WHAT’S THE ISSUE AT HAND?

Decentralization has been promoted globally as a potential pathway to democracy, good governance, and local development through the transfer of administrative powers from central to local authorities. The process aims to enhance local governance, broaden public participation, and strengthen accountability—ultimately improving the efficiency of public and private sector services by aligning them with local interests.

Decentralization can take various forms, including administrative, fiscal, regional, political, and service-related, each with its own legal framework. These distinctions are particularly important in Lebanon, where debates often conflate administrative decentralization—focused on devolving service delivery and operational authority to local entities—with political decentralization, which entails shifting decision-making power and political representation to elected local bodies. While administrative decentralization in Lebanon has largely been limited to the municipal level, political decentralization remains a more contentious issue, tied to broader questions of power-sharing and national cohesion.

However, decentralization presents challenges, especially in fragmented societies and weak states, raising concerns about its indirect effects. In Lebanon, administrative decentralization has been debated for decades. The current arrangement is governed by Municipalities Law No. 118 of 1977, after calls for reform began in the 1960s to address regional disparities.

During the civil war years, political decentralization demands were countered by calls for administrative decentralization to prevent division. The 1989 National Accord Document (Taef Agreement), which ended the war, included a commitment to “extensive administrative decentralization.” This referred to the devolution of authority to elected municipal councils and the establishment of decentralized units at the governorate level, with the aim of improving service delivery, enhancing citizen participation, and reducing reliance on central state institutions (Taef Agreement). The provision led to various proposals and draft laws from 1990 onwards, none of which have been adopted (UNDP, 2016).

Proposals for Administrative Decentralization

Between 1995 and 2014, Lebanon saw five proposals for administrative decentralization, each varying in scope and approach. These initiatives emerged in the shadow of the 1989 Taef Accord, which had nominally endorsed expanded administrative decentralization as part of Lebanon’s post-war governance reform.

Yet in practice, early proposals reflected a cautious and often superficial shift. For example, the 1995 proposal by MP Auguste Bakhos focused on forming appointed councils with limited powers, resembling deconcentration rather than true decentralization. A 1999 proposal by Michel Murr aimed to create administrative regions with appointed officials and elected councils, still under the ministry of interior's control. Elias Murr's 2001 proposal sought to broaden municipalities’ mandates, including direct elections for municipal heads and financial independence, marking a modest step towards decentralization.

In 2007, Robert Ghanem’s proposal introduced a 15-member elected caza (district) council composed of municipal heads, mukhtars, and representatives from professional associations and syndicates. These councils were to be granted decision-making and executive powers, along with financial and administrative autonomy—marking a substantive move toward decentralization at the caza level. However, it preserved centralized control at the governorate level, where oversight remained with the governor and the governorate council (Akl, 2017).

The 2014 Sleiman-Baroud draft law stands as Lebanon’s most far-reaching proposal for administrative decentralization to date. It envisioned transforming the district into a decentralized administrative unit with an elected council, administrative and financial independence, and a decentralized fund managed jointly with the central government, replacing the district governors and municipal unions.

The draft law included a 30 percent gender quota and special status for Beirut, moving municipalities from the ministry of interior to a new ministry for local administration. The proposed legislation sparked some political debate at the time, with Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) actively supporting it through a series of roundtables and publications aimed at broadening public and institutional engagement.

The proposal aimed to promote democratic participation, financial independence, and accountability, aligning with the Taef Agreement’s spirit of decentralization and balanced development. It also called for redistributing existing taxes rather than introducing new ones, and included significant electoral reforms, such as forming an independent electoral commission and allowing voting in the place of residency (LCPS Decentralization Portal).

The Sleiman-Baroud draft law was referred to the joint parliamentary commissions, which formed a sub-committee that last convened in October 2019. Since then, Lebanon has faced significant challenges, including widespread social upheaval, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Beirut port explosion, as well as the ongoing economic, political, and security crises, which have hindered policy discussions.

Following the 2022 elections, MPs have called for the draft law to be placed on the agenda, but progress has been stalled due to a combination of procedural backlog and political resistance. Pending issues include revising budget allocations and deciding on voting in the place of residence, leaving the future of administrative decentralization uncertain.

Challenges and Stakes

The level at which decentralization is implemented—municipal, district, or governorate—is not a mere technical detail but a core political fault line. It shapes power distribution, resource control, and institutional accountability. Yet in Lebanon, this question is often obscured by rhetorical appeals to reform, sidestepping the deeper implications for state cohesion and elite interests.

Research conducted by LCPS in 2014 - 2015 revealed that administrative decentralization in Lebanon is clouded by persistent “myths” and misconceptions, a blend of public perceptions and politically instrumentalized narratives. It is often portrayed as a gateway to federalism, division, or even partition, as several political factions have used it rhetorically to counter rivals, framing it less as a path to institutional reform and more as a means of securing confessional autonomy.

As a result, calls for federalism have recently grown, especially among Christians, with the National Liberal Party proposing federalism to replace the current system based on Muslim-Christian parity. This proposal stems from significant polarization and unease among political factions, particularly Christians, due to economic and political crises attributed to Hezbollah's influence over Lebanon's political and military spheres (Abi-Akl, 2024).

Proposals for federalism in Lebanon suggest maintaining a federal state, with control over foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy (Baroud, 2021). This means the main issues driving calls for federalism, such as resource distribution, taxation systems, and decisions about war, might not be solved and could even get worse.

In addition, implementing federalism faces challenges due to Lebanon's diverse society, complicating the drawing of federal boundaries and leading to conflicts between cultural and territorial autonomy. Each federal entity would need its own constitution, resulting in contested cultural affiliations and laws. For example, in regions dominated by Hezbollah, laws may be influenced by sharia, raising concerns for individuals who do not wish to live under such strictures, and further reinforcing Hezbollah’s grip over the Shia community in their strongholds.

Another misconception is that administrative decentralization simply involves granting municipal councils greater independence. However, Lebanon's large number of municipalities (over 1,000 in a country of 10,452 km² and a population of around 6 million) poses significant challenges for operationalizing decentralization. For comparison, Cyprus has 40 municipalities for a surface area of 9,250 km² and a population of 1,260,138.

Consider also that seventy percent of municipalities in Lebanon have fewer than 4,000 registered voters and councils of 9 to 12 members, often dominated by competing traditional families. This results in a micro power-sharing system that frequently hampers effective service delivery (LCPS Decentralization Portal), with the majority of municipalities struggling with limited financial resources, insufficient staff, and inadequate infrastructure. In fact, 86% of municipalities have fewer than six employees, with around 40% operating with only one employee, and 75% lacking the financial means to hire new staff (LCPS, 2015).

More recently, a 2025 study by Information International revealed that over half of Lebanon’s municipalities receive less than 250 million Lebanese pounds annually from the Independent Municipal Fund—equivalent to roughly $2,800 in 2022. This level of funding is insufficient to meet even the most basic service delivery needs, particularly in smaller or rural municipalities. Moreover, the fact that municipalities receive less than 6% of central government expenditures, coupled with decentralization rhetoric that often overlooks the financing dimension, highlights a critical gap.

Such disparities expose deep structural weaknesses in Lebanon’s municipal finance system and underscore the urgent need for reform to ensure more equitable and sustainable local governance. The ongoing economic and political crises have further strained the ability of local governments to function independently. While decentralization is often promoted as a pathway to empower municipalities, the reality is that many lack the institutional and financial capacity to assume greater responsibilities.

It follows that decentralization without adequate financing, governance, and structural reform risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative and is most probably destined to fail. Municipalities cannot absorb new responsibilities without the fiscal and institutional capacity to carry them out.

Merging municipalities could be a potential solution to address these issues. However, such a step is expected to be challenging, if possible at all, due to local and family-based politics, which are often associated with patronage and clientelistic practices between ruling political elites and their constituencies at the local level. These dynamics complicate efforts to merge municipalities, as local power structures are deeply entrenched.

While some actors have begun discussing the idea of merging municipalities (DRI, 2020), this discourse has not yet taken shape at the political level. The concept remains largely theoretical, with significant resistance expected from those who benefit from the current system. For merging municipalities to be successful, it would require overcoming substantial political and social barriers, as well as ensuring that the merged entities have the necessary resources and governance structures to function effectively.

WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Decentralization, when well designed and adequately resourced, can strengthen governance by making local authorities more responsive, equitable, and accountable. It enables municipalities to better address community needs, promote economic development, and ensure marginalized areas receive attention.

In post-conflict contexts like South Africa and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has helped reduce political tensions by redistributing power and fostering inclusive participation. Yet as Faguet, Fox, and Poeschl (2015) argue, its success in developing countries depends less on institutional design and more on the broader political economy—particularly the capacity of local actors to navigate power asymmetries and deliver public goods.

In Lebanon, administrative decentralization cannot be meaningfully pursued without confronting its confessional undercurrents and the political instrumentalization of reform. Though often framed as a modernizing tool, it is widely perceived—especially among political elites and segments of the public—as a veiled move toward federalism or communal separation. This fear is rooted in Lebanon’s sectarian architecture, where decentralization is seen not as a mechanism for inclusion, but as a threat to national cohesion and central authority (Akl, 2017). Political elites rarely view it as a state-building strategy; instead, they deploy it to reinforce patronage networks and maintain confessional leverage.

Effective decentralization in Lebanon requires more than technical design—it demands a strong and accountable central state, political consensus on its purpose, and modernized local institutions. This includes reforming outdated municipal frameworks, ensuring equitable fiscal transfers, and building the capacity of local actors to deliver services and engage communities. Without these foundations, decentralization risks becoming a symbolic gesture that shifts responsibilities without the means to fulfill them, deepening inequalities and reinforcing sectarian patronage.

More crucially, decentralization must not be treated as a substitute for central authority. In Lebanon’s current context of institutional fragility and elite entrenchment, framing decentralization as a workaround to state weakness is not only misguided—it is dangerous. When pursued without a functioning central government, it risks accelerating fragmentation, entrenching clientelism, and eroding what remains of public trust. As Carrascal, 2020 emphasizes, decentralization is a complement to central authority—not a replacement.

In conclusion, while decentralization holds the potential to reshape state dynamics, its success hinges on the intentions and actions of political actors. In Lebanon’s current context, it must not be treated as a neutral or technical fix. It is a deeply political project with far-reaching consequences. Without robust safeguards and genuine accountability, decentralization risks reinforcing patronage networks, deepening fragmentation, and accelerating institutional erosion. Hence, it must be approached not just with reflection, but with deliberate restraint.

References

Ziyad Baroud, Decentralization in Lebanon is not neutral | Middle East Institute (mei.edu), April 5, 2021

The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies LCPS, About Administration Decentralization in Lebanon, 2015, https://api.lcps-lebanon.org/content/uploads/files//1573808844-lcps_book-facing_pages-english-2015-03-27.pdf

Michel Akl, Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Democratic Renewal Movement, December 2017, محضر الاجتماع العادي رقم (19/09) بتاريخ 27 تموز 2009 (مسودة) (kas.de)

Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, The Federal Question in Lebanon: Myths and Illusions, 50 Shades of Federalism, 2021, https://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/the-federal-question-in-lebanon-myths-and-illusions/

Mona Harb and Sami Atallah (Ed.), Local Governments and Public Goods: Assessing Decentralization in the Arab World – Lebanon Chapter, https://api.lcps-lebanon.org/content/uploads/files/decentralisation.pdf

Towards Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon, LCPS Decentralization Portal, http://www.lcps-decentralization.com/facts.aspx?id=2

Public Debate Project on Decentralized Administrative Reform in Lebanon, Final Report, Public Policy Dialogue Series # 4, Lebanon, Common Space Initiative, UNDP, 2016, https://shorturl.at/Z1IMu

Ghadir El Alayli, Modest Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon and Its Expansion Plans, JCL MENA, issue 01, December 2020, https://shorturl.at/V6brO

Thomas W. Haase, Mona Harb, & Sami Atallah, Decentralization in Lebanon. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_2423

Yara Abi-Akl, Le PNL propose un projet de fédéralisme, «une solution et non un danger», L’Orient-Le Jour, 14 June 2024, https://shorturl.at/UX30v

Jean-Paul Faguet, Ashley M. Fox and Caroline Poeschl Does decentralization strengthen or weaken the state? Authority and social learning in a supple state. Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, January 2015, https://shorturl.at/8yBtL

Restructuring Subnational Governance in Lebanon: Towards Efficient Public Spending and Reduced Regional Inequalities, Democracy Reporting International, November 2020, https://shorturl.at/K8BvO

Isabel Henzler Carrascal, Decentralising Lebanon - Utopia or a feasible next step, The Lebanon Papers, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 10. 2020, the-lebanon-papers-2-decentralisation.pdf (freiheit.org)