Likewise, the 1992 elections were greatly blemished by irregularities
and defects in preparation, the most important case of which being
the administrative chaos prior to the elections, and on election
day, especially in the north and the Biqa`. This is not to speak
of the overt, armed presence by some militias, specifically, Hizballah
and Amal in the Biqa` and the south, which had a direct impact
on the election campaigns, and of course, on the election results.
We should point out that the Lebanese parliamentary elections
had taken place in a context of continuing improvement. The 1947
round, during the presidency of Bishara Khuri, were the most tarnished
by violations (40). Despite the discrepancy in opinions concerning
the improprieties witnessed by the various election rounds in
Lebanon, observers are agreed that the 1947 round contained the
most violations in voting and tabulation, while the 1972 round
was, relatively speaking, the most fair and organized, and had
the least amount of direct government intervention in the voting
and tabulation processes.
Although it is difficult, of course, to present tangible evidence
of election day violations, the rumors and contradictory accounts
concerning a single incident suffice in a small country such as
Lebanon to prove that a certain number of violations or tampering
actually took place. Here, we can indicate the differences among
constituencies in the time it took for votes to be tabulated;
these differences did not lack their justifications. In some constituencies,
results were announced less than 24 hours after the voting, while
in others the same period lasted five or six days, and took place
in an atmosphere of confusion, as rumors flew, and candidates
exchanged accusations. There were questions and doubts about what
occurred in the Biqa`s three constituencies (especially Ba`albak-Hermel)
and the muhafaza of the north, and to a lesser degree,
the south and Beirut.
Among the ironies was that the speaker of parliament himself was
the harshest critic; he resigned from his post in protest of the
course of the electoral process in Ba`albak-Hermel (41). He accused
his competitors from Hizballah of falsifying the elections, while
Hizballah and other opponents of his answered by saying that there
was in fact falsification, but it was to al-Husayni's benefit.
Regardless of the content, source, and truth of these accusations,
the long period of tabulating the votes--according to the announcement
by the ministry of the interior--after tabulation had ended in
the Biqa`s' two other constituencies (Zahle and Western Biqa`)
where competition was strong, opened up the possibilities for
serious questioning of the government's handling of the Ba`albak-Hermel
elections, where the two main competitors had close relations
with Damascus.
Whether or not Damascus had ulterior motives in Ba`albak-Hermel
(as some observers maintained it did), the electoral process in
this constituency was not free of government intervention whose
goal was to influence the results. An official report on the constituency's
tabulation process described in detail the infringements which
occurred on election day (breaking or stealing ballot boxes, the
disappearance or concealment of voter lists, vote tabulations
unsigned by the appointed observers, etc.), and it appears certain
that the results were subject to tampering (42).
Without entering into the details of this matter, we can say that
Hizballah's crushing victory in winning eight seats (four for
its Shi`a party members and four for its allies--two Sunni, one
Maronite, and one Greek Catholic) was an obvious sign of the party's
influence and high level of organization in the region, and that
this result did not surprise some observers. Likewise, Speaker
al-Husayni's victory, along with that of his Shi`i ally, did not
come as a surprise. It might have been surprising, to a certain
degree, if the other candidates on Husayni's list had been able
to defeat the principal Hizballah candidates, who were supported
by more than one foreign party.
In the north, there were also doubts raised concerning some of
the results, especially in the constituencies of the qada's
of Tripoli (al-Dinniyeh) and Akkar. This was also the case in
the Western Biqa` constituency, where Minister of the Interior
Sami al-Khatib was a candidate, and in the constituency of Zahle,
where the candidates for the hotly-contested Greek Orthodox and
Greek Catholic seats raised doubts about and objections to the
results. Another result that raised questions was that of one
of the Sunni seats in Beirut, won by the prime minister at the
time, Rashid al-Solh, by a small margin of votes, while the rest
of the Sunni members of his list lost against the list headed
by Salim al-Hoss and against independent candidates from the Islamist
groups. Finally, in the south and the north, with the accusations
made by the Kamil al-As`ad's list concerning the wide-spread falsification
of results which targeted this list (42), sources spoke of artificially
large totals received by some candidates to increase their standing,
although their victory would be easily obtained.
Perhaps three reasons come into play with regard to this issue:
1. The first is the coalition phenomenon, i.e., the non-competitive stamp of the 1992 elections, in contrast to previous rounds which gathered influential za`ims in various constituencies on one list. This occurred in the north and the south, through the expanded constituency, while it was impossible in other constituencies, such as Ba`albak-Hermel. In fact, the most important decision involved the composition of coalition lists, if allies agreed on a proportional division of the seats.
2. The second reason is connected to the composition of
competing lists in a number of electoral constituencies, which
invariably worked in the interest of the strongest outside
party. It is clear that the members of competing lists were either
supported by Damascus, or their relations with Syria were at least
as good as those whom Damascus was supporting. This was the case
in most of the constituencies where there was limited competition,
or at least competition among some of the candidates.
3. The third, and most important, reason is connected to
state pressure, or in other words, foreign pressure with regard
to the lists' composition. To a great extent, this decided the
election results prior to the elections. If it had not been for
these election settlements prior to the elections, the alliances
and competition would have differed.
In the north, the two principal electoral poles of influence were
Omar Karami and Minister Sulayman Franjiyyeh. In other circumstances
it would not have been strange for each of the two to lead his
own electoral list and compete against the other for parliamentary
seats, and for the za`ama of the north. What happened in
this instance, however, was that they composed a single list.
This "negative" unity did not prevent them from disagreeing
over local and regional matters: who would head the list, who
would choose the list's members, and how? Finally, "where"
would the list be announced and the commemorative picture be taken,
in Tripoli or Zgharta? These differences continued until only
a few days before the elections, and led to a day-long strike
in Tripoli in support of Karami's position; those involved maintained
that "he was not given the freedom to choose the members
of the electoral list" (44).
Likewise, it was not easy under normal circumstances for political
figures and groups to agree upon one list in the south. These
politicians were, for example, were either unable to get along
(Hizballah and Bahiyya al-Hariri), or violently opposed to one
another (Hizballah and Amal; the Usayran and al-Zayn families;
Nabih Birri and Minister Ali al-Khalil). None of these parties
could bring together these electoral contradictions; only an influential
state like Syria could manage this.
Sources close to Kamil al-As`ad, who headed the list competing
with Nabih Birri, said that al-As`ad would not have participated
in the elections had he not received outside encouragement to
do so. It was said that the same situation obtained in Beirut,
where Salim al-Hoss remained hesitant over entering the contest,
even a few days prior to the elections. In other electoral constituencies,
there was no need to intervene, since competition was practically
non-existent, except for the two Sunni candidates on Junblat's
list, who saw limited competition, and the Shi`a seat in Jubayl
and the two Shi`a seats in Ba`abda.
In addition, the government encouraged a multitude of candidacies
by people who had no political or popular basis, with the goal
of luring a larger number of people to vote, so that the elections
would appear to have strong competition and a high turnout. This
is what happened, in particular, in the by-elections of Kisirwan-Fattuh,
where candidacies rained down in the second phase. There were
24 candidates (of whom five withdrew), but only six candidates
can be considered to be serious; they competed over five seats.
With regard to competition by sect, and region, in other words
the ratio of candidates to seats within a single sect, this phenomenon
increased from 3.3% to 4.7% between 1972 and 1992. This is not
attributable to an actual rise in the percentage of competition,
but to the larger number of seats in the 1992 parliament, and
the high number of empty seats in the 1972 parliament. The Shi`a
recorded the highest number of candidates, followed by the Sunnis,
and Druze. The Christian sects recorded lower percentages. The
Greek Orthodox registered the highest percentage among the Christian
sects, followed by the Protestants, and Minorities. The Maronites
had the lowest percentage among the Christians.
There were wide contrasts among constituencies, and among sects.
The Biqa` had the highest percentage, and Beirut the lowest. These
percentages were recorded in previous elections as well. In 1992,
the lowest number was recorded in Jubayl, 6.52%, these voters
were overwhelmingly Muslim, constituting about 35% of the constituency's
Muslim voters. Jubayl's two Maronite candidates received 130 and
41 votes, or 171 out of the constituency's total of 63,878. The
highest turnout was recorded in Ba`albak-Hermel, with 51.77% (46).
The low turnout and large differences among constituencies and
sects were not only a result of the boycott in Christian areas,
but were also a result of the general feelings of indifference
toward the elections on the part of both Christian and Muslim
voters. This is clear from the low voting percentage in general,
even compared to regions in which competition is usually strong,
like the Biqa` and the south. Some sources said that some constituencies
experienced an artificial inflation of results, with the goal
of raising the number of voters to try to deflate the effect of
the boycott, especially in the second and third rounds of voting,
and especially in the north, Mount Lebanon, and the south.
We must note the political meaning of the percentage of voter participation. The question concerns the reason for high voter turnout in constituencies where there were no competing electoral lists, or indeed, no real competition which might prevent electing prominent candidates, as in the constituencies of Aley and the Shouf. The answer lies in the policy of encouraging voting among people residing in these areas, most of whom were Druze. This was not because of competition among candidates, but to demonstrate popular support for prominent candidates, diminish the effects of the boycott and the absence of Christian displaced voters. Thus voter turnout in the Shouf reached about 35% (where there was limited competition over the two Sunni seats) and about 24% in Aley.
Another example was the constituency of Kisirwan, where the turnout
was about 20%, due to reasons which do not reflect the real political
stance on the boycott. People expressed their rejection of the
elections in the first round, which led to the withdrawal of the
major candidates and the postponement of the elections. After
a new date was set, however, the candidates returned to the contest.
This brought voters to the polls, not because people had suddenly
changed their position on the elections, but because of local
and family political considerations, especially since the major
candidates enjoyed strong popular bases of support which were
not tied to the boycott issue, with its wider national dimension.
Like the candidate, the voter participated in the elections to
close the door on what were called the "infiltrators."
The proper political criterion for the voting percentage in some
constituencies, especially in Mount Lebanon, was not numerical,
as much as it was the political position in principle, which was
one of boycott, or was unsupportive of holding elections in the
political atmosphere of the summer of 1992.
Errors on the voter lists (an average of 3 to 5%, with mistakes
concerning the deceased, women's names being listed twice, as
single and married, etc.) in addition to voters being outside
the country, or absent due to displacement, helped decrease voter
turnout. Even if it is true that voter list errors accompanied
all previous electoral rounds, it remains that the number of absent
voters (whether due to displacement, or being outside the country
during the elections) was higher than in any previous round.
The most important reasons for the rise in the percentage of elite
circulation in the 1992 parliament (deputies being elected for
the first time, or who were deputies in parliaments prior to 1972)
were the following:
1. First, among the large number of new deputies were political
figures who had been active for many years, and whose influence
and standing surpassed that of parliamentary deputies, although
these figures were not in parliament. Prior to the 1992 elections,
Za`ims with secure positions such as Walid Junblat, Nabih
Birri, Sulayman Franjiyyeh, Omar Karami, and Salim Hoss were in
reality their sects' actual representatives, more so than the
many deputies in the previous parliament. This applies to other
politicians whose influence was based on their status as representatives
of the prevailing political line, more than their status as their
sects' representatives, or their popular bases of support. Some
examples of this group of prominent politicians are Muhsin Dalloul,
Sami al-Khatib, Michel al-Murr, Jean Ubayd, and other politically
active figures who enjoyed influence which surpassed that of the
average deputy of the 1972 parliament.
Thus we arrive at the conclusion that the za`ims with secure
positions and popular bases of support were in the same situation
as those influential politicians, or "new faces," who
had not entered the political stage. Regarding the latter group,
they entered parliament while enjoying much influence, and exercising
authority (sometimes on parliament itself), before they entered
as new deputies in 1992. Of course it is no coincidence that these
influential politicians were appointed deputies in 1991, and most
of them were then elected in contests that lacked strong competition.
These politicians were not "late" in reaching parliament;
it was only the electoral process that was "late," due
to the war.
2. The second reason for the rise in new deputies is the
additional parliamentary seats, in both relative and absolute
terms. In addition to the nine seats added to effect an equal
Christian-Muslim ratio (raising the number from 99 to 108), twenty
other new seats were added, equally divided between Muslims and
Christians. This increase, in addition to the 31 seats left vacant
by the passing of their deputies, opened the way for new figures
to fill these seats, which numbered 60, including the added seats,
or 46.87% of the current parliament's total.
3. The third reason is the effects of two decades without
elections. As in the 1960 round, when the number of seats rose
by approximately 30% (from 66 to 99), and the percentage of "inherited
seats" fell from 50% to 30.3%, the 22.2% increase in seats
in 1992 (99 to 128) was matched by a fall in the percentage of
parliamentary families from 44.4% to 38.28%. This percentage of
parliamentary families decreased by approximately 4% from the
1968 to 1972 parliaments.
The factor of political inheritance among members of the 1992
parliament remains in effect . With the exception of some Christian
political families whose candidates boycotted the elections (Edde,
Gemayel, Chamoun), most of the political families placed deputies
in the new parliament. At times, competition flared between politicians
or candidates within a single family. While new political families
did not emerge in the 1992 elections, this might occur in the
future, especially within the Muslim sects. This is if some of
the influential leaders remain politically strong, and can guarantee
the passing of their za`ama to their sons, and grandsons.
The highest percentage of elite circulation occurred within the
Shi`a sect, particularly in Ba`albak-Hermel, where there has traditionally
been sharp electoral competition among local political forces.
In the south, the increase in the number of deputies made way
for competition among Shi`a political families and new figures
at the same time.
With regard to elite circulation, only twelve deputies
who were elected in 1972 and were candidates in 1992 lost their
seats in this last round, while 19 deputies were reelected. With
regard to the political heirs of 1972 deputies, only two failed,
in the south (48). We should note here that the only political
family which was able to send two of its members to parliament
for the same constituency was the al-Khazin family in Kisirwan,
and its two candidates ran on competing lists, in an atmosphere
of sharp competition.
4. The fourth reason for the increase in the percentage of new faces in the 1992 parliament was the Christian boycott, especially in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, where political figures lacking popular bases of support were elected to fill the vacuum, out of necessity. It is ironic that some of these figures had no political or family ties to the constituency they were to represent, and some were not known to the voting public in these constituencies (49).
After excepting 49 deputies who belonged to political families,
and the 29 new seats added to parliament's 99, the number of "new"
deputies becomes 50 (128 minus 78), or 39.06% of the total number
of seats.
It remains to point out that three women entered parliament. Nayla
Mu`awad (the widow of the late president Rene Mu`awad), for Zgharta,
and Bahiyya al-Hariri (the sister of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri),
for Sidon; they won with a large number of votes. Mrs. Mu`awad
was her list's top vote-getter, surpassing the next candidate,
Sulayman Franjiyyeh, by about 15,000 votes. This was also the
case with Mrs. al-Hariri, who took second place on her list, about
1,000 votes behind Nabih Birri. The third candidate, who entered
parliament as an "infiltrator," was Maha Khuri As`ad
(Jubayl), who obtained 41 votes. Three other women submitted their
candidacies, but did not emerge victorious.
The highest and lowest percentages were recorded in Mount Lebanon,
while the north also had a high number of deputies over 50 years
of age. Among sects, the Maronites had a high percentage of over-50
deputies, followed in succession by Sunnis, and Shi`a.
While one would expect the war to produce a more "youthful"
parliament, the 20 year-absence of elections was sufficient to
age the war's "political elite," as we see that parliament's
new members' ages range from the late 30s to the late 40s, with
the exception of two politicians, Talal Arslan and Sulayman Franjiyyeh,
who are in their late 20s. We should point out that had elections
been held a few years earlier, for example, Franjiyyeh and Arslan
would have no doubt encountered fierce competition from within
their families, and the families' choice might have gone to older
members to lead the family. It is interesting that the average
age of deputies from the Islamist groups is lower than the general
1992 average.
Another observation is that the new parliament is the first not
to contain deputies from the mandate and independence generations
of the 1930s and 1940s. This is because there are only two deputies
who entered parliament in the 1950s; the 1972 parliament had ten
deputies who were first elected in the 1940s, and 17 in the 1950s.
Greek Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Druze have the highest percentage
of university graduates, followed by the Alawis, Protestants,
and minorities. The relative distribution of numbers of deputies
with university and secondary school educations is roughly equal
among the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi`a.
With regard to the institutions from which deputies have graduated,
many deputies have received degrees from local universities, especially
St. Joseph's University and A.U.B., and foreign universities,
especially French and American. It is the first time, however,
that we find graduates of the Lebanese University, especially
deputies from ideological parties and Islamist movements.