On June 24, the government sent a draft parliamentary election law to parliament for approval. The law immediately provoked the displeasure of some deputies and was recalled two days later by the government for further discussion. The guidelines of the law, which was clearly influenced by Syria, will most likely remain the same once the law is returned to parliament. As the Lebanon Report went to press, the law was still in the hands of the government.
The draft law specifies that elections, scheduled for August and September this year, if indeed they take place, are to be held on the basis of a mixed system. This has angered many opposition Christian political figures. This will very probably not lead to a widespread boycott of elections as happened in 1992, even if certain Christian leaders fail to participate. However, it seems almost certain that this year's elections will be nearly as controversial as those four years ago.
According to the draft law, the Lebanese will vote at the level of the muhafaza , or governorate, except in the predominantly Christian governorate of Mount Lebanon, where voting will take place at the level of the qada', or smaller sub-governorate district. Surprisingly, the draft law does not specify, as is usual in such cases, that the break-up of Mount Lebanon will be "for one time only." This lends the mixed system a permanent quality that has further alarmed the Christian opposition. Because of the controversy this provoked, there is a chance that the clause will be added in the final version of the law.
The draft also specifies that, as in 1992, the muhafazats of Nabatiyyeh and the South will be combined into one. The electoral breakdown will be the following: elections will be held at the muhafaza level in the North, South, Beirut, and the Biqa`; while in Mount Lebanon elections will be held in the six qada's of Shouf, Aley, Ba`bda, Metn, Kisirwan, and Jbeil. The mandate of the next parliament will be, for one time only, extended a further eight months until spring 2001. This is in order not to have the next elections interfere with the summer tourist season in the year 2000.
A separate government decree will set the date of the elections according to region. Elections will probably begin either on August 18 or August 25 depending on when parliament approves the government's draft law. The speculation is that Mount Lebanon will vote first, followed at week-long intervals by the North, Beirut, the Biqa`, and the South.
If this order is indeed followed, it would represent a change from 1992. By having Mount Lebanon vote first, the government would prepare for several eventualities: it would give opposition politicians, who are strongest in Mount Lebanon, less time to prepare their election campaigns. It would also give the government time to gauge the extent of the opposition's popularity and, in case of a strong showing, readjust its tactics in other regions accordingly. By leaving the south for last, the government would also prepare itself to prevent Israeli intervention early in the election process. Moreover, in case of instability in the south late in elections, the government could have the option of canceling the previous rounds of elections in other regions. This could be a useful instrument if the initial rounds of voting do not meet the government's expectations.
There are three primary objectives in organizing elections at the qada' level in Mount Lebanon: to allow the Druze leader, Walid Junblat, to win re-election; to divide the Aounists, who are powerful in Mount Lebanon; and to allow the interior minister, Michel al-Murr, to remain in his seat. Given the largely Christian electorate in the governorate, Mr. Junblat would be almost guaranteed of defeat in a muhafaza election. At the qada ' level, however, the Druze leader would be able to count on a decisively larger block of votes from within his Druze community. Similarly, Mr. Murr, who is hardly the most popular of Lebanese politicians, would also be ousted by a largely hostile electorate at the muhafaza level. His support within the Metn district, where he provides many services, is larger, and should help return him his seat.
The `Aounist factor' is the big unknown in the elections. While there is a widespread sentiment that the followers of General Michel Aoun have it within their power to break many a pro-government list, there is as yet no organized Aounist effort to participate in the elections. Indeed, the Aounist movement appears, for the moment, to be a chimera in organizational terms, with no real structure or well-known candidates. This reflects General Aoun's reluctance to order his movement, in part because he is afraid that his candidates may be co-opted by the regime.
The first major sign that a widespread boycott is far less likely these elections was the statement by the former deputy, Albert Mukhaybir, that he would be a candidate. Mr. Mukhaybir was one of the staunchest supporters of the 1992 boycott, and has been a pillar of the opposition since. By issuing his statement just prior to the Aoun-Gemayel-Chamoun meeting, Mr. Mukhaybir challenged the leading opposition figures to follow his lead, and signaled that he would not follow theirs. In addition to Mr. Mukhaybir, other leading Christian opposition politicians and parties are likely to participate in the upcoming elections. They include the former deputies Boutros Harb and Pierre Daccache, the former Kata'ib party official and minister Joseph al-Hashem, the former head of the Maronite League, Shaker Abou-Sleiman, the head of the Solidarity party, Emile Rahmé, and candidates from the Kata'ib party, including the party president, George Sa`adeh.
Christian opposition politicians have to deal with a new reality in their community, namely that there appears today to be a deep-seated desire for credible political representatives. In such an environment, the popularity of General Aoun, Raymond Eddé, Amin Gemayel, or Dory Chamoun, to name only them, will increasingly be based on their capacity to present serious alternatives to what the state is offering. They have mostly failed to achieve this to date, and a boycott would only further constrain their margin of maneuver. Whatever the results, the next elections, if they are held, will greatly undermine the politics of rejection which many opposition figures have favored in the past four years.
There still remains a chance that elections will be canceled this summer because of regional instability. With the appointment of a right-wing government in Israel and tensions elsewhere in the region, the Asad regime may prefer to wait awhile before allowing a potentially divisive election in Lebanon. One proposal has been to extend parliament's mandate for a further eight months and hold elections next spring. From then on, elections could be held in the spring, as they were in the past. On the other hand, if the Syrians calculate that the elections would, on balance, be to their advantage, they may prefer to bring in a new parliament in now before a shift in the balance of power next year. In either case, it is likely that the parliament will be overwhelmingly pro-Syrian.
7. See L'Orient-Le Jour, June 15, 1996, for a text of Mr. Eddé's call for an election boycott. In lieu of elections, the National Bloc leader called for a one-year extension of parliament's mandate "while awaiting the repercussions on the future of our country of the decisions which will be taken shortly by the Arab states [at the Cairo summit] and the new Israeli government."