Raghid el-Solh*
Table of Contents
The Arab Idea: Aims and methods
The Stage of Liberal Arabism
The Stage of Revolutionary Arabism
The Arab Idea: Aims and methods
The aim of the Arab idea, or Arabism, was defined by the Arab
National Congress which was held in Jerusalem in December 1931
as, ".... the realization of an independent Arab entity that
comprises the various Arab countries..."[1] This aim was
endorsed by the vast majority of groups, movements, and parties
which espoused the idea of Arabism throughout the century.
However, while the Arabists agreed on this broad definition, they
differed on several aspects related to it. One of these was the
nature of the intended entity: should it be a centralized state?
A federal state? A confederation? Or simply an association of
states? Another aspect on which there was disagreement had to
do with the method with which the entity was to be realized: would
it come about through insurrection? Through parliamentary action?
Through self-reliance? Or through an alliance with an external
power?
The Arabists believed that this unified entity would be the embodiment
of their Arab ideal. Within it, Arabs could explore and define
their common interests, which would contrast with parochial interests.
However, the Arabists believed that before the emergence of the
single Arab entity, there was a discernible common Arab interest
or imperative which transcended the status quo, cut across borders,
and called Arabs to duty. While this was accepted by almost all
those who adhered to the Arab idea, they tended to differ on the
actual identification of this imperative, the way to define, it,
and the proper mechanism that should be used to achieve it.
The debate on these issues had special significance for Lebanon
and the Lebanese because, there, a substantial portion of the
population, mainly within the Maronite community, challenged the
basic assumptions of the Arabists. This influenced the development
of the debate on Arabism in Lebanon and its outcome. Following
Lebanon's independence, the debate passed through two stages in
which the objectives, the methods, and the type of commitments
to the Arab idea were reassessed and reformulated in accordance
with the specific historical conditions in existence at the time.
Lebanese independence in 1943 represented, in a way, the ascendance
of the Lebanese Arabists to power - for the first time since the
fall of the Faysalite government in Damascus - in alliance with
Lebanese nationalists. The two sides did not merge into one party
or political bloc, but remained separate with different priorities.
The Constitutional Bloc, led by Lebanon's first post-Mandate president,
Bishara al-Khouri, considered Lebanese independence as an end-stage
in the anti-colonial struggle. The Arabists, led by Riyad al-Solh,
hoped that the independence of the Arab states would open the
way to the foundation of an "Arab entity." Neither of
the two parties abandoned their positions, but, rather, they sought
to find a common platform and a meeting ground. The formulation
of the idea "Lebanon with an Arab face" seemed to satisfy
the interests o both sides. It satisfied the Constitutionalists
and a substantial part of the Lebanonist constituency by pointing
out the difference between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab states,
whose Arabism encompassed more than just the "face",
but the soul, the heart, the mind, and the body. It also satisfied
the Arabists because Lebanon ceased to be merely "Mediterranean,"
or "Phoenician," or Francophone, but was recognized
as Arab.
What looked like a matter of semantics became a matter of substance
when the "Talks on Arab Unity" took place between Arab
leaders in 1943 in Cairo. The Lebanese Arabists supported the
establishment of a strong Arab association or regional system.
By so doing, they attempted to put the idea of an "Arab face"
into practice, since, on the one hand, they believed the Arab
League would safeguard the independence of Lebanon rather than
threaten it; yet, on the other hand, they maintained that the
League could always develop into a more centralized Arab entity,
along confederal, federal, or even unitary lines. In accordance
with this view, following the foundation of the League, the Lebanese
Arabists ventured to enhance its credibility and strength. Hence
when disagreement emerged between the Syrian and Lebanese governments
in 1948 following the conclusion of a Franco-Lebanese economic
treaty, the Lebanese government took the initiative of submitting
the case to the Arab League. More importantly, it proposed accepting
the verdict of the League's Council. Highlighting the significance
of this position from an Arabist perspective, Abd al-Rahman Azzam,
the secretary general of the League maintained that:
It is, in fact, an about-face in attitude, because
this arbitration (...) which should have started since the first
day as regards all issues, was not acceptable three years ago;
as for now, it is demanded by the people and the governments.[2]
This case was significant not only within the framework of the
Arab League, but also on the level of Lebanese domestic politics.
For it implied that, as time went by, the Arabists were proving
able to advance their cause and commit Lebanon more closely to
the Arab idea. On several occasions, Lebanon demonstrated that
it was not only Arab in "face" but in every other respect
as well: it was as involved as any other state in the Arab-Israeli
war of 1948, and its attitude towards Western alliances and defence
plans was no different than that of advocates of the Arab idea
in other Arab states such as Syria and Egypt.
What characterized this period was not only the content of the Arab idea within the Lebanese political environment, but also how it was defined. This was done through the quasi-democratic process: through parliamentary debates, ministerial quarrels, press campaigns, student demonstrations, and, last but not least, through "advice" offered by the ambassadors of regional and international powers. These pressures and counter-pressures contributed to the way the Arab idea was expressed and implemented in Lebanon's regional policies, and its definition was usually an outcome of ongoing compromise, bargaining, and political maneuvering, which underlined the pragmatism and the flexibility of the ruling elite.
The contribution of Lebanese Arabists to this process was commensurate
with their high standing in Lebanese and Arab politics. In fact,
there was a close correlation between the domestic and regional
positions of the Arabists. When they formed an important part
of the Lebanese political process, they rose in regional politics
and, hence, were better capable of advancing Lebanon's interests
and defending its system of government. By contrast, when the
Arabists were excluded from the political process, their regional
standing was threatened and they were less capable of shaping
and defining the Arab idea in a manner which accommodated the
Lebanese experience and Lebanon's specific conditions.
Similarly, Lebanese Arabists who were credible and had support
at the regional level, were able to play an important role within
the Lebanese political body and to bring about an acceptance of
the Arab idea and its ramifications. The Lebanese Arabists in
the period of liberal Arabism were able to make good use of these
correlations, and by so doing they contributed to an Arab idea
which came to terms with the Lebanese idea as espoused by the
Lebanonists.
The Stage of Revolutionary Arabism
Arabism became radicalized in the early 1950s. On the regional
level, the emergence of Israel was a main reason for this change:
the ascendance of Nasserism and the Ba`th, as a reaction to the
national humiliation of the Arabs, was both an expression of this
radicalization and its catalyst. On the domestic Lebanese scene,
the assassination of Riyad al-Solh, the death of Abd al-Hamid
Karamé, and the gradual and progressive exclusion of the Arabists
from the political process, contributed to the emergence of a
more radical and militant brand of Lebanese Arabism which embarked
on re-defining the Arab idea. The quest for an Arab entity remained
unchanged. Yet now it was felt that the Arab League - as an association
of states - did not fulfill Arab unionist aspirations. The new
Arab idea opted for a single federal or unitary state. The introduction
of socialism into the Arab idea and the calls for an alliance
with the USSR furthered its radicalization.
Initially, the radical Arabists did not commit themselves to a
definite strategy for the pursuit of their unionist objectives.
In Syria, for example, in the mid-1950s the advocates of union
with Egypt used both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action
to achieve their aims. Later, there was a shift in favour of non-parliamentary
strategies. Parallel to this shift, parliamentary democratic and
gradualist approaches came to be seen - especially in the early
1960s - as obstacles to the unification of the Arab region. The
new formulation of the Arab idea was echoed in Lebanon where it
presented a challenge to the ruling elite which subscribed to
the earlier, liberal Arabism. The Lebanonist constituency, which
remained skeptical towards the old interpretation of Arabism,
found even less that was endearing in the new Arab idea. The contradiction
between the forces which espoused this new idea and the forces
of the status quo in Lebanon was an important factor in fomenting
the 1958 crisis.
The war in 1958, together with a string of events which occurred
on the regional level - such as the rift between Cairo and Baghdad
following the 1958 Iraqi revolution, and the break-up of the UAR
- led President Nasser, as the leader of the Arabist movement,
to reformulate the objectives of the Arab idea. The idea of the
Arab nation-state was not abandoned, but the Arabists insisted
less on its realization. The idea of Arab solidarity was expressed
in summit conferences, and the role of the Arab League was emphasized.
This change of attitude had an important, if limited, impact on
regional politics. The Egyptian leader held on to two positions
which were relevant to the development of the Arab idea in Lebanon:
First, the belief in the centrality of Cairo in Arab politics,
which was never mitigated. Hence the attitude felt towards Arabism
was more or less coterminous with the attitude felt towards Cairo,
which was entrusted with the task of identifying and pursuing
the Arab common good. Second, the negative attitude towards parliamentary
democracy was maintained and even reinforced.
The radical formulation of the Arab idea which was articulated in the 1960s remained prevalent in Lebanon, even after the demise of Cairo as the undisputed center of Arab politics. Arabism in Lebanon ceased to be an idea expressed through the political process, and through cooperation and interaction with other Arab actors in a regional and a collective entity, but an identity which was acquired through allying Lebanon with any single Arab force which could establish itself as the principle actor on the Lebanese scene. To this effect, the role of the Lebanese Arabists was considerably and decisively reduced.
*Raghid el-Solh is a Lebanese political writer
and researcher living in London
1. Mohammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League, Vol.2, Beirut, 1962, p.7.
2. Butros Butros Ghali, dirasat fi al-diplomasiyya al-Arabiyya
(Studies in Arab Diplomacy)¸Cairo, 1973, pp. 173-74.