The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections: What Do the Numbers Say?

South 3 Electoral District: Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh

Georgia Dagher
Founded in 1989, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies is a Beirut-based independent, non-partisan think tank whose mission is to produce and advocate policies that improve good governance in fields such as oil and gas, economic development, public finance, and decentralization.

This report is published in partnership with HIVOS through the Women Empowered for Leadership (WE4L) programme, funded by the Netherlands Foreign Ministry FLOW fund.

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The author would like to thank Sami Atallah, Daniel Garrote Sanchez, John McCabe, and Micheline Tobia for their contribution to this report.
Executive Summary

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018, the electoral race in the districts of Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh (South 3) was highly uncompetitive, with all incumbents—members of Hezbollah, Amal, and their allies—being reelected. These parties succeeded in mobilizing their main constituents, Shia voters, who were significantly more likely to vote compared to other confessional groups, and gave nearly all of their votes to the list. Most of the remaining votes were received by an electoral list backed by the Free Patriotic Movement, Future Movement, and Lebanese Democratic Party, which relied on the Christian, Sunni, and Druze vote—the communities each of these sectarian parties has traditionally represented. South 3 saw variations between the behavior of women and men voters: In each of the three electoral districts, women were significantly more likely to vote compared to men. Moreover, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, where voters had the option to cast their preferential vote for a candidate from their own confession or a different one, women from all confessional groups were significantly more likely to vote for a co-sectarian candidate. Another notable difference across genders was the support for women candidates: South 3 was one of the very few districts in which men were more likely to vote for a woman candidate, compared to women voters. In line with the lack of competitiveness in the race, the Kulluna Watani list, formed by anti-establishment and emerging political groups, received one of its worst results in South 3. However, the analysis shows geographical variations in its performance: Kulluna Watani was more successful in more confessionally mixed cadasters, as well as cadasters that recorded lower turnout rates, which suggests that sectarian parties may have had lower interest in targeting voters in more heterogeneous areas, and, potentially, that Kulluna Watani’s support was obtained from voters who were not specifically mobilized by these parties. Finally, the analysis of the results in South 3 shows some signs of electoral fraud that benefited candidates on the Hezbollah and Amal list. First, the list generally performed better in polling stations that recorded a lower share of invalid votes; and second, the list’s number of votes across polling stations were distributed in an irregular, non-uniform pattern—both of which suggest vote rigging.

Introduction

After passing a new electoral law in 2017, the Lebanese parliament finally agreed to hold elections in 2018—nine years after the previous ones and two mandate extensions later. The new electoral law established a proportional representation system for the first time in the country’s history, paving the way for increased competition. This new system, however, led to little changes in political representation, with voters
in 2018 reiterating their support for the main established political parties. Nevertheless, these results must not be taken at face value and require closer analysis, as voting patterns across and within electoral districts, as well as across voters’ demographic characteristics, still showed variations.

As part of a larger study on the 2018 elections, LCPS has analyzed voter behavior at the national level and the electoral district level. Using the official election results at the polling station level, published by the Ministry of Interior, the analysis unpacks the election results and examines differing patterns in voting behavior across demographic characteristics and geographical areas. The results at the polling station level were merged with a series of potentially explanatory factors at the individual and cadastral levels. First, based on the ministry’s list of registered voters by confession and gender in each of the polling stations, we identified the demographic characteristics of registered voters in each of the polling stations. The results at the polling station level were also merged with a series of factors that may have affected voters’ choices at the cadastral level in each electoral district. These factors include the level of economic development in a cadaster, approximated by the night-time light intensity; the poverty rate in a cadaster, approximated by the ratio of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program over the population in the cadaster; the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, constructed by LCPS and based on the distribution of voters by confession in each cadaster; and, finally, the share of refugees over the number of registered voters in a cadaster. Through the use of multivariate regression analyses, the explanatory significance of each of these factors on voter behavior is identified.

Apart from voters’ preferences, the study also examines incidents of electoral fraud. We seek to identify evidence of voter rigging, such as vote buying, and vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

This report unpacks the results in the electoral district of South 3, which is allocated eleven parliamentary seats. South 3 combined Nabatiyeh, which has three Shia seats; Bint Jbeil, which has three Shia seats; and Marjayoun-Hasbaya, which has two Shia seats, and one seat for each of the Sunni, Greek Orthodox, and Druze communities. The report is divided into seven sections. First, we present the demographic distribution of registered voters in South 3. The second section analyzes voter turnout, which varied across confessional groups, districts, and cadastral areas. The third section of this report delves into voters’ preferences for electoral lists and candidates. Going beyond the results at the aggregate level, we shed light on the varying preferences for parties and candidates across voters’ sect and gender and across

1 Available at: http://elections.gov.lb.

2 Note that some polling stations had voters from multiple confessional groups registered to vote. Similarly, some had both men and women registered to vote.

3 Obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

4 Data on National Poverty Targeting Program beneficiaries was obtained from the Ministry of Social Affairs.

5 Based on electoral data on the sect of voters per polling station, we constructed an index of homogeneity (IH) = \( \sum_i S_{ij}^2 \), where \( S_{ij} \) is the sum of the square root of the share of each sectarian group in the total number of registered voters in a cadaster. The index ranges between 0 (when the cadaster is fully heterogeneous) and 1 (when the cadaster is fully homogeneous, or only one sectarian group is present).

6 Data on the refugee population is collected from UNHCR.
geographical areas in South 3, and how these preferences were affected by geographical factors. In the fourth section, we examine voters’ sectarian behavior—their preferences for candidates of their own sectarian group—in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, where seats are reserved for multiple groups. The fifth section looks at the performance of women candidates, and the sixth at the performance of emerging political groups. Similar to the other sections of this report, we identify each of their constituents, and the areas in which they performed best. The seventh and final section of this report identifies incidents of electoral fraud. Using a number of statistical methods—which include analyzing the distribution of results at the polling station level, such as turnouts, votes for each electoral list, and the share of invalid ballots—we test for voter and vote rigging, such as pressure to vote through vote buying, or manipulations in the vote-counting process.

I Who are the voters?

In the May 2018 parliamentary elections, over 450,000 Lebanese were registered to vote in the electoral districts of Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh (South 3). Out of the 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament, eleven are assigned to South 3. Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh each have three Shia seats, and Marjayoun-Hasbaya has two Shia seats, one Greek Orthodox seat, one Druze seat, and one Sunni seat.

South 3 has a low degree of confessional fragmentation, with Shias accounting for the majority of registered voters (80%). The split of constituents, when divided into confessional groups, shows that in Bint Jbeil, nearly 90% of registered voters are Shia and most others are Maronite. In Nabatiyeh, about 95% are Shia, with the remainder being split between Maronites, Sunnis, and Greek Catholics. Finally, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Shias comprise the largest group (58%), followed by Sunnis (16%), Druze (9%), and Greek Orthodox (8%), with the remainder being split between other Christian confessional groups.

7 Excluding the 2,678 public employees and the 7,911 diaspora voters registered in South 3, whose confessions were not specified.
Given the confessional allocation of seats, as well as the number of seats allocated to each minor district, representation is not the same for every voter. Across all South 3 districts, a similar number of Shia voters are represented by each of their seats—between 44,000 and 47,500 for each Shia seat. However, across confessional groups, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the distribution of voters by group shows an unequal level of representation for each. Greek Orthodox voters, followed by Druze voters, benefit significantly more from the quota compared to other represented groups. While each of the Greek Orthodox and Druze seats represent about 13,000 and 15,000 voters respectively, the Sunni seat represents over 26,000 voters while each of the two Shia seats represents over 47,000 Shia voters.
### Table 1  Confessional composition of South 3 and allocated seats by confessional group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nabatiyeh</th>
<th></th>
<th>Bint Jbeil</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of voters</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Voters per seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>139,619</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian minorities</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>147,711</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,044</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employees</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,864</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</th>
<th></th>
<th>South 3</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of voters</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Number of seats</td>
<td>Voters per seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>94,706</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>26,476</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>15,387</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>13,266</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>7,226</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian minorities</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>162,731</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>459,254</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public employees</td>
<td>844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>3,007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>166,582</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note* Percentages have been rounded up.
Although registered voters were generally divided into electoral centers based on their confession and gender, some centers had multiple groups registered to vote, thus inhibiting a comprehensive analysis of voter behavior by confessional group. In Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh, the vast majority of centers were reserved for Shias, with a low number of mixed stations (less than 10% in each, representing about 9,500 voters in Bint Jbeil and about 13,500 in Nabatiyeh), as well as a few Maronite and Greek Catholic stations. However, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the number of mixed stations was higher (20%, representing nearly 32,000 voters). The majority of centers were reserved for Shias, with the second share being for Sunnis, followed by Druze, as well as a few Greek Orthodox and Maronite stations.

A comparison of the total number of registered voters by confession to the number of voters registered in stations exclusively servicing voters of their confession shows that in all three districts, nearly all Shia voters were registered in their own stations (over 95%). In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the majority of Sunnis (over 80%) and Druze (over 70%) were registered in their own stations, but only 30% of Greek Orthodox were. Moreover, in Bint Jbeil, the highest share of registered voters in mixed stations were Shia (about 40%), followed by Maronites and Greek Catholics (30% and 25%). In Nabatiyeh, the highest share were also Shia (about 50%), followed by Maronites and Sunnis (about 20% each), and Greek Catholics (about 7%). Finally, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the confessional composition of mixed stations was diverse. The highest share were Greek Orthodox (30%), with between 10% and 20% of registered

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

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Note Percentages have been rounded up.
voters in mixed stations being Sunni, Shia, Druze, and Greek Catholic, and a small portion being Maronite and from Christian minoritarian groups (about 7% and 5%).

II Who voted?

Turnout in South 3 was close to the national average: 48.7% compared to 49%. Among the 469,843 voters in South 3, 228,563 cast a vote while the remaining 241,280 did not. Turnout varied across districts: It was highest in Nabatiyeh (54%), followed by Marjayoun-Hasbaya (49%), with voters in Bint Jbeil voting much less (43%). All three districts saw an increase in turnout compared to the 2009 elections, when 49% of voters in Nabatiyeh, 46% of those in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and 42% of those in Bint Jbeil voted.

Turnout varied across residencies, with the Lebanese diaspora—who were given the opportunity to vote for the first time in 2018—having a higher participation rate (53% compared to 49%). In Bint Jbeil, 52% of diaspora voters cast ballots, and in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, 54% of diaspora voters went to the polls. In Nabatiyeh turnouts were similar (54%).

Figure 3 Turnout across residencies in South 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residency</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Diaspora</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
The Shia community and women voters were heavily mobilized in all three districts

Turnout varied across confessional groups. In all districts, Shias were more mobilized than other groups—reflecting a trend observed at the national level—while Christian voters were the least mobilized (figure 4). In Bint Jbeil, turnout among the Shia community stood at 44%. Maronites followed with a 35% turnout rate, while turnout among Greek Catholic voters was much lower (15%). In mixed stations, turnout was 37%, which could be explained by the fact that the majority of voters who cast ballots in these stations were Christian.

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, 54% of Shia and Druze voters cast ballots. They were followed by Sunnis, who had a 47% turnout. Although they are represented by a seat, Greek Orthodox voters in their own polling stations had the lowest turnout (28%). Among Maronites and voters registered in mixed stations, 36% of voters cast ballots. This comparatively low turnout in mixed stations is potentially explained by the higher share of Christian voters registered in these—the majority of voters in mixed stations were Christian, with the largest group being Greek Orthodox.

In Nabatiyeh, turnout among Shias was 55%, while among Maronite voters in their own stations turnout stood at 38%. In mixed stations—where half of the voters were Shia, with the remaining being largely split between Maronite and Sunni voters—turnout stood at 42%.

In all three districts, variations in turnout across confessional groups were statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender and characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of confessional fragmentation and economic development. Shia voters were the most likely to vote, while Christian groups were the least likely to do so.

**Figure 4** Turnout by confessional group in South 3
Turnout also varied between male and women voters, with women being more mobilized than men in all three districts. In Bint Jbeil, turnout among women was 45%, compared to 41% among men, and in polling stations that serviced voters from both genders, turnout was the lowest (38%). In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, 51% of women voted, compared to 48% of men and 40% of voters in mixed stations. Finally, in Nabatiyeh, turnout among women was 56%, compared to 53% among men and 52% among voters in mixed stations. Women were more likely to vote than men even after controlling for voters’ confession as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of confessional fragmentation and economic development.

Large geographical variations in turnouts across cadasters in all three districts

A higher share of Shia voters in a cadaster was associated with higher turnout rates, and voters in more homogeneous cadasters—regardless of their confession—voted more.

In Bint Jbeil, overall turnout among residents stood at 43%. The cadasters with the lowest turnouts were Yaroun (19%), Ain Ebel (25%), and the cadaster of Bint Jbeil (30%). Other cadasters with low turnouts were Debl, Qaouzah, Tibnine (all three from 30% to 35%), Maroun El-Ras, Aaitaroun, Beit Yahoun, and Haris (all four from 35% to 40%).

Two factors may explain the low turnouts in these cadasters. First, in line with the lower turnouts among Christian voters, the cadasters mentioned above which had Christian voters registered recorded some of the lowest turnouts. These were Ain Ebel, Yaroun, Debl, and Qaouzah. However, as most voters in Bint Jbeil are Shia, other cadasters in which...
low turnouts were reported are either majority or fully Shia—meaning that, despite the higher turnouts among this community, the confessional composition of a cadaster is not the only factor that affected turnouts. These Shia cadasters include the cadaster of Bint Jbeil, Tibnine, Aaitaroun, Maroun El-Ras, Beit Yahoun, and Haris. A common characteristic of these cadasters is their larger size: In Bint Jbeil, larger cadasters or those that had a higher number of polling stations and a higher number of registered voters, had, on average, lower turnouts. This could be due to the lower capacity of parties in mobilizing a large number of voters in larger areas.

Fifteen cadasters had greater than 50% turnout, among which seven had greater than 60% turnout. The two cadasters with the highest turnouts in Bint Jbeil were the neighboring ones of Borj Qalaouiyeh and Qalaouiyeh (both 70%). Other high turnout cadasters were Aita El-Chaab, Jmaijmeh, Froun, Ghandouriyet Bint Jbeil, and Beit Lif (from 62% to 66% each). In line with higher turnouts among Shia voters, all of these cadasters are entirely Shia (except Ghandouriyet Bint Jbeil, where 96% of registered voters are Shia). Moreover, in contrast to the low-turnout Shia cadasters which are larger in size, these cadasters that recorded the highest turnouts were smaller.

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the lowest turnout was observed in the small cadaster of Abou Qamha (18%), followed by Rachaya El-Foukhar, Jdeidet Marjayoun, and Deir Mimas (from 26% to 29% each). In line with the lower turnouts among Greek Orthodox and Christian voters more generally, the majority of registered voters in these cadasters are Christian, with Rachaya El-Foukhar, Jdeidet Marjayoun, and Deir Mimas being mainly Greek Orthodox, and Abou Qamha almost entirely Greek Catholic.

Seven cadasters which had low turnouts, varying from 30% to 40%, were Kfair, Kaoukaba Hasbaya, Marj El-Zouhour, Ibl El-Saqi, Qlaiaa, Borj El-Moulouk, and Boueyda Marjayoun. Similar to the four cadasters with the lowest turnouts mentioned above, these are Christian, with the exception of Kfair (60% Greek Orthodox and 35% Druze) and Marj El-Zouhour (90% Sunni, 10% Greek Orthodox). Moreover, none of these low-turnout cadasters had Shia voters registered to vote.

The cadasters which reported the highest turnout were Saouanet Marjayoun (67%), followed by Qantara, Majidiye Hasbaya, Beni Haiyane, Aain Jarfa, Deir Siriane, and Aadchit El-Qoussair (from 60% to 65% each). Similar to Bint Jbeil, most of these high-turnout cadasters were fully Shia. The exceptions were Majidiye Hasbaya and Aain Jarfa, which are fully Sunni and Druze, respectively. It seems, therefore, that a higher prevalence of Christian voters tended to be associated with lower turnouts, while a higher share of Shia voters was associated with higher turnouts.
In Nabatiyeh, only three cadasters had below 40% turnouts. The cadasters with the lowest turnouts were Bfaroueh, Sarba El-Nabatiyeh, and Aazzi (from 35% to 40% each). In line with low turnouts among Maronite voters in Nabatiyeh, the two former cadasters are almost entirely Maronite (98%), while the latter has a majority of Maronite voters (60%), although it has a significant share of Shias and Greek Catholics (about 30% and 12%).

Fourteen cadasters in Nabatiyeh saw turnouts that varied from 60% to 70%, with the highest being in Aadchit El-Qoussair (68%). It was followed by Houmine El-Faouqa (67%), Siney (65%), and Qsaibet El-Nabatiyeh (65%). Again, all of the 14 cadasters that reported above 60% turnout are fully Shia.

As seen above, geographical variations in turnout seem to be driven by inter-sect differences. In line with higher turnouts among Shias, a higher prevalence of Shia voters in a cadaster tended to be associated with higher turnout rates. A higher prevalence of Christians in a cadaster was associated with lower turnout rates. All cadasters with the highest turnouts in Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh, except two—Majidiyeh Hasbaya, which is fully Sunni, and Aain Jarfa in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, which is fully Druze—are fully Shia. However, as mentioned above, many Shia cadasters in Bint Jbeil reported low turnouts. One potential explanation is the large size of these cadasters, in terms of both numbers of registered voters and number of polling stations, where voters may have been harder to mobilize.

Beyond the prevalence of a specific confessional group, turnout may have been affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster—that is, whether many confessional groups cohabit or there is a high predominance of one, regardless of which. In South 3, the more homogenous a cadaster is, the higher the participation in the elections (figure 6). This was the case in all minor districts.

Average turnouts in fully homogeneous cadasters were higher than the average across each of the districts. In Bint Jbeil, on average, turnout by cadaster increased from 20% in the most heterogeneous cadasters to nearly 50% in the most homogeneous ones; in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, turnouts increased from 35% in the most heterogeneous cadasters to nearly 55% in the most homogeneous ones; and finally, in Nabatiyeh, these increased from 45% in the most heterogeneous cadasters to nearly 60% in the most homogeneous ones. These relationships in each of the minor districts are statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender, confession, as well as some characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of economic development. This means that, for example, a Shia voter in a more homogeneous cadaster was on average more likely to vote than a Shia voter registered in a more confessionally fragmented cadaster. This
may point to the larger capacity and interest of sectarian parties in mobilizing voters in more homogeneous areas, where a higher share of their specific constituents may be registered, and easier to target.

Figure 6  Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in South 3

(a) Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in Bint Jbeil

(b) Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in Marjayoun-Hasbaya
What are the main drivers of turnout in South 3?

A multivariate analysis highlights the impact of different individual and geographic characteristics of constituents on turnout rates. Factors that affected turnout include characteristics of cadasters and polling stations in which voters were registered, as well as individual characteristics.

In all of Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh, as mentioned above, voters in more homogeneous cadasters tended to vote in higher numbers compared to those in more heterogeneous cadasters. This factor is statistically significant even after controlling for other characteristics of the cadasters and voters’ gender and sect, and points at sectarian parties’ interest in mobilizing voters in more homogeneous areas, i.e. those that have a higher share of their specific constituents. Other geographical characteristics that affected turnout rates were the level of economic development and poverty rates in a cadaster. In both Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh, voters in less economically developed cadasters were significantly more likely to vote; while again in Bint Jbeil, as well as Marjayoun-Hasbaya, voters in cadasters with a higher prevalence of poverty were more likely to vote. These results could suggest instances of voter rigging, as parties may be better able to mobilize voters in less developed localities by offering benefits in exchange for votes.

In all three districts, women were significantly more likely to vote than men. In Bint Jbeil, Shias were the most likely to vote, while Greek Catholic voters were the least likely, and Maronites fell in between. In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, both Shia and Druze voters were the most likely to vote. They were followed by Sunnis, with Maronite and Greek Orthodox
voters being the least likely to vote. One other finding regarding Marjayoun-Hasbaya is that voters in confessionally mixed polling stations were less likely to vote, compared to those in homogeneous stations—which could be explained by the higher share of Christian voters in these stations. This may also point toward parties’ targeted mobilization of constituents, or suggest that parties exerted pressure on voters in polling stations where the sectarian composition was known. Finally, in Nabatiyeh, Shias were much more likely to vote than Maronites.

Figure 7 Drivers of turnout in South 3

a Drivers of turnout in Bint Jbeil

b Drivers of turnout in Marjayoun-Hasbaya
III Who voted for whom?

Six lists competed in South 3, with a total of 46 candidates. There were 13 candidates competing for three Shia seats in Bint Jbeil, 11 candidates competing for three Shia seats in Nabatiyeh, seven Shia candidates competing for two Shia seats in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, four Sunni candidates competing for the Sunni seat, five Druze candidates competing for the Druze seat, and six Greek Orthodox candidates competing for the Greek Orthodox seat in Marjayoun-Hasbaya.

The race was highly uncompetitive, with one list obtaining all seats. Six electoral lists competed in South 3, but 86% of the votes went to the single winning one, ‘Hope and Loyalty’, a coalition between Amal and Hezbollah. In Bint Jbeil, the seats were won by Hassan Fadlallah (Hezbollah, 39,722 preferential votes), Ali Ahmad Bazzi (Amal, 9,290), and Ayoub Hmayed (Amal, 7,875). In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the Shia seats went to Ali Hassan Khalil (Amal, 16,765 preferential votes) and Ali Fayad (Hezbollah, 27,460), the Sunni seat to Qassem Hachem (Ba’ath Party, 6,012), the Druze seat to Anwar El-Khalil (Amal-affiliated, 6,347), and the Greek Orthodox seat to Assaad Hardan (Syrian Social Nationalist Party, 3,321). Finally, in Nabatiyeh, the seats were won by Mohammad Raad (Hezbollah, 43,797 preferential votes), Hani Kobeissi (Amal, 20,504), and Yassine Jaber (Amal-affiliated, 7,920). All of the winners were incumbents representing the same districts, with the exception of Hani Kobeissi in Nabatiyeh who was elected in Beirut in the 2009 elections, and replaced former Amal winner Abdel Latif El-Zein in Nabatiyeh.
Most of the remaining votes were won by ‘The South Deserves’, a list backed by the Free Patriotic Movement, Future Movement, and Lebanese Democratic Party (FPM, FM, and LDP, respectively). The list had 10 candidates and won nearly 8% of votes.

The other lists were ‘One Voice for Change’, formed by the Communist Party (nearly 3%, seven candidates), ‘Enough Talking’, formed by the Lebanese Forces (LF) and independent candidates (2%, five candidates), Kulluna Watani, the coalition between independent and emerging groups (1%, five candidates), and ‘We Can Change’, formed by independent candidates and the Lebanese Option Party (0.3%, eight candidates).

There were large variations in the success of each list across each of the minor districts (table 2). While Hezbollah-Amal won over 90% of votes in Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh, it won 77% in Marjayoun-Hasbaya. Most of these lost votes went to the FPM-FM-LDP list, which obtained 16% in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, in contrast to the 3% it obtained in each of the two other districts. This is explained by the support obtained by the FM, LDP, and FPM candidates in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, who were running for the seats representing their respective sectarian communities (Sunni, Druze, and Greek Orthodox), while all Shia candidates on the list were independents. The Communist party list was the only one apart from the Hezbollah-Amal list to perform better in Nabatiyeh than it did in the two other districts. All other lists performed better in Marjayoun-Hasbaya than in other districts.
By party and candidate, Hezbollah candidates were the most successful. One candidate from Hezbollah ran in each of the minor districts, and in each they ranked first. In addition, very few candidates in each of the districts were able to win over 1% of preferential votes.

The Lebanese diaspora had diverging preferences\(^{13}\) and showed higher support for the list that included the Lebanese Forces candidate, as well as the Kulluna Watani list, and lower support for the Hezbollah-Amal list. The votes received by Hezbollah-Amal were 10% lower among diaspora voters, while those for the list which included the LF were over three times as high among the diaspora (6% compared to 2% of votes among residents), and those for Kulluna Watani were four times higher (4% compared to 1%).

![Figure 9: Votes for each list across residencies in South 3](image)

*Note* Percentages have been rounded up.

### Table 2  Votes for each list across districts in South 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hezbollah-Amal</th>
<th>FPM-FM-LDP</th>
<th>Communist Party</th>
<th>LF-independents</th>
<th>Kulluna Watani</th>
<th>LOP-independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bint Jbeil</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjayoun-Hasbaya</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiyeh</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note* Percentages have been rounded up.

By party and candidate, Hezbollah candidates were the most successful. One candidate from Hezbollah ran in each of the minor districts, and in each they ranked first. In addition, very few candidates in each of the districts were able to win over 1% of preferential votes.
In Bint Jbeil, Hassan Fadlallah (Hezbollah) won 64% of preferential votes. Amal candidates followed, with Ali Ahmad Bazzi obtaining 15% and Ayoub Hmayed obtaining 13%. Only two other party members ran in Bint Jbeil, while all others were independents. Only three other candidates managed to win over 1% of preferential votes. Those were Ali Al-Amine (independent), the single candidate on the list backed by LF, Ahmad Mrad from the Communist party, and Hussein Chaer (independent running on the list backed by FPM, FM, and LDP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party and affiliation</th>
<th>Percentage of preferential votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Fadlallah</td>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Ahmad Bazzi</td>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayoub Hmayed</td>
<td>Amal</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Al-Amine</td>
<td>Independent (LF-independents list)</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Mrad</td>
<td>Communist party</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein Chaer</td>
<td>Independent (FPM-FM-LDP list)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other candidates (seven candidates)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Ali Fayad (Hezbollah) won 35% of preferential votes. Amal candidate Ali Hassan Khalil came in second with 21%. The third candidate was Imad El-Khatib from the FM, who won 11%. All candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list followed, with Amal-affiliated Anwar El-Khalil winning 8%, Ba’ath Party candidate Qassem Hachem 8%, and SSNP candidate Assaad Hardan winning 4%. Only four other candidates won over 1% of preferential votes: Wissam Charrouf (LDP) and Fadi Salameh (LF) won 3% each, while Chadi Massaad (FPM) and Hala Abou Kasm (Communist party) won 2% each. The 12 other candidates in the district—all independents except for one member of the Communist party—won less than 2% of preferential votes combined.
Not all of the five most successful candidates in Marjayoun-Hasbaya made it to parliament (table 4). Under the proportional representation system, combined with the option to cast a preferential vote, the sectarian allocation of seats, and the introduction of high electoral thresholds, candidates who receive the highest number of preferential votes do not necessarily win. Were seats obtained by the most successful candidates representing each sectarian group, regardless of list, FM candidate Imad El-Khatib would have won the Sunni seat in Marjayoun-Hasbaya instead of Qassem Hachem from the Ba’ath Party. While Hachem won with slightly over 6,000 votes, El-Khatib lost despite receiving over 8,500 votes. The electoral quotient—i.e. the minimum number of votes a list must receive in order to win a seat—in South 3 is set at 9.1% of votes, meaning that El-Khatib’s list fell short by only 3,500 votes to win a seat.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, in Nabatiyeh, Hezbollah’s sole candidate Mohammad Raad received the majority of votes (56%). He was followed by Hani Kobeissi (Amal, 26%), and Yassine Jaber (Amal-affiliated, 10%). The single candidate from the Communist party, Ali Hajj Ali, won 3%, while Mustafa Badreddine (independent on the list backed by FPM, FM, and LDP) won most of the remaining preferential votes (2%). The six other candidates in Nabatiyeh won slightly over 2% of preferential votes.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Main candidates in Marjayoun-Hasbaya}
\begin{tabular}{llll}
\hline
Candidate & Party and affiliation & Confession & Percentage of preferential votes \\
\hline
Ali Fayad & Hezbollah & Shia & 35\% \\
Ali Hassan Khalil & Amal & Shia & 21\% \\
Imad El-Khatib & Future Movement & Sunni & 11\% \\
Anwar El-Khalil & Amal-affiliated & Druze & 8\% \\
Qassem Hachem & Ba’ath Party & Sunni & 8\% \\
Assaad Hardan & Syrian Social Nationalist Party & Greek Orthodox & 4\% \\
Wissam Charrouf & Amal & Druze & 3\% \\
Fadi Salameh & Lebanese Democratic Party & Greek Orthodox & 3\% \\
Chadi Massaad & Free Patriotic Movement & Greek Orthodox & 2\% \\
Hala Abou Kasm & Communist party & Greek Orthodox & 2\% \\
All other candidates & & & 2\% \\
(12 candidates) & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Note} Percentages have been rounded up.

\textsuperscript{14} The electoral quotient is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats in a district. In South 3, where the number of valid votes was 225,807, the quotient was equal to 20,528 votes.
There were significant variations in support for parties and lists across confessional groups, but only minor ones across genders. Preferences for lists in South 3 did not vary across genders, with the differences in the share of votes given to each list being lower than 1%. However, voters in gender-mixed stations voted differently: They voted significantly less for Hezbollah-Amal (on average 9% less) and more for the FPM-FM-LDP (4% more) and LF-backed lists (5% more). These differences were driven by diverging support in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, where votes for Hezbollah-Amal were on average 16% lower among voters in gender-mixed stations than they were in gender-specific stations. Those for FPM-FM-LDP were 5% higher, and those for the LF-independents list were 10% higher. This is likely driven by the larger proportion of Christian voters in gender-mixed stations in Marjayoun-Hasbaya.

**Figure 10** Votes for each list among voters in gender-specific stations and those in gender-mixed stations

| Gender specific | 87% | 7% | 6% |
| Mixed gender    | 79% | 11%| 7% |
There were large variations in preferences for lists across confessional groups (figure 11). In total, nearly all Shia voters voted for the Hezbollah-Amal list (95%). The majority of Druze and Greek Catholic voters also gave their votes to this list. Among Sunnis, the majority voted for the FPM-FM-LDP list. The Greek Orthodox and Maronite votes were fragmented, with no list winning a majority. Their votes were split between Hezbollah-Amal, FPM-FM-LDP, and the LF-independents list. In most cases, however, preferences for lists were driven by support for specific candidates.

In every district, very few candidates received support from each confessional group.

Across each of the minor districts, in Bint Jbeil, 68% of Shia voters cast their preferential vote for Hassan Fadlallah. He was followed by Ali Ahmad Bazzi and Ayoub Hmayed (15% and 13%). Only one other candidate, Ahmad Mrad, managed to win over 1% of Shia preferential votes (nearly 2%), with all nine other candidates in Bint Jbeil winning less than 2%. These four candidates also relied on Shia constituents, as over 90% of the preferential votes they each received were cast in Shia polling stations.
Among Maronite voters in their own stations, Ali Al-Amine received the highest share of votes (31%), followed by Hussein Chaer (20%)—both independents on lists backed by the two Christian parties, the LF and FPM. Mohammad Kaddouh, the other independent on the FPM-FM-LDP list, followed (13%). These three candidates running on the LF- and FPM-backed lists relied on the Maronite vote as the majority of the total votes they received came from Maronite stations. The three candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list won between 7% and 12% of the Maronite vote. Finally, the only other candidate who won over 1% of the Maronite vote was Rima Hamid (Kulluna Watani, 3%). Regarding the few Greek Catholic voters, Hassan Fadlallah received the highest share (38%), followed by Hussein Chaer (23%), while Ali Ahmad Bazzi, Ayoub Hmayed, and Rima Hamid each won between 9% and 12%. Ali Al-Amine also managed to win 4%. Finally, in mixed stations, Hassan Fadlallah received close to the majority (49%). He was followed by Ali Ahmad Bazzi, Ali Al-Amine, and Ayoub Hmayed, who each won over 10%.

Overall, the three candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list were successful among all confessional groups. Ali Al-Amine, Hussein Chaer, and Ayoub Hmayed received support only from Christian groups, while all other candidates won over 1% of one specific group’s votes.

**Figure 12** Main candidates by confessional group in Bint Jbeil

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, among the 22 candidates, only five managed to win over 1% of the Shia preferential vote, with four of them being on the Hezbollah-Amal list. The majority of Shia voters chose Hezbollah candidate Ali Fayad (54%), followed by Amal candidate Ali Hassan Khalil (31%). Both of these candidates obtained over 90% of their votes from Shia polling stations. Qassem Hachem (Ba’ath Party) won a share of the Shia vote (7%), with only two other candidates winning over 1% of the community's vote: Assaad Hardan (SSNP, 3%) and Hala Abou Kasm (Communist party, 2%).

A majority of Sunnis voted for FM candidate Imad El-Khatib (66%), reflecting their support for the Sunni party. Out of the total votes received by El-Khatib, over 75% came from Sunni polling stations, highlighting his reliance on this community. Most of the remaining Sunni vote went to Qassem Hachem (20%, who received one-third of his total votes from Sunnis). Four other candidates, all on the Hezbollah-Amal list, managed to win over 1% of the Sunni vote, with the most successful being Anwar El-Khalil (5%), while Assaad Hardan, Ali Fayad, and Ali Hassan Khalil won from 1% to 2% each.

Druze voters gave the majority of their vote to Anwar El-Khalil (58%), followed by Wissam Charrouf (LDP, 28%). Although Charrouf won a significant share of votes among Druze voters, he was not able to win over 1% of any of the other groups’ votes. Both El-Khalil and Charrouf won the majority of their total votes from Druze stations, highlighting their reliance on this community. Four other candidates in the district obtained over 1% of Druze voters' preferential votes. Those were Assaad Hardan (6%), Imad El-Khatib, Akram Qais, and Fadi Abou Jamra (both Kulluna Watani).

Greek Orthodox gave an almost equal share of their vote to Assaad Hardan, Chadi Massaad, and Fadi Salameh (between 18% and 22%)—the three Greek Orthodox candidates from the biggest Christian parties. Two other candidates, Fadi Abou Jamra and Hala Abou Kasm won over 10%, while four others won over 1%: Ali Hassan Khalil (4%), Imad El-Khatib (3%), Ali Fayad, and Qassem Hachem.

Finally, Maronite voters in Marjayoun-Hasbaya gave the largest share of their vote to Fadi Salameh (46%). Chadi Massaad followed (21%), while Anwar El-Khalil, Ali Hassan Khalil, and Assaad Hardan each won between 7% and 8%. Two other candidates were able to win over 1% of the Maronite vote: Imad El-Khatib and Minah Saab (independent in the list with the Lebanese Option Party).

Overall, Amal and Hezbollah were successful among Shia voters, the Ba’ath Party and FM among Sunni voters, the SSNP among Greek Orthodox voters, the Amal-affiliated Druze candidate and LDP among Druze voters, and the FPM and LF among Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters, reflecting the sectarian character of Lebanese politics. Among
other candidates, Kulluna Watani and the Communist party only managed to capture a significant share of the Greek Orthodox vote.

In Nabatiyeh, the majority of Shia voters cast a ballot for the Hezbollah candidate Mohammad Raad (58%), followed by Hani Kobeissi from Amal (27%). Amal-affiliated Yassine Jaber won most of the remaining Shia vote (10%), while Ali Hajj Ali won 3%. All seven other candidates in Nabatiyeh won 3% of the Shia vote, combined.

Maronite voters registered in their own polling stations gave the highest share of their votes to Mustafa Badreddine, an independent on the FPM-FM-LDP list (38%). He was followed by the two independent candidates on the list backed by the LF, Rami Ollaik and Ahmad Ismail (15% each), as well as Mohammad Raad (14%). Four other candidates won between 3% and 5% of the Maronite vote: Hani Kobeissi, Yassine Jaber, Ali Hajj Ali, and Jamil Ballout (Kulluna Watani).

Finally, voters in mixed stations voted similarly to Shia voters: 49% voted for the Hezbollah candidate, 23% for the Amal candidate, and 9% for the candidate affiliated with Amal.
The Hezbollah-Amal list garnered above 90% of votes in 81 of the 131 cadasters in South 3. The list obtained 99% in Sir El-Gharbiyeh (Nabatiyeh), Al-Tairi (Bint Jbeil), Ghandouriyet Bint Jbeil, Bani Haiyyan (Marjayoun), and Markaba (Marjayoun). All of these cadasters are Shia, and saw higher than average turnouts (over 60% in each, except 58% in Markaba). These results highlight the parties’ effective mobilization of their constituents, however, such high percentages may also hint at voter rigging.

The Hezbollah-Amal list obtained less than 50% of votes in 19 cadasters. Its lowest percentage of votes were in Borj El-Moulouk (13%, Marjayoun) and Marj El-Zouhour (Hasbaya), where the FPM-FMLDP list was more successful; Ain Ebel (Bint Jbeil) and Boueyda Marjayoun, where the LF-independents list was more successful; and Sarba El-Nabatiyeh, where most votes were divided between the FPM-FMLDP and LF-independents lists (between 15% and 20% in each of these cadasters). None of these cadasters had Shias registered to vote, and all were fully Christian except Marj El-Zouhour, which is almost fully Sunni. Moreover, all of these cadasters had lower than average turnouts (less than 40%), which could point toward candidates’ lack of interest in mobilizing non-Shia voters, who are not their main constituents, as well as their opponents’ failure to mobilize their constituents.

16 The list obtained 100% of votes in the cadaster of Toul in Nabatiyeh. However, there were only 27 voters registered in this cadaster, with 13 who voted.
Regarding specific candidates, in Bint Jbeil, Hassan Fadlallah (Hezbollah) won over 70% of preferential votes in Aainata, Maroun El-Ras, Yaroun, Aita El-Chaab, Aaita El-Jabal, Baraachit, Kounine, Al-Tairi, and Rachaf. The candidate managed to garner over 2,000 votes in the cadasters of Bint Jbeil (4,174 preferential votes, 68% of votes), Aaitaroun (2,563, 69% [where no candidate won over 400]), Aita El-Chaab (2,612, 78%), and Chaqra (2,228, 70%). He also received more preferential votes than the two other candidates on his list, Ayoub Hmayed and Ali Ahmad Bazzi, in all cadasters but Debl, Beit Lif, and Qaouzah, where Hmayed was more successful, and Tibnine, where Bazzi was more successful.

Ayoub Hmayed won more preferential votes than Hassan Fadlallah in Debl (16% of preferential votes, although the most successful candidate was Ali Al-Amine, LF-independents list), Beit Lif (53%), and Qaouzah (44%). Hmayed won his highest number of preferential votes in Beit Lif (1,232 preferential votes); and won over 500 votes only in Aita El-Chaab (610, 18%), Haris (654, 31%), and Kafra Bint Jbeil (650, 29%).

Ali Ahmad Bazzi was more successful than Hassan Fadlallah in Tibnine (where he won 44% of preferential votes, although Fadlallah closely followed with 43%, or 29 less votes). Tibnine was also one of the few cadasters where Bazzi won over 500 votes (913 votes). He obtained his highest number of preferential votes in the cadaster of Bint Jbeil (1,497 preferential votes, 24% in the cadaster), while he also won over 500 in Chaqra (781, 25%) and Kherbet Selm (660, 25%).

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Hezbollah candidate Ali Fayad was most successful in the Marjayoun cadasters of Tallouseh, Markaba, Blida, Taybeh, and Deir Siriane (between 60% and 70% of preferential votes), while he was largely unsuccessful in Hasbaya. Fayad won over 1,000 preferential votes in nine cadasters and over 2,000 in Khiyam Marjayoun (3,572 preferential votes, 45%), Meiss El-Jabal (3,355, 52%), Taybeh (2,854, 67%), and Markaba (2,556, 69%). Ali Hassan Khalil won over 1,000 preferential votes in Khiyam (2,876 preferential votes, or 36%), Meiss El-Jabal (2,085, 32%), Majdal Selm (1,096, or 38%), and Markaba (1,045, 28%).

Druze candidate Anwar El-Khalil was more successful in Hasbaya, where Druze polling stations were located. The candidate won over 500 preferential votes in three cadasters: In the cadaster of Hasbaya (1,643 preferential votes, 50%), Aain Qinia (550, 53%), and Chouaya Hasbaya (505, 56%). He also won the majority of preferential votes—allbeit not a high number of votes—in the cadasters of Burghoz (88 preferential votes, 77%), Majidiyeh Hasbaya (37, 61%), and Fardis Hasbaya (186, 56%).

The Ba’ath Party Sunni candidate Qassem Hachem obtained his highest share of preferential votes in Chebaa (24%, representing 1,406
preferential votes [the highest number he won]), followed by Kfar Chouba (17%), Hebbariyeh, Kfar Hamam, and Meiss El-Jabal (13% each). His success in these areas reflects the support he obtained from the Sunni community, as all of these cadasters are entirely Sunni. In terms of number of votes, he won over 500 preferential votes in three cadasters: Chebaa (1,406 votes), Meiss El-Jabal (837 votes), and Khiyam (768, 10%).

SSNP candidate Assaad Hardan (Greek Orthodox) won 50% of preferential votes in Rachaya El-Foukhar and 23% in Deir Mimas, but less than 20% of votes in all other cadasters. Both of these cadasters are fully Christian, the community among which he was most successful. Hardan won between 10% and 20% of preferential votes in five other cadasters: Fardis Hasbaya, Meimes, Qabrikha, Ibl El-Saqi, and Kfarkela. In contrast to the other candidates on his list, he did not receive over 500 votes in any cadaster. The cadasters where he won over 200 preferential votes were Kfarkela (365 votes, 10%), Khiyam (297, 4%), Majdal Selm (280, 10%), Rachaya El-Foukhar (229, 50%), and the cadaster of Hasbaya (219, 7%).

In Nabatiyeh, the Hezbollah candidate Mohammad Raad was much more successful than the two other candidates on his list across the district. The highest share of votes Raad won was in Ain Bou Souar (80%), followed by Jibchit (74%) and Kfarfila (71%). He also won above 65% of preferential votes in Houmine El-Tahta and Jbaa El-Nabatiyeh. All of these cadasters are fully Shia, which could explain his success. Across the 42 cadasters in Nabatiyeh, Raad won over 1,000 preferential votes in 18 and over 2,000 in three. Those were the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (4,829 preferential votes [his highest number], 52%), Jibchit (3,181, 77%), and Harouf El-Nabatiyeh (2,138, 66%).

Hani Kobeissi only managed to receive a higher share of preferential votes than Mohammad Raad in four cadasters: Qsaibet El-Nabatiyeh (50% of preferential votes), Zibdine El-Nabatiyeh (50%), Bfaroueh (45%, compared to only 10% for Raad), and Siney (48%). He won over 800 preferential votes in six cadasters. The highest number was in the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (1,571 preferential votes, 17%), followed by Ansar (1,124, 34%), Harouf El-Nabatiyeh (978, 30%), Qsaibet El-Nabatiyeh (974, 50%), Habbouch El-Nabatiyeh (882, 31%), and Aarab Salim (808, 28%).

The last candidate on the list, Yassine Jaber, was unsuccessful in capturing a large number of preferential votes across cadasters, winning over 300 in only five. The highest number he obtained was in the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (1,995 preferential votes, 22%), where he was slightly more successful than Kobeissi. Jaber won over 300 votes in Nabatiyeh El-Faouqa (383 preferential votes, 16%), Aabba (359, 15%), Ansar (318, 10%), and Zawtar El-Charqiyeh (311, 15%, [more than Kobeissi, who won 191]).
The list backed by the FPM, FM, and LDP won over 10% of votes in only 35 cadasters, and over 60% only in six

Most of the cadasters in which the list was successful were in Hasbayya, followed by Marjayoun, where the party-candidates ran. The list was most successful in Marj El-Zouhour (79%, Hasbayya), and Borj El-Moulouk (69%, Marjayoun), where the Hezbollah-Amal list obtained some of its lowest percentage of votes. It also won over 60% in Chebaa, Hebbariyeh, Kfar Hamam, and Kfar Chouba.

In all of these cadasters but Borj El-Moulouk, the votes received by the list went almost exclusively to FM candidate Imad El-Khatib. In line with the higher level of support this candidate obtained from Sunni voters, all these cadasters are fully, or nearly fully, Sunni. Moreover, out of the nearly 8,400 preferential votes El-Khatib won among residents,17 almost half were cast in Chebaa (4,123 preferential votes, 70%), with a high number coming from Kfar Chouba (1,361, 60%), and Hebbariyeh (933, 66%).

All of the votes obtained by the FPM-FM-LDP list in Borj El-Moulouk (69%) were cast for FPM candidate Chadi Massaad (263 preferential votes). Apart from this cadaster, Massaad was only able to win over 10% of preferential votes in six cadasters. These were Kaoukaba Hasbayya, Deir Mimas, Qlaaa (between 20% and 25%), Ibl El-Saqi, Jdeidet Marjayoun, and Rachaya El-Foukhar (between 10% and 13%). Overall, these cadasters were also the only ones where Chadi Massaad managed to win over 100 preferential votes (except Rachaya El-Foukhar, where he won 55). He was also more successful than SSNP candidate Assaad Hardan in Qlaaa (20%) and Kaoukaba Hasbayya (25%).

LDP candidate Wissam Charrouf managed to win more than 20% of preferential votes in six cadasters—which were also the only ones in which he won over 100 preferential votes. The candidate won his highest share in Chouaya Hasbayya (353 preferential votes, 39%), Aain Jarfa (210, 36%), Aain Qinia (356, 34%), and Khalouet Hasbayya (240, 34%). He also won over 20% in the cadaster of Hasbayya (914 preferential votes [the highest number he won across cadasters], 28%), El-Meri (114, 24%), and Fardis Hasbayya (71, 21%). All of these cadasters are fully or majority Druze. Charrouf did not win more votes than Druze winner Anwar El-Khalil in any cadaster.

The two Shia candidates on the list in Marjayoun-Hasbayya each won less than 100 preferential votes among residents. Abbas Sharafeddine, who won 74 preferential votes from residents, received well over half of these from voters in Taybeh (46 votes, representing 1% in the cadaster). The candidate won eight votes or less in all other cadasters. Mourhaf Ramadan, who won 66 preferential votes among residents, received 44 of these from voters in Blat Marjayoun (4%). In all other cadasters, he won four preferential votes or less.

17 This excludes the number of votes El-Khatib won among public employees.
Among the candidates on the list in Bint Jbeil, Mohammad Kaddouh won a high share of preferential votes in three cadasters: Debl (146 preferential votes, 18%), Rmaich (243, 12%), and Ain Ebel (109, 10%). Overall, nearly 500 of the 568 preferential votes he won among residents came from these cadasters alone. The second candidate, Hussein Chaer, won over half of his votes from Rmaich—or 573 out of the 973 he received from residents, representing 29% of preferential votes in the cadaster. Chaer also won a high share of preferential votes in Debl (128 preferential votes, 16%), and Sulfantiyet Bint Jbeil (109, 15%).

Finally, in Nabatiyeh, Mustafa Badreddine, who was the most successful on his list, won a high share of votes in Sarba El-Nabatiyeh (214 votes, 39% of preferential votes), as well as Bfaroueh (65 votes, 28%), and Aazzi (65 votes, 17%). He received more votes than all candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list in Bfaroueh, and more votes than the two Amal candidates in Aazzi. Badreddine managed to win over 50 preferential votes in seven cadasters, with the highest being in the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (402 preferential votes, 4% of votes), followed by Sarba El-Nabatiyeh.

Nadim Osseiran, who won 385 preferential votes among residents, won less than 20 votes in all cadasters but five. He was able to obtain between 20 and 50 preferential votes in Kfar Tebnit (50 preferential votes, 2% of votes), Doueir El-Nabatiyeh (36, 1%), Nabatiyeh El-Faouqa (33, 1%), the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (27, 0.3%), and Houmine El-Faouqa (22, 1%). Finally, Hisham Jaber won less than 10 preferential votes in all cadasters but three. The highest share of the 145 preferential votes he won came from the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (51 votes, 0.6% of votes). He also won over 10 votes in Kfour El-Nabatiyeh (17, 2%), and Jarjouaa (17, 1.5%).

Nearly all candidates on the Communist party, LF-backed, and Lebanese Option Party-backed lists received half of their votes from one or two cadasters

The list that came in third was the Communist party one. It was overall more successful in Nabatiyeh, winning a high share of votes in Kfar Roummane (22%), Ansar (14%), Aazzi (10%), and Deir El-Zehrani (10%). The single candidate on the list in Nabatiyeh, Ali Hajj Ali, won his highest share of preferential votes in Kfar Roummane (755 votes, 23%)—performing better than both Amal candidates—followed by Ansar (458 votes, 15%, more than Amal candidate Jaber). Hajj Ali, who won 2,452 preferential votes among residents, therefore received half of these from Kfar Roummane and Ansar alone. Apart from these two cadasters, a high number of his preferential votes were garnered in the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (246 preferential votes, 3%), Deir El-Zehrani (178, 10%), and Kefer Sir (116, 5%).
In Bint Jbeil, the list won its highest share of votes in Aaitaroun (10%), where Ahmad Mrad obtained his best results. Over one-third of Mrad’s total votes came from Aaitaroun (376 vote, out of the 981 preferential votes he received among residents). The second candidate, Abbas Srour, won the highest share of his votes from Aita El-Chaab (64 preferential votes, out of the 144 he won among residents). Hussein Baydoun, the last candidate, received most of his preferential votes from the cadaster of Bint Jbeil: 68 out of the 108 he obtained among residents.

Finally, in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the Communist party list was most successful in Houla (18%), Deir Mimas (11%), and Ibl El-Saqi (9%). Hala Abou Kasm won her highest share of preferential votes in Houla (18%)—ranking second after Ali Fayad. In fact, over one-third of her preferential votes came from this cadaster alone—or 611 out of the 1,532 she won among residents. The Sunni candidate on the list, Said Issa, received over half of his votes from the Sunni cadaster of Kfar Chouba (98 votes, 4%, out of the 175 he received from residents). Finally, the Druze candidate Ghassan Hadife received half of his votes from voters in Aain Qinia (46 votes out of the 94 he won among residents, representing 4% in the cadaster). He also won a share in Chouaya Hasbaya (25 preferential votes, 3%). Both these cadasters are nearly fully Druze, explaining his better performance.

The list formed by independents and the LF received the highest percentage of its votes in Ain Ebel in Bint Jbeil, where 59% of voters cast their vote for Ali Al-Amine. Ain Ebel was the cadaster from where over one-third of Al-Amine’s votes came (624 preferential votes out of 1,536). Al-Amine was also successful in Debl (245 preferential votes, 30%), where he beat all other candidates in the district. He also won a high share of preferential votes in Rmaich (454, 23%). Overall, nearly all preferential votes he received from residents came from these three cadasters.

The same list was also successful in the Marjayoun cadasters of Qlaiaa, Jdeidet Marjayoun, and Boueyda Marjayoun (40%-50%)—all of which are fully, or almost fully, Christian. Overall, all candidates on the list performed better in cadasters that have a higher share of Christian voters registered to vote. Fadi Salameh (LF) won half of the votes in Qlaiaa (659 votes). He was also successful in winning a high number of votes in Jdeidet Marjayoun (799 preferential votes, 43%), Kaoukaba Hasbaya (147, 33%, [where he also performed better than all candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list and FPM-FM-LDP list]), and Deir Mimas (216, 28%). Salameh, who obtained 2,256 preferential votes among residents, therefore won the vast majority of these from voters in these four cadasters.
The list was much less successful in Nabatiyeh. However, voters in the cadaster of Sarba El-Nabatiyeh showed high support for each of the two candidates on the list. Ahmad Ismail, who won 175 preferential votes among residents, received 17% in Sarba El-Nabatiyeh (93 votes); and Rami Ollaik, who won 137 preferential votes among residents, received 14% in the cadaster (74 votes). Both candidates performed better in this cadaster than all candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list.

The final party-affiliated list, formed by the Lebanon Option Party and independent candidates, won 131 votes among residents in Bint Jbeil, and Mohammad Farjallah and Abdallah Salman won 59 preferential votes and 17 preferential votes, respectively, among residents. In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the list received 268 votes among residents. None of the candidates received a high share of their votes from a specific cadaster. The candidates were Abeer Ramadan (88 preferential votes among residents), Minah Saab (57), Adnan Al Khatib (25), Rabah Abi Haidar (six), and Kanj Alameddine (three). Finally, in Nabatiyeh, 228 resident voters cast their ballot for the list, and 163 gave their preferential vote to the single candidate Ahmad Al-Assaad. Al-Assaad also did not receive a high share of his votes from one cadaster, and his supporters were spread across the district.

What are the drivers of votes for each list?

Similar to the section above, the following section includes only the lists formed or backed by political parties. The factors that affected votes for Kulluna Watani are therefore reported in the sixth section of this report.

Across geographical areas, the Hezbollah-Amal list received a significantly higher share of votes in cadasters with higher levels of sectarian homogeneity. The factor that had the biggest effect on votes for the list was poverty rates: Voters registered in cadasters with higher poverty rates were much more likely to vote for the list. This may hint at voter rigging, with the candidates potentially having offered benefits to their constituents in exchange of votes.

Across polling stations, the list performed better in polling stations that had only one sect registered to vote. This is likely due to the fact that the vast majority of homogeneous polling stations were reserved for Shia voters. Controlling for all cadaster characteristics, across confessional groups, Shias were the most likely to vote for the list, while Sunni and Maronite voters were the least likely to do so.
No cadaster-level characteristics seems to have significantly affected voters’ support for the list backed by the FPM, FM, and LDP. Across polling stations, voters in mixed stations tended to vote more for the list compared to voters in homogeneous stations, which could be explained by the fact that the majority of Christian voters in South 3 were registered in mixed stations. Across confessional groups, Sunnis were the most likely to vote for the list, which is likely due to the fact that all Sunnis were registered in the district where the FM candidate ran. Shias were the least likely to vote for the list, partly explained by their large support for Hezbollah-Amal. Other voters stood in between, with no large variations between them, although Greek Catholics were slightly more likely and Greek Orthodox were slightly less likely to vote for the list than others.
The list formed by the Communist party tended to perform better in cadasters with lower poverty rates. A higher concentration of refugees in a cadaster was associated with a higher share of votes for the list. Across polling stations, the list received a slightly higher share of the vote in larger polling stations, as well as mixed stations. By gender, men voters were slightly more likely to vote for the list compared to women, and by sect, Greek Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for the list, while Sunnis were the least likely to do so.

Figure 17  Drivers of votes for the Communist party list in South 3

The list formed by the LF and independents tended to receive a slightly higher share of votes in more heterogeneous cadasters, as well as in mixed polling stations. This may be due to the fact that the most heterogeneous cadasters, as well as the vast majority of mixed stations, tended to have Christian voters registered to vote. The list performed slightly better in cadasters with higher levels of economic development, as well as those with lower poverty rates. A highly significant factor was the concentration of refugees in a cadaster: The higher the ratio of refugees per Lebanese, the lower the percentage of votes for the list—potentially related to the LF’s anti-refugee discourse. By sect, Maronite voters, closely followed by Greek Orthodox voters, were the most likely to vote for the list, while Shia, Sunni, and Druze voters were the least likely to do so.
Not many factors significantly affected votes for the list formed by independents and the Lebanese Option Party, which might be because the list garnered only 659 votes. Only voters’ sect was significant, with Maronite voters being the most likely to vote for the list, and Duze and Sunni voters being the least likely to do so.
**IV Do citizens cast preferential votes for candidates from their same confession?**

In South 3, only voters in Marjayoun-Hasbaya could choose between a candidate from their own confession or a different one. Among those who cast a preferential vote for a candidate within their selected list, 86% chose a co-confessional candidate.

Over 80% of each represented confessional group voted for a co-sectarian candidate in Marjayoun-Hasbaya

The highest confessional bias was observed among Druze and Sunni voters (88%), followed by Shias (85%), and the lowest was among Greek Orthodox (83%).

Maronite voters, who are not represented by a seat, gave the vast majority of their votes to Greek Orthodox candidates (77%). In mixed stations, votes were highly fragmented, with each type of candidate receiving between 20% and 30% of votes. The highest share was cast for Greek Orthodox candidates and the lowest for Sunni candidates. What may explain this is the fact that the majority of voters in mixed stations were Christian.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters’ confession</th>
<th>Candidate’s sect</th>
<th>Shia</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note** Percentages have been rounded up.

Across genders, women voters had a higher confessional bias than men

While 84% of male voters voted for a co-sectarian candidate, 88% of women did so. A higher confessional bias among women existed across all confessional groups, but was more pronounced among Shia, and to some extent Druze voters. While the percentage of votes cast for co-confessional candidates was less than 2% higher among Greek Orthodox and Sunni women compared to men, among Druze women it was 3% higher, and among Shia women it was 6% higher than it was among their male counterparts. Women voters were more likely to cast a ballot for a co-confessional candidate even after controlling for
Sectarian biases were widespread across Marjayoun-Hasbaya, being higher than 70% in all cadasters but three. The only cadasters where less than 70% of voters voted along confessional lines were Majidiyeh Hasbaya, Ain Arab, and Dellafeh. The lowest confessional bias was observed in Majidiyeh Hasbaya (34%), which only had a Sunni polling station with very few voters casting a preferential vote. Among the 61 voters that cast a preferential vote, the majority chose Anwar El-Khalil (Druze, 37 preferential votes), while most of the remaining voted for Imad El-Khatib (Sunni, 21).

Figure 20  Votes for co-sectarian candidates by confessional group and gender in Marjayoun-Hasbaya

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
Among the 318 Sunni voters in Ain Arab who chose a candidate, 65% cast a confessional vote, with a large share going to Shia candidates—mostly Ali Hassan Khalil, who ranked second. The final cadaster where less than 70% of preferential votes went to co-confessional candidates was the Shia cadaster of Dellafeh. Among the 211 Shia voters who voted for a candidate, 69% chose a co-confessional one, and most of their non-confessional votes went to Druze candidate Anwar El-Khalil.

Geographical variations in co-confessional preferences were present within each confessional group

Shia voters gave between 80% and 85% of their preferential votes to Shia candidates in 19 out of the 22 cadasters they had their own polling stations in. Only three cadasters saw less than 80% of Shia voters cast a co-confessional vote. The lowest percentages were in Dellafeh (69%), Houla (72%), and Kfarkela (75%). As mentioned above, a large share of Shias in Dellafeh voted for Druze candidate Anwar El-Khalil (27%). In Houla, most of those who did not cast a confessional vote voted for Greek Orthodox candidate Hala Abou Kasm (Communist party, 18%). In Kfarkela, most of the non-confessional votes were divided between Assaad Hardan (Greek Orthodox, SSNP) and Qassem Hachem (Sunni, Ba’ath Party, 10% each). In general, when Shias had a lower confessional bias, most voted for candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list. Over 95% of Shia voters cast a confessional vote in Bani Haiyyan (99%), Markaba (98%), Saouanet Marjayoun (96%), and Tallouseh (96%). In all of these, nearly all preferential votes went to Ali Fayad (Hezbollah) and Ali Hassan Khalil (Amal).

Among Sunni voters, who had their own polling stations in six cadasters, the lowest percentage was observed in Majidiyeh Hasbaya (34%, as mentioned above), where the majority voted for Anwar El-Khalil (Druze, 61%). Similarly, in Ain Arab, 65% of Sunnis cast a confessional vote with the majority going to Sunni candidate Imad El-Khatib (51%), and Shia candidate Ali Hassan Khalil ranking second (19%). Sunni voters showed their highest confessional bias in Chebaa (94%), where, among the 5,452 Sunni voters who cast a preferential vote, 70% voted for FM candidate Imad El-Khatib and 24% voted for Ba’ath candidate Qassem Hachem.

Among Greek Orthodox voters, who had their own polling stations in five cadasters, the confessional bias was lowest in Khiyam Marjayoun (64%, out of the 88 who cast a preferential vote), mostly divided between Chadi Massaad and Fadi Salameh (28% and 25%). Shia candidate Ali Hassan Khalil received a similar share of their vote (25%). Their confessional bias was highest in Deir Mimas (92%, out of 347 preferential votes), with the votes being fragmented between different Greek Orthodox candidates.
Finally, among Druze voters, who had their own polling stations in nine cadasters, the cadaster that saw the lowest percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates was Meimes (70%, out of 562 preferential votes). Most of these votes went to Anwar El-Khalil (Druze, 65%), while his main Druze competitor, Wissam Charrouf, only received 5% (or 29 preferential votes). The candidate that ranked second among Druze voters in this cadaster was Assaad Hardan (Greek Orthodox, SSNP), who received 16% (or 89 preferential votes). On the other hand, 98% of Druze voters in Chouaya Hasbaya chose a Druze candidate (out of the 652 who cast a preferential vote). The majority voted for Anwar El-Khalil (56%), with the rest choosing Wissam Charrouf (LDP, 39%).

What are the drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates?

Among the factors included in the analysis, only poverty rates in a cadaster and voters’ gender seem to have significantly affected the share of votes given to co-sectarian candidates. Voters in cadasters with higher poverty rates were significantly more likely to vote for a co-sectarian candidate. By gender, as mentioned above, women were significantly more likely to choose a co-sectarian candidate compared to male voters.

Figure 21 Drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Marjayoun-Hasbaya

![Diagram showing drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Marjayoun-Hasbaya]
V  How did women candidates perform?

Only three of the 46 candidates in South 3 were women. One woman ran in Bint Jbeil, and two in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, while none ran in Nabatiyeh.

The woman candidate in Bint Jbeil was Rima Hamid (Kulluna Watani), who obtained less than 1% of preferential votes in the district (471 votes). In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the two women candidates were Hala Abou Kasm (Communist party), who won 2% of preferential votes (1,593 preferential votes), and Abeer Ramadan (independent on the list with the Lebanese Option Party), who won 0.1% (93 votes).

The support received by each woman candidate varied across confessional groups, but all three were more successful among male voters

In Bint Jbeil, Rima Hamid obtained 11% of Greek Catholics’ preferential votes. However, given that only 129 Greek Catholic voters cast a preferential vote, this percentage only accounts for 14 votes. Regarding other groups, 3% of Maronites voted for Hamid (or 107), and 0.5% of Shias did so (representing 259 preferential votes). In mixed stations, 2% (or 48 voters) voted for the candidate. Hamid received a slightly higher number of votes among male voters, with 211 men voting for her, compared to 198 women voters.

Despite her low share of votes in Bint Jbeil, Hamid was more successful than the other candidate on her list, Salah Noureddine (who only received 71 preferential votes). Across cadasters, the highest number of preferential votes Hamid obtained was 92 in Ain Ebel, representing one-fifth of all the votes she won.

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Hala Abou Kasm was one of the very few candidates in the district who won over 1% of preferential votes (2%). She was successful among Greek Orthodox voters (10% of their preferential votes, representing 106 votes). She also won 2% of the Shia vote (1,142 preferential votes), but was much less successful among other confessional groups, with less than 1% of each casting ballots for her. In mixed stations, she received nearly 2% of preferential votes (185).

Across genders, Abou Kasm was significantly more successful among male voters: 805 men voted for her (2.5%), compared to 583 women (1.7%). In mixed stations, 1.6% of voters voted for her (144 preferential votes). Most of the votes obtained by the Communist party list were cast for Abou Kasm. The two other candidates on her list in Marjayoun-Hasbaya received less than 200 votes each, while she won over 1,500.

Across geographical areas, Hala Abou Kasm won her highest share of preferential votes in the cadaster of Houla (611 votes, 18% of preferential votes). The votes she received in Houla represent over one-third of her total votes. In all other cadasters, she won less than 100 preferential votes.
The third woman candidate, Abeer Ramadan, won only 93 votes but performed better than the other candidates in her list in Marjayoun-Hasbaya. Ramadan received nearly all of her votes from Shia voters (68 preferential votes). Across genders, she was again more successful among men voters, and obtained twice as many votes from men than women (53 compared to 25 votes).

What are the drivers of votes for women candidates?
Across cadasters in South 3, voters in more heterogeneous cadasters were more likely to vote for a woman candidate. Cadasters with lower levels of economic development, as well as those with lower poverty rates, tended to see a higher share of preferential votes go to women candidates. By gender, men were significantly more likely to vote for a woman candidate compared to women voters; and by sect, Greek Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for a woman candidate. They were followed by Shia and Sunni voters, then Maronite and Druze voters, while Greek Catholics were the least likely to vote for a woman candidate.

<table>
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<th>Voters' confession</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
VI How did emerging political groups perform?

Kulluna Watani, the coalition between emerging and independent groups, fielded five candidates and received only 1% of votes in South 3 (2,262 votes). The list was more successful among the diaspora, winning 4% of their vote (158 votes).

The list had two candidates in Bint Jbeil: Rima Hamid (471 preferential votes) and Salah Noureddine (71 preferential votes). In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, it also put up two candidates: Fadi Abou Jamra (615 preferential votes, Greek Orthodox) and Akram Qais (166 preferential votes, Druze). In Nabatiyeh, it only had one, Jamil Ballout (680 preferential votes).

Kulluna Watani performed better in more heterogeneous cadasters and those that recorded lower turnout rates

Similar to other lists, there were large geographical variations in the performance of Kulluna Watani across cadasters.

In Bint Jbeil, where Kulluna Watani received 602 votes (0.9%), the list won its highest share of votes (9%) in Ain Ebel—representing over a sixth of the total votes it obtained (104 votes) in the district. The list won less than 1% of votes in all other cadasters but three: Qaouzah (10 votes, 4%), Yaroun (18 votes, 3%), and Rmaich (48 votes, 2%). Similar to other lists, Kulluna Watani won a relatively high number of its votes from voters in the cadaster of Bint Jbeil (57 votes, representing 1% of votes in the cadaster).
In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, Kulluna Watani received 914 votes and was more successful in Hasbaya than Marjayoun (2% of votes, compared to 0.8%). In Hasbaya, the highest share of votes Kulluna Watani won was 22% in Kfair (170 votes, which was as much as the FPM-FM-LDP list), while the list also performed well in Deir Mimas (68 votes, 7%), and Meimes (31 votes, 5%). Overall, in Hasbaya, the majority of votes Kulluna Watani received among residents (425 votes) were cast in Kfair, the cadaster of Hasbaya (103 votes), and Deir Mimas (a total of 341 votes). In Marjayoun, Kulluna Watani received its highest percentage in Ibl El-Saqi (28 votes, 4%), followed by Jdaideh Marjayoun (51 votes, 3%). The list won 424 votes among residents, with a high share coming from voters in Jdaideh Marjayoun (51 votes) and Khiyam Marjayoun (78 votes).

Finally, in Nabatiyeh, Kulluna Watani received 746 votes (0.9%), with the highest share being in the cadasters of Sarba El-Nabatiyeh (24 votes, 4%), Jarjouaa (31 votes, 3%), and Aazzi (12 votes, 3%). The list was highly unsuccessful across Nabatiyeh, winning less than 50 votes in all cadasters but the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (108 votes).

Apart from Kulluna Watani’s results in specific cadasters, some geographical factors appear to have affected the list’s performance. In particular, the percentage of votes received by the list across cadasters tended to decrease as the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster increased. This was statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender, confession, as well as other characteristics of the cadaster, such as level of economic development. This may point toward sectarian parties’ higher capacity and interest in mobilizing voters in more homogeneous areas, or those that have a higher share of their main constituents.

Figure 23 Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and votes for Kulluna Watani in South 3
Moreover, votes for the list also tended to decrease as the turnout in a cadaster increased. This relationship was also statistically significant and highlights Kulluna Watani’s failure to mobilize voters. Such a relationship could also suggest that Kulluna Watani tended to do better among voters who were not specifically targeted and mobilized by the main parties.

Beyond these geographical variations in the list’s performance, the support it received varied across voters’ characteristics.

Kulluna Watani generally received higher support from male voters and Christian communities.

In Bint Jbeil, 272 men voted for Kulluna Watani, compared to 249 women voters, with the list also receiving 24 votes from polling stations that had both genders registered to vote. Across confessional groups, while the percentage of votes received by Kulluna Watani was highest among Greek Catholic voters (12%), these represented a very low number of votes (17 votes) given the low share of Greek Catholic voters in Bint Jbeil. Maronites followed with 4% (130 votes), while Shia voters cast less than 1% of their votes for the list. However, given that Shias constituted most voters in the district, over half of the votes won by Kulluna Watani in Bint Jbeil came from Shia polling stations (338 votes).

Among the candidates on the list, Rima Hamid was more successful than Salah Noureddine among all confessional groups and genders, and received most of the preferential votes cast for her list (87%). Hamid won 11% of the few Greek Catholic voters’ preferential votes (14 preferential votes), 3% among Maronites (107), 0.5% among Shias.
Hamid received a slightly higher number of votes from men voters (211 votes) than she did from women (198 votes).

Across geographical areas, Rima Hamid was most successful in the cadaster of Ain Ebel where she won 8% of preferential votes (92), which represented over one-quarter of the total votes she received from resident voters (428). Most of the remainder of her preferential votes came from the cadaster of Bint Jbeil (44), and the cadasters of Rmaich, Beit Lif (about 30 preferential votes in each), Yaroun, and Debl (about 15 preferential votes in each). Overall, over half of the preferential votes Hamid received among resident voters were cast in these cadasters.

Salah Noureddine also received more support from men (36 preferential votes) than he did from women voters (22). He won less than 1% of every confessional group’s vote, with most of his votes coming from Shia polling stations (49 preferential votes), and only 13 from all others. Noureddine was also unsuccessful in capturing a significant share of votes across the district, winning less than 0.5% of preferential votes in all cadasters.

Table 8 Votes for Kulluna Watani and each candidate by confessional group and gender in Bint Jbeil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters’ confession</th>
<th>Volunteers for Kulluna Watani</th>
<th>Share of votes</th>
<th>Volunteers for Rima Hamid</th>
<th>Share of votes</th>
<th>Volunteers for Salah Noureddine</th>
<th>Share of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voters’ gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed gender</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Percentages have been rounded up.

In Marjayoun-Hasbaya, a similar number of male and women voters cast ballots for Kulluna Watani (325 men and 328 women, 1%), with 196 voters in gender-mixed stations voting for the list (2%). Across confessional groups, support for the list was much higher among Greek Orthodox voters compared to other groups (132 votes, 13%). Less than 1% of each of the other groups voted for the list—the only exception was Druze voters, who gave 3% of their vote to Kulluna Watani (representing 156 votes). Looking at who the main supporters of the list were in the district shows a high level of fragmentation.
across confessional groups. Among the 849 votes the list won among residents, the highest share came from voters in mixed stations (266 votes), followed by Shia stations (221 votes). A significant share also came from Druze (156) and Greek Orthodox stations (132 votes), while a much lower number was cast in Sunni (58) and Maronite stations (16 votes). Beyond these numbers, however, comparing the share of votes obtained by the list from each type of polling station with the total share of votes that came from each type of polling station shows that Kulluna Watani’s main supporters were Greek Orthodox and Druze voters.

Among the candidates on the list, Fadi Abou Jamra was preferred among all confessional groups, and received most of the preferential votes that went to his list in Marjayoun-Hasbaya (79%). While Druze Kulluna Watani voters also mostly voted for Abou Jamra, they were the only ones who gave a significant share of their preferential votes to the other candidate, Akram Qais.

Fadi Abou Jamra won 12% of the Greek Orthodox preferential vote (124), and was also successful among Druze voters, winning slightly over 1% (78). Less than 1% of every other confessional group voted for Abou Jamra. However, in line with the higher number of Shia voters in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, the candidate won a high number of his preferential votes from Shia polling stations (140) and also received support in mixed ones (190). There were no variations in his performance across genders, with 209 men and 205 women, in addition to 159 voters in mixed stations, giving him their preferential votes. Abou Jamra had his own stronghold: He won 20% of preferential votes in Kfair—ranking second in the cadaster after Anwar El-Khalil—from which over one-quarter of his total votes also came (155 of the 573 preferential votes he received from resident voters). He also performed well in Deir Mimas (61 votes, 7%).

Akram Qais received his most significant share of support from Druze voters, his co-confessional voters, winning 64 of their preferential votes (1%), which represents over one-third of the votes he won in total. He won less than 0.2% of every other confessional group’s vote, with the highest number being from Shias (35 preferential votes) and voters in mixed stations (41). His performance did not vary across voters’ gender, with 70 men and 69 women, as well as 13 voters in mixed stations, voting for him. Across the district, over one-third of Qais’s votes came from the cadaster of Hasbaya (56 preferential votes, representing 1%). While he won 3% of preferential votes in El-Meri and Fardis Hasbaya, these combined only translate into 20 votes.
In Nabatiyeh, a higher number of male voters voted for Kulluna Watani: 322 men compared to 295 women, with the list obtaining 74 votes from voters in stations that had both genders registered. Across confessional groups, 4% of Maronite voters voted for the list, which only translated to 20 votes. Most of the votes received by the list therefore came from voters in Shia stations (571 out of the 691 it won among residents).

The only candidate in Nabatiyeh, Jamil Ballout, received 1% of the Shia vote, which represented the vast majority of his total votes, or 532 out of the 632 votes he garnered from residents. Ballout received a slightly higher number of votes from men-only polling stations (301 votes) than he did from women-only ones (268 votes). Across the district of Nabatiyeh, Ballout only won a high number of votes in a few cadasters. Similar to many candidates, one of his highest number of votes came from the cadaster of Nabatiyeh (102 votes, 1%), while he received 50 preferential votes or less in all other cadasters.
What are the drivers of votes for Kulluna Watani?

A number of factors at the polling station and cadaster levels seem to have affected the performance of Kulluna Watani. First, higher turnouts in a polling station were associated with a lower percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani—a relationship that was observed in all three districts, and which may point toward sectarian parties’ more effective mobilization of their constituents. Moreover, Kulluna Watani tended to perform significantly better in more heterogeneous cadasters, a relationship that was also observed in all three districts, and was statistically significant even after controlling for voters’ gender and sect. This could suggest that sectarian parties may be more effective at mobilizing their voters in more homogeneous areas, which have a higher number of their constituents. Across polling stations, voters in mixed polling stations were generally more likely to vote for the list compared to those in homogeneous stations, which, related to the factor above, could suggest that parties have higher interest in targeting polling stations in which their specific constituents are registered to vote.

Kulluna Watani also generally performed better in cadasters with lower poverty rates, which may potentially point toward sectarian parties’ higher mobilization of voters in poorer areas through voter rigging. Other factors that seem to have affected the list’s results are the level of economic development and concentration of refugees, with lower levels of economic development, as well as a lower concentration of refugees in a cadaster being associated with a higher share of votes for Kulluna Watani. By sect, Greek Orthodox, followed by Greek Catholic and Maronite voters, were the most likely to vote for the list, while Shias and Sunnis were the least likely, and Druze voters were only slightly more likely to vote for the list compared to Shias.

### Table 10 Votes for Kulluna Watani and each candidate by confessional group and gender in Nabatiyeh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters’ confession</th>
<th>Voters’ gender</th>
<th>Votes for Kulluna Watani</th>
<th>Votes for Jamil Ballout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voters’ confension</td>
<td>Voters’ gender</td>
<td>Number of votes</td>
<td>Share of votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed confession</td>
<td>Mixed gender</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note Percentages have been rounded up.
Were there any signs of irregularities?

Irregularities can occur during the election process, through ballot stuffing that either increases the total number of votes or adds votes for one party at the expense of another. Fraud can also occur during the vote aggregation process when there is collusion between certain candidates (usually the more connected ones) and election officials. Voter rigging, or pressuring voters to cast ballots in a certain manner, tends to occur more in small polling stations where it is easier to monitor voters’ behavior. Therefore, testing whether turnout was abnormally higher in smaller voting centers can help approximate whether there was a presence of voter rigging or not. Another method for detecting signals of election fraud is to observe the distribution of turnout and vote numbers and test whether they have a ‘normal’ shape. For example, an abnormally high number of voting centers with close to 100% turnout could suggest either voter or vote rigging at any stage of the election process. Other lines of research focus on statistical tests that examine the random nature of numbers to test whether numbers were manipulated in a non-random manner.

There were no irregular patterns in the distribution of turnout by polling station

Turnout usually has a normal shape, with the majority of electoral centers reporting turnouts close to the average and a low number of centers having a very high or very low turnout rate. The average turnout
across the 793 polling stations in South 3 was 48%, ranging from 10% to 78%, with one polling station recording a 100% turnout rate.¹⁸

The distribution of turnouts by polling station in South 3 only slightly diverged from the normal distribution. The number of centers that recorded very low turnouts (below 30%) and those that recorded very high turnouts (over 70%) was only slightly higher than expected, providing no initial evidence of voter or vote rigging.

Some evidence of voter rigging to the benefit of Amal
Voter rigging entails political parties pressuring or coercing voters with the intended aim of affecting turnout. The literature on election irregularities distinguishes vote rigging from voter rigging, as coercion is not apparent in the latter case. However, there are some ways to detect potential instances of voter rigging through statistical tests.
One way to test for voter rigging is to examine the correlation between turnouts and the size of a polling station. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive for politicians buying votes, or exerting some kind of pressure on voters to vote, because smaller groups of voters facilitate aggregate monitoring of whether voters cast their ballots, and for whom. Looking at the difference and variation between turnout rates and the size of polling stations, as well as the relationship between the size of polling stations and votes for a party, can therefore demonstrate whether politicians exerted pressure on voters to influence their voting decisions.

There was no clear relationship between the size of polling stations and turnout rates in South 3. However, one specific party or list could have benefited from smaller stations, which would suggest vote monitoring. Looking at the relationship between polling station size and votes for each party shows that Amal candidates on average received a much higher percentage of votes in smaller polling stations, while this was not the case for any other party. As voter behavior in smaller stations is easier to monitor, given the lower number of voters, this relationship between the size of the polling station and votes for Amal candidates may suggest that they could have exerted pressure on voters in these stations to vote in a certain manner. This relationship to some extent existed in Marjayoun-Hasbaya and Nabatiyeh, but not Bint Jbeil.

Figure 27 Polling station size and percentage of votes for Amal in South 3

Apart from the size of polling stations, a list may have benefited from higher turnouts. A list benefiting from higher turnouts by polling station could be due to more effective mobilization, possibly through voter rigging—as pressure to vote for a given list would increase both turnout and votes for the same list in a polling station. A positive relationship between turnouts and votes for a list could also be due to vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing, as adding ballots for a list would also increase turnout.

Hezbollah and Amal benefited from very high turnouts, suggesting fraudulent behavior

The Hezbollah-Amal list seems to have benefited from higher turnouts, with its average percentage of votes steadily increasing as the turnout by polling station increased—from 50% of votes in polling stations that recorded the lowest turnouts, to nearly 90% of votes in those that saw the highest turnouts (figure 28). These relationships in votes for the list and turnouts by polling station existed in all of Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun-Hasbaya, and Nabatiyeh.

Of note is that the percentage of votes received by all other lists tended to decrease as the turnout by polling station increased.

**Figure 28** Percentage of votes for the Hezbollah and Amal list and turnout rate by polling station in South 3

All polling stations that had the highest turnouts (19 polling stations, with 70% turnout or above) saw an overwhelming majority of votes go to the Hezbollah-Amal list—in most cases (in 15 of these polling stations) over 95% of votes. In none of these high-turnout stations did another list receive over 10 votes (or 2%), except in one where the FPM-FM-LDP list received a high share (40%), and another where the Communist party list won 5%.
Higher turnouts in a polling station associated with an increase in votes for a list could be due to its higher success in mobilizing its specific constituents—in the case of Hezbollah-Amal, Shia voters, who had the highest turnout rates in South 3—and not necessarily through voter rigging. In order to detect whether higher turnouts benefiting Hezbollah-Amal were potentially due to voter or vote rigging, the differences in votes for lists and turnouts among each confession must be taken into account. We account for these differences across confessional groups by creating standardized variables of turnout rates and percentage of votes for each list. For any polling station, the standardized turnout rate would be the turnout rate in the specific polling station minus the average turnout rate of all polling stations in its district with registered voters from the same sect, divided by the variability (standard deviation) of the turnout rates in those centers. This measures how abnormally low or high the turnout in a polling station is compared to all other centers within the same confession. The standardized measures of share of votes for lists and parties follow the same procedure. As previous studies have found, no clear relation should be observed between turnouts and votes for a list or party in ‘clean’ elections.\(^\text{22}\)

Accounting for the differences in votes for each list and turnouts among each confessional group, we observe variations in the percentage of votes obtained by each list between polling stations that had very low (1 standard deviation below the mean), normal, and very high turnouts (1 standard deviation above the mean).

The Hezbollah-Amal list’s share of votes in polling stations that recorded very high turnouts was on average 9% higher than its share in stations with normal turnouts (90% compared to 81%). All other lists performed worse in stations with very high turnouts. Compared to its share of votes in stations that had normal turnouts, the FPM-FM-LDP list’s votes in stations that had very high turnouts was 5% lower (10% compared to 5%), and the LF-independents list’s was 3% lower (3.3% compared to 0.6%). Moreover, the LF-independents list benefited from very low turnouts, with its share of votes being over twice as high in very low turnout stations (7.5%).

All of these variations in the share of votes obtained by lists across turnouts may suggest that candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list pressured their supporters to head to the polls, and could also suggest that candidates on other lists performed better among constituents who were not specifically targeted by Hezbollah and Amal, highlighting other lists’ failure to mobilize constituents. The better performance of candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list could also point toward ballot stuffing, as adding ballots for candidates would also increase turnout.

There are signs of vote rigging on the part of Hezbollah and Amal. Higher turnouts benefiting the Hezbollah-Amal list seem to point toward ballot stuffing.

One way to test for signs of ballot stuffing is to determine how the percentage of null votes in a polling station correlates with the turnout, as well as the percentage of votes that a party or list obtained. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots they tend to forget to include a similar proportion of invalid votes. Potential irregular behaviors can be identified by looking at the correlation between the percentage of null votes, turnouts, and votes for a list or party. A lower percentage of invalid votes in a polling station associated with a higher turnout and a higher percentage of votes for a list or party would suggest manipulations in the vote count. However, a negative correlation is not enough to suggest ballot stuffing, as null votes could be ‘protest’ ones. Stronger evidence of
ballot stuffing would entail an increase in the share of null votes that is smaller than the decrease in the percentage of votes for a list or party.

In South 3, average turnouts tended to be higher in polling stations that counted a lower percentage of null votes, although the variations were not large enough to provide evidence of ballot stuffing. However, when analyzing the relationship in each of the three minor districts, some evidence of ballot stuffing in Bint Jbeil becomes apparent (figure 30). In Bint Jbeil, average turnouts by polling station decreased from 43% in polling stations where 1% of votes or less were null, to 38% in polling stations that recorded the highest share of null votes, or 4%. This means that a 4% increase in the share of null votes was associated with a 5% decrease in turnout by polling station. A significant irregular relationship was not observed in Marjayoun-Hasbaya and Nabatiyeh.

Beyond this relationship between the share of null votes and turnout by polling station, which can provide some initial evidence of ballot stuffing, examining the relationship between votes for a list and the share of null votes could show whether a specific list benefited from ballot stuffing. A higher share of votes for a list associated with a lower share of null votes in a polling station would suggest ballot stuffing to the benefit of that list.

In South 3, there is a clear negative relationship between the votes received by the Hezbollah-Amal list and the share of null votes per polling station (figure 31), while no such relationships were observed in votes for the other lists.

In stations where less than 3% of votes were null, the Hezbollah-
Amal list obtained over 80% of votes, while as the share of null votes increased, the percentage of votes for the list decreased until reaching an average of 65% in polling stations where nearly 7% of votes were null. A 7% increase in the share of null votes was therefore associated with a 15% decrease in votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list, a significant difference which might point at ballot stuffing.

Figure 31  Percentage of null votes and votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list in South 3

The negative relationship between the share of null votes and votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list was present in both Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun-Hasbaya, but not in Nabatiyeh (figure 32). A 5% increase in the share of null votes by polling station in Bint Jbeil was associated with a 15% decrease in votes for the list (from 90% to 75%), and in Marjayoun-Hasbaya, a 7% increase in the share of null votes by polling station was associated with a 20% decrease in the votes obtained by the Hezbollah-Amal list (from 71% to 51%).

Figure 32  Percentage of null votes and votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list in Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun-Hasbaya
Another form of vote rigging would be parties ‘cooking’ the numbers, i.e. parties manipulating the vote count either by adding or subtracting votes for a list, or ‘re-shuffling’ votes within their list from one candidate to another. One way of detecting manipulations in the vote counting process is to look at the distribution of the last digits in votes for a list or party.\(^{25}\) The last-digits test is based on the hypothesis that humans tend to be poor at making up numbers, which would result in an abnormal distribution of numbers at the aggregate level. In ‘clean’ elections, last digits in votes for a party should be uniformly distributed, with an equal chance of every number (from 0 to 9) to appear (10% chance).

Restricting the sample of voting centers where at least 50 valid votes were cast (as a small vote count may lead to an oversample of zeros and ones) shows that, across all polling stations in South 3, the last digits in the number of valid votes did not significantly diverge from a uniform distribution.

However, when looking at the last digits in votes for each list, and separating polling stations in each of the minor districts, votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list diverged from the uniform line in both Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh, which may suggest manipulations in the vote count on their part.

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Figure 33  Distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list compared to a uniform distribution

a  Distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list compared to a uniform distribution in Bint Jbeil

b  Distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for the Hezbollah-Amal list compared to a uniform distribution in Nabatiyeh
Overall, in South 3, there are signs of fraud, and particularly vote rigging, on the part of Hezbollah and Amal

In South 3, there are some signs of vote rigging that benefited candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list.

Normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters to vote or not to vote, votes for a list or party should not significantly vary across turnouts by polling station. A higher share of votes for a list in polling stations that had very high turnouts could suggest pressure to vote for this list. Candidates on the Hezbollah-Amal list performed significantly better in polling stations with very high turnouts, which may point toward voter rigging. The opposite relationship was observed in votes for the FPM-FM-LDP and LF-independents list, which could suggest that candidates on these lists performed better when constituents were not specifically targeted by Hezbollah and Amal, although it may simply be due to their weaker mobilization of voters. Very high turnouts benefiting Hezbollah-Amal could point toward ballot stuffing as well, as adding ballots for a list would also increase turnout in a polling station. In South 3, further methods of testing for irregularities in the elections provide evidence of vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing and manipulations in the vote count.

One way to detect signs of ballot stuffing is to examine the correlation between the percentage of null votes and votes for a list or party in a polling station. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar share of invalid votes. Observing a strong negative relationship between the share of null votes and votes for a list in a polling station would therefore provide some evidence of ballot stuffing. This was observed in the Hezbollah-Amal list’s votes, which significantly decreased as the percentage of null votes increased. The relationship was present in both Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun-Hasbaya, but not in Nabatiyeh, and could suggest ballot stuffing to the list’s benefit in the two former districts.

Another way to test for ballot stuffing, and vote rigging such as vote counting manipulations, is to examine the distribution in the last digits of votes for a list across polling stations, which, in regular elections, should be uniformly distributed. There is evidence that the distribution of the last digits in the number of votes for Hezbollah-Amal in Bint Jbeil and Nabatiyeh was not uniform, which provides some further evidence of ballot stuffing to the benefit of this list.