Introduction

The renewed Israeli aggression in Lebanon in March-April 2026 has once again brought the country into acute crisis, with 2,586 killed and 8,020 injured (between 2 March and 30 April), widespread destruction, and the forced displacement of an estimated 1.2 million people. Beyond its immediate impact, this moment raises a critical question: What conditions and vulnerabilities were already shaping people’s lives before this latest escalation—and what they imply for responses today?

Between January and February 2026, just weeks before the escalation, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) conducted a nationwide survey and a series of focus group discussions to capture citizen perceptions, experiences, and priorities amid the ongoing economic collapse and protracted conflict. This article draws on these findings as an early snapshot ahead of a forthcoming, more detailed report.

The results point to a society already under sustained pressure. Economic hardship was widespread, insecurity had become a defining feature of daily life, and trust in public institutions remained limited. At the same time, the findings reveal important variations in how these pressures were experienced across regions and groups, as well as in how people adapted and what they expected from the state.

As Lebanon enters a new phase marked by renewed aggression and continued uncertainty, including a fragile ceasefire in place since April 2026, these pre-escalation findings are essential for understanding how current developments are intersecting with existing vulnerabilities, and what they reveal about the challenges facing response and recovery efforts.

A Fragile Baseline

Lebanon entered the March 2026 escalation from a position of deep and protracted fragility. Long before the latest round of violence, the country had been shaped by overlapping crises, including economic collapse, the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of the Beirut Port explosion, weakened public services, political paralysis, and recurring conflict, including along its southern border since October 2023. Over time, these crises have eroded state capacity, public trust, and household resilience.

The November 2024 ceasefire offered only a narrow and uncertain opening for stabilization. While political developments—including the election of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of a new government led by Nawaf Salam—raised expectations for recovery, these remained constrained by continued insecurity, ongoing Israeli violations, delayed reforms, a severely weakened economy, and persistent political polarization. Public institutions continued to struggle to provide basic services, while recovery and reconstruction efforts were limited by both domestic political fragmentation and external conditionality.

By early 2026, when this research was conducted, these pressures were already firmly in place. Economic hardship, insecurity, and low confidence in state institutions were shaping how people experienced their lives and anticipated their future. In this sense, the March 2026 escalation did not mark a rupture, but an intensification of an already strained reality.

This baseline is critical for understanding the current phase. The effects of renewed violence are unfolding in a context where vulnerabilities were already entrenched, and where the capacity of both households and institutions to absorb further shocks had already been significantly weakened.

Living under Pressure: Economic Strain and Insecurity

By early 2026, many Lebanese households were already living under sustained economic pressure. The latest escalation did not trigger a new crisis as much as deepen an existing one. For most, the war was not experienced as a standalone shock, but as another layer in a prolonged period of decline that began with the 2019 financial collapse. Rising living costs, declining incomes, and stalled economic activity had already reshaped daily life across the country.

Survey findings reflect the scale of this strain. Respondents most frequently identified the rising cost of living as the most significant impact on their households, followed by reduced income and declining business activity. While these pressures were widespread across regions, their intensity varied. In areas directly affected by war and displacement, households faced additional burdens, including the cost of displacement, damage to housing, and rising rents. Elsewhere, economic hardship was more closely linked to reduced purchasing power and shrinking economic opportunities. Qualitative insights reinforce these trends. As one respondent from the Bekaa explained: “There is no purchasing activity, no new activity (…) there is nothing encouraging at all.”

In response, households have increasingly relied on coping strategies centered on austerity measures—cutting back on essential expenditures, reducing social and leisure activities, and in some cases,  drawing on savings, remittances, or debt to meet basic needs. As one respondent from Baalbek-Hermel noted: “We sold gold, we lost our savings, moved our kids to public schools, we buy only the necessary (…) we are in debt.”

While these measures have allowed families to adapt in the short term, they also point to a steady erosion of resources and a diminishing capacity to absorb further shocks. For many households, the crisis is no longer about coping, but about survival.

These economic pressures are compounded by a pervasive sense of insecurity, reinforcing one another in ways that shape how households experience and respond to the crisis. Even before the renewed escalation in March-April 2026, the November 2024 ceasefire had done little to restore a sense of stability. Continued occupation and military activity—including targeted strikes and repeated violations of Lebanese airspace—alongside the threat of renewed escalation, meant that many citizens did not experience a meaningful return to normalcy.

This is reflected in perceptions of safety. By January 2026, nearly half of respondents reported feeling less safe since the onset of the October 2023 war. Importantly, insecurity was not confined to areas directly exposed to military attacks. Across the country, the constant sounds of jets or drones, the unpredictability of sudden escalation, and reports of nearby strikes contributed to a broader climate of fear and uncertainty. As one respondent from Nabatieh explained: “You never know when they will strike. You might be walking and someone behind you is targeted—how can you feel safe then?”

At the same time, insecurity was experienced differently across regions. Economic insecurity emerged as the most widely shared concern nationwide. However, in conflict-affected areas, such as the South, Nabatieh, and Baalbek–Hermel, concerns centered more directly on external military attacks and exposure to shelling.

While such concerns were also present elsewhere, insecurity in other regions was more often associated with internal tensions, theft and criminal activity, often linked, among other factors, to weak law enforcement. The spread of unregulated weapons further heightened perceptions of risk, reinforcing a sense that protection could not be reliably ensured through formal institutions. As one participant from Tyre noted, “If I have a dispute with you in the street, I no longer resort to the law to settle it. Weapons settle it.”

Faced with these overlapping pressures, individuals and households have adapted their behavior to reduce exposure to risk—limiting movement, avoiding certain areas or forms of transport, and relying more heavily on personal networks for safety and support. These strategies reflect a broader shift away from institutional reliance toward individualized and informal mechanisms of protection. Women and girls, in particular, described how insecurity has affected their sense of safety, mobility, and life choices, with these effects especially acute in contexts of displacement.

Taken together, these dynamics point to a deeply layered crisis in which economic hardship and insecurity are not separate challenges, but mutually reinforcing conditions. Households are navigating a context where both livelihoods and safety are increasingly uncertain, and where the burden of managing crisis has largely shifted away from institutions and onto individuals.

Trust, Governance, and the Limits of State Response

Alongside economic strain and insecurity, the crisis has been marked by persistently low levels of trust in state institutions and limited confidence in their ability to respond effectively. By early 2026, dissatisfaction with government performance was widespread, with nearly two-thirds of respondents expressing negative views. These perceptions were largely shaped by everyday realities, including access to basic services, the pace of recovery efforts, and the absence of visible improvements in living conditions.

This reflects a deeper and longer-standing erosion of the relationship between citizens and the state. Across focus group discussions, public institutions were frequently described as absent or ineffective, with policies perceived as disconnected from people’s lived realities. In areas directly affected by conflict, frustration was particularly pronounced, especially in relation to delays in reconstruction, limited support for displaced populations, and the lack of visible state engagement in addressing economic pressures.

At the same time, trust in state actors is not uniform. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) continued to command relatively high levels of confidence, reflecting its perceived role as a national and stabilizing institution. This contrasts sharply with low levels of trust in the government. Beyond formal institutions, however, many households relied on alternative actors to meet immediate needs.  In early 2026, a large majority reported receiving no support, and among those who did, assistance was more likely to come from political parties, diaspora networks, or other non-state actors than from the state.

This points to the following dynamic: While the state is widely seen as responsible for recovery and reconstruction, it is not perceived as the primary provider of support in practice. Instead, assistance is experienced as fragmented and uneven, reinforcing disparities in access and deepening reliance on non-state structures.

These patterns raise important questions about the role and visibility of the state in the present context. Even as response efforts evolve, pre-existing gaps in trust, delivery, and coordination remain central to how citizens experience support. The challenge is not only one of capacity, but of credibility—whether institutions are seen as able and willing to respond in ways that are consistent, equitable, and visible in people’s daily lives.

Social Strain and Uncertain Futures

Beyond material hardship and insecurity, the crisis has also had profound social and psychological effects. By early 2026, a pervasive sense of distress had already taken hold across Lebanese society, reflecting both the cumulative impact of prolonged crises and the anticipation of further instability. A large majority of respondents reported that the conflict had affected their psychological well-being or that of their families, pointing to the depth and scale of these pressures.

Negative emotions were widespread, with respondents most frequently reporting feelings of despair, frustration, and fear. Focus group discussions echoed these findings, with participants describing a constant state of anxiety, uncertainty, and heightened alertness. Even in areas less directly exposed to violence, this sense of unease remained strong, shaped by the broader national context of instability and the unpredictability of developments. As a youth respondent from Mount Lebanon explained: “My heart is always racing (…) there is constant anxiety.”

At the same time, access to psychosocial support remained extremely limited. Only a very small proportion of respondents reported seeking professional assistance, with cost, limited availability, and stigma acting as major barriers. In the absence of formal support, many relied on informal coping mechanisms, including family networks, emotional suppression, or behavioral adjustments to manage ongoing stress.

These pressures have also shaped social dynamics in more complex ways. While moments of solidarity emerged during periods of displacement, social cohesion remained fragile and uneven. A notable share of respondents reported that cohesion had weakened following the November 2024 ceasefire. Qualitative insights also reflected this ambivalence: while some participants described strong community support, others questioned its depth, suggesting that expressions of unity were sometimes more visible on the surface than in practice.

This sense of strain extends to how people view their future in Lebanon. By early 2026, levels of optimism regarding reform and recovery were already limited, with more respondents expressing pessimism than hope. At the same time, emigration has become a central consideration for many households, reflecting not only individual decisions but broader perceptions of constrained opportunities and uncertainty.

Economic pressures remain the primary driver of emigration considerations, but security concerns are also salient.  These dynamics are especially pronounced among younger respondents, who described a growing sense of blocked prospects and difficulty planning for the future. As one respondent from Dahiyeh noted: “Young people’s futures were affected (…) their path was blocked. I am one of those people.” In this context, leaving the country is not only perceived as an opportunity, but increasingly as a necessary coping strategy for survival in the face of severely constrained options.

These dynamics point to a society under sustained psychological and social strain, where uncertainty extends well into expectations about the future. The cumulative effects of economic hardship, insecurity, and limited institutional support are shaping not only how people cope today, but how they imagine their place in the country moving forward.

Conclusion

The findings presented here capture Lebanon at a critical moment—on the eve of renewed Israeli aggression in March-April 2026. They point to a society already under significant pressure, where economic hardship, insecurity and limited trust in institutions had become embedded features of daily life. These dynamics emerged as a result of overlapping and prolonged crises that have steadily weakened both household resilience and state capacity.

In this context, the latest escalation is better understood as an intensification rather than a rupture. Its effects are unfolding within a landscape where vulnerabilities were already deeply entrenched and the capacity to absorb further shocks had already been significantly eroded.

Across sectors, a common pattern emerges: the burden of navigating crisis has increasingly shifted onto individuals and communities. Households are managing declining livelihoods and insecurity through personal coping strategies, while support systems remain fragmented and uneven. At the same time, expectations of the state remain high, even as confidence in its ability to deliver remains limited.

These dynamics highlight a central tension shaping the current phase: a gap between responsibility and delivery, expectation and experience. How this gap evolves is likely to shape not only the immediate trajectory of response efforts, but also broader prospects for stability, recovery, and public trust.

As Lebanon moves forward under conditions of continued uncertainty, including a new fragile ceasefire, these pre-escalation insights offer a critical lens for understanding the pressures now unfolding—and the constraints within which responses are being shaped.