-
Social IssuesOct 15, 2025
Lebanon’s Collapse: Migration and the Path to Recovery
- Christelle Barakat
Migration is not a new phenomenon in Lebanon’s history; it has existed for centuries, yet the compounded economic and political crises since 2019 have led to its intensification. Six years since the beginning of the economic collapse, the catastrophic Port of Beirut explosion, the COVID-19 pandemic, internal political divisions, and the intensified tensions on the southern border, Lebanon remains in a state of crisis.
Today, the state’s failure can no longer be ignored. Without immediate and meaningful reforms, the country risks serious decline, leaving behind a lost generation. Nowhere is that failure and deficit of trust in the Lebanese state and the social contract more evident than with the intensifying trend of migration out of Lebanon. The sheer scale and intensity of the recent war and the protracted state of Lebanon’s enduring crisis risk cementing this trend of migration, further catalyzing a cycle of demographic, economic, social, and political turmoil.
If Lebanon is to emerge out of these successive calamities and reverse migratory trends, it cannot afford to continue ignoring its responsibilities to decisively put in place the urgent reforms needed to unlock international aid and assistance and restore the trust of its people. With the election of a president, appointment of a prime minister, and the formation of a government, after more than two years of paralysis and impasse, Lebanon has taken its first critical step forward.
To help put Lebanon firmly back on its feet, Lebanon’s new leadership and government must adopt an agenda that prioritizes accountability, sustainable recovery, and people-centric reconstruction. As Lebanon’s new government prepares to launch reconstruction operations after the recent war, reform its crisis-hit economy, and address the declining quality of life, it must be guided by one underlying question: How can the Lebanese state rebuild the social contract?
A Failing State in Need of Reforms
The 2019 crisis highlighted the need for urgent political, economic, financial, infrastructural, and institutional reforms. Yet, to date, the majority of these reforms remain aspirations, rather than realities. The escalation of tensions on Lebanon’s borders has further added to the country’s precariousness. These tensions continue to shake Lebanon’s stability, delay reforms, and push Lebanese people to consider migrating.
As reflected in a 2022 LCPS survey and subsequent key informant interviews conducted in 2023 and 2024, Lebanese individuals wanting to emigrate attribute this to political and economic reasons. In today’s context, security reasons are also pushing many to initiate migration.
On the political level, it is important to restore people’s trust in their country’s leadership. This can be achieved through strengthening the rule of law, including the independence of the judiciary, and enforcing pre-existing transparency and anti-corruption laws and mechanisms. It also encompasses electoral reforms and increased implementation of decentralization through the empowerment of municipalities.
On the economic and financial levels, the banking sector is in dire need of restructuring to address the financial collapse and protect depositors. Fiscal and monetary reforms would help to counter the depreciation of the Lebanese pound and the mismanagement of public finances, while allowing for the rerouting of adequate funds to much-needed public services.
These reforms would also aid in stabilizing inflation, rebuilding trust in the Central Bank and formal financial institutions and boosting economic growth. This is particularly important because international aid is a temporary solution, whereas economic reforms and good governance build long-term stability.
On the infrastructural and institutional levels, there have been ongoing calls to reform the power sector, public transportation, education, healthcare, and water and waste management. Advocacy has also centered on civil rights, strengthening protection for women and children, and anti-corruption measures.
The Decision to Leave vs. the Decision to Return
The decision to leave Lebanon is deeply personal and familial, but collectively reflects a failing state. Whether driven by the economic collapse, political environment, or security considerations, this mass migration signals a profound breakdown in the Lebanese social contract.
A year-long study by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, drawing insights from civil society leaders, academics, and local experts, underscores this alarming trend and the complex relationship between Lebanon’s worsening socio-political crisis and the rising rates of mass migration. The study offered expert perspectives on the significant impact of irregular migration, particularly on children and vulnerable households.
Migration, formal and informal, has now become a survival strategy, a direct response to the dire security situation, crippling economic crisis, and the failure of Lebanon’s institutions to provide basic human security. As Eugene Sensenig, the Director of the Lebanese Emigration Research Center at Notre Dame University (NDU), stated: “The proverbial ‘push-factors’ have always been stronger than the ‘pull factors.’ Deeper systemic changes are absolutely necessary.” In other words, the reasons forcing Lebanese individuals to migrate have always been stronger than the reasons encouraging them to stay in Lebanon.
As the quality of life in Lebanon worsens, with basic necessities already scarce and growing further out of reach, migration will continue to embody a final way out for many desperate citizens. Between 2019 and 2022, irregular migration out of Lebanon surged dramatically.
According to Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss, Senior Research Fellow with the Institute for Migration Studies at the Lebanese American University (LAU): “2024 saw a dramatic increase in the number of Lebanese citizens who attempted irregular migration, adding to the numbers of non-Lebanese using the country as a transit space to access Europe and other regions. However, irregular migration has been increasing since at least 2019, with successive security and economic crises and the ongoing war in Syria. Also, changing attitudes toward migrants in Europe have pushed the most vulnerable to seek irregular routes to migrate.”
The crisis of informal migration disproportionately affects the most vulnerable, particularly women and children, who face significant risks in their journeys. On the one hand, women and children caught in the middle of irregular migration are at high risk of being abused, exploited, and trafficked. Children are also at risk of child labor in their host countries. On the other hand, migration, whether regular or irregular, disrupts children’s education, either temporarily or permanently. Reasons for this include the need to prioritize work and survival over education, as well as the inaccessibility of schools or their unaffordability in host countries.
From a mental health perspective, the instability created by migration can have long-term mental health impacts on children. Children may suffer from trauma either due to the migration journey or their inability to adjust to life in destination countries. Children who stay behind in Lebanon could also suffer from trauma linked to the breakdown of family structures and being separated from one of their parents.
In addition, the absence of effective governance has been marked by lawlessness, violence, and abuse, facilitating irregular migration. Families, already burdened with poverty and vulnerability, are forced to sell their assets and incur crippling debt to pay smugglers for a chance at a better life abroad. Unfortunately, the outcome is never guaranteed, and if migrants are detained in the destination country and deported, families become even worse off.
In areas like Tripoli, Akkar, and the Bekaa, where economic despair is more pronounced, irregular migration has come to embody Lebanon’s systemic failures. Without decisive reforms, those who left will face difficult decisions about whether they can ever return. With remittances increasingly becoming a lifeline for those most vulnerable, the decision to leave and return is also one about whether the country can provide the conditions for ordinary people to provide for themselves and their families. Yet, migration out of the country, though a personal and familial decision, is not a sustainable coping mechanism for a war-battered and crisis-hit country.
Lebanese Need a State They Can Trust
The mass migration the country is suffering from—whether through legal channels or informal routes—is the clearest evidence of Lebanon’s failure to meet its most basic responsibilities to its citizens. It also indirectly highlights the country’s lack of commitment to reforms and rebuilding people’s trust in it.
In other words, Lebanon’s future hinges on critical reforms that break the perpetual cycle of state failure, negligence, and corruption. These reforms would help usher in transparency, accountability, recovery, and reconstruction. Ultimately, they would boost economic growth as well as decrease migration and attempt to reverse it.
Overall, a reform-driven state, one that restores the integrity of its public institutions and holds itself accountable to its citizens, is the only way forward for Lebanon to rebuild the trust of its people.
References
Arab Barometer. Lebanon Migration Insights: 2024 Public Opinion Factsheet. August 2024. https://www.arabbarometer.org/2024/08/lebanon-migration-insights-2024- public-opinion-factsheet/.
Barakat, Christelle. The Fragmented Future: Lebanon’s Lost Generation Amid Crisis and Migration. Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, August 5, 2025.
https://www.lcps-lebanon.org/en/articles/details/4960/the-fragmented-future-lebanon%E2%80%99s-lost-generation-amid-crisis-and-migrationDiab, Jasmin Lilian and Ibrahim Jouhari. Conflict, Crisis, and Migration: Maritime Irregular Migration from Lebanon Since 2019. Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, 2023. https://www.freiheit.org/publikation/conflict-crisis-and-migration.
Haddad, Yara, Diana Matar, Nouha Abardazzou, Malek Ben Adallah, and Bashir Choucair. ‘Wave after Wave: The Lebanese Brain Drain.’ American University of Beirut Data Visualization, November 29, 2022.
https://sites.aub.edu.lb/datavisualization/2022/11/29/wave-after-wave-the-lebanese-brain-drain/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Lebanon. Building Resilience in a Protected Crisis: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities for the Youth of Lebanon. September 2023. https://www.undp.org/lebanon/publications/building-resilience-protracted-crisis-transforming-challenges-opportunities-youth-lebanon.
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Middle East and North Africa. Shattered Childhoods: The Catastrophic Toll of War on Children in Lebanon. February 2025.
https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/shattered-childhoodsChristelle Barakat is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. She is a recent Lebanese Fulbright Foreign Student program graduate from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, holding an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies with a concentration on International Peace Development. She completed her BA in Political Science and International Affairs with high distinction from the Lebanese American University. Her areas of interest include conflict analysis and resolution, disarmament, globalization, migration and refugee studies, and women and gender studies.