The relations between the Hariri government and labor, never good, took a decided turn for the worse in February. Early in the month at a conference at the Carlton hotel in Beirut, the main labor confederation, the General Confederation of Lebanese Workers (GCLW), called for a general strike and demonstrations on February 29 to oppose the government's social and economic policies. Among the GCLW's demands were a 76% increase in salaries, a rise in the minimum wage, an end to the government ban on demonstrations, and a modification of the law on the audio-visual media.
In the period leading up to February 29, it appeared that the government might be flexible, at least as regards improving certain social conditions. The GCLW, chafing at what it considered a long and unlawful ban on peaceful demonstrations, rejected all proposals as unsatisfactory. The government responded by threatening to resort to force: on February 27, Mr. Hariri announced that the army would take over security in selected areas of Lebanon for a three-month period to implement government decisions, including banning all demonstrations. The GCLW announced that it would take to the streets anyway and the stage was set for a confrontation between labor and the army along the lines of what took place in July last year.
It is at that point that the army pulled a surprise. Evidently unhappy with being made a policeman, the army announced on the eve of the demonstrations that Lebanon would be under curfew the following day. While this greatly embarrassed the government, Mr. Hariri was compelled to praise the move. The GCLW also welcomed the curfew order, as it permitted labor to avoid a potentially damaging confrontation with the army.[4] This may have provided only a temporary setback for the government, however: the order granting the army security duties for three months still stands, and there is little chance that the army commander, General Emile Lahoud, will confront the government more forcefully. Mr. Hariri immediately responded to the army's decision by forcing through implementation of the new law on the audio-visual media which, if it is applied in the two-month period called for by the law, will close down most television stations.[5]
Conditions are detoriorating While labor and the army avoided coming to blows, the problems confronted by salary earners remain very real. According to the economist, Kamal Hamdan, the condition of the labor force of which two-thirds is composed of salary earners has steadily declined in the past four years.[6] Dr. Hamdan notes that despite the estimated 40% growth in GDP and a 30% appreciation of the Lebanese pound vis-à-vis the dollar between 1991 and 1995, salary earners have seen their purchasing power steadily shrink by 10%-15% due to inflation. He calculates that whereas in 1975 the minimum wage covered some two-thirds of the income level designated as the poverty line, today it covers only 20%: the poverty line today is estimated at $600 per month for a family of five. Meanwhile, the percentage of expenditures on sickness and maternity treatment represents less than 1% of GDP, half the proportion that it represented in 1974. End of service compensation is estimated to have lost 75% of its value. Moreover, these developments are taking place in an environment in which health and education costs are increasing.
The potential tension which such figures may generate has caused the government to at least publicly pay more heed to social issues. In the aftermath of the February 29 events, the government announced that it would initiate a dialogue with the GCLW. Mr. Hariri appointed one of his advisors, Muhammad Kishli, to negotiate on his behalf. Still, the government continues to reject a substantial increase in salaries, and it has insisted that private sector social benefits be provided by employers. This has raised the ire of the employers who already find themselves paying partly for the transportation and education of their employees and their families. One of the main items which will be discussed by the government and labor is the activation of the Social and Economic Council. The council has already been established, although the government retains the option of appointing its members. The GCLW is not represented as such in the council, which is one of the items of dispute between it and the government. Whether the dialogue will succeed remains questionable. If past events are any indication, the prime minister will instead use the pretext of a dialogue to buy time.
Syria is also said to be exerting subtle pressures to avoid allowing the social discontent to be transformed into political instability. Mr. Hariri enjoys Syrian confidence, particularly in his disagreements with the GCLW, but Damascus's primary objective in Lebanon is to ensure stability. The Syrian calculation appears to be that it the coming months, as Syria's regional status becomes more delicate due to the Israeli and U.S. elections, very little change can be allowed in Lebanon. This will frustrate labor even more, increasing the likelihood of repeated confrontation between it and the government. To avoid this, the Syrians apparently have encouraged Mr. Hariri to make some concessions, of which the first example was the dialogue initiated with labor. Mr. Hariri has been able to use the imperatives of stability to control labor's increasingly angry demands; in the coming months, however, he will probably seek to avoid allowing a greater Syrian say in his government's economic policies.
Notes
4. reports suggested that the GCLW and the army command had coordinated their actions in order to prevent a confrontation. The brother of the secretary-general of the GCLW, Elias Abu Rizq, is a senior army officer.
5. By late March there was continuing uncertainty as to whether the law would be implemented in a two-month period or whether parliament would amend the law to extend this period and thus delay implementation. This will depend on the objectives of the parliament speaker, Nabih Birri, who was believed to have been guaranteed that his (as yet uncreated) television station would be granted a broadcasting license after implementation of the medial law. New information suggests that Mr. Birri may have decided not to establish a station after all. The head of a television station close to the prime minister, however, privately suggested that the law would be implemented on schedule.
6. See al-Safir (Beirut), February 28, 1996.