The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections: What Do the Numbers Say?

South 1 Electoral District: Saida and Jezzine

Georgia Dagher
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Georgiea Dagher
Georgiea Dagher is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. Her research focuses on parliamentary representation, namely electoral behavior and electoral reform. She has also previously contributed to LCPS's work on international donors conferences and reform programs. She holds a degree in Politics and Quantitative Methods from the University of Edinburgh.
Executive Summary

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018, the districts of Saida and Jezzine (South 1) saw a highly competitive race, leading to more diverse representation at the parliamentary level. Each of the winning parties and candidates owed their success to one confessional community, respectively: The Future Movement relied on the Sunni vote, the Free Patriotic Movement on the Christian votes, and the Popular Nasserist Organization—running with a candidate backed by Amal—received much higher levels of support among the Shia community. Some voters were also more mobilized than others. Sunni and Shia voters voted in significantly higher numbers than Christian voters, although there were variations within each sectarian group across cadastral areas. In Jezzine, where two confessional groups are represented by a seat, Maronite voters were much more likely to vote for a candidate from their own sect compared to Greek Catholics. Geographical variations were also present: Among each group, those in more homogeneous areas were significantly more likely to vote along sectarian lines. South 1 saw minor voting variations between women and men, but one notable difference was in support for women candidates. Two women candidates ran in South 1, and although their performances were highly unequal—the first was one of the most successful candidates across the country and the second was one of the least successful—they both received significantly higher support from women voters. Finally, the results of the votes in Jezzine point at incidents of vote rigging, particularly on the part of the Free Patriotic Movement: First, the party generally performed better in polling stations that recorded a lower share of invalid votes; and second, the list’s number of votes across polling stations were distributed in an irregular, non-uniform pattern—both things that do not normally occur in clean elections.

Introduction

After passing a new electoral law in 2017, the Lebanese parliament finally agreed to hold elections in 2018—nine years after the previous ones, and two mandate extensions later. The new electoral law established a proportional representation system for the first time in the country’s history, paving the way for increased competition. Yet, this new system led to little changes in political representation, with voters in 2018 reiterating their support for the main established political parties. These results must however not be taken at face value and require a closer analysis, as voting patterns across and within electoral districts, as well as across voters’ demographic characteristics, still showed variations.

As part of a larger study on the 2018 elections, LCPS has analyzed voter behavior at the national and electoral district levels. Using the official election results at the polling station level, published by the
Ministry of Interior, the analysis unpacks the results and examines differing patterns in voting behavior across demographic characteristics and geographical areas. The results at the polling station level were merged with a series of potential explanatory factors at the individual and cadastral levels. First, based on the ministry’s list of registered voters by confession and gender in each of the polling stations, we identified the demographic characteristics of registered voters in each of the polling stations. The results at the polling station level were also merged with a series of factors that may have affected voters’ choices at the cadastral level in each electoral district. These factors include the level of economic development in a cadaster, approximated by the night-time light intensity; the poverty rate in a cadaster, approximated by the ratio of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program over the population in the cadaster; the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, constructed by LCPS and based on the distribution of voters by confession in each cadaster; and, finally, the share of refugees over the number of registered voters in a cadaster. Through the use of multivariate regression analyses, the explanatory significance of each of these factors on voter behavior is identified.

Apart from voters’ preferences, the study also examines incidents of electoral fraud. We seek to identify evidence of voter rigging—such as vote buying—and vote rigging—such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

This report unpacks the results in the electoral district of South 1, which combined Saida and Jezzine, and is allocated five parliamentary seats: Two Sunni seats in Saida, and two Maronite seats and one Greek Catholic seat in Jezzine. The report is divided into six sections. First, we present the demographic distribution of registered voters in Saida and Jezzine. The second section is concerned with voter turnout, which varied across confessional groups, districts, and cadastral areas. The third section of this report delves into voters’ preferences for electoral lists and candidates. Going beyond the results at the aggregate level, we shed light on the varying preferences for parties and candidates across voters’ sect and gender and across geographical areas in South 1, and how these were affected by geographical factors. In the fourth section, we examine voters’ sectarian behavior—i.e. their preferences for candidates of their own sectarian group. The fifth section looks at the performance of women candidates. Similar to the other sections of this report, we identify each woman’s constituents and strongholds. The sixth and final section of this report identifies incidents of electoral fraud. Using a number of statistical methods—which include analyzing the distribution of results at the polling station level, such as turnouts, votes for each electoral list, and the share of invalid ballots—we test for voter and vote rigging, such as pressure to vote through vote buying, or manipulations in the vote counting process.
I Who are the voters?

In the May 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections, over 120,000 citizens were registered to vote in the electoral district of South 1, which combined Saida and Jezzine. Out of a total of 128 parliamentary seats, five are reserved for South 1: Two Sunni seats in Saida, and two Maronite seats and one Greek Catholic seat in Jezzine.

South 1 has a high level of confessional fragmentation, however, each minor district is homogeneous. In Saida, Sunnis represented over 80% of registered voters, Shias represented 8%, while about 10% of voters were from different Christian groups. In Jezzine, Maronites represented over 60% of registered voters, Greek Catholics represented 13%, while Shias represented 20%.

Figure 1 Registered voters and allocated seats by confessional group in South 1

![Figure 1](image.png)

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Given the confessional allocations of seats, representation is not the same for every voter but rather depends on the confessional group to which they belong. In Jezzine, where two confessional groups are represented by seats, Greek Catholic voters benefit more from the quota than Maronite voters. While the Greek Catholic seat represents slightly less than 8,000 voters, each of the Maronite seats represents almost 19,000 constituents. There are also more Shia than Greek Catholic voters in Jezzine, although they are not represented by a seat in the district.

7 We calculate the number of registered voters by confession using the official election results published by the Ministry of Interior, as well as the ministry's list of registered voters by confession in each polling station. Our approximation of the confessional composition of each district excludes public employees and diaspora voters, whose confessions were not specified.
Table 1  Conferessional composition of South 1 and allocated seats by confessional group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Saida</th>
<th>Jezzine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of voters</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>51,952</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>2,416</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>1,881</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>4,955</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian minorities</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62,548</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employees</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63,377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Registered voters were generally divided into electoral centers depending on their gender and confession. However, nearly 30% of voters were registered in polling stations that had multiple confessional groups registered to vote, representing over 35,000 voters, thus inhibiting a complete analysis of voter behavior by confessional group. Nevertheless, the remaining polling stations were homogeneous, with Sunnis having the largest share (39%), followed by Maronites (18%), Shias (11%), and Greek Catholics (2%).

Figure 2  Conferessional composition of polling stations in South 1
In Saida, a majority of Sunni voters were registered in their own stations (90%), as well as Shias (nearly 70%). Slightly over 12,000 voters were registered in mixed stations, with the largest group being Sunnis (40%), followed by Maronite and Greek Catholics (20% and 15%). In total, nearly half of voters in mixed stations were Christian.

In Jezzine, about 60% of Maronite voters were registered in their own stations, while about one-third of Greek Catholic voters were, thus inhibiting the analysis of their voting behavior. The majority of Sunnis and Shias, who are not represented by a seat in Jezzine, also had their own stations. Among the nearly 24,000 voters in mixed stations, about 65% were Maronite, 25% Greek Catholic, and 10% Shia, with only 3% being from other confessional groups.\(^8\)

II Who voted?

Turnout in South 1 was higher than the national average: 54% compared to 49%. Among the 124,574 registered voters in South 1, 67,346 cast a vote while the remaining 57,228 did not.

There were significant variations in turnout rates across districts—the turnout in Saida was 56%, compared to 52% in Jezzine. Compared to the 2009 elections, turnout in the South 1 districts varied significantly. Similar to many of the Sunni-majority districts, Saida saw a drop in turnout—from 68% in 2009. Jezzine experienced an increase in turnout from 2009, when 48% of voters voted.

Turnout varied across residencies, with the Lebanese diaspora—who were given the opportunity to vote for the first time in 2018—having a higher participation rate. Among the 2,441 Lebanese emigrants who registered to vote in their country of residence, 64% of them decided to vote, compared to 54% of Lebanese registered in the country (figure 3).

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*This is calculated by comparing the total number of registered voters by confession to the number of voters registered in their own stations. On the same basis, it is also possible to calculate the confessional composition of mixed stations.*
The Muslim communities were the most mobilized, while Christian groups were much less so.

Turnout largely varied across confessional groups, with Sunnis being the most mobilized (figure 4).

In Saida, turnout in Sunni polling stations was 59%, while turnout in Shia stations was 54%. In mixed stations, which included all Christian voters in the district, turnout stood at 44%. These variations across confessional groups are statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as the level of confessional fragmentation and economic development.

In Jezzine, turnout among Shias and Sunnis, who are not represented by a seat, was highest (57% and 55%, respectively). By comparison, only 51% of Maronite and 47% of Greek Catholic voters cast ballots. The few Druze voters registered in their own station had a 50% turnout. This lower rate is surprising given that all seats in Jezzine were reserved for Maronites and Greek Catholics. Mixed stations saw half of their voters cast ballots (50%), which may be due their confessional composition—overall, about 85% of voters registered in mixed stations were Maronite and Greek Catholic combined.

Figure 4 Turnout by confessional group in South 1
Turnout slightly varied across genders (figure 5). In Saida, turnout among men was 1.5% higher than that among women: 58% compared to slightly less than 57%. In gender-mixed stations, turnout was lower, at 47%. This lower turnout reflects the turnout in confession-mixed stations: All gender-mixed stations in Saida, but two, were also confessionally mixed.9

In Jezzine, turnout among women was 1.2% higher than it was among men: 51% compared to 50%. In gender-mixed stations, however, turnout was higher, at 54%. This was the case among all confessional groups which had voters registered in both gender-mixed stations and stations reserved for one specific gender. In all gender-mixed stations, turnouts were significantly higher than the average among each confessional group: 55% of Maronite voters and 58% of Greek Catholic voters registered in gender-mixed stations voted, while 53% of voters registered in stations that were both mixed in gender and confession voted.

Figure 5 Turnout by gender in South 1

A higher share of Muslim voters registered in a cadaster was associated with higher turnouts

There were large variations in turnouts across cadasters, in both Saida and Jezzine.

In Saida, where voters were registered in six cadasters, turnouts varied from 52% to 57% in five of them, while one of them saw a 70% turnout. The cadasters with the lowest turnouts were Haret Saida and Saida El-Dekerman (52% each). They were followed by Saida El-Wastani (55%); Miyeh w Miyeh and Saida El-Qadimeh (57% each). The cadaster of Bramiyeh had a much higher turnout (70%).

Geographical variations were driven by intra-sect variations: A higher prevalence of Christians registered in a cadaster was associated with lower turnout rates, while a higher prevalence of Sunnis and/or

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9 In fact, the two Sunni stations that had both genders registered to vote saw much higher turnouts (54%).
Shias was associated with higher turnouts. Haret Saida and Saida El-Dekerman have the highest prevalence of Christians (53% and 27% of registered voters), while in all other cadasters 12% or less were Christian. The association between a higher prevalence of Christians and lower turnout rates can also be seen when examining variations in turnouts across neighborhoods within each cadaster. In the three cadasters where voters were registered in more than one neighborhood, turnouts in those that had a high share of Christians were significantly lower than they were in those that had a higher share of Sunnis and/or Shias. For example, the neighborhood of El-Qanaya (located in Saida El-Dekerman), where over 80% of registered voters were Christian, saw a 41% turnout, while the neighborhood of Dekerman, where 70% of registered voters were Sunni and 10% were Shia, had a 54% turnout. Similarly, in Mar Nicolas, a Christian-majority (over 80%) neighborhood located in Saida El-Qadimeh, turnout stood at 35%, compared to above 58% turnouts observed in each of the other neighborhoods in the cadaster. In Saida El-Wastani, the last cadaster where voters were registered in different neighborhoods, El-Sharea where 30% of voters were Christian saw a 53% turnout, while the two other neighborhoods in the cadaster, where less than 10% of voters were Christian, saw a turnout of 56% each.

In Jezzine, geographical variations in turnout across cadasters were much more apparent—from over 60% to below 40%. However, in contrast to many electoral districts, turnout was never below 30%, and never above 70%. The lowest turnout was in the cadaster of Qtaleh (31%), while five others reported the lowest turnouts: Bkassine, El-Midan, Azour, Kfarhouna, and Machmouche (between 37% and 39% turnouts).

In 13 cadasters, over 60% of voters cast ballots. The cadasters with the highest turnouts were Louayzeh (69% turnout), followed by Aaray and Rimat (66% each). Saidoun, Soujoud, and Taaid followed (between 63% and 64%), while six other cadasters reported turnouts varying from 60% to 62%.

Variations across cadasters do not seem to be explained by their confessional composition. While Maronite voters had high turnouts in some cadasters, they had low ones in others. Turnout among Maronite voters was high in Rimat and Aaray, while it was low in Bkassine, El-Midan, Azour, and Machmouche. Similarly, Greek Catholic voters had high turnouts in some cadasters, but lower ones in others. In the Greek Catholic-majority cadasters of Hassaniye, Haytouleh, and Ain El-Mir, turnouts were high, while in Kfarhouna, turnouts among Greek Catholics were low. The lower turnout among Greek Catholics overall was driven by their low turnouts in Kfarhouna (35% in Greek Catholic stations)—in fact, in all other cadasters, over 52% of Greek Catholics voted. Their lower turnout in Kfarhouna might have been affected.
by the level of confessional homogeneity in the cadaster. While they constituted a high share of registered voters (40%), the cadaster had an equal share of Maronites, as well as a significant share of Shias registered to vote (20%). Even Shias in this cadaster voted much less than they did in others (43%, compared to over 55% in all other cadasters).

However, in line with the higher turnouts among Shias and Sunnis, cadasters with a higher share of these voters saw higher turnouts, with the exception of Kfarhouna. Such cadasters included the fully or nearly fully Shia cadasters of Louayzeh, Soujoud (over 60% turnout in both cadasters), and Aaramta (58%), the fully Sunni cadaster of Benouati (57%), and Jarmaq (59%) and Aaychiyeh (54%)—both of which had a high share of Sunni voters (26% and 13%, respectively).

Beyond this, turnout may be affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster—i.e. whether there is a high predominance of a confessional group, regardless of which, or whether many different groups cohabit in a cadaster. While turnouts tended to increase as the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster increased—with the most homogeneous cadasters seeing 51% turnouts on average and the most heterogeneous ones seeing an average of 44%—this factor was not statistically significant after controlling for voters’ gender, confession, as well as other geographical characteristics.

Figure 6 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in Jezzine
What are the main drivers of turnout in South 1?
A multivariate analysis highlights the impact of different individual and geographical characteristics of constituents on turnout rates. Factors that affected turnout include the individual characteristics of voters, as well as characteristics of the cadasters and polling stations in which they were registered to vote.

In Saida, voters in mixed polling stations were less likely to vote compared to those in homogeneous stations, which may be because all Christian voters in Saida, who are not represented by a seat in the district, were registered in these. Across geographical areas, higher levels of economic development in a cadaster tended to be associated with slightly higher turnout rates, and cadasters with lower poverty rates tended to see significantly higher turnouts compared to those with higher poverty rates.

Controlling for all these factors, Sunnis were more likely to vote than Shias, likely due to the fact that all seats in Saida are reserved for Sunni voters.

In Jezzine, turnout was not significantly affected by the level of sectarian homogeneity, economic development, or poverty rates in a cadaster. Moreover, although variations across confessions were present, these were not statistically significant after controlling for geographical factors.
III Who voted for whom?

Four lists competed in South 1, with a total of 17 candidates. In Saida, there were seven candidates competing for two Sunni seats, and in Jezzine, there were six Maronite candidates competing for two Maronite seats, and four Greek Catholic candidates competing for the Greek Catholic seat.

A highly competitive race led to some changes in representation

The elections in Saida and Jezzine were highly competitive, with three of the four competing lists winning seats.

The competing lists were ‘For All People’, formed by the Popular Nasserist Organization (PNO) and backed by the Amal Movement; ‘Saida and Jezzine Together’, formed by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Jama’a al-Islamiyah; ‘Integration and Dignity’, formed by the Future Movement (FM); and ‘Capacity of Change’, formed by the Lebanese Forces (LF) and Kataeb.

The PNO and Amal list captured the largest share of votes (22,083 votes, 34%) and won two seats—one in each of the minor districts. The winner in Saida was PNO candidate Osama Saad (9,880 votes), and the winner in Jezzine was Maronite Amal-affiliated candidate Ibrahim Azar (11,663 votes). Azar unseated FPM candidate Amal Abou Zeid, whom he ran against in Jezzine’s 2016 by-elections. While in 2016, Azar won 7,759 votes and Abou Zeid won 14,653, in 2018, Azar received over 11,000 votes, compared to his competitor’s 5,016 votes.

The second winning list, comprised of FPM and a candidate from Jama’a al-Islamiyah (Islamic Group), obtained 31% of votes (20,127 votes) and the two remaining seats in Jezzine. The second Maronite
seat was won by FPM candidate Ziad Assouad (7,270 votes), and the Greek Catholic seat by FPM candidate Salim Khoury (708 votes).

Finally, the FM list captured 25% of votes and won the last seat in Saida, which went to Bahia Hariri (13,739 votes).

The LF-Kataeb list was the only one that lost, as it obtained only 10% of votes, falling far below the required threshold for winning a seat in South 1 (20% of votes).

Three of the four lists were more successful in Jezzine than they were in Saida. In Saida, the FM list won nearly half of the vote (45%), making the other lists’ share of votes much lower. The same list won only 4% of votes in Jezzine, where all the candidates running on it were independent. Although the PNO-Amal list won the highest share of votes in South 1 overall, it ranked second in both Saida and Jezzine (winning 30% and 38%). The FPM-Jama’a list won 42% in Jezzine, while it ranked third in Saida (21%). Finally, the LF-Kataeb list’s share of votes was four times higher in Jezzine than it was in Saida: While the list only obtained 4% of votes in Saida, in Jezzine, it won 16%. Members of the two Christian parties, LF and Kataeb, only ran for the Christian seats in Jezzine.

Figure 9: Votes for each list in South 1

The proportional representation system allowed new parties to enter parliament in Saida and Jezzine. Under the previously majoritarian electoral system, the FM occupied all seats in Saida and the FPM all seats in Jezzine. In 2018, the PNO and the candidate backed by Amal made large gains.

However, all the winners were already known figures with previous political experience or connections. Osama Saad is the leader of the PNO and entered parliament in 2002, replacing his deceased brother Mustafa Saad. He was re-elected as an MP in Saida in the 2005 elections. The second winner on his list, Ibrahim Azar, is the son of former MP Samir Azar, who served from 1992 to 2009. Ibrahim Azar also ran in the 2016 Jezzine by-elections but lost to FPM candidate

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13 In order to win a seat in a district, a list has to obtain a higher number of votes than the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats. In the case of South 1, that was equal to over 13,000 votes.
Amal Abou Zeid, who ran again in 2018 but lost. Ziad Assouad was elected in the parliamentary elections of 2009. The final winner, Bahia Hariri, has been representing Saida since 1992—the first parliamentary elections after the Lebanese civil war. She is also the sister of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and the aunt of Saad Hariri, who was caretaker prime minister at the time of the 2018 elections.

The Lebanese diaspora showed higher support for Christian parties Votes for the LF-Kataeb list were 15% higher among diaspora voters, and those for the FPM-Jama’a list were 8% higher. Conversely, votes for the PNO-Amal list were 15% lower among diaspora voters, and those for the FM list were 8% lower. These differences were driven by higher support for the members of the LF, Kataeb, and FPM, rather than independent candidates on their lists.

Figure 10 Votes for each list by residency in South 1

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

How well did candidates perform in each district?
Among parties, only candidates from FM, PNO, and Jama’a al-Islamiyah ran in Saida, while all other candidates were independents. The two candidates from FM, Bahia Hariri and Hassan Chamseddine, won the plurality of preferential votes (45%). Bahia Hariri was the most successful candidate in the district, winning 42% of preferential votes (13,739 votes), while Chamseddine won 3% (1,026 preferential votes). The two candidates from PNO, winner Osama Saad and Abdel Kader Bsat, won 30% of preferential votes, with nearly all of these going to Saad. Saad won 30% of preferential votes (9,880 votes), making him the second-ranking candidate in the district, while Bsat only won 0.1% (36 votes), making him the last-ranking candidate. Finally, the candidate from Jama’a al-Islamiyah, Bassam Hammoud, won 10% of preferential votes in Saida (3,204 votes). The other candidate on Hammoud’s list was independent candidate Abdul Rahman Bizri, who won 11% of preferential votes (3,509 votes, ranking third). Finally, one candidate ran on the LF-Kataeb list in Saida, independent Samir Bizri, who won almost 4% of preferential votes (1,198 votes).
In Jezzine, members of the FPM, LF, and Kataeb, as well as one affiliated with Amal, ran for office. The single candidate affiliated with Amal, winner Ibrahim Azar, won 38% of preferential votes (11,663 votes), ranking first in the district. The other candidate on his list was independent candidate Youssef Skaff (Greek Catholic), who won 0.1% of preferential votes (31 votes, ranking last in Jezzine). The three FPM candidates received 42% of preferential votes combined. Winner Ziad Assouad won 24% (7,270 votes, ranking second in the district), Amal Abou Zeid 16% (5,016 preferential votes, ranking third), and the last candidate, Salim Khoury, despite obtaining a seat, only won 2% of preferential votes (708 votes). On the LF-Kataeb list, each party had one candidate. The LF candidate Ajaj Haddad (Greek Catholic) won 14% of preferential votes (4,394, ranking fourth in Jezzine), while the Kataeb candidate Joseph Nahra (Maronite) won 1.5% (472). Finally, three independent candidates ran on the FM list. Together, they obtained slightly less than 4% of preferential votes. Amine Rizk won 2% (Maronite, 632 votes), Robert Khoury won 1.5% (Greek Catholic, 449 votes), and Angele Khawand won 0.1% (Maronite, 36).
With the proportional representation system, combined with the option to cast a preferential vote, the sectarian allocation of seats, and the introduction of high electoral thresholds, candidates who receive the highest number of preferential votes do not necessarily win. As previously seen, Salim Khoury from FPM won the Greek Catholic seat with only 708 preferential votes, ranking fifth in Jezzine. Had seats been obtained by the most successful candidates representing each sectarian group, regardless of list, LF candidate Ajaj Haddad would have won the Greek Catholic seat instead of Salim Khoury. Haddad lost despite receiving nearly 4,400 votes. With the electoral quotient—i.e. the minimum number of votes a list must receive in order to win a seat—in South 1 set at 20% of votes, Haddad’s list fell short of nearly 7,000 votes to win a seat—a number even higher than the votes his list obtained.

Small voting variations across genders
Preferences for lists did not significantly vary across genders. The largest voting variations between men and women were noticeable among those who voted for the FM and FPM lists. Compared to men, women voted more for the FM list (28% compared to 26%), while they voted less for the FPM list (29% compared to 30%), and only slightly less for the two other lists (less than 1% difference).

Voters in gender-mixed stations voted differently: On average, they voted less for the PNO and FM lists, and more for the FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb lists. However, there were variations across each of the minor districts.

Figure 13  Votes for each list by gender in South 1

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Saida, women voters cast more ballots for Bahia Hariri than male voters (44% compared to 40%) and voted slightly less for Osama Saad and Bassam Hammoud (1% to 2% less than men). The few voters who cast ballots in gender-mixed stations—the majority of which were also
confessionally mixed, and therefore had a higher share of Christian voters—on average voted much more for Osama Saad (about 6% more compared to voters in gender-specific stations) as well as Samir Bizri (3% more), while they voted less for Bahia Hariri and Bassam Hammoud (4% and 2% less, respectively).

In Jezzine, the only significant difference between male and female voters was observed in votes cast for Ibrahim Azar, who was more successful among women (1.4% higher), which resulted in a lower share of votes for Ajaj Hadad (1.4% lower). Similar to Saida, voters in gender-mixed stations voted differently. Compared to voters in gender-specific stations, those in mixed ones voted more for Ajaj Haddad, Amal Abou Zeid, Salim Khoury (between 8% and 5% more), and Robert Khoury (3% more), and much less for Ibrahim Azar (20% less). They tended to vote more for members of the Christian political parties—likely explained by the fact that none of the gender-mixed stations in Jezzine had Shia or Sunni voters registered to vote.

**There were large variations across confessional groups**

A near majority of Sunni voters cast ballots for the FM list, a majority of Christian voters opted for the FPM-Jama’a list, and nearly all Shia voters cast ballots for the PNO-Amal list—highlighting the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics.

In Saida, nearly half of Sunni voters opted for the FM list (49%). The remainder of their vote was divided between the PNO and FPM-Jama’a lists, although the former was more successful (26% and 21% of their vote, respectively). The LF-Kataeb list received a small percentage of the Sunni vote (3%). Shias gave an overwhelming majority of their votes to the PNO list (79%)—therefore voting for the Amal and Hezbollah allies. They gave the second-highest share to the FM list (12%), followed by FPM-Jama’a (7%). Similar to Sunnis, barely any Shia voters voted for LF-Kataeb (2%). Voters in confession-mixed stations voted differently from Sunnis and Shias. Their vote was highly fragmented between the PNO-Amal and FM lists (36% each), and similar to others, the FPM-Jama’a list followed (21%). However, the LF-Kataeb list received much higher support from voters in confessionally mixed stations (7% of their votes), likely explained by the higher share of Christians in these stations.
The preferential votes among Sunnis and those who voted in mixed stations were more fragmented than those among Shias. Although a near majority of Sunni voters cast their preferential vote for Bahia Hariri (45%), a high proportion voted for Osama Saad (26%), and a significant share gave their preferential votes to each candidate in the FPM-Jama’a list (11% each). Shias mostly voted for PNO-Amal and all preferential votes they cast for the list went to Osama Saad (79% of their preferential votes in total). Abdel Kader Bsat, the second PNO candidate, received 0 votes from Shia voters. The second-most preferred candidate among Shia voters was Bahia Hariri (11%), while no other candidate obtained over 4% of their preferential votes. In mixed stations, which were largely composed of Christian voters, votes were divided between Osama Saad (37%) and Bahia Hariri (35%). Those who voted for FPM-Jama’a tended to prefer Abdul Rahman Bizri, who received almost twice as much of their votes as Bassam Hammoud (13% compared to 7%). Samir Bizri (LF-Kataeb list) won 7% of the vote in mixed stations, with less than 3% of Sunnis and Shias voting for him (each).
Given the unequal number of registered voters by confessional group, examining the percentage of votes received by each candidate from each type of polling station can show which candidate was able to mobilize each confessional group. While all candidates received the majority of their votes from Sunni voters, variations can be observed in support they obtained from other groups. The candidate who had the most diverse group of supporters was Osama Saad—the only one who obtained a significant share of his votes from Shia voters (13%). Other candidates who received a significant amount of their votes from mixed stations, and therefore relied on Christian voters, were primarily the independent candidates on the LF-Kataeb and FPM-Jama’a lists—in other words, those running on lists affiliated with Christian parties. Candidates affiliated with Sunni parties, FM and Jama’a al-Islamiyah, received a lower share of their votes from mixed stations compared to other candidates.

Table 2  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>List</th>
<th>Voters’ sect</th>
<th>Mixed confession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|           |      |              | Sunni | Shia | (
| Popular Nasserist Organization and Amal | Independent | Osama Saad | 68% | 13% | 18%
| Popular Nasserist Organization | | Abdel Kader Bs | 85% | 0% | 15%
| Free Patriotic Movement and Jama’a al-Islamiyah | Independent | Abdul Rahman Bizri | 80% | 2% | 18%
| Jama’a al-Islamiyah | Bassam Hammoud | 89% | 1% | 10%
| Future Movement | Future Movement | Bahia Hariri | 86% | 1% | 12%
| Future Movement | Hassan Chamseddine | 89% | 2% | 9%
| Lebanese Forces and Kataeb | Independent | Samir Bizri | 69% | 3% | 28%

Note  Percentages have been rounded up.

In Jezzine, the FPM-Jama’a list was the preferred one among Maronite and Greek Catholic voters, receiving the majority of their votes (55% and 50%, respectively). Among Maronites, the PNO-Amal list ranked second (25%), followed by LF-Kataeb (16%). Among Greek Catholics, the LF-Kataeb list (27%) was more successful than the PNO-Amal one (16%). Voters in mixed stations voted similarly to those in Christian stations, with the FPM-Jama’a list being the most popular (48%), followed by PNO-Amal (28%), and LF-Kataeb (21%). Similar to those in Saida, Shia voters registered in their own stations
In Jezzine, the Maronites gave almost all of their votes to the PNO-Amal list (94%). The remainder of their vote went to the FPM-Jama’a list (5%). Shias, therefore, voted for the Hezbollah-Amal Christian allies, rather than their main opponents (LF, Kataeb, and FM). Regarding the few Sunnis registered in their own stations, the highest share voted for PNO-Amal (42%). However, they were the only ones to give a significant share of their votes to the FM list (35%)—thus showing allegiance to the main Sunni party. Most of the remainder of their votes went to the FPM-Jama’a list (19%), with LF-Kataeb receiving a low share (4%). The few Druze voters in their own station gave the majority of their vote to the PNO-Amal list (67%), with most remaining votes being cast for the FPM-Jama’a list (26%).

**Figure 16 Votes for each list by confessional group in Jezzine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confessional Group</th>
<th>PNO-Amal</th>
<th>FPM-Jama’a</th>
<th>FM</th>
<th>LF-Kataeb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note** Percentages have been rounded up.

Similar to Saida, all confessional groups in Jezzine, except Shias, had a highly fragmented vote. Most Shia voters gave their preferential vote to Amal-affiliated candidate Ibrahim Azar (94%), and the remainder of their votes went primarily to FPM candidate Amal Abou Zeid (5%). Among Maronite voters, FPM candidate Ziad Assouad ranked first (34%), followed by Ibrahim Azar (25%). A significant share of Maronites also gave their preferential vote to Amal Abou Zeid and Ajaj Haddad (LF) (19% and 15%, respectively).

Greek Catholic voters gave one quarter of their votes to each of Ajaj Haddad (26%) and Ziad Assouad (25%). Ibrahim Azar followed, with 16%, while Amal Abou Zeid and Salim Khoury received 13% and 12%, respectively. Among Sunni voters, most preferential votes went to Ibrahim Azar (42%), followed by Amine Rizk (FM list, 25%), who was only able to capture a significant share of votes among Sunnis. The remainder of the Sunni vote went primarily to Amal Abou Zeid (15%).
and Robert Khoury (8%). The few Druze voters gave a majority of their preferential votes to Ibrahim Azar (67%), with the remainder going to Amal Abou Zeid (26%).

Finally, in mixed stations, the vote was highly fragmented, with Ibrahim Azar ranking first (28%), and Ziad Assouad, Amal Abou Zeid, and Ajaj Haddad each receiving between 25% and 19% of votes.

By candidate, Ajaj Haddad (LF, Greek Catholic) was only able to win a significant share of preferential votes among Maronite and Greek Catholic voters, as well as those in mixed stations, where the majority of registered voters were from these two confessional groups. He was more successful among Greek Catholics—his co-confessional voters. Ziad Assouad (FPM, Maronite), was also only successful among Christian voters, ranking first among Maronite voters and second among Greek Catholics as well as voters in mixed stations. On the same list, Salim Khoury (Greek Catholic) received a high share of his confessional group’s vote, but won less than 2% among other groups. Amine Rizk (FM list, Maronite) captured 25% among Sunni voters and did not obtain over 3% of any other group’s votes in the district. Similarly, on the same list, Robert Khoury (Greek Catholic) was successful among Sunnis (8%) and Greek Catholics (7%). This was also the case regarding the last candidate on the FM list, Angele Khawand (1% of the Sunni vote, compared to less than 0.2% among other groups).

By contrast, Ibrahim Azar and Amal Abou Zeid were successful among all confessional groups, although there were large variations in their performance among each. Ibrahim Azar won 94% of the Shia vote, but only 16% of the Greek Catholic vote, while Amal Abou Zeid’s success was similar among all groups, although higher among Maronites (19%) and lower among Greek Catholics (13%).

![Figure 17 Votes for each candidate by confessional group in Jezzine](image)

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
Examining the share of votes obtained by each candidate from each type of polling station shows that only candidates on the PNO-Amal list received a significant share of their votes from Shia voters, and only candidates on the FM list received a significant share of their votes from Sunni voters—reflecting the sectarian character of each party. Moreover, Greek Catholic candidates across all lists received a high share of their votes from Greek Catholic voters—with the exception of Youssef Skaff, who did not receive any votes from Greek Catholics, and only received a total of 30 votes among resident. Given the higher number of voters in Maronite and mixed stations, most Maronite and Greek Catholic candidates tended to receive the majority of their votes from voters in these stations.

Table 3 Share of votes received by each candidate from each type of polling station in Jezzine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Voters' sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>List</strong></td>
<td><strong>Individual affiliation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Nasserist Organization and Amal</td>
<td>Affiliated with Amal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement and Jama’a al-Islamiyah</td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free Patriotic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Movement</td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese Forces and Kataeb</td>
<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kataeb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

Support for political parties significantly varied across cadasters. Results for each list significantly varied across cadasters in Saida. While the FM list obtained between 44% and 52% of votes in the majority of them, it received 62% in Bramiyeh and only 26% in Miyeh w Miyeh. Conversely, votes for the PNO-Amal list were lowest in Bramiyeh (21%) and highest in Miyeh w Miyeh (57%)—while
they varied between 23% and 32% in all other cadasters. This is in line with the variations in preferences for lists across confessional groups: Cadasters with a significant share of Shia registered voters saw a lower percentage of votes go to the FM list and a much higher one go to the PNO-Amal list. Indeed, in Miyeh w Miyeh, Sunnis and Shias represented a similar share of registered voters (46% each), while Bramiyeh was the cadaster with the lowest share of Shia voters (less than 1%, with 87% being Sunni). The PNO-Amal list received its second-highest percentage of votes in Saida El-Dekerman (32%), where 10% of registered voters were Shia—while in all other cadasters, less than 5% were.

The FPM-Jama’a list did not manage to win more votes than the FM and PNO-Amal lists in any cadaster. It received its highest percentage of votes in Saida El-Wastani (23%) and its lowest in Miyeh w Miyeh (13%), while in all other cadasters its share varied between 15% and 22%. Finally, the LF-Kataeb list did not obtain above 5% in any cadaster—it was lowest in Miyeh w Miyeh (13%), while in all other cadasters, less than 5% were.

In Jezzine, the FPM-Jama’a list, which ranked first, obtained 84% of votes in the cadaster of El-Maknouniye. The list was also successful in Chawalik Jezzine, Karkha, Aaychiyeh, Qatine, Bouslaya, Kaitouly, Kfar Jarra, Bteddine El-Loqch, and Harf Jezzine (over 60% in each). All of these were fully, or nearly fully, Christian. All were Maronite, with the exception of two: Kaitouly, which had a high share of Greek Catholic voters, and Karkha, which was fully Greek Catholic.

The FPM-Jama’a list failed to win over 5% of votes in Rihan, Louayzeh, Soujoud, and Aaramta. All of these cadasters were nearly, if not fully, Shia. These four cadasters were among those that showed the highest support for the PNO-Amal list, with none of the two other lists (FM and LF-Kataeb) winning over 1% of votes. PNO-Amal won over 90% of votes in Soujoud (99%), Louayzeh, Rihan, and Aaramta, driven by the higher share of Shia voters in these cadasters. The list also won the majority of votes in Kfarhouna (62%), while in other cadasters, less than half of voters voted for it. Although Kfarhouna had a significant share of Greek Catholic voters, the list’s success was driven by the votes it received from Shias in the cadaster (97%, while Greek Catholics gave 56% to the FPM-Jama’a list).

The PNO-Amal list was least successful in the cadasters where FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb managed to win their highest share of votes. It received its lowest level of support in El-Maknouniye and Karkha (less than 5%), where voters opted mostly for the FPM-Jama’a list. It also received less than 10% in Kaitouly, Qatine (where the FPM was also most successful), Bayssouf Jezzine, Sfaray, El-Midan (where the LF was most successful), Haitoura, and El-Mharbiyeh (where, in contrast to other cadasters, the FM list received its highest level of support).
The LF-Kataeb list only won the majority of votes in Wadi Baankoudine (55%), the only cadaster where it obtained a significantly higher share of votes than FPM-Jama’a (29%). LF-Kataeb was only able to win over 30% of votes in six other cadasters: El-Midan, Bayssour Jezzine, Sfaray, Taaid (between 35% and 45%), Bhanine, and Lebaa (33% each). All of these were fully Christian, most often Maronite.

Finally, the FM list, which was highly unsuccessful across the district, won over 30% of votes only in Benouati (34%)—the only cadaster with Sunni polling stations—and El-Mharbiyeh (31%). In all other cadasters, the list obtained less than 15% of votes—and won less than 1% in nine cadasters.

What are the drivers of votes for each list?
A multivariate analysis highlights some of the geographical and individual characteristics that might have impacted votes for each list.

In Saida, voters in larger polling stations were less likely to vote for the FM and FPM-Jama’a lists, while they were more likely to vote for the PNO-Amal and LF-Kataeb lists. Across cadasters, voters in more homogeneous cadasters were more likely to vote for the FPM-Jama’a list while they were less likely to vote for the PNO-Amal one. Voters in more economically developed cadasters tended to vote more for FM and less for the FPM-Jama’a list, with the latter also generally performing better in cadasters with higher poverty rates. Finally, cadasters with a higher concentration of refugees tended to see a larger share of votes for FM and a lower one for FPM-Jama’a. Across polling stations, voters in polling stations that had more than one confession registered to vote were less likely to vote for FM, while they were more likely to vote for any of the other lists, compared to voters in single-sect polling stations. Regarding each confessional group, Sunnis were more likely to vote for the FM, FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb lists compared to Shias, while they were less likely to vote for the PNO-Amal list.

Overall, the PNO-Amal list received better results in larger polling stations and those with more than one sect registered to vote. Voters in more heterogeneous cadasters also tended to vote more for the list. By sect, Shias were more likely to vote for PNO-Amal compared to Sunnis.

FPM-Jama’a tended to receive better results in smaller polling stations and in those that had more than one confession registered to vote. Across cadasters, the list performed better in cadasters with higher levels of sectarian homogeneity, those with lower levels of economic development, and those with higher poverty rates. The list was also generally more successful in areas with a lower concentration
of refugees. By sect, Shias were less likely to vote for the list compared to Sunnis.

The FM list tended to obtain better results in smaller polling stations and homogeneous ones. Among these, even after controlling for geographical factors, Sunnis were the most likely to vote for this list.

Finally, the LF-Kataeb list tended to obtain better results in mixed polling stations and among Sunnis, while no geographical-level factor seems to have affected its results.

Figure 18 Drivers of votes for each list in Saida

a Drivers of votes for the PNO-Amal list in Saida

b Drivers of votes for the FPM-Jama’a list in Saida
In Jezzine, most geographical factors had no effects on the results. The exception was poverty rates, with higher poverty rates in a cadaster being associated with a higher share of votes for the PNO-Amal list, and a lower share for the FPM-Jama’a and FM lists. Across polling stations, voters in mixed polling stations were more likely to vote for FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb, while they were less likely to vote for the PNO-Amal and FM lists—which could be due to the higher share of Christian voters in these stations. By confession, Maronites and Greek Catholics were the most likely to vote for the FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb lists, while Shias were the most likely to vote for the PNO-Amal list and Sunnis the most likely to vote for the FM list.
By list, the PNO-Amal list generally received better results in homogeneous stations, and among these, after controlling for geographical factors, Shias, followed by Sunnis, were the most likely to vote for them while Greek Catholics were the least likely to do so.

The FPM-Jama’a list tended to perform better in polling stations that had more than one confession registered to vote. Lower poverty rates in a municipal area were associated with a higher share of votes for the list. Across confessional groups, Maronites, closely followed by Greek Catholic voters, were more likely to vote for the FPM-Jama’a list compared to Sunni and Shia voters.

Regarding the FM list, it tended to perform better in cadasters with lower poverty rates. Voters in homogeneous stations were more likely to vote for the list, and among these, Sunnis were more likely to vote for the list compared to other sects, while Shias were the least likely to do so.

Only the confessional composition of polling stations affected votes for the LF-Kataeb list. Voters in mixed polling stations were more likely to vote for the LF-Kataeb list, and by confession, Greek Catholics, followed by Maronites, were the most likely to vote for the list while Shias were the least likely to do so.

Figure 19 Drivers of votes for each list in Jezzine

a Drivers of votes for the PNO-Amal list in Jezzine
b  Drivers of votes for the FPM-Jama’a list in Jezzine

C  Drivers of votes for the FM list in Jezzine
IV Do citizens cast preferential votes for candidates from their own confession?

In South 1, only voters in Jezzine could choose between a candidate from their own or another confession. In Jezzine, 99% of voters represented by a seat cast a preferential vote for one candidate within their selected list. Among those who cast a preferential vote, 79% chose a co-confessional candidate.

Maronite voters were much more likely to cast a sectarian vote. Preferences for co-confessional candidates varied by confessional groups and genders. The sectarian bias was highest among Maronite voters, as 83% of Maronites voted for a co-confessional candidate, and only 44% of Greek Catholic voters did so. These variations are statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of confessional homogeneity and economic development.

Across genders, Maronite women had a higher confessional bias (86%) compared to Maronite men registered in their own polling stations (84%). Greek Catholic women were less sectarian than their male counterparts as 34% of them voted for a Greek Catholic candidate, compared to 36% of Greek Catholic men. Surprisingly, the share of votes cast for co-confessional candidates in gender-mixed stations was different: 67% of Greek Catholic voters and 77% of Maronite voters registered in gender-mixed stations voted for a co-confessional candidate.
Sectarian biases varied geographically and were stronger in more homogeneous cadasters

Similar to other districts, there were large variations in the percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates across cadasters, with some seeing over 80% of votes go to co-confessional candidates, and others seeing less than 50%. The strongest confessional biases were observed in the cadasters of Harf Jezzine, followed by Jernaya (91% each). In both, nearly all registered voters were Maronite.

Other cadasters that had a high percentage of co-confessional votes included the cadaster of Jezzine (88%), Chawalik Jezzine, Bteddine El-Loqch, and El-Mharbiyeh (between 81 and 80%). In the three former cadasters, Maronite voters comprised the vast majority of registered voters (over 90% if not 100%). All registered voters in El-Mharbiyeh were Greek Catholic. This was the cadaster where Greek Catholics showed their highest confessional bias.

The cadaster where voters showed their weakest confessional bias was Kfarhouna (21%), in which among the represented groups, only Greek Catholics had their own polling stations. In Kfarhouna, Ibrahim Azar (Maronite) won the vast majority of votes (63%)—but in Greek Catholic stations, Ziad Assouad (Maronite) was more popular. This cadaster also had mixed stations—nearly fully Maronite—where Ibrahim Azar obtained the highest share of votes.
The only other cadaster where less than the majority of voters voted for a co-confessional candidate was Roum (45%). This is again explained by the fact that only Greek Catholic voters had their own polling stations in this cadaster, while all Maronites were registered in mixed stations. Other cadasters that recorded a low percentage of co-confessional votes were Taaid and Hassaniye (58%). Taaid, which is fully Maronite, is where voters from this group had their lowest confessional bias. Hassaniye, on the other hand, is fully Greek Catholic.

The percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates was largely affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster. Voters in more homogeneous cadasters were significantly more likely to vote for a co-confessional candidate. This relationship is statistically significant after controlling for voters’ gender, confession, and some other characteristics of the cadasters such as level of economic development and poverty rates. Both Kfarhouna and Roum, where only Greek Catholics had their own polling stations, were the two cadasters with the lowest percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates, as well as two of the most heterogeneous cadasters. Greek Catholics in the homogeneous cadasters of El-Mharbiyeh and Hassaniye voted more for Greek Catholic candidates, showing that this group in more homogeneous cadasters tended to have a higher confessional bias than they did in more heterogeneous cadasters.

All of the cadasters where voters showed their highest confessional biases were fully homogeneous, with the exception of the cadaster of Jezzine, which was nearly so (90% of registered voters were Maronite). Among the fully homogeneous cadasters, only Taaid showed a low preference for co-confessional candidates.

Figure 21 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and percentage of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Jezzine
Overall, in Jezzine, Maronite voters were more likely to cast a sectarian vote compared to Greek Catholic voters, and the percentage of votes given to co-sectarian candidates tended to increase as the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster increased. Across polling stations, voters in larger stations tended to vote along sectarian lines slightly more. No other geographical factor significantly affected voters’ preferences for candidates of their own confession.

Figure 22 Drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Jezzine

V How did women candidates perform?

Two women, out of the 17 candidates, ran in South 1. In Saida, the only woman candidate, Bahia Hariri (FM), ranked first with 42% of preferential votes (13,739 votes), winning a seat. The woman candidate in Jezzine, Angele Khawand (independent on FM list) won 0.1% of preferential votes (36 votes), ranking second-to-last.

Similar to the majority of women MPs, the success of Bahia Hariri is due to her previous political experience and her political connections. Hariri has represented Saida in parliament since 1992, and is the sister of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and aunt of caretaker prime minister at the time of the elections, Saad Hariri. Bahia Hariri was also one of the most successful candidates across the country.

Highly unequal performance of each woman candidate, but both were more popular among women voters

Bahia Hariri was the most successful candidate in Saida. Her main constituents were Sunni voters, with 45% of them giving her their preferential vote (11,655 votes), and also received 11% of Shia voters’ votes (179 votes)—or nearly all of those who did not vote for Osama
Saad (79%). In mixed polling stations, which included all Christian voters, 35% cast a preferential vote for Hariri (1,664 votes), making her slightly less successful than Saad in those stations (37%). All these variations are statistically significant: After controlling for voters’ gender, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, Sunnis were the most likely to vote for Hariri, while Shias were the least likely to do so, and voters in mixed stations stood in between.

Hariri received a higher share of preferential votes among women voters (6,671 votes, 44%) than she did among men (5,326 votes, 40%). In stations that had both men and women registered to vote, she obtained 39% of preferential votes (1,501 votes). These variations across genders were statistically significant when controlling for voters’ confession as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered. Overall, nearly half of the votes Hariri received were cast by women voters, while about 40% were cast in male stations, and 10% were cast in gender-mixed stations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>11,655</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>35%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
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<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>5,326</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6,671</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed gender</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Angele Khawand was largely unsuccessful in Jezzine. In fact, she received 0 votes in over 100 polling stations among residents, and her highest number of votes in any polling station was seven votes.

While Khawand won the highest share of preferential votes among voters registered in Sunni stations (1% of their preferential vote, representing only five votes), her highest share of votes came from voters in Maronite stations (0.2% of their votes, representing 20 votes). In confessionally mixed stations, she won 0.1% (eight votes), while no Greek Catholic or Shia voters voted for her. Khawand performed better among women voters, winning twice as many votes in women-only stations, as 0.2% of women voters voted for her (18 voters), compared to 0.1% of men (eight voters). She also won 0.1% in gender-mixed stations (seven votes).
Table 5 Number and percentage of votes for Angele Khawand by confessional group and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
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<td>0%</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed gender</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are the drivers of votes for women candidates?
Certain characteristics of the polling stations and cadasters in which voters were registered affected votes for Bahia Hariri. However, her success in the elections could be attributed to the fact that she is a member of one of the most prominent Lebanese political families. Results from the multivariate regression show that, as mentioned above, women were more likely to vote for Hariri compared to men voters, while across confessional groups, Sunni voters were the most likely to vote for her. Beyond voters’ characteristics, those registered in smaller polling stations tended to vote more for Hariri—just as they tended to vote more for her list in Saida. Across cadasters, higher levels of economic development in a cadaster were associated with a higher share of votes for Hariri, who also tended to perform better in cadasters with lower poverty rates.

Regarding Angele Khawand in Jezzine, as mentioned above, women voters, as well as Sunnis, were the most likely to vote for her. Similar to Hariri, Khawand tended to receive better results in smaller polling stations, and in cadasters with higher poverty rates.
Figure 23 Drivers of votes for women candidates in South 1

a Drivers of votes for Bahia Hariri in Saida

b Drivers of votes for Angele Khawand in Jezzine
VI Were there any signs of irregularities?

Irregularities can occur during the election process, through ballot stuffing that either increases the total number of votes or adds votes for one party at the expense of another. Fraud can also occur during the vote aggregation process when there is collusion between certain candidates—usually the more politically connected ones—and election officials. Voter rigging, or pressuring voters to cast ballots in a certain manner, tends to occur more often in small polling stations, where it is easier to monitor voters’ behavior. Therefore, testing whether turnout was abnormally high in smaller voting centers can help approximate whether there were incidents of voter rigging. Another method for detecting signals of election fraud is observing the distribution of turnout and vote numbers and testing whether they have a ‘normal’ shape. For example, an abnormally high number of voting centers with nearly 100% turnouts could suggest either voter or vote rigging at various stages of the election process. Another line of research focuses on statistical tests that examine the random nature of numbers to test whether numbers were manipulated in a non-random manner.

No major irregular patterns were found in turnouts

Turnout rates usually have a normal shape, with the majority of electoral centers having turnouts close to the average and a small number of centers having a very high or very low turnout rate. Turnouts by polling station in South 1 only slightly diverged from the normal distribution. Although there were deviations, the number of centers that had significantly high turnouts (above 80%) and significantly low ones (below 20%) was very small, thus providing no strong evidence of irregularities.

Figure 24 Distribution of turnout rates by polling station in South 1
Some evidence of voter rigging in Jezzine

Voter rigging entails political parties pressuring or coercing voters with the intended aim of affecting turnout. The literature on election irregularities distinguishes vote rigging from voter rigging, as coercion is not apparent in the latter case. However, there are some ways to detect potential instances of voter rigging through statistical tests.

One way to test for voter rigging is by examining the correlation between turnouts and the size of a polling station. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive among politicians buying votes or exerting some kind of pressure on voters because smaller groups of voters facilitate the aggregate monitoring of whether voters cast their ballots, and for whom.15

In South 1, there appears to be a small correlation between turnouts and the size of the polling stations. On average, turnouts tended to decrease from over 60% in the smallest polling stations to less than 50% in the largest ones. This provides some initial evidence of voter rigging. Across minor districts, the relationship was present in Jezzine but not in Saida. In the latter, turnouts did not significantly vary across polling station size. However, in Jezzine, turnout decreased from an average of 60% in the smallest polling stations to 50% in the largest ones.

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Comparing the relationship between turnouts in small polling stations—or those whose size was one standard deviation below the mean—to turnouts in stations whose sizes were closer or larger than the mean polling station size confirms that smaller polling stations in Jezzine had higher turnouts. The average turnout rate in small polling stations in Jezzine was 7% higher than that in non-small stations (58% compared to 51%).
It is also possible to determine whether a party or list performed better in smaller polling stations, regardless of turnout.

On average, there seems to be a negative correlation between the votes for each of the FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb lists and the size of the polling stations, while there were no such relationships in the votes for the PNO-Amal and FM lists. Given that the types—in terms of confession—and sizes of the polling stations varied across minor districts, looking at these relationships in each of the minor districts shows that only the FPM-Jama’a list benefited from smaller stations in Jezzine, with its votes, on average, decreasing from 60% in the smallest stations to below 40% in the largest ones (figure 28). This provides some evidence of voter rigging that benefited FPM candidates in Jezzine.
No list benefited from significantly high turnouts in Jezzine, while they only slightly benefited the FM list in Saida.

Apart from the votes received by each list across polling station size, another method of testing for voter rigging is examining the relationship between turnout by polling station and votes for a list.

Normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters to cast ballots, votes for each party should be more or less similar in very low, normal, and very high turnout centers. In order to take into consideration differences across sects and votes for a list, we created standardized variables of turnout rates and percentage of votes for each list. For any polling station, the standardized turnout rate would be the turnout rate in the specific polling station minus the average turnout rate of all polling stations in its district with registered voters from the same sect, all divided by the variability (standard deviation) of the turnout rates in those centers. This measures how abnormally low or high the turnout in a polling station is compared to all other centers within the same sect. The standardized measures of share of votes for lists and parties follow the same procedure. As previous studies have found, no clear relation should be observed between turnouts and votes for a party in ‘clean’ elections.

Taking into account the differences in votes for each list and turnouts among each confessional group, we observe significant variations in the percentage of votes obtained by each list between polling stations that had abnormally low (1 standard deviation below the mean

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17 Ibid.
South 1 Electoral District: Saida and Jezzine

No list benefited from very high or very low turnouts in Jezzine. However, in Saida, results varied slightly, although the differences were not large. The FM list performed slightly better in polling stations that had very high turnouts, while on average, the FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb lists performed better in those that had very low turnouts (figure 29). Compared to its share of votes in polling stations that had normal turnouts (44%), the FM list’s share of votes in very high turnout stations was 5% higher (49%). PNO-Amal performed slightly worse in polling stations that had very high turnouts, with its share of votes being 6% lower (25% compared to 31%). Both the FM and PNO-Amal lists also performed slightly worse in polling stations that had very low turnouts, with each of their share of votes being 5% lower than they were in normal-turnout stations (39% for the FM list and 26% for the PNO-Amal one). FPM-Jama’a and LF-Kataeb received better results in polling stations that had very low turnouts. Compared to the average share of votes it obtained in normal turnout stations (20%), the FPM-Jama’a list’s share was 5% higher in very low turnout stations (25%), while the LF-Kataeb list’s share was 4% higher (8% compared to 4% in normal turnout stations).

These variations could suggest potential pressure to vote for FM candidates, which resulted in a lower share of votes for PNO in very high turnout stations. However, given that the variations were not significantly large, it could also simply be explained through FM’s stronger mobilization of voters, and not necessarily through vote buying. The better performance of the Christian party-led lists in very low turnout stations highlights their weakness in mobilizing voters in Saida.
So far there is no strong evidence of fraud pointing toward one specific party, given that different results are observed in each district and for two different parties (FM and FPM). While the FPM tended to perform better in smaller polling stations in Jezzine, it did not benefit from very high turnouts, thus providing no strong evidence of voter rigging. The FM did not benefit from small polling stations, but saw slightly better results in very high turnout stations in Saida, which suggests better mobilization of voters, but does not necessarily suggest vote buying as stronger evidence of vote buying would be to see a significant variation.

A list benefiting from higher turnouts could also be due to vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing, as adding ballots for a party would increase both turnouts and votes for this party in a polling station.

There is stronger evidence of vote rigging in Jezzine, particularly on the part of FPM

One method of testing for signs of ballot stuffing is to see how the percentage of null votes in a polling station correlates with the turnout, as well as the percentage of votes that a party obtained in that polling station. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar proportion of invalid votes. Potential irregular behaviors can be identified by looking at the correlation between the percentage of null votes, turnouts, and votes for a list or party. A lower percentage of invalid votes in a polling station, associated with a higher turnout and a higher percentage of votes for a list or party would suggest manipulations in the vote count. However, a negative correlation is not enough to suggest ballot stuffing—as null votes could be ‘protest’ ones. Stronger evidence of ballot stuffing would entail an increase in the share of null votes that is smaller than the decrease in the percentage of votes for a list or party. While we observed a slight
negative correlation between turnouts and the share of null votes, the differences were not significant. In fact, a 10% increase in null votes was associated with only a 5% decrease in turnouts.

It can be determined whether one list or party received a significantly higher share of votes in polling stations that had a very low share of null votes. Across lists, the share of votes received by FPM-Jama’a generally decreased as the share of null votes in a polling station increased, while the opposite was observed in votes for the FM list, and no trend existed regarding the results for PNO-Amal and LF-Kataeb.

Focusing on each of the minor districts shows signs of irregularities in Jezzine but not Saida, suggesting potential ballot stuffing in the former district. In fact, in Jezzine, the average share of votes obtained by the FPM-Jama’a list in polling stations where 5% of votes or less were null was 40%, while that share decreased until reaching nearly 20% in polling stations where 10% of votes were null (figure 31.a). In other words, a 10% increase in the share of null votes was associated with a 20% decrease in the share of votes for the list—a significant difference. The relationship went in the opposite direction in votes for the FM list, and at the same rate. While in polling stations where less than 5% of votes were null the FM list obtained an average of 5% of votes, that rate increased until reaching over 25% in polling stations where 10% of votes were null (figure 31.b). This provides some potential evidence of ballot stuffing on the part of the FPM-Jama’a in Jezzine, and suggests that any potential irregular behavior was done at the expense of FM.
Another form of vote rigging would entail parties ‘cooking’ the numbers, i.e. parties manipulating the vote count either by adding or subtracting votes for a list, or ‘re-shuffling’ votes within their list from one candidate to another. One way of detecting manipulations
in the vote counting process is by examining the distribution of the last digits in votes for a party. The last-digits test is based on the hypothesis that humans tend to be poor at making up numbers which would result in an abnormal distribution of numbers at the aggregate level. In ‘clean’ elections, the last digits in the number of votes for a party should be uniformly distributed, with an equal chance of every number (from 0 to 9) to appear (10% chance).

The distribution in the last digits in the number of valid votes, as well as votes for each list in a polling station (restricting the sample to stations where each list obtained at least 50 votes to avoid an overcounting of ones or zeros), shows no signs of ballot stuffing in Saida. However, in Jezzine, the last digits in the number of votes for the FPM-Jama’a list and PNO-Amal slightly deviated from the uniform line. This was particularly the case for the former. There was a lower number of votes for FPM-Jama’a ending in one and a higher number of votes ending in six than expected; while there was a lower number of votes for the PNO-Amal list ending in zero and seven, and a slightly higher number of votes ending in three and five than expected (figure 32).

Figure 32 Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for the FPM-Jama’a and PNO-Amal lists compared to a uniform distribution in Jezzine

a Distribution of last digits in the number of votes for FPM-Jama’a

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20 P-value of 0.08 and 0.09, respectively.
Overall, in South 1, there are some signs of irregularities in Jezzine. There are some signs of irregularities in Jezzine but not in Saida. First, turnout by polling station tended to decrease as the size of the polling station increased. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive for politicians buying votes as the smaller number of registered voters facilitates aggregate monitoring of their behavior. When looking at the performance of each list, the FPM-Jama’a one tended to perform slightly better in smaller stations, which could point toward voter rigging. This relationship did not exist in Saida, and there was also no such relationship in votes for any other list in each of the minor districts.

Beyond the size of the polling station, normally, votes for a list or party should not significantly vary between polling stations that had very low, normal, or very high turnouts. A list benefiting from higher turnouts could point toward pressure to vote, although it could be due to more effective mobilization of voters. In Jezzine, no list benefited from very high or low turnouts, while in Saida, the FM list received slightly better results in very high turnout stations. However, the variations were not large enough to suggest voter rigging, meaning that the FM receiving better results in polling stations that had very high turnouts was more likely due to effective mobilization of and support from voters.

A party or list benefiting from very high turnouts could also point toward ballot stuffing. One way to test for signs of ballot stuffing is to look at the correlation between the percentage of null votes and votes for a party or list in a polling station. Seeing a significant decrease in votes for a party associated with an increase in the share of null votes
in a polling station would provide some evidence of ballot stuffing. The results show that in Jezzine, the FPM-Jama’a list’s share of votes significantly decreased as the percentage of null votes in a polling station increased, which could suggest ballot stuffing on the part of FPM candidates in Jezzine. One other way to test for ballot stuffing is to look at the distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for a list or party. Normally, if there was a lack of fraud, the distribution of last digits in votes for a list or party should be uniform. The last digits in the number of votes for the FPM-Jama’a and PNO-Amal lists deviated from the uniform line, providing further evidence of ballot stuffing on the part of FPM-Jama’a, and potentially PNO-Amal.

Overall, while some methods of testing for voter rigging point toward irregularities, the results are inconsistent across each district, thus providing no convincing evidence of voter rigging in South 1. Stronger evidence of vote rigging is only found in Jezzine, pointing specifically toward the FPM.