In five rounds between August 18 and September 15, Lebanon held its second parliamentary elections since the end of the war in 1990. The participation level was estimated at a comparatively high 44% nationally. The election results favored government and pro-government candidates, while independent opposition figures in the parliament have been reduced to a mere handful. Two large blocs will exist in parliament, one headed by the prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, another headed by the speaker of parliament, Nabih Birri. Neither of the two blocs, nor any of the other major groupings in parliament, are expected to challenge the general direction of the new government's policies.

The law governing the parliamentary elections provoked controversy. It organized elections at the level of the muhafaza (governorate) in the North, South, Beirut, and the Biqa', while Mount Lebanon was made to vote at the lower level of the qada' (sub-governorate). The exception in Mount Lebanon was principally designed to break up the predominantly Christian electorate and prevent it from ousting several key ministers from their seats, most notably the Druze leader Walid Junblat. In the meantime, the government set the dates for the different rounds of elections, deciding that Mount Lebanon would vote first on August 18, the North second on August 25, Beirut third on September 1, the South fourth on September 8, and the Biqa' last on September 15.

Several deputies, and leading opposition figures, denounced the electoral law, insisting that it contradicted the constitutional clause that specifies equality between Lebanese. A group of ten deputies took the matter before the Constitutional Court, which decides on the constitutionality of laws. To the surprise of many the court upheld the appeal and declared the law unconstitutional. The government responded to the decision by insisting that the law would be implemented as initially presented. It did, however add a clause to the law specifying that the exceptions were "for one time only." According to some legal scholars this made the law constitutional, although others argued that in such cases the burden was on the government to prove that the "for one time only" formulation was justified. Regardless of who was legally correct, the government chose to ignore the spirit of the Constitutional Court's decision.

The law provoked a split in the predominantly Christian opposition. Soon after the law was issued, three leading opposition figures meeting in France, General Michel Aoun, Dory Chamoun, and Amin Gemayel announced that they would boycott the elections. This came several weeks after the former deputy Raymond Eddé declared that he would call for a boycott. Mr. Eddé's announcement provoked a contrary reaction from the former deputy Albert Mukhaybir, a central figure in the opposition. Mr. Mukhaybir declared that he would be a candidate and pointed out that the 1992 boycott, which he supported, had not achieved its desired ends.

The differences between Mr. Eddé and Mr. Mukhaybir carried over into a more general disagreement between the opposition in Paris and that in Beirut. At a meeting at Mr. Mukhaybir's home in Bayt Meri on July 16, three days after the call for a boycott from France, 52 mostly Christian politicians announced that they would participate in the elections. This further deepened the rift between the domestic and external oppositions, one which the government exploited when it openly allowed General Aoun's supporters to demonstrate in favor of a boycott. The government correctly calculated that an effective boycott would favor pro-government candidates in the elections.

To improve the chances of pro-government candidates, the government, and Syria, carefully timed the different rounds of elections. Mount Lebanon was made to vote first in order to provide opposition candidates with as little time as possible to organize their campaigns. Moreover, the government reasoned that by hitting the opposition hard in Mount Lebanon, where it was strongest, a pattern of intimidation could be set for elections in other regions.

There was a surprise in the decision to schedule the elections in the South before those of the Biqa', as was done in 1992. The explanation became clear when in the first three weeks of elections Hizballah refused to form an electoral alliance with the rival Amal movement in the south. Syria, fearing open fighting between the two sides in a politically sensitive region, eventually forced the two parties into an agreement. However, the Syrians had already scheduled the Biqa' last in order to sanction the party's candidates there in case Hizballah refused the alliance. In the same way as an electoral alliance was to be a carrot for Hizballah in the south, the Biqa' was to act as Syria's stick .

The election process was marred by fraud in all regions, although the overall impact of this on the election results varied. An independent monitoring body, the Lebanese Association for the Democracy of Elections (LADE), issued reports at the end of each election round and described the more obvious examples of fraud. This included a wide range of actions including the use of falsified documents by voters, the absence of proper isolation booths, and the outright intimidation of voters by delegates of other candidates or by the security forces. It can safely be assumed that several candidates who would otherwise have been eliminated won because of fraud.

No matter how widespread the fraud, the victory of government and pro-government candidates was caused primarily by their extensive use of state services to mobilize voters. To cite but one example, the interior minister, Michel al-Murr, successfully pressured the Armenian electorate in the North Metn to vote overwhelmingly for his list of candidates. More significantly, he warned them against voting for only part of his list, insisting that all his allied candidates be chosen. Mr. Murr was able to do this precisely because he controls services that are vital to the community. The minister's pressure worked: he received 10,000 Armenian votes, for only a few hundred given to his rivals. This pattern repeated itself throughout the election process.

The parliament which emerged from the recent elections will be a far more homogeneous body than the 1992 parliament, itself virtually devoid of a serious opposition. Since among government institutions parliaments alone have the duty of encouraging diversity, the homogeneity of the 1996 parliament is profoundly disturbing. Most of Mr. Hariri's social and economic programs should have little difficulty passing parliament. Any problems faced by the prime minister will probably emanate from Mr. Birri's bloc, or a combination of smaller blocs, which will merely seek a more equitable share of power or influence. The new parliament also has the confidence of Syria, which played a central role in shaping the electoral law and insuring the victory of virtually all its major allies. It appears highly improbable that the new parliament will betray this confidence and oppose the general guidelines which have governed Lebanese political life since the end of the war.