Elections: Mount Lebanon
On August 18, parliamentary elections took place in the six qada's of Mount Lebanon: the North Metn, Aley, Ba`bda, the Shouf, Kisirwan, and Jbeil. The division of voting districts into qada' s represented an exception when compared to the other electoral districts in Lebanon, in which voters elected candidates at the level of the muhafaza , or governorate. According to the interior ministry, the participation level was near 49%.[1] The real figure is higher given that many of those registered on voters lists are either outside the country or dead.
From the outset, it was virtually inevitable that Mount Lebanon would have a separate status in the 1996 elections. From the government's perspective, Mount Lebanon was a bastion of the opposition that was better divided than united. Moreover, there was a fear in official circles that the predominantly Christian electorate would vote out government candidates, in particular the Druze leader Walid Junblat and the interior minister, Michel al-Murr.
One of the paradoxes of the special electoral status accorded to Mount Lebanon was that, in the present circumstances in the country, it was potentially more democratic than elections at the muhafaza level. In Mount Lebanon, candidates who were not on officially-sponsored lists had a greater chance of being elected since electoral districts were smaller. In proposing a special status for Mount Lebanon, the government understood that it could count on the support of many Christian candidates in the muhafaza , especially parliamentarians, who saw qada' elections as their best chance of entering or re-entering parliament.
The election process in Mount Lebanon was characterized by abnormal levels of fraud, particularly in the North Metn and Ba`bda regions. An independent monitoring group, the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections alone cited some 58 electoral violations. The most serious accusations were directed at the interior minister, Michel al-Murr, who was a also candidate in the North Metn. Mr. Murr was accused by his rivals and independent observers of using the state apparatus, including the security forces, to insure an election victory for himself and other pro-government candidates. Similar accusations were leveled at government candidates in other regions, including the minister Walid Junblat.
In several areas, the most rudimentary rules of election procedure were ignored. Voters were intimidated into selecting specific candidates, voters lists were inaccurate, and the curtains of voting booths were removed. In several places, representatives of certain candidates were prevented from distributing candidates lists or observing the voting process. At least one candidate is believed to have won a seat due to irregularities in the vote count. There were few reports of major violence, although one individual close to the Druze candidate Talal Arslan was killed in the Aley district.
Elections: The North Metn
The elections in the North Metn district took on particular importance as they involved a contest between two leading opposition figures, the Greek Orthodox former deputy Albert Mukhaybir, and the Maronite deputy Nassib Lahoud, on the one hand, and the interior minister, Michel al-Murr, on the other. Mr. Mukhaybir and Mr. Lahoud headed a list that included all but a candidate for the Armenian Orthodox seat, while Mr. Murr aligned a complete list.
In the period leading up to the elections, Mr. Mukhaybir took the controversial decision of calling for participation in elections. This earned the former deputy, who was a leading supporter of the 1992 boycott, the rebuke of several opposition figures residing in Paris, particularly General Michel Aoun and the former deputy Raymond Eddé. Mr. Mukhaybir responded by organizing a meeting at his home in Beit Meri of mostly Christian political figures who opposed a boycott. This provoked a sharp rift between Mr. Mukhaybir and his potential supporters in the Metn who were close to the Paris opposition.
Mr. Mukhaybir's decision to participate made it virtually inevitable that he would ally himself with the deputy Nassib Lahoud. Though considerably different in their political approaches, both men saw the alliance as a necessity: Mr. Lahoud to gain votes from Mr. Mukhaybir's electorate which did not forgive him for participating in the 1992 elections; and Mr. Mukhaybir to take advantage of the fact that Mr. Lahoud is a Maronite whose credibility has been on the rise. The Mukhaybir-Lahoud list also included the Greek Catholic former minister Michel Samaha and other lesser known figures from the Metn.
The Mukhaybir-Lahoud list faced a Murr list which had the strong backing of the state. Mr. Murr's list included, among others, Ghassan Ashqar, a leading figure in the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the former president of the Maronite League, Shaker Abou Suleiman, the deputies Habib Hakim and Auguste Bakhos, and the head of the Armenian Tashnag party, Sebouh Hovnanian.
On election day, Mr. Murr used state services liberally to insure that all the candidates on his list would win seats. One of his first actions was to have several officials in the Lahoud campaign arrested for alleged corruption. In so doing, the interior minister prevented the officials from organizing Mr. Lahoud's electoral representatives who insure that there is no fraud in polling stations. As a result of Mr. Murr's move, the Mukhaybir-Lahoud list had virtually no observers in several coastal areas, including Dekwaneh, Sin al-Fil, and, most significantly, the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hammoud. A representative from the Lahoud list in Dekwaneh, for example, was helpless to prevent the head of a polling station from openly handing out the Murr list to voters.
Final official results showed that all but one of the candidates from the Murr list had won a parliamentary seat. Mr. Murr received 43,407 votes, some six thousand more than Ghassan al-Ashqar who came in second overall. Of the opposition list, only Mr. Lahoud managed to win a parliamentary seat with 31,914 votes, at the expense of Auguste Bakhos. The big shock was the elimination of Mr. Mukhaybir, who received 26,270 votes and finished third among the Greek Orthodox candidates, for whom two seats were reserved.
Several factors aside from fraud were instrumental in insuring a victory for the Murr list, among them the Armenian vote, the vote of newly-naturalized citizens, and an apparent generational factor. The most significant variable playing in Mr. Murr's favor was his ability to garner the Armenian vote. While the Armenians have traditionally voted for state-backed candidates, the sheer magnitude of the Armenian vote - some 10,000 votes for the Murr list, and only a few hundred for opposition candidates [2] - suggested there was some truth behind the contention that Syria had helped persuade the Armenians to back Mr. Murr.
Through a combination of intimidation and aggressive lobbying, the interior minister also insured that a vast majority of newly-naturalized Lebanese would vote for his list. There was no clear indication how many newly-naturalized citizens appeared on the voters lists, and Mr. Murr avoided distributing copies of new lists to other candidates to insure that they did not calculate the number. Sources in the Lahoud camp, however, estimate at a maximum of 10,000 the number of newly-naturalized in the Metn.
The high participation level suggested that a third factor had also played a part in Mr. Mukhaybir's defeat, namely the fact that the octogenarian former deputy is not well known by a younger generation of voters. Though immensely popular among his supporters, Mr. Mukhaybir has been so isolated in the past four years by most media outlets close to pro-government politicians that few younger voters know him well. In contrast, Mr. Lahoud is relatively young and is often seen on television, which, results showed, gave him consistently good results in most areas of the Metn.[3]
Mr. Lahoud's victory could well make of him one of the central figures of the opposition. As a strong Maronite from the Metn, Mr. Lahoud appears to have both the confessional and geographic prerequisites to become a unifying force in the opposition. However, several potential obstacles remain which may block this: first, Mr. Lahoud's is unwilling to seriously challenge Syria's role in Lebanon, which must be a necessary feature in any program seeking to unite the opposition. Second, Mr. Lahoud's is profoundly reluctant to come across as a Maronite politician, which, while laudable in absolute terms, may in the medium term weaken his standing in his predominantly Maronite Metn region. And third, Mr. Lahoud has deep differences with supporters of other Christian opposition leaders, particularly those in exile in Paris, whom he cannot afford to ignore, however, if he is to eventually play a national role.
Mr. Murr, in turn, can take pleasure in the fact that he eliminated his main Greek Orthodox rival, Mr. Mukhaybir. However, Mr. Lahoud's victory was badly received by the interior minister, who is conscious that a strong Maronite in the Metn can potentially build up a much stronger power base than he. Moreover, Mr. Murr's lack of popularity may well contribute to his being replaced at the interior ministry in a new government, with the added threat that other strong and wealthy Greek Orthodox deputies have appeared on the political scene. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that Mr. Murr may be in for a period of relative political isolation similar to what happened to the interior minister who organized the 1992 elections, Sami al-Khatib.
Elections: Ba'abda
The Ba`bda elections were a test both of Syria's willingness to allow a major opposition figure, Pierre Daccash, to enter parliament, and its intention to curb the power of Hizballah. Two major lists (and a third weaker list) vied for the three Maronite, two Shi`a and one Druze seats in the qada' . One was headed by the electricity and water resources minister, Elie Hubayqah, the other by Mr. Daccash. Mr. Hubayqah, who had the open backing of the state, included on his list the deputy Jean Ghanem, a former president of the Maronite League, Ernest Karam, the deputies Ayman Shouqair, who is close to Walid Junblat, and Basem al Sab`eh, who is close to Prime Minister Hariri, as well as a new face, Salah al-Haraki, who is a member of the Amal movement.
Mr. Daccash, in turn, allied himself with several notables from the region, including a representative of the Druze A`war family and Victor Farhat from Hammana. The most surprising move, however, was Mr. Daccash's inclusion or the Hizballah deputy Ali Ammar on his list instead of the former deputy Mahmoud Ammar who, like Mr. Daccash himself, was a member of the National Liberal Party of Camille Chamoun. In so doing, Mr. Daccash sought to take advantage of Hizballah's capacity to mobilize support in the southern suburbs, where Mr. Daccash had little support.
Prior to the election, the Syrians had proposed to Hizballah that the party collaborate indirectly with the Hubayqah list. They suggested an arrangement whereby Mr. Hubayqah would leave one of the Shi`a seats in his list open for Mr. Ammar, in exchange for which Hizballah supporters would vote for the Hubayqah list. Hizballah rejected the arrangement arguing that it could not collaborate with Mr. Hubayqah, whom it considers responsible for the massacres in 1982 at the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. Mr. Hubayqah and the Syrians retaliated by bringing in Mr. Haraki, who is close to Mr. Birri, and filling the two Shi`a seats.
As far as Mr. Daccash was concerned, the decision to form an electoral alliance with Ali Ammar was a success. Mr. Daccash was the only candidate on his list to win a seat in parliament, at the expense of Ernest Karam. In contrast, Mr. Ammar was defeated by Mr. Sab`eh and Mr. Haraki. The outcome of the vote was a shock for Hizballah, and for Mr. Ammar in particular. All the more so since, according to reports citing official election figures, Mr. Ammar won a vast majority of the votes in the southern suburbs. In appeared that while most of Mr. Ammar's supporters had given votes to Mr. Daccash, Mr. Daccash's predominantly Christian supporters were reluctant to vote for the Hizballah candidate. Hizballah was also weakened by the loss of the Druze vote, which in 1992 had helped bring Mr. Ammar into parliament.
The Ba`bda elections were marred by intimidation and abuse. In several places, Mr. Hubayqah's supporters managed to control polling stations in the mountain, inducing voters to chose his list. Several polling stations were transferred at the last minute from the Tahouita district in a Beirut suburb to the mountain town of Kfar Selwan in an effort to weaken the Daccash list. At the same time, Hizballah tightly controlled polling stations in Beirut's southern suburbs where, observers noted, it was more than likely that fraud was also committed.
In the aftermath of Mr. Ammar's defeat, observers attempted to predict what this meant for the future of Hizballah. The Syrians clearly sought to send a message to the party that it could not afford to stand in opposition to the state while at the same time hoping to win a sizable share of power. This eventually forces Hizballah into an alliance with Amal in the south and the Biqa` (see below), although this did not reassure the party as to its future.
Mr. Daccash can be happy that, like Nassib Lahoud in the Metn, he managed to break the monopoly of an officially-backed list. Still, Mr. Daccash's victory is not necessarily to the disadvantage of the government. Mr. Daccash was at one time among the most credible figures in the opposition and a supporter of the 1992 boycott; his entry into the system is clearly a blow to the opposition. Moreover, Mr. Daccash's victory appeared to disprove the opposition's contention that the government would prevent any and all opposition figures from reaching parliament. Despite this, Mr. Daccash knows the demands of his electorate well and will very probably be a leading critic of the government in the new parliament.
Elections: Aley-Shouf
The election in Aley was primarily between a pro-Junblat list headed by the Druze deputy Akram Shuhayyib, and a list headed by the deputy Talal Arslan. The principal stake in the Aley election was to determine who, Walid Junblat or Mr. Arslan, would be able to lay claim to the leadership of the Druze in the qada' . The participation level in Aley was estimated at 50% by the interior ministry.
That the traditional Arslan-Junblat rivalry had gone beyond reconciliation was evident early on in the fact that Mr. Arslan refused to form a unified list with Mr. Shuhayyib. This was predictable, given that Mr. Junblat's offer of a united list was little more than a trap to force Mr. Arslan to approve a list essentially made up of Junblat supporters. Instead, both Mr. Arslan and Mr. Shuhayyib chose to compromise somewhat by leaving the second Druze seat on each other's list open in order not to block the other out.
A major bone of contention between Mr. Arslan and Mr. Junblat was whether to include the two Maronite deputies Pierre Helou and Fouad al-Sa`d, and the Greek Orthodox deputy Marwan Abou-Fadel, on a unified list. Mr. Junblat openly opposed the three men, who, for different reasons, have taken positions critical of the government in the past. Mr. Arslan, in turn, declared that he would not break his alliance with three.
Mr. Junblat responded by replacing the three deputies with three candidates of his own: Abdo Bejjani and Antoine Hitti for the Maronite seats, and Antoine Andraos for the Greek Orthodox seat. Mr. Bejjani was the director-general of the Higher Customs Council before being appointed to the Investment Development Authority of Lebanon (IDAL). He is considered close to Prime Minister Hariri. Mr. Andraos, who headed the Fund for the Displaced, is also close to the prime minister and was an employee of his Oger company in France before he returned to Lebanon in 1992. Mr. Hitti is a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP).
The election led to a humiliating defeat for the Arslan list. Only Mr. Arslan himself was elected to parliament, and only because Mr. Junblat had left a place open for him on the Shuhayyib list. Members of the Arslan list accused Mr. Junblat and his supporters of widespread fraud. One of the losing deputies, for example, accused supporters of the Junblat list of having forged tens of thousands of identity documents to widen the margin of defeat of the Arslan list. This could not be independently confirmed. The tension between the two sides was especially high in the town of Shuwayfat, where a supporter of Mr. Arslan died allegedly of a heart attack following an attack by Junblat supporters.
The elections in the Shouf were closely linked to those in Aley in that both areas form the area of influence of Mr. Junblat. Mr. Junblat's list in the Shouf included several allies from the 1992 campaign including the minister Marwan Hamadeh, the deputies Nabil Boustani, George Deeb Ne`meh, Khalil Abd al-Nour, Ala'eddine Terro, and Zahir al-Khatib, as well as a new face, the Maronite candidate Wadih Aql. Mr. Khatib, who has not been on good terms with Mr. Junblat, was included on the list evidently under Syrian pressure.
Although Mr. Junblat's list was the obvious favorite, a second list headed by the Maronite candidate Naji Boustani was also in competition. It also included the deputy Samir Aoun, who had been on Mr. Junblat's list in 1992, but who since had a falling out with the Druze leader.
Mr. Junblat's list easily won all the Shouf seats, although there was a small surprise in that Marwan Hamadeh won almost 4,000 more votes than the Druze leader. Most probably Mr. Hamadeh benefited from genuine popularity among Christian voters, most of whom probably voted for Mr. Junblat out of political necessity. Naji Boustani showed that he had electoral clout in the Shouf by winning some 25,000 votes, although this was approximately half the number won by Mr. Junblat's Maronite allies. The interior ministry estimated the participation level in the Shouf at 52%.
There were a number of reports of fraud, although it appears unlikely that these substantially changed the election outcome. Naji Boustani complained that pages from a voters list in the village of Gharifé had been missing, although he chose not to accuse anybody in particular for the omission. The independent Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections (LADE) also noted problems in the voting, including the absence of officials at certain polling stations, although they were relatively minor when compared to the abuse in other areas of Mount Lebanon.
The Shouf and Aley were in many ways the forgotten centerpieces of the Mount Lebanon election. It was in order to give Mr. Junblat a majority in both qada' s that the election law did not organize muhafaza elections in Mount Lebanon. The Aley election in particular had both local and national importance. At the local level it confirmed - whether fraud was used or not - that Mr. Junblat was the paramount Druze leader in the mountain. In inter-confessional terms, it was also an indirect message to the Maronite hierarchy, in particular Patriarch Nasrallah Sfayr, that the Maronites cannot hope to wager in the future on an alternative Druze leader emerging from the Arslan family. Mr. Junblat also made clear that only he could choose the Christian representatives in Aley and the Shouf, and that the future of Christians in the areas were tied to his political fate, not to that of his Druze rivals.
At the national level, the Aley-Shouf elections appeared to confirm the conclusions of those who have chosen to describe Mr. Junblat as the real third member of the leadership troïka , with the prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, and the parliament speaker, Nabih Birri. Certainly the use of the state apparatus to help crush Mr. Arslan suggested that there exists a general consensus that Mr. Junblat is a central pillar of the post-Ta'if political system. At another level, the elections underlined that the alliance between Mr. Junblat and Mr. Hariri remains stronger than ever. Indeed, it can be said that Mr. Hariri's influence has been extended to the mountain through Mr. Junblat's victory. The question is whether in the long term this alliance will not threaten the second major bloc which has emerged in parliament, that centering around Mr. Birri.
Elections: The Kisirwan
Two major lists faced off one against the other in the Kisirwan, one headed by the foreign minister and deputy Faris Buwayz, the other by the deputy Rushayd al-Khazen. The turnout in the contest for the five Maronite seats in the district was estimated at a high 51%.
The major stake in the Kisirwan was to determine whether Mr. Buwayz would be able to use the election to consolidate his position within the country's leadership hierarchy. Having been granted the key foreign ministry portfolio, Mr. Buwayz is considered, at least on paper, the leading Maronite in the Hariri government. In reality, however, Mr. Buwayz, who is also the son-in-law of the president, Elias Hrawi, has long been on uneasy terms with the prime minister, in part because of his personal ties to the president, in part because his ambitions have clashed with those of Mr. Hariri.
In contrast, two of Mr. Buwayz's opponents, the deputies Rushayd al-Khazen and Mansour al-Bone, were considered close to the prime minister. It was therefore not surprising to see Mr. Buwayz react with particular vehemence at the formation of Mr. Khazen's list. This was exacerbated by the fact that Mr. Khazen took Camille Ziyadeh on his list. Mr. Ziadeh, a deputy in the 1992 parliament, had angered President Hrawi last year by voting against an extension of his mandate. In response, the president demanded of his son-in-law that he not include Mr. Ziyadeh on his list. At one stage, this appeared to spell the end of Mr. Ziadeh's political career.
The election proved to be a failure for Mr. Buwayz, however. Aside from the foreign minister himself, only one member of his list, Elias al-Khazen, won a parliamentary seat. Mr. Bone won the most votes of any candidate with 20,133, while Rushayd al-Khazen won 17,926 votes. Mr. Ziyadeh also was elected. There were signs that Mr. Buwayz was saved from elimination from a manipulation of the vote count, which also made it appear that he had won more votes than Mr. Ziadeh. Sources close to the foreign minister suggested that at one stage during the counting he fully expected to be eliminated.
Whether Mr. Buwayz was actually saved or not, the Kisirwan election was a severe blow to his prestige. It not only showed that the foreign minister is unpopular in the Kisirwan, it also underlined that President Hrawi's influence in the Christian heartland is at best marginal. This situation raises a number of questions as to Mr. Buwayz's future. The foreign minister's poor showing will certainly reduce his chances of gaining a major portfolio in the new government. Moreover, even if Mr. Buwayz is reappointed a minister, it will only be thanks to pressure from President Hrawi's. Whatever happens, Mr. Buwayz's power will be substantially reduced, which could turn into a liability for Mr. Hrawi.
The fate of Mr. Ziyadeh will also have to be watched. Unlike his fellow list members Mr. Khazen and Mr. Bone, Mr. Ziyadeh is not a supporter of Mr. Hariri. The deputy's decisions to oppose an extension of President Hrawi's mandate and to vote against the new electoral law were the first serious signs that he sought to play an independent opposition role in parliament. With his election victory in hand, Mr. Ziyadeh will very likely become part of the rump opposition in the next parliament. This could well increase his local power base, even as it expands his national appeal among the government's critics.
Elections: Jubayl
The Jbeil contest was described by several observers as an election without stakes. In reality, the stakes were in large part local. Participation was estimated at 55% as candidates vied for the two Maronite and one Shi`a seat in the qada' . Voters had the choice between several contending lists and dozens of independent candidates.
The high participation level in Jbeil showed how ineffective had been the call for a boycott by the National Bloc leader Raymond Eddé. Mr. Eddé, historically a leading figure in Jbeil politics, called for a boycott in 1992 that had helped limit the participation level in the qada' to 6.5%. However, Mr. Eddé has been living in self-imposed exile in Paris since the mid-1970s, and the desire of voters to participate in the politics of the region was evident in the most recent elections.
The apparent quest for new blood notwithstanding, one of Mr. Eddé's most long-standing rivals, Nouhad Sou`aid, was a candidate in Jbeil. The Sou`aid-Eddé rivalry reflected the historical opposition between the supporters of Mr. Eddé's father, the former president, Emile Eddé, who are known as kitlawis , and the supporters of the former president, Bishara al-Khoury, who are known as destouri s. While the rivalry has little resonance in present-day Lebanon, it does remain alive in certain areas such as Jbeil.
Mr. Eddé's boycott call was partly undermined by the decision of one of the principle members of his National Bloc party, Jean Hawwat, to stand for elections. While Mr. Eddé derided Mr. Hawwat's decision to participate, the episode showed the profound differences which exist between the Lebanese opposition leaders in exile and their supporters at home. Moreover, those who opposed a boycott had to take into consideration another factor which encouraged massive participation: the inclusion of newly-naturalized Lebanese citizens on electoral lists in the Jbeil hinterland. In the village of Bijjeh, for example, local inhabitants complained that dozens of Sunni Muslim families had been placed on electoral lists, presumably to vote for pro-government deputies such as Michel Khoury and Maha Khoury As`ad.
The outcome of the elections split victory three ways. Nouhad Sou`aid was the sole candidate from her list who won, as were the deputy Mahmoud Awwad and Emile Naufal. Mr. Awwad is a Shi`a doctor who was elected in 1992, while Mr. Naufal is an independent businessman with no political experience.
The Jbeil elections confirmed the extent to which the qada' remains divided in its political allegiances. Competition over the Shi`a seat in particular provided a good illustration of this. Both Amal and Hizballah backed candidates, only to see Mr. Awwad, who is close to the prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, win the seat with more votes than any other candidate. At the least, this suggests that Mr. Hariri will be able to further extend his influence into the Maronite heartland after the election of Mansour al-Bone and Rushayd al-Khazen in the Kisirwan.
Elections: North Lebanon
The second stage of elections was held on August 25 in the muhafaza of the North, where voters were invited to elect 28 deputies. The North is the largest constituency in number of voters with over 569,000. The turnout in the North differed between one qada' and another, varying between 25% in Bsharri and 50.5% in Dinniyeh. The interior ministry estimated the average turnout for the muhafaza at 40%.
Four lists were formed in the south, although there was no clear way to differentiate between the candidates. Three of the lists included both pro-government candidates and opposition figures. This situation was explained away by the deputy Suleiman Franjiyyeh, who remarked that North Lebanon contained more friends and allies that any single list could include. Moreover, many of those who oppose the government, including Mr. Franjiyyeh and the former prime minister, Omar Karami, are at the same time major supporters of the post-Ta'if political system.
The leading list, which was named the National Solidarity list, was headed by a triumvirate made up of Omar Karameh, Mr. Franjiyyeh, and the billionaire Isam Fares. It included leading traditional northern politicians, including Nayla Mou`awwad, Estephan Douayhi, and Talal al Mer`ebi, and candidates from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) as well as the Kata'ib and Ba`th parties.
The second leading list, which was named the Development and Change list, was headed by Ahmad Karameh, the cousin and political rival of Omar Karami, and included the minister Omar Miskawi, who is close to Mr. Hariri, the former minister Mikhaïl al-Daher, and candidates from the Jama`a Islamiyya.
A third list headed by the Maronite former deputy and minister Boutros Harb gathered several candidates who failed to make it into the first or second lists. And a fourth list, named the Other Choice list, was formed of an alliance between several intellectuals and independent northern politicians. It was headed by Samir Franjiyyeh, the son of Hamid Franjiyyeh, the older brother of the late president, Suleiman Franjiyyeh. In addition, 55 independent candidates ran for eats, among them the former minister Hasan Ezzeddine and Ghassan al-Ashqar from the Communist Party.
On election day, signs of fraud were less visible than in Mount Lebanon. In the Akkar, however, supporters of Mikhaïl al-Daher were intimidated by the security forces. From the outset, it appeared that Mr. Daher had been targeted for defeat by the government since he was one of a handful of deputies who had voted against the extension of President Hrawi's mandate. The main problem appeared to be the reliability of voters lists, where thousands of names were missing. There were also indications that thousands of newly-naturalized Lebanese were brought in from Syria on buses to elect pro-government and pro-Syrian candidates.
A main feature of the northern elections was the decision by voters to prepare their own lists by selecting candidates from each of the rival lists. Observers remarked that this showed signs both of political independence and maturity. This behavior appeared to be caused by the lack of homogeneity in the lists, which made it difficult for voters to vote for entire lists. Moreover, several candidates cut deals with members of rival lists to insure that they would win, which made even more unpredictable the voting pattern in the north.
Results
Final results showed that the Karami-Franjiyyeh-Fares list had won 17 seats. The Ahmad Karami list won nine seats, and the Harb list won two seats. None of the members of the Samir Franjiyyeh list won a seat. Still, there were many surprises.
The first surprise was the performance of the wealthy Alawi candidate from Tripoli, Ahmad Hbous, who won the largest number of votes with 123,142. Mr. Hbous won some 50,000 more votes than Omar Karameh, who only placed eighteenth. Mr. Hbous's success can be understood in part by the fact that he stood against Ali Eid, once the head of an unpopular Alawi militia in Tripoli. This won Mr. Hbous Sunni votes. It also appears that the Syrian regime actively backed Mr. Hbous against Mr. Eid. This gave the victorious Alawi candidate a large bloc of votes from recently-naturalized Lebanese living in Syria.
A second surprise was the performance of Omar Karameh, who emerged from the elections thoroughly humiliated. His 69,186 votes were considerably lower than the 81,489 votes received by his cousin Ahmad. Even in Tripoli, Omar received only 15,214 votes to Ahmad's 24,325. Omar reacted to the result by threatening to resign from parliament, and accused Mr. Hariri of having worked against him. This should substantially reduce his chances to have a say in the new government, and will reduce his ability to be a powerful Sunni candidate at the national level.
A third surprise was the performance of Boutros Harb. Under evident Syrian pressure Mr. Harb was rejected from the two leading lists. He instead formed a list of his own and promptly won 99,793 votes, defeating the Kata'ib party leader George Sa`adeh. Mr. Harb's success did not come as a complete surprise, however. Apart from being popular, Mr. Harb is close to President Hrawi who prior to the elections reportedly intervened on Mr. Harb's behalf with the Syrians. While Syria did not support Mr. Harb, it may have decided not to actively oppose him either so as to placate Mr. Hrawi. Mr. Harb took with him to parliament Musbah al-Ahdab, the only other candidate from his list to win a seat. Mr. Ahdab who is the scion of a prominent northern Sunni family from Tripoli, is a wealthy businessman who was honorary consul of France in the city.
A fourth surprise was the failure of the Islamist parties. The two candidates from the Jama`a Islamiyya, Faysal Mawlawi and As`ad Harmouch, as well as Taha Naji from the Ahbash all lost. Only Khaled Daher of the Jama`a succeeded in winning a seat in the Akkar defeating Jamal Isma`il by a mere 112 votes and Muhammad Yahya.
A fifth surprise was the defeat of the head of the pro-Syrian Ba`th party, Abdallah Shahhal, and a candidate from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), Salim Sa`adeh. Both were on the Karami-Franjiyyeh-Fares list and were favored to win. Their loss appeared in part to be a rejection of overtly pro-Syrian candidates, although Syria saw many of its allies win seats in the north. It could also have reflected a weakness of political parties. The Kata'ib party's candidate George Sa`adeh, who was on the same list as Mr. Shahhal and Mr. Sa`adeh, was also defeated.
As in the elections in Beirut (see below), the northern elections brought several wealthy businessmen into parliament. The most obvious examples are Isam Fares, Ahmad Hbous, Maurice Fadel, Musbah al-Ahdab, and Jihad al-Samad, as well as several deputies elected in 1992, including Riyad Sarraf and Farid Makari.
Finally, the elections showed that the traditional families continue to dominate the northern political scene. Most of the major families were represented in the elections, in some cases by more than one candidate, including the Karami, Kabbara, Samad, Khayr, Mou`awwad, Franjiyyeh, Douayhi, Toq, Issa al-Khoury, Ahdab, and Mere`beh families. All managed to win seats, which underlined their willingness to cooperate one with the other. The northern elections appeared to e decided by two factors: the power of the traditional families, and Syrian priorities.
Elections: Beirut Elections in Beirut were held on September 1. Despite signs of dissatisfaction among voters and a participation level estimated at a low 31%, the elections for the 19 seats in Beirut were a clear-cut victory for the prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri. Mr. Hariri entered the contest with 17 candidates, leaving open one Sunni seat and the Maronite seat on his list. He succeeded in getting all but three of his candidates elected, including five Armenian deputies. The prime minister was opposed by three lists, all incomplete, one headed by the former prime minister and deputy, Salim al-Hoss, a second headed by the deputy Najah Wakim, and a third headed by the deputy from the Islamic Charitable Works Association (The Ahbash), Adnan Traboulsi.
In the months preceding the parliamentary elections, Mr. Hariri sent contradictory signals as to his intention to stand for elections. Initially, he indicated that he would be a candidate in Beirut. However, the mood in the Hariri campaign appeared to change in spring as informal polls conducted by the prime minister's information-gathering services suggested that any list he headed would perform poorly. Even the president, Elias Hrawi, is said to have recommended to Mr. Hariri that he not stand for elections in order to avoid being weakened by an unsuccessful campaign. Until a few weeks before the elections, the prime minister appeared to confirm this fiction.
In retrospect, Mr. Hariri's decision to stand for elections was almost inevitable. The prime minister needed to anchor himself further in a system in which he has developed such a large stake. The prime minister's decision to keep his intentions vague as to his participation was primarily a tactical step to keep his opponents off guard. For as long as Mr. Hariri's intentions were unclear, his most serious Sunni rivals, Mr. Hoss and the head of the Maqasid Islamic Charitable Association, Tammam Salam, were unable to form strong lists of their own: political figures in Beirut were both reluctant to antagonize the prime minister by entering lists opposed to him, while several awaited to see whether Mr. Hariri would call on them in the formation of his list.
Mr. Hariri formed his own list after efforts failed to form a coalition list which would have also included, among others, Mr. Hoss and Mr. Salam. According to observers, Mr. Hariri would only have formed a coalition list had he been given the lion's share in selecting his fellow candidates. However, neither Mr. Hoss nor Mr. Salam, given their experience in Beirut politics, were willing to play second fiddles to the prime minister. This prompted Mr. Hariri to enter the Beirut race with uncharacteristic aggressiveness. In a speech announcing his candidacy, the prime minister openly denounced those who, he claimed, had poorly represented Beirut during the past four years. The attack was clearly aimed at Mr. Hoss, who responded heatedly that this had not prevented Mr. Hariri from seeking an electoral alliance with him.
Mr. Hoss soon paid the price of Mr. Hariri's determination. When a final and unsuccessful Syrian-mediated effort to convince Mr. Hoss to join a coalition list failed, Mr. Hariri persuaded one of Mr. Hoss's electoral allies, the Greek Orthodox deputy Bishara Merhej, to abandon the former prime minister and join a Hariri list. Some suggested that Mr. Merhej had been persuaded by members of the Syrian leadership, with whom he is close, to take this course of action in order to punish Mr. Hoss for his stubbornness. However, it is also true that Mr. Merhej had hoped that a coalition list would be formed in the capital to include Mr. Hariri and Mr. Hoss.
In order to fill the second Greek Orthodox seat in Beirut, Mr. Hariri had initially selected the former deputy Michel Sassine. Reports suggested that initially the prime minister had wanted to include the former foreign minister, Fouad Boutros, on his list, but that the two men had not been able to arrive at an agreement on candidates. At that stage, Mr. Hariri turned to Mr. Sassine, who has support in the largely Christian district of Ashrafiyyeh. Mr. Boutros, who was said to be unhappy with Mr. Sassine's appointment, reportedly threatened to order his supporters to vote for Mr. Hariri's bitter rival, the Greek Orthodox candidate Najah Wakim. This interpretation could not be confirmed. However, the prime minister promptly dropped Mr. Sassine from his list and replaced him with a candidate from western Beirut, Atif Majdalani.
Mr. Hariri's final list included mostly unknown candidates, many of them contractors and businessmen with no political experience. The electoral alliance between Mr. Hariri and the speaker of parliament, Nabih Birri, led to the inclusion in the list of Husayn Yatim, a Shi`a candidate close to the Amal movement. Like Michel al-Murr in the North Metn, the prime minister was able to forge an alliance with Armenian deputies, whose community votes in a highly cohesive way at election time. By convincing Mr. Merhej to join his list, Mr. Hariri also won a sizable portion of votes of newly-naturalized Lebanese, who received their citizenship when Mr. Merhej was interior minister. There was never doubt, however, that it was mainly the prime minister's prestige that would carry his list through.
Mr. Hoss formed an incomplete list that included several of his allies from 1992, including the deputies Isam Na`man, Muhammad Yusif Beydoun, and Muhammad Qabbani. Aside from Fadi Mughayzil, the son of the late Greek Catholic deputy Joseph Mughayzil, Mr. Hoss's list also included largely unknown candidates with little political experience.
The Wakim and Traboulsi lists were both incomplete, and weak, although both Mr. Wakim and Mr. Traboulsi could count on a core of loyal supporters. Mr. Wakim allied himself with two former deputies, Ousama Fakhoury and Asmar Asmar, as well as with the Communist Party candidate, Nadim Abd al-Samad. In addition, Mr. Wakim left a Shi`a seat open on his list to benefit from Hizballah votes in favor of the party's candidate in Beirut, the deputy Muhammad Birjawi. Indeed, in many places the Wakim list was distributed with Mr. Birjawi's name on it.
Mr. Traboulsi's list was made up of an unlikely alliance of candidates unknown outside specific neighborhoods in the capital. It included Gilbert Shammas, a Greek Catholic candidate reputed to be close to the minister Elias Hubayqah, and Habib Ephrem, a Syriac candidate for the minorities seat. Both men were once close to the Lebanese Forces.
The fate of Tammam Salam was particularly revealing as a sign of the change in the balance of power in Beirut politics. The Salam family, which heads the Maqasid social and educational foundation, has long been among the leading Sunni families in the capital, and Saëb Salam, Tammam Salam's father, was prime minister countless times in Lebanon's post-Independence period. At any other time in the past, a Salam would have headed the strong list in Beirut. Mr. Hariri's arrival in the capital, however, curtailed the power of the traditional Beirut Sunni families, who found that the prime minister had infiltrated the myriad social services networks that had for so long provided them with political support.
It was not surprising, then, that Mr. Hariri and Mr. Salam were unable to come to an agreement on forming a joint list. One of the prime minister's unstated objective was to break the power of the traditional Beirut families, while Mr. Salam could ill afford to join a list in which most candidates were selected by the prime minister. As a result, Mr. Salam entered the contest as an independent. This was an implicit acknowledgment of his inability to form a strong list, saving him from the embarrassment of seeing his electoral allies fail. However, it also allowed Mr. Salam to avoid a bruising confrontation with the prime minister which could have had negative repercussions in the future.
Election day
The major characteristic of the Beirut elections was the low voter turnout estimated at 31%. The figures released by the interior ministry also revealed a lower level of participation in the eastern portion of the capital as compared to the western portion. Some 116,000 voters went to the polls, from a total number of eligible voters of 379,000.
In western neighborhoods participation was estimated at 42% for Mazra`a, 41% for Ayn al-Mraysseh, 35% for Msaytbih, 35% for Bashoura, 34% for Zoqaq al-Blatt and 16% for Minet al-Hosn-Medawwar. In the eastern areas, the participation level in Ashrafiyyeh was estimated at 24% and in the areas of Rmeil-Sayfi-Port at 20%. Observers noted that the real participation of Christians in Ashrafiyyeh was probably no higher than 7%, but that strong Armenian participation raised the overall average to 24%.
The relatively low turnout reflected, at least in part, a feeling of uneasiness among voters with the general mood surrounding the Beirut election. Mr. Hariri's opening attacks against Mr. file:///C|oss created a climate of confrontation which appeared to have taken many voters aback, particularly those in the predominantly Muslim western areas of the capital. In the predominately Christian eastern areas, the low participation level seemed to signal that many Christians felt under-represented in the Hariri and Hoss lists.[4] A further sign of this dissatisfaction was the heavy Christian vote in favor of the deputy Najah Wakim, who has long been a harsh critic of Mr. Hariri and the government. Mr. Wakim won over 53,000 votes, a remarkable figure given that the prime minister exerted strong efforts to bring him down.
Mr. Hariri won the largest share of votes, with over 78,000. Mr. Hoss, who spent far less money than the prime minister, won over 64,000 votes, a fine result that did not, however, carry over to most members of his list. Mr. Salam also performed well, winning 46,000 votes and defeating one of Mr. Hariri's allies. Despite his victory, Mr. Hariri was reported to be unhappy with the results of the voting. Sources close to the prime minister's campaign suggested that he had been aiming to win over 100,000 votes. The election results appeared to show that Mr. Hariri, a Sidonian, has yet to be fully accepted in Beirut, particularly by its Sunni community which eyes the prime minister with a mixture of awe and suspicion.
The prime minister must have quickly gotten over his setback. His victory, while not overwhelming, was more than convincing. Mr. Hariri is more powerful than he was at any other time since taking over the prime ministry in 1992. Moreover, even among his Beirut rivals, few have a vested interest in opposing Mr. Hariri for very long. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Beirut elections, both Mr. Salam and the Shi`a deputy Muhammad Yusif Beydoun made overtures to the prime minister. Even Mr. Hoss, who is politically a cautious man and who finds himself alone, will probably not seek a confrontation with Mr. Hariri. Only Mr. Wakim, whose raison d'être is to be a firebrand, can be expected to continue his attacks against the prime minister and the government.
Elections: South Lebanon
On September 8, parliamentary elections took place for 23 seats in the two unified muhafaza t s of south Lebanon, the South and Nabatiyyeh. The unification of the two governorates was an exception to the electoral law, which the government justified by underlining that large parts of south Lebanon were occupied. In reality, the joining of the two muhafaza t s was primarily done to strengthen the power of the parliament speaker, Nabih Birri. It allowed Mr. Birri to head a large list of over 20 deputies instead of the 11 or 12 he would have controlled if the two muhafaza t s had voted separately. Moreover, Mr. Birri's power in Nabatiyyeh is limited when compared to that of Hizballah and other forces historically present there.
The elections in the south were characterized by a last-minute alliance between Mr. Birri's Amal movement and Hizballah. Up to 72 hours before the elections it appeared that the two rivals would compete against each other. The prospect of a conflict between Amal and Hizballah in a region close to Israel induced Syria to redouble the pressure on the parties to form a coalition list. Prior to their agreement, however, several other alliances were discussed, namely between Hizballah, leftist forces represented by the deputy Habib Sadeq, the president of the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers, Elias Abou Rizq, and independent figures on the one hand; and between Mr. Birri's supporters, the prime minister's sister, Bahiyya al-Hariri, the Ba`th party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and some traditional figures on the other hand.
The representation of Sidon remained a problem since the prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri insisted on having both his sister and a political ally, Abd al-Rahman al-Bizri, on Mr. Birri's list. Hizballah, in turn, threw its support behind the deputy Mustapha Sa`d, a rival of Mr. Hariri in Sidon, and Ali Shaykh Ammar of the Jama`a Islamiyyah. To benefit from both Amal and Hizballah votes, Mr. Sa`d declared that he would stand as an independent.
In the weeks prior to the elections, the tension increased between Amal and Hizballah, with each side accusing the other of working against the revitalization of state authority and national institutions. This was further exacerbated by Mr. Hariri, who declared that the parliamentary elections were a contest between "moderates" and "extremists," which appeared to signal a desire to isolate Hizballah.
Syria's desires prevailed, however, and both Mr. Birri and Hizballah negotiated a joint list which they chose to name the Liberation and Development list. There was general agreement on which candidates would be on the coalition list, although four seats created a problem: two seats in Marja`youn-Hasbayya where Habib Sadeq and Elias Abou Rizq were running, and two seats in Sidon where no solution was found to the Hariri-Sa`d imbroglio. While both sides agreed not to take Mr. Abou Rizq, Hizballah insisted on having both Mr. Sadeq and Mr. Sa`d on the list. Mr. Birri rejected Mr. Sadeq, who himself had earlier rejected an alliance with the parliament speaker. Mr. Birri agreed to take Mr. Sa`d on the list, but Hizballah categorically rejected Bahiyya Hariri in exchange. Moreover, Mr. Sa`d and Ms. Hariri vetoed each other.
Finally, a compromise was reached whereby Hizballah agreed to nominate one of the two Shi`a candidates in Marja`youn-Hasbayya against Mr. Sadeq, while Mr. Birri nominated the other. Both sides also agreed that they would not instruct their voters to scratch from their lists the name of the other's candidate. In Sidon, things were more complicated as both sides refused to budge from their initial positions. It was finally agreed that the coalition list would not include candidates from Sidon, and Mr. Sa`d and Ms. Hariri stood as independents. Mr. Birri asked his supporters to vote for Ms. Hariri and Mr. Bizri, while Hizballah voted for Mr. Sa`d and Mr. Ammar.
Mr. Sadeq, meanwhile, announced the formation of an opposition list, the Democratic Choice list, with Mr. Abou Rizq, the deputy Sa`id al-As`ad, and Sa`dallah Mazra`ani of the Lebanese Communist Party, as well as other independent opposition figures. At the same time, former parliament speaker, Kamel Al-As'ad announced his list which included the former deputies Rafiq Shahine, Anwar al-Sabbah, and Munif al-Khatib, as well as other figures.
Election day
As the candidates lists were announced 48 hours before election day, many voters were unfamiliar with most of the candidates. This had little impact on the turnout as an estimated 48.3% of voters went to the polls. In addition, thousands of voters were allowed by Israel to leave the occupied zone and to travel to Beirut where their polling stations were located. It is believed that most of those in the occupied zone were instructed to vote for Mr. Birri and Ms. Hariri and against Hizballah.
Both the pre-election period and election day were characterized by more than average levels of fraud. In the pre-electoral period, village mayors (mukhtar s) were invited to Mr. Birri's estate at Msayleh and were told that they should use their influence to induce voters to vote against Mr. Birri's "enemies." Elsewhere, witnesses noted that they had seen false identity documents, which are necessary to vote, distributed to Amal supporters. On the eve of elections, officials responsible for polling stations, who were from the north, were substituted by others from the south and the Biqa`, regions in which Amal is strong.
Fraud was also a factor on election day. Representatives of the opposition lists were unable to enter polling stations, despite having permits, especially in the region of Tyre. Those who succeeded in entering were told to leave before the final vote count, which it is their job to monitor. The serial numbers of ballot boxes were changed at the last minute, preventing opposition candidates, who were monitoring results on the basis of the old serial numbers, from preparing a parallel vote count to verify official results. One of Mr. Sadeq's representatives was beaten and arrested for four hours in Tibnin, Mr. Birri's village, because he protested against the way the head of the polling station was counting the votes. In Tyre, two people working for Mr. Sadeq were also beaten and arrested.
As was widely expected, the Amal-Hizballah coalition list won all 21 seats in the south. In Sidon, Ms. Hariri and Mr. Sa`d won, which satisfied both Amal and Hizballah. Nazih Mansour, the Hizballah candidate in the qada' of Marja`youn-Hasbayya, won the most votes with 159,244. This was not surprising since he benefited from both Hizballah and Amal votes: Hizballah obviously because he was the party's candidate, Amal because Mr. Birri wanted the defeat of Mr. Sadeq, who was a rival candidate in the qada' . Mr. Birri received the second largest number of votes with 155,890 votes.
Amal candidates received more votes than Hizballah candidates in the coalition list. It appeared that Amal voters scratched the names of Hizballah candidates from their lists more often than Hizballah voters did Amal candidates. However, Hizballah did gain votes from some of Mr. Sadeq's supporters. Four deputies were elected from Hizballah. Aside from Mr. Mansour, the party saw Abdallah Qassir and the former deputies, Muhammad Ra`d and Muhammad Fnaysh voted into parliament. Mr. Birri, however, got the lion's share of candidates: he selected five Shi`a candidates from Amal and four from the traditional families, two of them close to Mr. Hariri. Mr. Birri also selected the Christian candidates from Jezzine and Zahrani, Samir Azar, Nadim Salem, Suleiman Kan`an, and Michel Moussa, all elected in 1992. They all received less votes in their constituencies than outside. The speaker also chose the Sunni candidate and deputy from Marja'youn-Hasbayya, Ahmad Suwayd. The Druze leader, Walid Junblat, selected the Druze candidate, Anwar al-Khalil.
While Habib Sadeq failed to regain his parliamentary seat, he officially won around 66,000 votes, higher than the number of leftist votes he traditionally relied upon. This revealed the existence of a third force in southern politics, one which appears to reject both Hizballah and Amal. What makes Mr. Sadeq's performance more interesting was the fact that he did not benefit from votes from the other lists. He was first in many villages, particularly in the Christian villages east of Sidon, and in many Shi`a villages where leftist parties have been historically present.
Mr. Sadeq's running-mate, Elias Abou Rizq, won an even higher number of votes as 94,452 people voted for him. He received most of the votes given to Habib Sadeq as well as thousands of votes from Hizballah and some votes from voters in the occupied zone. His performance may partially protect him, and the GCLW, from measures the government's intends to take against labor in the future. In voting for Mr. Abou Rizq, Hizballah also sent a message that it would side with the GCLW in case of a conflict between it and the government.
The former parliament speaker, Kamel al-As`ad, managed to preserve his popular base when compared to 1992. He was not able to substantially enlarge his base, however, mainly because of his political absence in the past years and the traditional opposition to him in the south. He won 42,160 votes, a noticeable but not particularly large increase from the 35,000 votes he received in 1992.
The voting pattern in the Israeli-occupied zone was also revealing. Many Christians from Marja'youn voted for Mr. Abou Rizq, who is from the town, although the majority of voters voted for Mr. Birri's candidates and Ms. Hariri. Newspaper photographs showed members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) celebrating Mr. Birri's victory in Khiyam, with the speaker's pictures on their cars.[5] One explanation for this behavior was that a vote for Mr. Birri in the south was a vote against Hizballah. Another reason may have been equally true: namely that voters in the occupied zone were preparing for the day when the Israeli army will leave Lebanon and when they will have to come to terms with the Shi`a in the south. In that case, better Mr. Birri than Hizballah.
Hizballah was on balance a loser in the elections. The party won only four seats, leaving Mr. Birri (and Mr. Hariri) with 18 seats. Mr. Sa`d is an independent, and there is no guarantee that he will side with Hizballah in the future. Moreover, the party leadership was obliged to accept the coalition under Mr. Birri's (and Syrian) conditions, which lost it credibility particularly among its rank and file. In the weeks after the elections, Hizballah members privately made known their displeasure, acknowledging that the party's margin of maneuver had been reduced. The party remains more wary than ever that it will pay the price of an agreement, or a conflict, between Israel and Syria.
A final figure from the elections reveals the extent to which the current electoral system can be unrepresentative. In the absence of proportional representation, an average of 134,000 southern voters from an electorate of 265,000 elected 23 deputies, while the remainder were able to elect not one.[6]