Political Party Representation in the 1992 Parliament
Although electoral politics in Lebanon have not been centered around political parties, this applies to Lebanese politics in general (53). It is no wonder, then, that the average percentage of political party members has not exceeded one-third since 1964. If we except a small number of organized political parties, we find that most parties function as situational alliances, and not as organized parties in structure and practice, as is the case in western democratic countries.

While party representation decreased slightly in comparison with the previous parliament, change came in the form of party substitution, as parties entered parliament for the first time as others lost their representation, even if the reasons for their exit differed.

Most of the parties that did not return to the 1992 parliament were Christian parties which boycotted the elections. Ideological parties constituted the majority of those that entered for the first time, guaranteeing their seats, in general, by filling the vacuum left by other parties. The two most prominent examples here are the SSNP, in Beirut, and the Wa`ad Party, in Ba`abda and Mount Lebanon. These two parties (including the Ba`th Arab Socialist Party) enjoyed support from Damascus not obtained by any other ideological party, such as the Lebanese Communist Party.

There are also some parties and political movements which had a political and military presence during the war, but vanished from the Lebanese political and electoral scene afterward. Among these parties that had an Islamic basis, we can point to al-Murabitoun in Beirut, and Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islamiyya in Tripoli. The last of those which disappeared, after the ouster of Aoun, was the Guardians of the Cedars Party, which had a Christian basis. The Union of Working People's Forces was another party which participated in the elections; it entered Kamal Chatila, who resided outside of Lebanon, as a candidate. Among the ironies of Lebanese politics is that we find the Organization of Communist Action, which is not now active politically, boycotting the elections along with the Christian parties, for different, if not conflicting, reasons.

The Lebanese Communist Party, which was active during the war and the period of preparation of Taif, and which had a number of candidates in various constituencies in the 1972 elections, was unable to gain a seat in the 1992 parliament, just as it failed to gain a seat for its general-secretary, George Hawi, in the parliamentary appointments of 1991.

We might have expected a rise in the percentage of party representation in the 1992 parliament, or at least a commensurate rise with the increase of deputies from 99 to 128, or roughly 20%. This did not occur, however, not only because of the Christian boycott, as one might think, but because the image of political parties has suffered serious damage, and their popularity has declined, especially among youth, who used to form their primary foundation. While party membership or support reached high levels in the pre-war period (the first half of the 1970s) especially among university students, we see that parties have lost much of their glamour, and influence, in popular circles.

No doubt the most prominent exception to the fortunes of political parties in the 1992 elections is the rise of the star of the Islamist parties and organizations. Political forces such as Hizballah, al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya, and al-Ahbash, which did not have an organized party presence ten or twenty years ago, put all of their political energy into the elections, in which they were participating for the first time. In striving to establish their influence, they expanded their activity among the their popular base, mobilized their organizations, and employed all of their capital (political or otherwise) in the elections. The victory of the fundamentalist parties, then, was a reflection of their actual influence and electoral strength, at least under the current electoral law, and under the circumstances that surrounded the 1992 elections.

With regard to the effect of the Christian boycott on the gains of the Islamist candidates, there were consequences in the results in Ba`abda, Mount Lebanon and Beirut, but not necessarily in Ba`albak-Hermel, the south, and the north. In the final analysis, the fortunes of Islamist candidates were like those of other political forces and parties, dependent on electoral alliances which were subject to variable political calculations. Finally, we should point out that 1992 was the first time that the number of Muslim deputies from political parties exceeded their Christian counterparts (54).

The percentage of deputies from parties or groups which fought the war, or which were led by a militia leader, reached 24%.

This percentage could have been higher, had the parties with a Christian basis, such as the Kata'ib and the National Liberals, participated in the elections. A quick look at the Islamist parties shows that Hizballah added four seats belonging to allies to the eight seats of its members, making it the largest organized parliamentary bloc, while Amal, Hizballah's principal competitor, gained only four seats.

Electoral Issues
Parliamentary elections in Lebanon were considered an event for which the people waited every four years, preparing themselves to win in the coming "battle." The electoral seasons always saw popular and political mobilization, constituting an event in whose uproar people from all sects and regions, ages and social levels could mix (55). From this angle, the 1992 elections were the antithesis of past rounds. The average citizen's interest was, in general, almost non-existent. This was especially the case among youth, i.e. the "war generation," which had reached the legal voting age during this period, but had not been able to exercise this right due to the twenty-year absence of elections.

The slight interest in the first elections in twenty years, however, neither affected the content of electoral proposals, nor the nature of incentives for the candidate and the voter. In pre-war Lebanon, parliamentary elections were a local affair, to a great extent, in which narrow electoral issues and matters which concerned the region, village or constituency were discussed. Goals and political "requests" were short-range. Rarely did the elections have serious programs connected to ideological or socio-economic issues, or any well-defined electoral platform (56). A candidate or a list's electoral program was usually presented in general terms, with vague slogans, citing lofty goals. These proposals were presented to the voting populace only a short time prior to election day.

If this applied to pre-war Lebanon, relatively open and stable, when political discourse reflected both differing ideological proposals and contradictory regional policies, how does it fail to apply today, with the demise of ideologies (not only in Lebanon or the region, but in the world in general), and the marginalization of free political debate, compared to the period prior to the mid-1970s? It is attributable to the fact that some issues have been decided, if only in theory (the end of the Arab nation, and Lebanon's Arab identity), and that the discussion over regional issues has become limited to a priori issues whose political, and non-political framework is determined by the distinctive relations between Lebanon and Syria.

The politically and intellectually stormy atmosphere of the 1970s was absent from the electoral programs of the 1992 elections. There was a clear absence of fundamental national issues, such as those connected to the implementation of Taif, Lebanon's participation in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, economic problems, and government performance in general--issues that can spur serious and critical discussion. Likewise, there was an absence of ideological proposals concerning the left and the right, which have lost their importance in Lebanon, as in other countries in the post-cold war period. It is Lebanon's share of "the end of history" (57), even if Lebanon continues to see important issues which contain both ideological and religious dimensions.

We mean by this the Islamic fundamentalist movements, represented by three groups: Hizballah, with a Shi`a basis (58), and the two Sunni groups, al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya and the Islamic Charitable Works Association, or the al-Ahbash. These groups entered the electoral contest like other political forces, putting ideology aside, and playing electoral cards with the utmost pragmatism and within the traditional Lebanese framework (in general, that of narrow electoral policies). On this basis, electoral considerations were based on cost against return, and did not use a veto in the name of ideological or religious considerations. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah pointed this out, saying, "The success of the Islamists in Lebanon is a mixture of the general factor which attracts many people, either to join or give support, or through the historical vestiges which determine people's positions, in addition to some issues and language that some people see in the Islamists, which separates them from the general path." (59)

The 1992 elections' most important issue was the procedural obstacles which seriously impeded the discussion of electoral policy issues, in particular the time-period between the preparation of the elections (the passing of the electoral law), the setting of dates for the elections, and election day. Even if we assume that the country was mobilized in favor of certain issues, or against them, the time was not at all sufficient to hold a general discussion of these matters, whether through election campaigns, or the candidates' electoral programs.

There is another special feature which distinguished the electoral programs. In 1992, electoral policy did not depend on calculating future political alliances for the post-election period, as was the case in previous rounds. These calculations are usually centered around competition for the three top political positions in Lebanon (president, prime minister and speaker of parliament). In previous rounds, especially when the new parliament would elect a new president of the republic, competition among candidates, whether within the same sect, or in alliance with other sects, usually aimed at influencing the forming of political alliances and common interests of people supporting the new regime. This is what occurred in the parliamentary elections of 1947, 1957, 1964, and 1968, where candidates looked toward influencing the presidential elections of 1949, 1958, 1964 ,and 1970.

In 1992, these calculations were absent; if we do find them (even if only hidden), they did not have fundamental importance in electoral policies and proposals, in contrast to the pre-war period. There is no doubt that the nature of electoral competition that produced the 1992 parliament, which will elect the next president, would not have occurred in the same manner (both in form and content), had the prevailing political circumstances differed. In reality, this unintentional absence is because the election of the next president will obey the same givens and bases that were obeyed in the 1976 presidential election, which reflected the regional balance of power in Lebanon more than the country's own internal political dynamic.

Does this mean that the current parliament will have the same effect and role in electing the president of the republic and parliament, that the previous parliament has had in recent years? Who will be the most important voter in the next presidential election, and under what criteria will the election take place? Will there be, for example, a presidential election decided by one vote, as in the last pre-war election (1970), that ended an era that lasted for two presidencies, an era some deplored as "military rule"?

Incentives for Voters and Candidates
Contrary to expectations, the war did not change much of the nature of motives and incentives, not only for candidates, but for voters as well. The 20-30 age group, which is usually attracted by political exuberance, whether through a higher inclination to politicization, or because it has not exercised the right to vote previously, did not only fail to participate in the elections, but was the group that most strongly supported the boycott, especially in Christian areas.

In democratic countries, the percentage of voters who participate in elections is a limited one, sometimes reaching only 50%. Participants aim to support specific political and economic proposals, or support a public political directive of a given competing party. In Lebanon, party cohesion has been weak. There are few parties that can be compared to western democratic ones. This is because Lebanese parties are closer to temporary blocs, or groups that rarely conform to organized party concepts. They are indebted for their existence to leadership based on the strong and effective za`im, who is usually the founder of the party (60).

During the war years, most of the parties became militias, and in other cases, street gangs, which used acts of violence against a sect or region they pretended to protect, more than they took recourse to killing what was called "the enemy." This situation made party identity a burden, instead of a positive "value." Moreover, the word "party" itself has today become, in the minds of many Lebanese, an pejorative word, tied to the tribulations brought by the war.

If we except a very limited percentage of party activity in the elections, then those who participated in the elections did so for the following reasons. The most basic and prominent reason for voting is the policy of services and sponsorship of personal interests, practiced by the candidates, in exchange for loyalty and "vassalage" from those who benefit (61). In the Lebanese dictionary, this is known as the policy of "services" or "wasta," or the intervention by politicians in the state or other official apparatus in order to carry out the business of voters and facilitate their daily affairs. Many politicians built their za`ama upon this popular foundation, whose nucleus involves people benefiting from the za`ims' personal services.

Family and tribal ties are another reason why people participated. While these ties are generally stronger in rural areas, in Lebanon they prevail in both the countryside and in cities, even if they are more prominent in the countryside. A third reason is connected to what voters expect in the way of political and other rewards if candidates supported by the government win election. Here, we should mention the group of state employees and seekers of official posts. The fourth reason is the role of financial "aid" which varies from support for local projects with a positive return for society, to buying votes and bribery in its various forms on election day.

Leaving aside ideological or religious conviction (or both), voting in the 1992 elections was motivated by the above-mentioned reasons, among which we should emphasize "services" in the wide sense, a factor which applies to all regions, and sects. The role of money in the 1992 elections was probably more effective in some constituencies than others. The constituencies of the Biqa`, the south, and the north were in the forefront of this group (62). Even the religious-ideological motive for voting in the 1992 elections was not completely clear, because it was mixed with other tribal and social considerations. Examples of this lie in the voting percentages for Hizballah in Biqa`-Hermel, where the tribal social fabric prevails, and for other Islamic movements in Akkar and al-Dinniyeh in the north. There are also wide-scale "services" provided by these groups in their regions of influence, investments which yielded positive results in the end.

Perhaps the 1992 elections were the most expressive of the effect of the services factor on the voting percentage, a clear sign of its electoral importance. This is because other effective factors were limited, especially in areas that witnessed electoral boycott. This was the case in Northern Metn, especially in the constituency of Kisirwan-Fattuh, where the services factor had a big influence on encouraging people to vote, despite the boycott.

Like voters, the candidates also had motives to run for election, other than pure political ambition. Aspirants to parliament are motivated by factors that deserve some examination, especially since Lebanese political parties have a limited role in selecting and producing candidates, in contrast to western democratic (especially parliamentary) regimes.

If we except candidates from political parties, and those influential politicians who are considered perennial candidates, we find that other politicians such as local notables or independents aspire to political office for various reasons which include:

• The social station that ties the people to the holder of government office, and the distinctions enjoyed by those in power.
• The parliamentary representation charged traditionally to a certain family in a certain region, which results in competition (sometimes violent) among sons, brothers and cousins within a single family.

• To run for election is the expectation of political or financial return that is facilitated by membership in parliament. It is of course clear that attaining a governmental post or appearing in the various media is easier for deputies than it is for other politicians outside parliament. In reality, parliament might be an entry to a large, material return; being a deputy has been tied to the role of money since the elections during the mandate period (63). The 1972 parliament, which served for the longest period in parliamentary history, and lived through the most terrifying period in Lebanon's history, was the most subject to "experimentation."

• The result of the war, which extended parliament's tenure from four to 20 years. Those politicians who narrowly missed becoming deputies in 1972 would not accept a second missed opportunity in 1992, no matter what the difficulties and problems surrounding the elections. If history is a guide, then the lesson taught by the 1972 parliament is not encouraging. This is because the political aspirants find themselves waiting for many more years (perhaps more than four) on the platform for the next train. In this likelihood, they are not only deprived of parliament or a ministry, but perhaps their age exceeds 60, becoming too old to receive another opportunity.

• The final factor is political opportunism by candidates who aimed to fill the gap left by politicians who boycotted the elections, especially in some of Mount Lebanon's constituencies. Of course we cannot forget that a large number of candidates presented themselves on the electoral stage in order to gain media exposure, although they had absolutely no chance of winning, and were not qualified to enter one of the principal candidate lists. Many candidates did this in order to gain some fame, or the title "former candidate for parliament." This would raise their social standing, and their media stock, while they wait for another try in the future, with the goal of local notable status in the village, neighborhood, or family.

In reality, parliamentary elections in Lebanon, before and after the "hot," and "cold" wars, are a project for gaining notable status by "new faces" which aspire to emerge on the scene, and for the old figures who wish to secure or renew their za`ama. The irony is that the highest aspirations by new figures who mouth lofty slogans in the name of fighting the old system, known in the Lebanese political lexicon as "political feudalism," in effect imitate the old and establish new "political feudalism," designed to their specifications. It is interesting that what applies to individuals also applies to the parties, both "progressive" and "reactionary." This is how the mechanisms of change and elite renewal work, in a vicious circle, before and after the elections. The elections' importance lies in their giving legitimacy to projects for gaining notable status. The representative represents the people, and legislates, while parliament improves the conditions of the deputy's work, not only as a representative of the people, but also outside the framework of being a deputy, giving him the opportunity for political and non-political movement or action, in local affairs, and in general.

In the end, no matter how much parliamentary elections are connected to parties, organizations, and national issues, they remain, practically speaking, a story of local goals and environment, at the level of the family, tribe, town, neighborhood, and region. Both the candidate and the voter know this well, and political positions are often seen to change quickly, a few hours prior to the opening of polling stations.

Change in the 1992 Elections: The Influential Candidates and the Role of Their Election Machines

While it is true that many features experienced little change between the 1992 elections and the previous round, it is also true that clear change occurred in at least three ways: the first area involved the position of the important candidates and the extent of their influence; the second area involved the role of the "electoral keys;" and the third was the way in which voters dealt with the electoral lists.

With the exception of Minister Walid Junblat, who maintained, if not strengthened, his za`ama within the Druze sect, especially after the war of the Mountain, most of the traditional za`ims have witnessed a decline in their influence during recent years. They were unable in 1992 to exercise the amount of influence that they enjoyed in the pre-war period. Although most za`ims with a secure popular basis of support continued to exercise noticeable influence in their electoral constituencies, this influence began to diminish, in comparison with the pre-war period. The war years affected this za`ama, due to many reasons--the legitimacy of some was shaken, and the strength of others crumbled, even though the reasons differed from one za`im to another, and from one region to another.

Perhaps the most prominent reason that led to the relative decline of some za`ims is the absence of the authentic za`im (such as Arslan, Chamoun, Gemayel, Franjiyyeh, Karami, Skaff) regardless of how these new za`ims were related to the "old man." There is no doubt that the inheritance of the above-mentioned examples did not equal the influence and authority exercised by their predecessors. One reason for this is the opposition and challenges that the heirs faced within the family, making them weaker. Within the sect, meanwhile, they did not possess the amount of legitimacy of their predecessors. This is not to speak of some of those who lacked political experience. Other za`ims' influence retreated or collapsed in the face of militia "domination" during the war years. This is because the militias primarily targeted the local za`im, and were his main competition, bearing slogans of progressiveness and democracy, with the goal of fighting "political feudalism" and anchoring bases of truly popular representation.

In the recent elections, some of these political families regained some of their positions, perhaps because people became fed up with militia rule and its excesses. Other political families were not as successful. One of the most prominent examples of this is former speaker of parliament Kamil al-As`ad, whose za`ama had persisted in decline since before the war, following the emergence of a strong Shi`a leadership which opposed him and helped to create a wide, popular tendency within the sect led by, principally, the Imam Musa al-Sadr. In reality, the Shi`a za`ims of the south and the Biqa` were the za`ims most affected by the change that shook the foundations of their influence. This is because of reasons directly connected to the internal and external forces of change that radically transformed the political basis of the Shi`a sect (64) during a relatively short period of time. Some za`ims also faced strong competition from new ascendant political forces, represented especially by the Islamist movements, particularly in the Biqa` and the north. As for the situation with regard to Christian za`ims, the popular spread of what is known as the Aoun tendency, which boycotted the elections, exemplified the new political force that could compete with the traditional za`ims or other politicians, or ally with them.

There are two other factors which might shed some light on the decline of the influence of the important candidates.

• The first lies in the existence of two contradictory results of the expanded electoral constituency. While the expanded constituency increased the authority of the strong za`im over his local popular base, in return, it put him in the difficult situation of dealing with a wider and more diverse body of voters than the small constituency, limiting his influence over and ability to reach directly these voters.

• The second and more important factor is Damascus' connections and sometimes direct influence, in some areas, with most of the influential leaders among all sects and electoral constituencies. The Syrian leadership's considerable political capital and various methods of influence, added to its accurate knowledge of the sectarian and regional features of Lebanon's political map made Damascus the most important focal-point, whether within a single sect or among various sects. Among the realities that cannot be denied is the fact that in 1992, no active political force in Lebanon was able to contest Damascus in an area the latter considered a vital interest.

In previous parliamentary elections subject to external influences, the focal point of electoral politics had a domestic basis, with regard to the structure of deals and electoral alliances, which originated in the country's sectarian politics. Whatever the pressures and influence exercised by foreign parties in the past (such as financial and political support, visits by candidates to certain Arab countries, and media exposure with their leaders), certain sects and za`ims were targeted, during periods when a political atmosphere reflecting regional political currents prevailed.

Today, these pressures and influence have penetrated the political elite in all parts of the country. In the past, the pressure of this foreign intervention was limited and confined, in form and content, to affecting electoral results in some constituencies of a certain political or sectarian stripe. This foreign intervention in parliamentary and presidential elections, however, occurred to a large extent in the 1940s and 1950s; it declined perceptibly in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Our clear examples here emerge in the presidential election of 1970, and the 1972 parliamentary elections. This is despite the fact that Lebanon was a stage for regional conflicts which shook the country's stability to an unprecedented degree.

The truth is that foreign intervention in Lebanon's internal politics in the pre-war period (whether during elections or at other times) relied on a certain amount of popular support, influenced by a given Arab regime. Likewise, this external intervention was related to the continuing debate and differences over Lebanon's identity and role in the region's various issues. Today, foreign intervention does not rely upon a popular base, mobilized by slogans and causes. These slogans and causes no longer exist, or would find difficulty in mobilizing public opinion in the way that they did in the 1970s, although the accomplishments of the Taif Agreement included settling the dispute over Lebanon's Arab and national identities. It was for this particular reason that the amount of foreign intervention should have declined to a minimum in the 1992 elections, although this did not occur in practice.

In light of what has been presented here, it remains to point out that the decline that befell the important politicians and their influence did not necessarily translate into the emergence of an alternative political force whose popular support and influence surpassed the traditional leaders. With the exception of the Islamic movements, this phenomenon, at the least, did not emerge in the 1992 elections. From all of these givens, we can conclude that a political vacuum whose exact extent is difficult to determine "filled" the political arena, and will no doubt be filled by future political competition more in line with the will of the people, in terms of preparation, timing, and practice, than was the case in the 1992 elections. If this holds more for the Christian voter, because of the boycott, than for the Muslim voter, then it will no doubt hold for young voters in general, from all sects and regions.

It was natural for the decline in the power of the traditional politicians and their positions, as we have seen above, to result in the decline in the role of what is known as the "keys to electoral victory," and their influence. Their role had included participating in election campaigns, searching for likely supporters, offering "services," distributing money, and observing the electoral process, among other things. One of the explanations for this issue is that the "electoral keys" belonged to a generation whose average age had risen by 20 since the previous elections. Those in their 40s or 50s, the group with the most experience with this matter, have now reached their 60s or 70s. This does not take into account those who have passed away, or those who are no longer active as they were previously. This age factor limited the effect of the "electoral keys" on the 1992 elections.

The other factor in this regard resulted from the twenty year period without electoral activity. This led to the break in the connection between the "electoral keys" and their za`ims. While the four-year period between elections allowed the connection to continue between the za`im and his "electoral keys," the twenty-year absence of elections either decreased the loyalty of the electoral key to his za`im, or led to a total break in this relationship. In addition, there is the more negative effect, represented by the absence of new generations of "electoral keys," with the experience gained from their fathers or relatives who had played these roles.

Another factor that becomes relevant here is that a new generation of "electoral keys" was prevented from emerging by the entrance of the militias into local politics, and their competition with the za`ims, not only over political leadership, but over the "machinery" of local politics, and its central axis, represented by the "electoral keys." This is because a number of this latter group, especially its youth component, joined the militias and assumed military functions, with the accompanying financial return and other forms of compensation. This occurred more in cities and their environs, where local "strongmen" were actively present; they transferred their loyalty to the za`ims of the militias (65).

Of course the surprise decision, relatively speaking, to hold the elections did not help maintain the weight of the "electoral keys'" role. This is because candidates were not given sufficient time to prepare for the elections, undertake the necessary organization, and reestablish contact with the "electoral keys," especially in the big constituencies like the north and the south. This is something from which the political parties benefited, at the expense of the non-party affiliated politicians.

Finally, in 1992 a change befell the pre-war model with regard to voting for a complete candidate list. This is because voters resorted to choosing a mix of list candidates and independent candidates, or from a competing list. This was known, in electoral parlance, as al-tashtib, which occurred in the 1992 elections more than in any previous round.

The reasons for this phenomenon are various; they include:

• the decline in the influence of the major candidates,
• the formation of candidate lists with many contradictions,
• the lack of coordination among the members of a single list, and the long period since the previous electoral round.

All of these reasons contributed to the decrease in voting for a list in its entirety, and to the resort to al-tashtib in most electoral constituencies, specifically those with competition among candidate lists. In this lies the explanation for the big difference in votes gained by a single list's candidates, along with the explanation for the victories by some independent candidates.

We must also point out that the 1992 elections were distinguished from previous rounds by the existence of a large number of incomplete lists in the three big constituencies (Beirut, the south, and the north). This is attributable to the larger number of seats in a single electoral constituency, the phenomenon of the coalition list, and on limited competition.