*Joseph Bahout is a researcher at the Centre d' Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain (CERMOC) in Beirut. This article is a translated and modified version of a paper entitled "Deux ans après les legislatives de l' été 1992, où en est l e parlementarisme libanais?" in Relations Internationales et Strategiques (Paris), No. 16, Winter, 1994, pp. 57-66.
Lebanon, throughout its existence as an independent state and until its collapse in 1975, had been able to take satisfaction in the regularity of its electoral contests and the quality of its parliamentary life. Both achievements were not only proof of the existence and vitality of democratic life perceived by the founding fathers and much of the political class as the country's raison d'être but as a sign of Lebanon's distinctiveness within its regional environment. Lebanese democracy so conceived may have become something of a cliché; it was also partly true. The war, which began in 1975, appeared to destroy this image for good. However, the elections of 1992 at least in the minds of those who organized them had the merit of returning the vote to those who thought they had lost it. Even the date was perfect: indeed, 1992 was a scheduled election year. The forms were preserved: if the Lebanon of the past could not be returned to the Lebanese, certain parliamentary rituals could be. Often, however, to the point of a caricature.
The post-Ta'if Constitution preserves parliament's role as the main institution for communal representation. Members of parliament represent as much their constituencies as the confessional groups to which they belong. This point merits mention since as one of the most pressing demands of those who fought against the "system"of the First Republic was the abolition of political confessionalism. This explains an apparent paradox in that the new Constitution promises to instruct parliament to establish a committee of "wise men"to deconfessionalize political life in the country. Once this is achieved, communal representation is to be transferred to a Senate having largely consultative powers. The new Constitution also changed communal representation in parliament by imposing parity between Christian and Muslim representatives. While this necessarily implied an increase in the number of seats to 108 according to Ta'if the electoral law governing the 1992 legislative elections raised the figure further to 128. It was evident that the increase in seats was designed to allow for the entry into parliament of a substantial number of members of the new political elite. More bluntly, it was a move that effectively enlarged the political authorities' circle of clients.
The enlarged powers of the speaker of parliament represented the most significant change in the new Constitution. The speaker's term of office is extended to four years and corresponds to that of the legislature. Parliamentarians can only with great diffi culty remove a speaker from office, and this only once every two years. The increased stature of the speaker notwithstanding a desire to strengthen the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive must principally be understood as a concession to the sp eaker of parliament himself, and the community which he represents. The 1943 National Pact which governed the First Republic was a contract between the Sunni and Maronite communities; institutionally it reflected a strong dual executive power in the hands of the president of the republic and the prime minister. The Second Republic, in turn, sought to distribute powers to Lebanon's three major religious groups by granting genuine power to the speaker of parliament, the highest post reserved for the ShiŒa. That this power is indeed genuine can be attested by two major prerogatives granted to parliament:
It is undoubtedly the combination of these two modifications in Ta'if which left the most distinct mark on "Lebanese parliamentarism"and, indeed, on political life in the country. Parliament has thus become "the real beneficiary of the structural changes adopted at Ta'if. [...] The Chamber of Deputies has the opportunity at present because of the absence of a strong executive branch and a sufficiently independent legislative branch to exercise its hegemony in all constitutional quietude."[2]
The incomplete and partial interpretations of Ta'if by the political class have led to a series of successive setbacks, however, which make it difficult to speak of Lebanon today as a "republic of parliamentarians."The separation of powers previously conentrated in the hands of the president of the republic undoubtedly extended parliament's powers. Yet, as we have seen, these powers have been largely confiscated by the speaker of parliament, who may put them to use for strictly communal ends. At the same time, the speaker, under the guise of participating in the national destiny," has been accorded quasi-executive powers with the president and the prime minister. The result has been a de facto triumvirate of power which has become known as the leadership troik,a The term, widely accepted and used, has come to legitimize what could more accurately be called a confusion of powers. Under Ta'if, power has been so diffused that the political center of gravity has been lost. In a perverse way, an other form of concentration has been achieved: the concentration of legislative power in the hands of the speaker thanks to a concentration of all decision-making powers in the hands of the members of the troik,a at the expense of their respective institutions.
If one were to examine parliamentary government in Lebanon since 1992 solely from the juridical or constitutional angle, this would not be enough to determine all its shortcomings. Lebanon's parliamentary tradition has always been a product and reflection of evolution within its body politic: Lebanese parliamentarism today is, above all else, an expression of a new form of political behavior which has emerged since the end of the war. In this sense, parliament has come to allow new or renewed political fo rces to express themselves, and within a forum allowing them to carry out the negotiations for power that make up the political game.
The current parliament, and Lebanese parliamentarism since Ta'if, took their origin in the elections of 1992.[3] It suffices to say that these elections "without choice²[4], (because of their divisiveness and the opposition they provoked), appeared from the outset to present several problems: first, the size of the electoral districts and the numbers of seats in parliament adopted, which contradicted both the Constitution and the electoral guidelines set down in the Ta'if agreement; second, the indifference towards the fundamental constitutional principle that all national decisions must respect the rules of coexistence; and, subsequently, the disdain with which the political authorities dealt with the wide spectrum of forces which remained outside the e lectoral process;[5] third, voting irregularities in several areas which went against the elementary rules of the electoral process; and fourth, the lack of respect for the principle of sovereignty, which allows states to freely organize their own elections. At all levels, the irregularities in the 1992 voting process allow us to speak of an electoral coup d'état by the political authorities; by establishing a pliant parliamentary base, they effectively could legitimize their numerous transgressions.
The particular characteristic of the 1992 elections was their boycott by a large number of voters. The "ethical"arguments presented by the boycotters, no matter how justified, could not conceal the fact that their political calculations were often diverse , even at times contradictory. Nor can one deny the negative impact the boycott had on the political system, even on the opposition itself, since 1992. This makes all the more ironic the recent resurgence of a "boycott mood"for elections later this year i n case of an abusive election law.
The parliament which emerged from the 1992 elections reflected a renewal of the political class. Of the 128 members, only 18 had been elected to the 1972 parliament, while only 29 were deputies appointed in 1991. The figures were deceptive, however, and d id not reflect the real representativity of the newly elected: the massive boycott allowed individuals to enter parliament who would otherwise not have been able to do so.
One of the first observations concerning the 1992 parliament is the fact that its mandate began with that of the government of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri; more precisely, the parliament brought in the new government. For roughly the first three years of the parliamentary term, the government and parliament were in confrontation, with the latter functioning in apposition to the former. That this situation changed substantially after 1995, when parliament's institutional autonomy was significantly reduced, does not lessen the fact that Lebanese parliamentarism since 1992 was and remains largely the story of the Hariri era.
The relation between the parliament and government began warmly with a positive parliamentary plebiscite of the billionaire-politician, before developing into a war of positions. Indeed, the appointment of Mr. Hariri followed a new pattern established by Ta'if: according to the Constitution, the president appoints the prime minister on the basis of binding consultations with the deputies; in the case of Mr. Hariri, a vast majority of parliamentarians and parliamentary blocs pre-empted the process by expre ssing their support for the future prime minister on the steps of the presidential palace. A few weeks later, parliament, by a vote of 104 to 12, expressed its confidence in the new government. Armed with this almost unanimous support, Mr. Hariri asked fo r a "grace period"of six months, before requesting special powers to issue decrees.
From that point on, the relationship between parliament and the government (or more specifically Mr. Hariri himself) soured. One of the major functions of the Hariri government was to neutralize the political crisis provoked by the elections and to calm popular discontent through effective social and economic development. Moreover, the choice of Mr. Hariri to head the government attested to the bankruptcy of the political class, which sought, through the prime minister's appointment, to regain some lost p olitical legitimacy. Under the circumstances, it was almost natural that Mr. Hariri should underestimate parliament and seek to circumvent it in order to achieve his reconstruction plans. Parliament, in turn, saw the situation in diametrically opposite te rms: lacking in popular legitimacy, it saw that this could only be regained through opposition to the government. A paradox emerged whereby parliament, needing Mr. Hariri, also needed to oppose him.
This was made possible by the peculiar structure of parliament, which does not give rise to a majority party from which governments emerge. The Lebanese legislature is structured in such a way that, while the government can guarantee no stable majority in parliament, criticism of the government need not translate into opposition of its policies. It would be difficult to outline clear-cut tendencies in parliament; the political alignments which take shape defy all political classification, often bringing t ogether (whether because of instructions from the outside or narrow calculation) opposition members and government supporters.
Another reason why parliament refused to knuckle under to Mr. Hariri was the resistance of its speaker, Nabih Birri. Mr. Birri was unwilling to see Mr. Hariri's immense personal power erode parliament's prerogatives which had so recently been won at Ta'if . The only avenue open to the speaker was to engage in a form of parliamentary "guerrilla warfare"against the government. The impact, however, was a further exacerbation of the already problematic relationship between the different state institutions. All questions, from the most trivial to the most important, became stakes in the ongoing struggle for power between Mr. Birri and Mr. Hariri.
A pattern soon developed in which parliament opposed and even blocked the government's actions, but never took steps to threaten its position. Repeatedly in parliamentary debates on governmental policies, deputies routinely launched the most violent tirad es against the government, only to end up "despite all"voting confidence in it.[6] The explanation must be sought outside Lebanese institutions and in Syria's exceptional influence over the Lebanese political scene. The extent of this influence was clear on one notable occasion when a crisis between parliament and the government led Mr. Hariri to threaten to resign: the Syrian vice-president, ŒAbd al-Halim Khaddam, rushed to Beirut to calm every one down, and announced that the Hariri government would rem ain for the duration of President Hrawi's mandate.
Despite the imposed durability of the government, during every severe crisis Mr. Hariri has denounced what he has referred to as parliamentary interference in and hegemony over the executive's powers. The complaint had a measure of truth in it, but corres ponds to a specific reading of the constitutional texts of the Second Republic.[7] It has been argued that Lebanon has the potential of being ruled by a parliamentary dictatorship; still, this view neglects the fact that the executive branch, though perha ps in less frequent ways, has also interfered in parliamentary affairs. For example, on the occasion of elections to parliamentary committees in October 1993, President Hrawi went so far as to threaten resignation if his nephew, with whom he was feuding p olitically, was elected president of the Finance Committee. The episode would have been amusing had it not placed in peril the proper functioning of national institutions, and reflected the sorry levels to which the political culture of the new Lebanon could reach.
While members of the 1992 parliament have taken pride in the fact that the institution has broken all records in terms of laws passed, this has come at the expense of parliamentary control over the government and, most important, the legislature's role as a source of political alternatives. Lebanese parliamentarism has sacrificed substance for form, largely because it operates within a political system with few clear reference points and where support for or opposition to the government is often interchan geable. Perhaps this is a further sign of the growing "harmony"between Lebanon and its regional environment, and an example of the "convergence"between the Lebanese and Syrian systems.
The image of Lebanese parliamentarism has suffered from its numerous shortcomings. In the two final years of the war, an army general sought to build his popularity on the remnants of a discredited parliament and the old political class that populated it. It is not certain that present and future deputies will be able to regain the respectability which has been so sorely lacking in the public perception of them. What is more serious, however, is the impact this will have on parliamentary democracy in Lebaenon, and on the inevitable decline of political life in general in the country.
Notes
1. For example, when no compelling cause exists, failing to meet in two successive parliamentary sessions; or failing to vote on the entire budget with the objective of blocking the government's actions.
2. Joseph Maïla, "Le ŒDocument d'entente nationale' un commentaire,"in Les Cahiers de l'Orient, No. 16-17, 4eme trimestre, 1989 (pp. 135-217) et 1er trim. 1990 (pp. 184-185).
3. For an analysis in French of the 1992 elections, see Joseph Bahout, "Liban: les élections législatives de l'été 1992,"in Maghreb-Machrek, No. 139, January-March 1993, pp. 58-81. A more exhaustive analysis (in Arabic) is found in Farid el-Khazen and Pau l Salem (eds.), al-intikhabat al-'ula fi lubnan ma baŒd al-harb, al-arqam wal-waqaŒih wal-dalalat (Lebanon's First Post-War Elections: Facts, Figures, and Indicators), Lebanese Center for Policy Studies and Dar al-Nahar, 1993.
4. The term is inspired by that used by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié (eds.) in Elections Without Choice, London: The Macmillan Press, 1978. It describes non-competitive elections conducted by authoritarian regimes.
5. We must correct here a widespread misconception which has gradually gained credence for obvious political reasons, concerning the level of participation in the 1992 elections: According to Farid el-Khazen and Paul Salem, op. cit., the election particip ation level, based on official figures, was estimated at 30.34%, the lowest level in Lebanese parliamentary elections. However, there is a persistent belief that the level was an even lower 13.86%. This represents what is called a "taux de representativit é"(rate of representativity), an average of votes won by each deputy over the total number of eligible electors (as opposed to those participating) in their constituency. The concept is clearly misleading, particularly in a country where electoral lists a re often inaccurate and where many voters have emigrated, and is otherwise very rarely used in political analyses.
6. The pattern continues as was shown most recently in the debate on the 1996 budget which, despite severe criticism, was approved by an overwhelming majority.
7. Fouad Boutros, "Entre Troïka et gouvernment d'assemblée,"L'Orient-Le Jour, August 5, 1994.