plunder it of its wealth.

* Fares Sassine teaches Philosophy at the Lebanese University.

Endnotes
1. We will sketch here a phenomenology of the Lebanese mind. The initial affirmation - in our case the initial affirmation of Lebanonism - was correct, but remained too immediate and empty for as long as it had not been subjected and confronted by its negation or negations.

2. Michel Chiha, Le Jour (July 18, 1951), reproduced in Politique intérieure (Beirut, 1964), p.230. The italics are ours.

3. Charles Malik, Lubnan fi Dhatihi (Lebanon in Itself), Beirut , 1974, p.9.

4. Kamal al-Hajj, Fi Qurrati al-haqiqa (At the Heart of the Truth), Beirut, 1966, pp.34, 37.

5. Michel Chiha, le Jour (December 29, 1953).

6. Jawad Boulos, Lubnan wa-l-buldan al-mujawira (Lebanon and its Neighbors), Second edition, Beirut, 1973, p.21.

7. Etienne Saqr, Les Dimensions du nationalisme au Libanais, Kaslik, 1970, p.49.

8. Selim Abou, Le Bilinguisme arabe-français au Liban, Paris, 1962, pp.19, 30-31.

9. Ahmad Beydoun, Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains, Beirut, 1984; and Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, London, 1988.

10. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, La Phénomenologie de l'Esprit, from the Preface.

11. Albert Hourani in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, New york, 1966, p.28.

12. Edmond Rabbath, La Formation historique du Liban Politique et constitutionnel, Beirut, 1973, p.525.

13. Michel Chiha, Politique intérieure, p.269.

14. Immanuel Kant, Le conflit des facultés en trois sections (1798), Paris (French translation), p.101.