Between 1972 and 1992, no parliamentary elections were held. This period, however, saw the election of a president in 1976 and 1982, and most recently in 1989. These elections occurred during the war's apogee, which of course affected the two parts of the electoral process, the choice of candidates and the choice of a president. Presidential elections were an inevitable matter, and were held in order to avoid the alternative, a constitutional vacuum. The postponement of parliamentary elections, meanwhile, could occur because parliament was able to extend its term, as long as the political and security situation did not permit holding parliamentary elections.
The freezing of the parliament since 1972 can be attributed to many reasons. Lebanon was not, of course, the scene of an endless war during these 20 years from which elections were absent, but conditions for holding elections, such as freedom and security, were absent. The first of the a priori reasons was the lack of stability and security, and the absence of state authority in many parts of the country. Since the middle of the 1970s, and with the exception of periods when fighting was widespread (1975-76, 1978, 1982), Lebanon was the theater for armed clashes from which no Lebanese- or non-Lebanese group was safe, especially in Beirut, the south and the Biqa` (4). In addition, there was fighting, which broke out from time to time along contact points in Beirut, and the continual tension and fear which accompanied the average citizen as a result of random bombing, or after every car-bomb explosion or explosion that targeted populated areas in the capital, or other major cities.
Another reason that prevented the holding of parliamentary elections was that state institutions had been beset by paralysis, and by sectarian and regional divisions. With the exception of the short period of calm in 1977 which followed the "two years' war," and the formation of the Arab Deterrent Force, the presidencies Ilyas Sarkis and Amin Gemayel buckled in the face of continual political crises. These crises reached their climax later, when prime ministers Karami and al-Hoss practiced a political boycott of the final two years of Amin Gemayel's presidency. Political life in the decade that preceded 1988 did not see the state undertaking its normal activities; external actors fulfilled this role: internally, the various sectarian militias, and externally, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, and later, Iran.
Thus we arrive at the third reason, specifically, the absence of elements of national sovereignty. In most parts of Lebanon, external actors enjoyed influence which, to a great extent, exceeded that of the Lebanese state, if its influence existed at all. The events that transpired in these areas were the result of varying regional alliances and policies more than Lebanese internal politics.
Since 1986 the dominant trend has been toward increased sectarian and regional disintegration, leading to the decline in state authority, and the continuing marginalization of its institutions. This was the situation in the summer of 1988, when presidential elections were held to select a successor to President Amin Gemayel. The election, however, did not take place. Since were are merely sketching the reasons that led to this dead end, it suffices here to point out that a group of local, regional and international actors worked in one way or another to prevent any possibility of an orderly transfer of power (5).
President Gemayel was unable, unlike his predecessors, to effect this orderly transition; he behaved as if he was the least of those concerned with the matter (6). The two other Maronite political pillars, the head of the army, General Michel Aoun, and the leader of the Lebanese Forces (LF), Samir Geagea, rejected what they termed the imposed American-Syrian naming of Deputy Mikhail Daher, the sole candidate for the presidency. There is no need to mention here that Damascus was not only in an effective position on the Lebanese scene, but was in a position to select the candidate it desired, despite its knowing that influential Christian leaders would reject him. This complication, along with the reality that neither of the two sides would be able to impose its decision (which was the reverse of the case with the presidential elections of 1976 and 1982), was what brought the country to a dead end. This led to the appointment of General Michel Aoun as head of a transitional cabinet in the final minutes of Amin Gemayel's presidency.
Lebanon's politics and general security increasingly deteriorated during the two years during which General Aoun held power. There were bloody clashes, which were ended by the outbreak of yet another war. However, this war's goals and results were more profound than those of past military confrontations. This was the military operation launched on 13 October 1990, which led to the ousting of General Aoun, and the entry of the Syrian army into the "Eastern regions" (7). This development began a new decade of political history for Lebanon's post-1943 era, and of Syrian-Lebanese relations in the post-1975 period.
The questions that we wish to pose here are:
In reality, if we leave aside the improvement of the country's security situation (the end of military operations), the change that occurred on the pre-Taif political scene was very limited. If the end of military operations and the opening of regions to one another are two big accomplishments that have given Lebanese the feeling that the situation will return to normal, and that there is internal peace, then the political issues have not changed much from the pre-Taif period, especially with regard to preparing the way for holding free and organized parliamentary elections. The improved security situation, in other words, did not translate into an improvement of the political situation.
Here we see the Lebanese predicament's dual nature. It seems that Lebanon, at least at present, is unable to provide itself with both situations simultaneously. It is either security, i.e. the halting of military operations in return for a particular situation and increasing influence for those groups providing this security, or collapse and chaos for a besieged and disintegrating state. This negative exchange has dominated Lebanon's post-Taif political environment and created the framework that brought about the new electoral law and all of the elections' preparatory procedures. In the same context, some of Lebanon's leaders who called for holding elections did not ignore the tie between the elections, in case they did not take place, and the probability of the return to the sounds of war.
For these reasons, the obstacles which prevented the holding of
elections since the mid-1970s remained in effect. The government's
decision-making remained paralyzed, not because of bombing, or
boycott (or both) on the part of one group or another, as was
the case before the Taif Agreement. Rather, the Taif Agreement
rendered the boycott a reality within the heart of political decision,
by virtue of the various groups with veto power within the state
apparatus, while decision-making was no longer limited to Lebanon's
internal political structure, and dynamic. More importantly, new
problems, and consequently political struggles, resulted from
differences over interpreting the Taif Agreement's text, on the
one hand, and from the selectivity of its application, on the
other.
While the call for reform has accompanied the course of Lebanese politics, this call found a political translation whose beginning may have lain in the constitutional draft announced by President Franjiyyeh in March 1976. This document, which proposed equal parliamentary representation on a sectarian basis, was acceptable to some at the time, and rejected by others. In the vanguard of those who rejected it at the time was the Druze leftist leader, Kamal Junblat (9). An external party, specifically Syria, was involved in creating the constitutional document, while another external element, the PLO, was involved with its execution, or lack thereof. There was no doubt that the constitutional document would not see the light of day as long as the war continued. In the spring of 1976, military confrontations extended to various parts of the country, turning into a truly violent war between Syria and the PLO (10). This war did not end until Syria recorded a decisive military victory over the Palestinian forces and their allies in the fall of 1976.
Between 1977 and 1982, Lebanon was a theater of successive changes, with regard to both internal sectarian politics and regional alliances (11). At the beginning of 1978, it became clear that the group of internal and external forces constituting the element of balance in the balance of power, experienced a radical change. The Syrian-Christian rapprochement that had stood in the face of the alliance of the left and the PLO was short-lived, by virtue of many incidents which turned the situation on its head. Returning to the chronology: the assassination of Kamal Junblat in March 1977, followed a year later by clashes between Christian militias led by Bashir Gemayel, and the Syrian army, east of Beirut, and finally, the Syrian-PLO rapprochement following the Camp David agreement at the end of the 1970s. Accompanying this changing balance of power on the internal and regional fronts was the situation in the wake of the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982.
Although the developments of 1982-1984 reshuffled the deck for all of the players, the situation quickly returned to the pre-invasion status quo. Internally, political division possessed clearly-discernible features. Externally, as the PLO leadership and its military forces exited Beirut, then Tripoli, and Israel reduced its political concern for and military presence in the border region in the south, Iran secured a position for itself on the Lebanese political scene, which burdened the internal situation with increased external difficulties. Following the failure of the Geneva and Lausanne conferences in 1983 and 1984, where Lebanese leaders met in the presence of representatives of Syria and Saudi Arabia, there were attempts to create new political realities. The presence of a new balance of power that reflected the post-1984 reality became clear. This balance of power rested on an arranged alliance among the three principal militias: the LF, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). This Cesarean section was crowned by the signing of the trilateral agreement among these three militia leaderships, along with Damascus, on 28 December 1985.
While some of Lebanon did not oppose the trilateral agreement, there is no doubt that this agreement was not easy to gain approval in the "Eastern Region," where it was rejected by President Gemayel, and the LF leader Samir Geagea, who led a successful military attack against the wing of the militia led by Elie Hubayqa in East Beirut (12). Thus, the failure of the trilateral agreement, which was sponsored and supported by Syria, resulted in new political givens which played the principal role in the following two and one half years of Gemayel's presidency. This period was characterized by three givens. The first was Muslim leaders' political boycott of President Gemayel, the second was the return of the Syrian army to West Beirut in 1987 following the bloody war of the camps between Amal, supported by Damascus, and Palestinian forces. The third was the LF securing control over East Beirut, especially after Elie Hubayqa's failed attempt to penetrate East Beirut in September 1986.
Meanwhile, there were many attempts by President Gemayel through mediating channels (the most important of which was American envoy April Glaspie) to restore channels of communication with Damascus. These attempts, however, all met with failure. Likewise, there were many meetings held in Beirut and Damascus, during which various types of reform plans were exchanged, but it appears that Damascus was "not ready to reach agreement with President Gemayel because mutual trust between them was a complex matter, liable to break down at any moment" (13).
This situation continued until the end of Gemayel's presidency in September 1988, when General Michel Aoun was appointed prime minister of a government composed of the Military Council's five members, who represented Lebanon's five major sects (the three Muslim members resigned minutes after the announcement of the cabinet's make-up). The "war of liberation" announced by General Aoun in March 1989 and the subsequent brutal war in East Beirut between the Lebanese Army and the LF ended with the ouster of Aoun, making room for the beginning of the implementation of the Taif Agreement (14).
What concerns us here is the emergence of the "reform mentality" that was behind the Taif Agreement, because it was closely tied to the "mentality," which accompanied the preparation of the new election law of 1992. As we have mentioned, Taif had international dimensions, within which various local and external actors were involved. If the Taif Agreement's reform dimension was directly tied to the country's military and political balances of power, then the content of reform and the timing of these proposals were not the product of Lebanese internal politics and its priorities as much as they were of the external balance of power operating within Lebanon. The timing of the reform proposals, and even their content, were tied to the settlement of the conflict, a settlement that was connected, in turn, to external actors: Syria and the PLO in 1976, Syria and Israel after 1984, and Syria and Iraq after 1988. The mediators of Taif included the tripartite Arab committee composed of the foreign ministers of Algeria, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.
The internal dissension emanating from Taif was the most important concern of Lebanese, while external groups had their own, differing priorities with regard to the Agreement. The external dimension, with the passing of time, did not only dominate the internal one, but imposed its priorities and content as well. More importantly, the external pillars of Taif, who played a balancing role in its creation, gradually disappeared from the scene. The tripartite Arab committee, which balanced Syria's weight in the scales, ended its activities. The U.S.' role became diminished as well, following its role as the most important external party in the intensive engineering of Taif during various stages (before, during, and after the process). The US retreated, and limited its role to a well-known type of routine public support for reform and Lebanon's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity (15).
The Taif Agreement had two roles: it constituted the draft of
a new constitution, and was to be interpreted and implemented.
The text contained negatives and positives, and accordingly, was
subject to discussion and review. Its implementation, in return,
obeyed the varying foundations of the political variables. The
text was fixed, and its interpretation and implementation were
variables that were continually subject to review and change.
This occurred as the balance of power inside Lebanon, and around
it, changed. Based on these givens, both fixed and variable, we
can explain the developments that led to parliament's adoption
of an electoral law, and the motives behind the decision to hold
elections, despite the vehemence of the opposition and its criticism,
of both the electoral law and the timing of the elections.
The map of these positions crystallized over three principal axes:
support for holding the elections according to their proposed
schedule, opposition to the elections' preparation and timing,
and finally, a position fluctuating between rejection and acceptance,
which remained an issue of give and take up until a few days prior
to election day. With the exception of some prominent public positions,
positive and negative, the positions of those who hesitated best
expresses the 1992 elections' environment, from the standpoint
of the conflicting opinions over the timing of the elections,
and the inability of many groups to take a decisive stand. In
this context, it is interesting to note not only the multiplicity
of positions and the big gaps among them, but also the continual
exchange of positions during a short period of only a few weeks.
With regard to the official positions announced by the regime's
political pillars (such as prime ministers and ministers), most
supported holding elections. The language of this support and
the way in which it was expressed, however, differed among these
officials. While the stand of some was characterized by frankness
and clarity, hesitation and embarrassment dominated the positions
of others. The three heads of the government, al-Hrawi, al-Husayni
and al-Solh, officially called for holding elections, passing
the election law, and the administrative and political preparation
for the electoral process. These official positions, however,
were matched by unannounced positions which circulated among their
supporters. This atmosphere of hesitation and caution emerged
in al-Hrawi and al-Husayni's readiness to consider the issue of
the elections' timing, until only a few days before the elections
(16). This was obvious in their covert openness to the proposals
to postpone the elections, especially after the hard-line stand
by the Christian opposition, which forced President Hrawi into
a difficult position, because of initiatives undertaken by some
deputies in support of the opposition, the most important of which
were those by former deputies Albert Mkhayber and Butrus Harb
(17).
In the beginning, Speaker al-Husayni did not evince his enthusiasm
for holding elections. al-Husayni enjoyed a strong and influential
position both inside and outside parliament, or on the level of
what is known as the "troika" of power. In reality,
the elections' significance, for al-Husayni, was really two-fold:
the make-up of the new parliament's balance of power, and the
strong local competition between him and President al-Hrawi in
the Biqa`. The tug of war between the two had not abated, even
briefly, from the beginning of al-Hrawi's presidency. The internal
crises of the regime, of either a personal or a political nature,
reflected the atmosphere of disharmony between the two men, regarding
the implementing laws, or their ulterior motives. al-Husayni's
initial lack of enthusiasm for the elections subsequently changed
into one of support for them, and he worked in the required fashion
to pass the election law in parliament. Perhaps al-Husayni's insistence
on forming coalition candidate lists in various regions in order
to bring strong candidates to parliament reflected the atmosphere
of caution with regard to participating in the coming elections,
which were unavoidable.
President al-Hrawi displayed the greatest enthusiasm for the elections,
relying on (according to some sources) the process as a way for
him to finish off some of the state's unresolved issues within
the "troika" (18). Therefore the elections might have
been a way to reshuffle the deck with regard to the country's
internal politics, on the one hand, and along the Beirut-Damascus
axis, on the other. Prime Minister al-Solh was the clearest in
his position on the elections, and he headed the government charged
with holding them.
Other regime actors, who included influential ministers close
to Damascus such as Minister of the Interior Sami Khatib, Minister
of Defense Michel al-Murr, and Ministers Muhsin Dalloul and Abdullah
al-Amin, were the clearest and most decisive in all electoral
matters. Their positions did not only not contain any obscurity;
rather, some of them even intimated that not holding the elections
could be the prelude to a return to war (19).
The positions of other groups, such as political parties and prominent
political and spiritual leaders, varied between contrary positions:
the first rejected not only the elections, but the Taif Agreement
as well. These groups were represented by General Aoun's movement
that was politically active prior to the elections, Raymond Edde,
the National Liberals Party, and some politicians, the most prominent
of whom were the former deputies Albert Mkhayber and Pierre Dakkash,
both of whom enjoyed much popular support (20). The rejectionist
position was matched by an equally clear stand which supported
holding elections, and called for participation. This position
was taken by Hizballah, which did not only announce its support
of the elections, but was the first to announce the names of its
candidates in all of the electoral constituencies (except for
the south) on 5 August 1992.
The positions of other groups were distinguished by continual
shifting and inability to make a definitive decision except after
exhausting all of the means and channels, in an attempt to avoid
the bitter pill of the elections. The shifting positions were
a reflection of the government's shifting electoral policy, which
was tied in its turn to the stock exchange of the electoral law--in
other words, the number of deputies, allocation of seats by sect
and region, and the apportionment of electoral constituencies.
Perhaps the best way to examine these hesitant positions (which
we have not looked at thus far) and their development during the
two or three months that preceded the elections would be to classify
them as follows:
1. Initial support for the principle of holding elections,
subsequently wavering on this principle and on participating in
the process. This position was especially represented by Salim
al-Hoss, who at first called for holding parliamentary elections,
then retreated and expressed reservations, and avoided making
public pronouncements on the issue. He remained hesitant until
a few days prior to election day. al-Hoss' visit to Syria a few
days before the elections had a decisive effect, according to
observers, on his decision to run, and form a incomplete coalition
list.
2. Fluctuating support for participation in the elections, criticism of their preparation, and unhappiness with the general electoral environment. This position became one of non-participation in the end. The most prominent representative of this stand was Tammam Salam, who adhered to the position of his father, Saeb Salam, who announced his stand from his residence in Geneva, opposing the holding of elections in an atmosphere of sectarian polarization, which contravened the principle of coexistence among Lebanese.
3. Lack of enthusiasm and perhaps dissatisfaction with
the entire electoral process; this position finally leaned toward
participation, in the name of realpolitik, and coexistence with
the powers that be. Perhaps the best expression of this position
was the development of Walid Junblat's stand, and his calling
on Christian leaders who were boycotting the elections to participate,
especially since the proverbial train would not stop for the boycotters.
4. Skepticism and lack of enthusiasm from the beginning.
The logic of the "last chance" won out in the end over
skepticism and the lack of enthusiasm, especially after some guarantees
were obtained from certain influential political groups. This
was Kamil al-As`ad's position after he made the decision to participate,
and run, despite the formidable political and security obstacles
blocking his path in the south, during the campaign and on election
day.
5. Hesitation, and waiting and watching, searching for
a way to save face if participation was decided upon, and a way
back if not. In the end, this position reached a dead end, after
its representatives worked to discover a way out that would mean
the least possible political damage. Those associated with this
position ended up with the boycott, which was the lesser of two
evils. The Kata'ib Party's simultaneous position of support and
opposition, which later became one of reluctant boycott, exemplifies
this position of hesitation, and inability to make a decision
until after it became impossible to find a suitable way out.
6. The "non-position," or waiting for the balance
to tip in one of the two directions. The issue here was one of
not losing the electoral opportunity, because the train was leaving
whether the boycotters wanted it to or not. This was the position
of many deputies and independent candidates in all regions, especially
in electoral constituencies where serious preparations were being
made, as it became clear that the candidate lists were on their
way to being composed.
7. A position unique to independent candidates in Mount Lebanon, where the boycott was strongest. This position reflected the vicissitudes of all of the electoral positions, and took its final form a few days before the train's whistle. This stand was tied to conditions in the electoral constituencies, and their special political and sectarian maps, in addition to their special problems. Some Christian candidates in the Shouf and Aley linked their participation to finding a solution to the issue of the Christian displaced of the Mountain, within a short period of time. This is because it was difficult to justify running in a constituency the majority of whose voters resided outside the region, and were unable to return to their villages and regain their property and land-holdings.
In Mount Lebanon's other constituencies, the decision to participate
was taken after exhausting all of the means for political escape,
especially for some Maronite candidates for the Northern Metn.
In the constituencies of Jubayl and Ba`abda, the boycott opened
the way for "infiltrators" who were intent on entering
parliament, no matter the cost, whether with people's votes or
without them. Finally, the Kisirwan constituency had a distinctive
situation, in view of the region's political and sectarian make-up.
The popular tendency opposed to the elections and the opposition
of Patriarch Sfayr (from a prominent Kisirwani family) as well,
made inevitable the withdrawal of the principal candidates, especially
Minister Buwayz and the two al-Khazin family candidates, which
led to the cancellation of the elections and their being held
on 11 October, under different conditions, which were dominated
by purely local political considerations (21).
Perhaps the multiplicity of stands, the hesitation, and the inability
of politicians to make a decisive decision one way or another
(before all avenues of escape were exhausted, and at the last
minute) are attributable to a principal factor: decision-making
at the state level and the accompanying levels of this process
along the Beirut-Damascus axis. The dominating fact over all of
these positions was the defensive position. This position sought
to find a regional, sectarian, and political justification to
participate, and not to enhance democratic political life, or
support the course of peace, and the National Covenant, in order
to remove the residue of the war.
In reality, the dynamic of the hesitaters' political stands resembled,
to a great extent, the stands of those who were hesitant and cautious
concerning the Taif Agreement, during the stages of its preparation
and implementation. This was especially true of some Christian
groups, as they rejected the elections at first, then sought a
suitable political dressing for their acceptance, finally taking
a publicly supportive stand. The boycotters' positions also had
their special dynamic, a mixture of refusal on principle to holding
elections under unsuitable conditions, and various political calculations.
Gradually, these positions crystallized, and grew, both on the
political and popular levels. Whoever was hesitant, or reviewed
his personal considerations, was brought along in the wake of
this dynamic; the snowball surprised some and put others in a
difficult position.
In reality, what the boycott groups lacked was the ability to
unify their ranks, and agree on a single strategy to enter the
electoral battle. They agreed upon boycott, but it was difficult
to assemble these groups in a machine which would confront the
holding of elections. This is due, on the one hand, to differences
among some of the principal boycott leaders, and on the other,
their various differing positions on the Taif Agreement, and the
current regime.
It is useful to point out that the principal opposition began
with the passing of the new electoral law. A wide political debate
revolved around the passing of this law, whether concerning a
given article, or the content of the entire law. Many political
parties expressed their opposition to, or criticism of, the new
law, beginning with the boycotting groups, followed by those who
were hesitating (whether participating or boycotting), and finally
those groups participating in the elections, such as Hizballah
(22). However, the electoral law itself became secondary, compared
to the decision to hold elections and begin actual preparation
for them. Some felt that going along with the elections was the
best-case scenario, being less of a defeat than losing one's seat
in parliament.
The issue that is interesting for discussion in the post-Taif
era does not lie in the positions of those groups which opposed
Taif and boycotted the elections, such as Aoun, and others such
as Raymond Edde, the leader of the National Bloc, Amin Gemayel,
and the National Liberals Party. The issue lay in the positions
of parties and leaders such as the Kata'ib, the LF, and Patriarch
Sfayr, who did not only support Taif, but had principal roles
in creating Taif in its various stages, which were politically
and militarily costly.
The partial implementation of the Taif Agreement and the contravention
of its "spirit" distanced those Christian leaders who
had supplied its urgent need of political cover against vehement
popular opposition. This difficult situation resulted in another
development, whose consequences were more damaging, because it
widened the breach between those leaders and the great majority
of Christian public opinion. This occurred at a time when Aoun
enjoyed wide public support, which went beyond Christian public
opinion, and at a time when the President of the Republic lacked
the minimum amount of public support necessary to confront this
difficult situation. These developments made the Christian leaders
and political parties, even those that were prepared to expend
political capital in support of Taif, increasingly unable to participate
in the elections. This, then, was the battle, which was a losing
one on two fronts: if participation would mean the loss of a popular
base, staying out of the process would mean the loss of a share
of power in the regime.
Nowhere was this problem embodied more than by the Kata'ib Party,
whose leaders were principal participants in the Taif Agreement,
putting it in direct conflict with Aoun. This is either from the
standpoint of the personal goals and interest in removing Aoun
from power, or realpolitik, with the goals of containing the situation
and finding the necessary end to the crisis, and ending the war.
The Kata'ib leadership went along with the Taif process, giving
it urgently needed Christian political cover. In the end, however,
the party was unable to fulfill its obligation, especially during
the periods of Taif's partial implementation, and suddenly faced
an extremely difficult situation. It was a trap of losing and
winning at the same time in which the Kata'ib found itself, facing
the reality of the elections. It was forced to decide, at the
last moment, not to participate in the elections, after exhausting
all of the possible political and non-political avenues of escape,
and following many discussions, trips, and processions (both public
and secret) by its leaders between Beirut and Damascus.
The Lebanese Forces were not better off. Following their loss
on two fronts--the loss of the popular Christian base during the
brutal war with Aoun, and the loss of their promised share of
political power in the post-Taif period, they faced the holding
of elections with only one option, that of boycott. Of all of
the groups which participated in the Taif process, perhaps the
LF were the biggest losers. In reality, the dissolving and disarming
of the militias, as stipulated by the Taif Agreement, was thoroughly
implemented in areas that were under the control of the LF, while
other armed groups, whether Lebanese or non-Lebanese (Palestinian,
Kurdish), were either not dissolved, or were treated obligingly.
The fact was that any parliamentary representation that the LF
could aspire to would not even return a portion of the considerable
influence it had before Taif. Even worse, any electoral defeat
suffered would be the coup de grace.
While the Kata'ib and the LF acted in this way, according to various
political considerations, Patriarch Sfayr's opposition to what
he termed the "imposed elections" resulted from factors
completely unrelated to any personal or political calculations
or interests. Sfayr, a political moderate, open and cautious,
was pushed into a hard-line position, which gained wide support
among popular Christian circles. For the first time, he took an
unambiguously clear position concerning a central political issue,
in this case, parliamentary elections.
In a series of Sunday sermons, beginning in April 1992, Patriarch
Sfayr concentrated on Christian apprehensions about and objections
to the Taif Agreement, in general, and the parliamentary elections,
in particular (23). Patriarch Sfayr found himself, after his important
role in constructing Taif and giving it the required support on
more than one level (at a time when Aoun's popularity was at its
height), facing a fait accompli, with Taif violated in letter
and spirit at the hands of three "national unity" governments,
which had all been formed under the banner of Taif, and with its
sponsorship. The metaphor of the "train that has departed,"
connected to the implementation of Taif, found its practical translation
in the visits by officials to Bkirki, in order to "consult"
with Christian political and spiritual leaders, but only after
decisions had been made. Thus Rashid al-Solh, the prime minister
at the time, went to Bkirki to "consult" with Sfayr
about the content of the electoral law, on the day following its
passing in parliament.
With the Taif Agreement, sectarian complaints and objections were
turned on their head: before Taif, Muslims had felt "injustice,"
and Christians "fear." It became the case that Christians
now felt as if they had been treated unjustly, although feelings
of fear did not dissipate. This was the basis of Patriarch Sfayr's
policy regarding Taif's implementation, and the way in which parliamentary
elections would be prepared.
In reality, Christian fears and objections did not lack a justification.
This is because these feelings sprang from a number of realities.
The first of these was the Christian displaced who had lost their
property and homes following the 1983 war of the Mountain (24).
This humanitarian and political problem, which included all sects,
and the necessity of whose solution was stipulated by the Taif
Agreement, was not only a passing matter on the agenda of the
three governments formed in the wake of Taif. The problem also
turned into a political dispute between Walid Junblat and Minister
of State Elie Hubayqa. The displaced were caught between the hammer
and the anvil; between these two difficult positions the displaced
were unable to return to their homes and villages. There is no
doubt that the problem of the displaced remained a political issue
of the utmost importance; a number of internal and external groups
were also involved.
The second fact that lay behind these fears and apprehensions
was that the dissolving of the militias and their disarming (according
to the Taif Agreement) was implemented selectively, since it did
not include all of the armed groups in the country. While there
were some armed groups which were excepted, the Christian militia
was the group most targeted by this implementation. Disbanding
the militias found support from many Lebanese, especially Christians.
They objected, however, to the unequal manner in which the disbanding
was implemented, especially when the government indulged other
militias and armed forces (Lebanese or foreign), that went beyond
allowing the resistance in the south to retain their weapons,
in the end, involving groups supported by outside parties.
A third fact, the formation of governments with unequal representation,
clearly reflected the new political formula of the post-Taif era.
Christian representation in the three National Covenant governments
did not help strengthen the National Covenant; rather, they worked
to reinforce the negative political atmosphere and lack of trust
in the regime's proposals, and in the positions of some of the
influential officials. The required policy, however, should have
supported the revitalization of Christians' trust in the state,
and specifically the course of Taif, through working to re-link
Christians (at least the skeptics and realist opponents among
them) to the state and the decision-making mechanism. The developments
and political stands taken during the preparations for the elections,
however, confirmed people's doubts and increased estrangement,
and conflicts on all levels. The Christians' requirements, even
if they were put forth by pro-Taif groups, did not find those
disposed to listen. This applies to electoral issues such as the
participation by Lebanese residing outside the country, and other
non-electoral matters, while decisions were arriving ready-made,
and ready for implementation, concerning issues which reopened
old problems, with the many negatives that this entailed.
A fourth fact with regard to Christian objections was the adoption
of a new electoral law and the subsequent setting of 23 August
as the date for the elections, which violated the Taif Agreement.
Two issues are of importance in the electoral law: the number
of deputies and the division of electoral constituencies.